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Sustainable Development

Monterrey (Mexico), September 26, 2024

Dear Colleagues [1],

First of all, I would like to say how pleased I am to be able to share a few moments with you. Of course, this does not make up for my regret that I cannot be in Monterrey. This is due to the narrow-mindedness of the US Administration, which cannot imagine anyone else going to Iraq.

In my presentation, I would like to focus my remarks on two points. The first, very briefly, is to tell you that while the Brussels Area Node is pursuing a wide range of activities in the field of foresight, particularly with its European partners, including the European Commission, it is also open to new initiatives.

 

1. A wide range of foresight activities

Six main developments can be briefly mentioned:

1.1. The continuation of our activities at regional, federal, interregional and European levels, particularly during the first half of 2024 as part of the Belgian Presidency of the European Union (foresight work on the European Territorial Agenda and anticipating the effects of climate change on spatial planning, etc.).

1.2. Participation with the European Commission’s DG RTD on innovation foresight in the framework of Horizon Europe. Report:

Citizens’ engagement approaches and methods in R&I foresight

1.3. Investment in global issues in partnership with the Millennium Project: Human Security for All, Establishing the common good by arming wisdom, WAAS Conference, May 2024.

1.4. Continuation of work at Wallonia level, particularly a wide-ranging foresight mission for the Government of Wallonia, with the Foresight College to prepare policy recommendations for 2024 (for a new government in July) and 2029, based on a 2050 foresight horizon. This College is made up of about twenty young people under the age of 35, mostly women. 24 recommendations were made to the government and the main social players – including the political parties – in Wallonia on subjects as diverse as preserving biodiversity, developing a more sustainable agricultural market, mapping infrastructure, social cohesion in regional planning, supporting housing renovation policies, providing educational information on public budgets, anticipating changes at local level, developing medical centres, school nutrition programmes, sharing the burden of contraception, etc.

1.5. Strong involvement in education and training in foresight at the universities of Reims (Foresight course applied to the environment and ecological transition in a new master in Sustainability Science) and Paris-Diderot / Cité (Foresight methods in Master 2) and different seminars about biodiversity, mobility and the future of religions).

The Destree Institute continues to organize its Executive Certificate in Operational Foresight: 100-hour course spread throughout the year, 4 hours every Monday afternoon with a dozen high-level speakers.

1.6. The Millennia2025 Women and Innovation Foundation continues its work to empower women and promote equality. Building on its international foresight research process, it is working to translate its six strategic axes into concrete actions.

https://www.millennia2025-foundation.org/processus_prospective.html

The inauguration of the meeting room named after Ted Gordon at The Destree Institute on the 28th of May 2024 [2] was an opportunity to welcome Nikos Kastrinos, former Foresight Leader at the EC’s DG Research, to our own planning committee. He sits alongside Marie-Anne Delahaut, President of Millennia2025 Women and Innovation Foundation – who has been active in the MP for years -, Thomas Deridder, the new CEO of The Destree Institute, as well Giovanna Sacco and Frédéric Moray, the initiators of the Open Changin’ School project.

2. The Open Changin’ School project

This new project is the second element I would like to talk about. It is supported by the Brussels Area Node of the Millennium Project and currently brings together in a fruitful exchange the Liège University College (HELMo) and the State University of Liège, the King Baudouin Foundation and The Destree Institute. This project is, by definition, open to other partnerships and I would like to invite all the nodes to participate. Our contacts with the team in charge go back to 2018 and the keynote speech I had the opportunity to give at the beginning of the academic year at this University College on « Jobs of Tomorrow ». I presented our MP work and scenarios on Future Work/Technology 2050.

This project, called Open Changin’ School, aims to help current educational models evolve in the face of the many challenges of the future by showcasing, through film, the innovative educational initiatives that are emerging around the world [3]. As Giovanna Sacco explained, for each target school, the documentary will address themes such as the school’s culture and vision of learning, the content and curricula, the skills developed, the organization of the school, the methods used, the points of view of the children, parents and teachers, and the challenges to be met. These subjects will be covered using an immersive and authentic approach, with interviews with key players in the education community, extracts from original interviews and video illustrations explaining the answers to the documentary’s ‘key’ questions. The team, consisting of an education specialist and a filmmaker, will be supported by a scientific advisory board. Of course, this can only be done effectively by building partnerships between our different countries to identify the places and processes of educational innovation that anticipate and address our 15 global challenges.

Examples of inspiring schools have already been identified: in Denmark, the United States, Uruguay, Canada, Norway and so on. But this work needs to be continued and represents a real opportunity to analyse and understand experiences. We will promote them among ourselves and try to make them inspiring objects for adapting our education systems to the changes we want to see in tomorrow’s world.

That’s why I’m listening carefully to what you have to say and I’m counting on your commitment to this project, which is so necessary for the future generations.

 

Philippe Destatte

PhD2050

 

[1]  This paper is the finalized version of my presentation to the Planning Committee of the Millennium Project, held in Monterrey, Mexico, on 26 and 27 September 2024, as chair of the Brussels’ Area Node of the Millennium Project.

[2] Ph. DESTATTE, Tribute to Ted J. Gordon (1930-2024), Brussels, May 29, 2024, https://phd2050.org/2024/05/29/ted/

[3] Giovanna SACCO & Frédéric MORAY, Open Changin’ School ou l’Ecole ouverte (sur le monde) en changement (dans son propre système), May 28, 2024, 22p.

Brussels, May 16, 2024

 

1. Continually embracing the complexity of the world

It is always extremely difficult to objectivise a trend towards increasing global violence or the escalating risks of conflagration we face [1]. Today, it is claimed that the return to power struggles and brutal initiatives are characteristics of the 21st century. Without diminishing them, the historian must observe that these have instead been a characteristic of humanity for more than 40 centuries.

Nevertheless, as the data collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Swedish University of Uppsala shows, while the number of wars has remained fairly constant since 1946, minor conflicts have increased significantly since 2010, after a decrease in the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall and its consequences on the rest of the world.

Davies SHAWN, Therese PETTERSSON & Magnus ÖBERG, Organized violence 1989-2022 and the return of conflicts between states? in Journal of Peace Research, 2023. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/

According to Peter Wallenstein, for the world as a whole, the total number of armed conflicts is staggering. Despite great efforts at conflict resolution, it appears that, for each conflict solved between parties with international efforts, a new one emerges, often pursued by splinter groups, requiring the same mix of improvisation and standard operating procedures by the international community [2].

The very nature of these conflicts is evolving to such an extent that the classic distinction between inter-state war and civil war is being replaced by a trichotomy for conflict analysis. The first category includes inter-state conflicts over territory and government [3]. The second category identifies intra-state conflicts over government and a third category contains intra-state conflicts over territory. It should be noted that, whereas during the period 2000-2010, there were only 4 out of 73, from 2011 to 2021, inter-state conflicts represent 7 out of a total of 110. Over the entire period 1989-2021, inter-state conflicts amounted to 14 out of 190 [4].

The professor of foresight, meanwhile, has long been saying that to regard the fall of the Berlin Wall or the collapse of the USSR as events that definitively marked the end of the Cold War could only be established over a long period which we have clearly not achieved. Today, we are facing a high-intensity war in Ukraine. One possible outcome is that it leads to a partition of that country along the Dnieper River – or some demarcation further eastwards or westwards – and that a new iron curtain will eventually descend across the continent of Europe for a long time. There seems no question, however, that we are currently facing an ominous bifurcation as a result of a new geopolitical upheaval in the world [5].

So let us simply note, that, in 2024, in some regions, such as in Europe, there is increased media pressure surrounding the issues, along with a challenge to our way of life resulting from greater awareness of climate change and the ravages of the Covid-19 pandemic. The latter, it should be remembered, has caused more than 6.7 million deaths to date.

Determining an underlying cause for all these symptoms seems rather pointless and could even highlight a linearity which our awareness of global complexity would not accept. This is precisely the view expressed by Garry Jacobs and Janani Ramanathan and their co-authors in March 2024: a piecemeal focus on single issues would be inadequate at a time when the inter-linkages and interdependencies between issues, disciplines, sectors, regions and cultures of an increasingly globalized world had become so evident and determinative [6].

The fact remains that, specifically, all the efforts and initiatives, including those undertaken by the World Academy of Art & Science (WAAS) and by the Millennium Project, in particular regarding education, to highlight this complexity and the inter-linkages between the various issues that preoccupy us are worthwhile.

But such complexity reminds us that there is no simple response to the obstacles hampering the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and that it will be necessary to continue our efforts in a series of different directions to enable beneficial accelerations and favourable outcomes.

 

2. The lack of public interest and common good at the international level

Those who are acculturated to strategic or operational foresight know how difficult it is to progress together towards a common goal such as peace, security, harmony or sustainability without including the idea of the common good as an ultimate aim in a shared vision.

Yet, as stated by the Swiss jurist Robert Kolb, the common good present in international society is blatantly deficient and structurally inadequate. In international law, this concept is the quest for a harmonious equilibrium between general interests and individual interests, between the individual and the collective at every moment in history… Embodied in the social order, this common good becomes a principle which is relevant for the application of the law: it governs the interpretation of the rules by giving them an ultimate purpose which they must pursue [7].

The idea of genuine international community based on common values is constantly being challenged by exaggerated State sovereignty. Thus, international society does not seem to actually exist or assume a specific, active form, being merely a society of societies, whose component societies fully believe that they can be self-sufficient. For Kolb, Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva, this conventional primacy of the individual good over the collective good is reflected in a serious distortion of the spectre of the common good. In the essential sectors, this spectre borders on anarchy and gives free rein to power. And, indeed, sovereignty, nationalism and particularism reign supreme in our world. Universal common good is still simply the aspiration of some enlightened circles [8].

What could this common good look like? Perhaps an overriding interest, as conceived or observed by the French philosopher and historian Raymond Aron. During the 1960s, Aron, author of Peace and War, A Theory of International Relations, noted this interest in the solidarity of the two Greats against total war [9], a solidarity not to self-destruct. For the United States and Russia, it was a means of moving beyond global concepts and ideologies that were seemingly irreconcilable. It was the reciprocal threat of nuclear weapons and the shadow of death for all that would have ensured that established this interest in the absence of a common good. But the common good was clearly present: it was – and, to a degree, remains – the protection of civilisation, or the aspiration of harmonious civilisation.

Other major powers have emerged since the Cold War period – China and India, for example – along with other self-destruction elements: although nuclear apocalypse has not been eliminated, climate change has increased in magnitude and constitutes an additional threat in a world whose population has risen from 3 to 8 billion people in sixty years.

Tackling climate change ought to be the overriding interest of nations and the common good of civilisation: a battle in whose name all wars and international crises should be banned. In this way, international peace and justice could be achieved if all States truly acknowledged the common good represented by universal society, nature and the biosphere. In the words of Robert Kolb, this international community could establish a sort of constitutional law [10] on a global scale. Collective solidarity would prevail over state sovereignty and disproportionate individual ambitions.

Endowed with a common purpose, therefore, how should this collective ambition be applied?

 

 3. Arming wisdom? The collapse of diplomacy and dissuasion

Tomorrow we will try to arm wisdom, but we will not let the human values he taught us be prescribed, values of which he was the living example, stated Raymond Aron on 27 January 1945 in tribute to the French philosopher Léon Brunschvicg (1869-1944) [11].

 

3.1. The United Nations

Arming wisdom is the hope and the necessity of this Post-War period. The aims and principles of the United Nations Charter embody this hope. The first, well-known Article sets out the organisation’s ambition: 

  1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
  2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
  3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
  4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends [12].

Unfortunately, Articles 45 and 47 of the Charter are less well-known, since they have remained unheeded to date[13]:

Article 45: In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47:

1.There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

  1. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
  2. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
  3. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees [14].

These articles represent the armed wing of wisdom and must be endorsed by the international community and the institutions that support it.

Although Raymond Aron stated that military force remains the bedrock of international order, he recognised that it is not decisive everywhere or at every point[15]. We can see this in the Vietnam of his era or the Afghanistan of our own.

But to take just a few recent examples, Congo, Yemen, Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza demonstrate the simultaneous collapse of international diplomacy and dissuasion. These are all examples of our inability to establish peace and protect people: inability in global governance as well as inability in the governance of continental Europe as far as the war in Ukraine is concerned.

 

3.2. Europe

I will spend a bit of time on Europe’s inability, particularly in view of the need for it to keep its own house in order rather than criticise the United Nations yet again. In addition to NATO, there are three institutions that are, to varying degrees, responsible for security in its different dimensions: the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which is often forgotten but which was one of the architects of the Minsk Agreements of September 2014 [16].

Since the rejection of the European Defence Community by the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954 and, in its wake, the creation of the Western European Union, considerable efforts have been made to establish a European defence system that would offer a way to arm the declared diplomatic wisdom of Europe – inside or outside NATO [17]. These efforts have had little effect.

Thus, at the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the European Union became aware of its inability, both diplomatically and politically, to intervene on its own continent and it had to stand aside in favour of NATO on two occasions: in 1995, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, in 1999, in Kosovo [18]. There have been numerous European Councils (including Cologne and Helsinki in 1999) aimed at revising the treaties (particularly Maastricht in 1992, Nice in 2001 and Lisbon in 2007) and initiatives to implement programmes, create institutions and raise funds, all with the aim of constructing a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Union established a Political and Security Committee (PSC) and set up a Military Committee (EUMC) and a Military Staff unit (EUMS) with a view to pre-emptive deployment of military forces. It decided to create a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops, a decision which has had little impact to date. You can judge for yourselves: in April 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron, in a speech at the Sorbonne, again argued in favour of achieving the critical size of 5000 soldiers under the European flag.

Although the Maastricht Treaty had placed the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the hands of the President of the European Council, the Lisbon Treaty instituted the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Article 18 of the TEU) which has an administration and is therefore a sort of Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Union.

External representation of the European is thus exercised by three actors: the President of the European Council, the Commission and the High Representative, which creates a degree of tension and does not facilitate diplomatic action[19] – a fact not lost on anyone.

Following the Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022, the Union adopted a common strategy (the Strategic Compass) and set up a European Defence Fund which will total nearly 8 billion euro by 2027. However, this may seem a paltry sum given the geopolitical challenges and compared with the resources allocated by some European countries to modernise their armies: 100 billion euro for Germany, 120 billion for Poland[20]. Such joint European initiatives have not always been encouraged by the United States and have sometimes been hampered by the European States themselves, particularly those that had adopted a position of international neutrality while still being members of the Union (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria) [21]. But we should not deceive ourselves: it is particularism and State sovereignty, corollaries of the lack of awareness of the common good, that are the main barrier. As that great promoter of European integration, Jean Monnet, wrote in 1976: the sovereign nations of the past are no longer the framework for solving the problems of the present [22].

The time has come to build up the European Union’s strategic, and therefore military, autonomy, so that it can play an influential role in world diplomacy and help to promote the values of peace and solidarity that led to the founding of the Union.

Therefore, if we cannot support President Macron in what he describes as strategic ambiguity when speaking of sending European troops to the Ukrainian front, we must salute his proactive notion of identifying a new paradigm in the area of defence: a credible defence for the European continent. For Europe, he reminded us, shouldering our responsibilities means deciding for ourselves and leading our European defence efforts. It means building a new paradigm, more cohesion and concrete initiatives together. This defence power obviously relies on diplomacy that enables us to continue to form partnerships with third countries, in other words to build a Europe which can show that it is never the vassal of the United States and that it can talk to other world regions, to emerging countries, to Africa, to Latin America. Not just through trade agreements, but through genuinely balanced and reciprocal strategic partnerships [23].

 

Conclusion: a more preventive diplomacy

Five practices of international law were developed over several centuries before being enshrined in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter in 1945:

  1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
  1. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means [24].

Negotiation, the traditional diplomatic route with a preventive aim. Taking the form of good offices, it offers a way to establish a negotiation process without participating in it or imposing a solution.

International enquiry, instituted by the Hague Convention of 29 July 1899, along with arbitration, aims, through various investigative means, to uncover the facts behind a dispute and to report these facts to the parties.

Mediation proposes the bases for negotiation and intervenes in the process.

Conciliation not only involves examining the constituent elements of a dispute: conciliation committees must also reach a solution.

Arbitration is a judicial process for preventing and resolving international disputes which has developed since the 19th century[25].

As we are reminded by the French historian Laurence Badel, diplomacy may take the form, both at the United Nations and within the European bodies, of a negotiation instrument before being a discussion forum [26]. Active preventive diplomacy, a subject dear to Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961) [27], seems far removed from the diplomacy of appeasement characterised by the shadow of the Munich crisis in 1938. How often have we alluded to this in recent years: raising the subject of diplomatic negotiation with the Kremlin equates to being labelled a “Munich sympathiser”. According to Peter Wallenstein, the prominent professor and former director of the Peace and Conflict Department at the University of Uppsala, the concept of preventive diplomacy contains the constructive actions undertaken to avoid the likely threat, use or diffusion of armed force by parties in political dispute [28].

Although this approach was revived by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace in January 1992, the European organisations tried to make it an essential foundation of their practice after the fall of the Berlin Wall[29]. They perhaps failed to make it credible, however, for the reasons we have mentioned.

The importance for the WAAS of cultivating the values that underpin its principles is paramount: peaceful coexistence, fellowship, shared humanity, universal solidarity and shared responsibility for common futures[30]. These could form the basis of the universal common good whose need we have stressed. I do not need to remind you that this common good can only be established through dialogue between people brought up not only on such values, but also on an understanding of the world and on dialogue itself. Learning to understand each other and talk to each other is of great importance. European culture turns negotiation into the art of knowing the Other, states Laurence Badel. Knowing the person’s culture and reflecting on the best method of communication to deal with them are considered key elements in negotiation[31]. Naturally, therefore, education must remain central in any global construction effort. Such education must be that which frees us from our certainties in order, as expressed so clearly by the educationalist Philippe Meirieu, to exchange views on convictions and knowledge [32]. Clearly, such knowledge comes from understanding other people and the trajectories of temporalities: retrospective, present and prospective. That I mention this point will come as no surprise to anyone.

The WAAS also knows the extent to which any challenge approach, such as that relating to peace and security, can only be resolved in the diplomatic and military fields of negotiation and violence. There has been much emphasis, in relations with Russia, on the collapse of a peace model founded on trade and the movement of goods and capital. The complex and systemic dimensions of global relations require us to consider such economic and social dimensions. In 2001, when examining relations between the European Security and Defence policy and NATO, the National Defence Research Institute of the RAND Corporation clearly noted that, in future, it would also depend on transatlantic economic relations[33]. The aim of turning NATO into a global system after 9/11 clearly has not altered this issue, in which, at that time, Russia still seemed to be a stakeholder.

In addition, some of the governance methods and techniques highlighted by the WAAS in its ambitions can be investigated and developed. Preventive diplomacy essentially takes place through impact prior analysis before decisions are taken [34]. The world cannot create itself by rolling the dice. Rational decision-making requires thought and elaboration.

It was Raymond Aron, once again, who asserted this point:  the reasonable conduct of politics is the only rational one if the goal of the intercourse among states is the survival of all, common prosperity and the sparing of the peoples’ blood [35].

The blood of the people – of men, women and children – is clearly what is at stake when we talk about security. And it is a key reason for grasping this issue with all the necessary intelligence and determination.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] This text is the background paper for my speech in the session « Root Causes and Remedies for Rising Insecurity, Social Unrest, War and Violence and Global Turbulence » at the 64th Conference and General Assembly of the World Academy of Art and Science, on 16 May 2024. I would like to thank the organisers, and in particular Garry Jacobs and Janani Ramanathan, for giving me the opportunity to speak on this sensitive subject.

[2] Peter WALLENSTEEN, Understanding Conflict Resolution, p. 38, Los Angeles, Sage, 2023.

[3] Source UCDP, March 2022, in P. WALLENSTEIN, Understanding Conflict Resolutions…, p. 76.

[4] P. WALLENSTEEN, Understanding Conflict Resolution…, p. 82-83.

[5] Emmanuel TODD et Baptiste TOUVEREY, La défaite de l’Occident, p. 19, Paris, Gallimard, 2024.

[6] Garry JACOBS, Janani RAMANATHAN e.a., Origins and Pathways for the Future of the World Academy of Art & Science Strategic Perspectives and Opportunities, in Cadmus, March 6, 2024. https://cadmusjournal.org/article/volume5-issue3-p1/origins-and-pathways-future-of-waas

[7] Robert KOLB, Théorie du Droit international, 3ed., p. 421-424 et 429, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2022.

[8] Ibidem, 431.

[9] Raymond ARON, Paix et Guerre entre les nations, Préface de la quatrième édition, p. 7, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1966.

[10] R. KOLB, Théorie du Droit international…, p. 440.

[11] Raymond ARON, La philosophie de Léon Brunschvicg, dans Revue de métaphysique et de morale, t. LV, n° 1-2, 1945, pp. 127-140, p. 140. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40899141

[12] United Nations Charter, Peace, dignity and equality on healthy planet, United Nations.

https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text

[13] R. KOLB, Théorie du Droit international…, p. 433.

[14] United Nations Charter, Peace, dignity and equality on healthy planet, United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text

[15] R. ARON, Paix et guerre entre les nations, Préface de la quatrième édition, p. 11.

[16] Laurence BADEL, Diplomaties européennes, XIXe-XXIe siècles, p. 433-434, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 2021.

[17] Voir Daniel MÖCKLI, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War, Health, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity, London-New York, Tauris, 2009. – Sylvain KAHN, Histoire de la construction de l’Europe depuis 1945, Paris, PUF, 2021. – Pierre HAROCHE, Dans la forge du monde, Comment le choc des puissances façonne l’Europe, Paris, Fayard, 2024.

[18] Ibidem, p. 434.

[19] Federica BICCHI & Nikla BREMBERG, European Diplomacy in Practice, Interrogating Power, Agency and Change, London-New York, Routledge, 2018.

[20] Francisco Juan GOMEZ MARTOS, La défense commune européenne : ambition légitime ou vœu pieux ? dans Pascale JOANNIN dir., L’État de l’Union, Rapport Schuman 2023 sur l’Europe, p. 164, Paris, Fondation Robert Schuman, Éditions Marie B, 2024.

[21] Nicolas BADALASSI, Histoire de la sécurité européenne depuis 1945, De la Guerre froide à la guerre en Ukraine, p. 182, Paris, A. Colin, 2024.

[22] les nations souveraines du passé ne sont plus le cadre où peuvent se résoudre les problèmes du présent. Jean MONNET, Mémoires, p. 617, Paris, Fayard, 1976.

[23] E. MACRON, Europe Speech, 25 April 2024, Elysée, 2024 https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2024/04/24/europe-speech

[24] United Nations Charter : https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-6

[25] L. BADEL, Diplomaties européennes…, p. 427-428.

[26] L. BADEL, Diplomaties européennes…, p. 376, 406, 425, 430.

[27] Dag Hammarskjöld, Le rôle vital des Nations unies dans une diplomatie de la réconciliation., Londres, 2 avril 1958. #

[28] Peter WALLENSTEEN, Preventing Violent Conflict, Past Record and Futures Challenges, p. 34, DPCR-Uppsala University, 1998. – P. WALLENSTEEN, Understanding Conflict Resolution… p. 286sv.

[29] L. BADEL, Diplomaties européennes…, p. 431.

[30] Garry JACOBS, Janani RAMANATHAN e.a., Origins and Pathways…

[31] L. BADEL, Diplomaties européennes…, p. 377.

[32] Philippe MEIRIEU, Ce que l’école peut encore pour la démocratie, Deux ou trois choses que je sais(peut-être) de l’éducation et de la pédagogie, p. 37-52, Paris, Éditions Autrement, 2020.

[33] Robert E. HUNTER, The European Security and Defense Policy, NATO’s Companion or Competitor?, p. 159-161, Arlington, Rand – Rand Europe, National Defense Research Institute, 2002.

[34] Ph. DESTATTE, Increasing rationality in decision-making through policy impact prior analysis, Blog PhD2050, Namur, July 12, 2021. https://phd2050.org/2021/07/12/pipa_en/

[35] R. ARON, Peace and War, A Theory of International Relations (1966), p. 45, New Brunswick (USA) and London, Transaction Publishers, 2003.

3. Prospective, R&I et engagement citoyen : surmonter les ambiguïtés 

 

Bruxelles, le 26 mars 2024

3.1. La prospective comme processus d’innovation et de transformation stratégique

Comme le rappelaient en 2010 Luke Georghiou et Jennifer Cassingena Harper, la prospective peut être utilisée pour informer ou réformer la politique et la stratégie d’innovation, une activité qui, il y a quelque temps, a été appelée « câblage du système d’innovation » [1]. Comme ils l’indiquent heureusement, la prospective permet de construire des politiques sur mesure dans le domaine de la recherche et de l’innovation dans des contextes national, régional, local ou sectoriel. C’est d’autant plus vrai que les instrument de R&I évoluent et nécessitent des visions communes entre les acteurs (entreprises, pouvoirs publics, universités, centres de recherche, incubateurs, acteurs impliqués, utilisateurs et donc citoyens, etc.) et des feuilles de route solides : plateformes d’innovation, clusters, pôles de compétitivité, etc. dans des logiques d’innovation ouverte, elles-mêmes en profondes mutations [2]. Les deux chercheurs de l’Université de Manchester notaient également en 2010 que le rôle de la prospective dans de tels contextes doit à la fois être renforcé et mieux compris [3].

Surmonter les ambiguïtés, c’est-à-dire les interprétations incertaines ou les sens multiples, est une des vocations de la prospective, avec la capacité d’appréhender le futur, de rendre compte de la complexité et des dynamiques des systèmes, ainsi que prendre la mesure des incertitudes présentes et futures. Ainsi, la prospective constitue-t-elle bien elle-même un processus d’innovation et de transformation stratégique, fondé sur la systémique et le long terme, pour mettre en œuvre des actions présentes et opérationnelles. Dès lors, la prospective bien comprise n’est pas un instrument de simple ajustement de la trajectoire donnée, mais un outil de transformation qui réinterroge les fondations système dont elle se préoccupe. Jean-Philippe Bootz a montré que la prospective opérait selon des modèles d’apprentissage organisationnel en double boucle, c’est-à-dire que sa vocation était de porter des stratégies de rupture, d’opérer des changements structurels, intentionnels et non routiniers [4].

Comme observé dans la note introductive au R&I Foresight Mutual Learning Exercise, la prospective a fait l’objet ces dernières années d’une promotion certaine au sein de l’Union européenne, de ses institutions et parmi un certain nombre d’États membres [5]. Les initiatives ne manquent pas même si elles ne s’inscrivent pas toutes dans la même compréhension de ce qui constitue les fondements de la prospective européenne telle qu’elle s’est constituée au début des années 2000 par les efforts de convergence entre le Foresight anglo-saxon et la prospective latine [6]. Comme le rappelait Cornelia Daheim, la prospective en matière de R&I remplit des fonctions très variées et couvre des activités différentes dont les développements et les impacts ne sont pas toujours clairs par manque d’évaluations formelles, externes ou partenariales [7]. On pourrait même ajouter que l’objet même du R&I Foresight n’est pas toujours très bien défini par rapport à un riche environnement dans lequel on retrouve STI Foresight, Innovation-system Foresight, Technology Foresight, Foresight in Science, Forward-thinking in R&D, Research Foresight, Foresight on Innovation Policy, Forward-looking R&I policies, etc. autant de concepts ou de pratiques qui semblent parfois utilisés indifféremment l’un pour l’autre. Certes, dans le temps, la prospective a pris différentes formes, approches et méthodologies notamment lors de sa transformation d’activité académique en instrument pour le policy-making au sein de la DG Recherche et Innovation de la Commission européenne.

Pendant longtemps, la prospective est restée de nature informative, tentant d’influencer la réflexion sur les politiques plutôt que s’atteler à leur élaboration. Elle a ensuite été davantage acceptée comme un outil de connaissance pour la prise de décision [8] avant qu’elle devienne, au-delà du fait de penser et de débattre de l’avenir, un outil pour le façonner au moyen d’un processus structuré  [9].

 

 3.2. Construire et suivre le processus de prospective

 Un modèle de processus complet de prospective a été élaboré en 2006 par la plateforme d’apprentissage mutuel (MLP). La MLP était une initiative conjointe des DG Entreprises et industrie, Recherche et Politique régionale de la Commission, avec la participation du Comité des régions. L’objectif était d’accroître les investissements dans la recherche et l’innovation et d’aider à définir des politiques pour rendre l’innovation régionale plus efficace.

Dans ce cadre, un processus de prospective tourné vers l’innovation a émergé à partir du partage d’expérience de nombreux acteurs de la prospective et de l’évaluation des choix technologiques (TA) engagés dans les régions européennes. Ce modèle permet, au-delà du diagnostic prospectif et de l’identification des enjeux de long terme, de construire une vision et de concevoir la stratégie et le moyen de leur mise en œuvre opérationnelle, afin de procéder à celle-ci, de la monitorer puis de l’évaluer. Trois grandes phases apparaissaient nettement dans tous les exercices analysés :

  1. une phase de préparation et de maturation, parfois très longue, qui sert à envisager les objectifs de l’exercice de prospective, son positionnement sur l’horizon temporel, ses limites géographiques, la gouvernance et les structures de pilotage de l’exercice, sa programmation, les budgets mobilisables et le financement des différents travaux, y compris ceux de la communication et de l’implication des acteurs.
  2. une phase de Prospective, comprenant l’analyse du système, des interrelations entre les variables, l’étude de sa dynamique et de sa trajectoire, avec les alternatives et évolutions potentielles. Cette phase comprend trois séquences :

– l’identification des acteurs et des facteurs du système et l’ensemble du diagnostic prospectif;

– la définition des enjeux à long terme, c’est-à-dire les véritables questions révélées par l’exploration des futurs possibles ;

– la construction d’une vision commune et partagée du futur qui réponde réellement en termes de futurs souhaitables aux questions de long terme identifiées ci-dessus.

 

  1. une phase stratégique qui va à la fois permettre de répondre aux enjeux de long terme par des initiatives de terrain et de réaliser concrètement la vision en prenant des mesures entre aujourd’hui et l’horizon choisi de cette vision. Quatre séquences habitent cette phase d’opérationnalisation :

– la définition des axes stratégiques;

– le choix des actions concrètes et leur intensité (mesure);

– le pilotage et le monitoring de la mise en œuvre;

– l’évaluation du processus et des produits de l’exercice (effets, impacts, résultats, etc.) [10].

Ce processus, largement expérimenté depuis sur de nombreux exercices et par différentes institutions, est applicable tant en prospective technologique, industrielle, territoriale ou générale et donc également pour la R&I. Il n’est évidemment nullement contraignant et certaines phases ou séquences peuvent être inversées et modifiées. il peut et doit être adapté selon les besoins et les demandes. Néanmoins, nous considérons que la prospective comprend tout le cycle, qui peut d’ailleurs se poursuivre dans la logique d’une prospective continue permettant l’encapacitation (empowerment) et donc le développement des compétences prospectives des acteurs, citoyens et parties prenantes.

Dans la plupart des circonstances, il nous paraît indispensable que les parties prenantes, les acteurs et les citoyens soient associés et interagissent à chacune des étapes du processus. Le risque est grand en effet qu’ils soient à l’avenir démotivés à participer à d’autres exercices s’ils observent que les décideurs les ont  éloignés dans des moments cruciaux de stratégie, de répartition des budgets, de mise en œuvre ou d’évaluation du processus.

Le processus de la prospective (Clar et Destatte, 2006)

Ce modèle a d’ailleurs évolué au sein de l’équipe prospective de l’Institut Destrée pour prendre mieux en compte la dynamique des systèmes non linéaires, la complexité et l’incertitude qui nécessite un travail soutenu de veille tout au long du processus pour continuer à l’alimenter et mieux appréhender les signaux faibles, les émergences ainsi que les wildcards. Les progrès du Knowledge management, les nouveaux liens qui se sont tissés avec la prospective, de même que le dialogue avec l’intelligence stratégique ont permis d’intégrer ces dimensions comme processus internes [11].

Processus de la Prospective (DESTATTE, 2022)

On peut encore capitaliser sur les travaux de la plateforme mise en place en 2006 par l’Unité Science & Technology Foresight de la DG Recherche en évoquant les quatre processus transversaux identifiés au sein même du processus général et auxquels il faut apporter une attention particulière : appropriation, implication, apprentissage sociétal, participation.

Quatre processus transversaux (CLAR & DESTATTE, 2006)

  1. L’appropriation résulte de la compréhension, de l’assimilation et du partage des résultats du processus. En effet, l’appropriation intériorise chez chaque acteur à la fois le chemin qui mène au résultat de la démarche prospective et le résultat lui-même. Lorsque l’exercice est approprié, il transforme toutes les parties prenantes en acteurs conscients des enjeux, motivés par les réponses élaborées, et déterminés à participer à la mise en œuvre du programme d’action produit collectivement.
  2. Le processus d’implication des parties prenantes, acteurs et citoyens : dès lors que la prospective s’affirme comme un lien d’interaction et un forum, il est essentiel d’associer les différentes sphères de la gouvernance : le privé, le public et la société civile. Il est parfois difficile d’impliquer les entreprises, même sur des sujets qui les importent. C’est pourtant indispensable dès lors que l’on considère que leur rôle s’accroît dans la société, mais aussi dans la gouvernance où elles sont souvent devenues les premiers partenaires des gouvernements. Le poids qui est le leur dans la recherche et l’innovation fait que l’on voit mal comment elles pourraient ne pas être autour de la table. Trop souvent, leur présence se fait au travers de leurs associations, ce qui est très insuffisant pour bénéficier de leur apport de terrain. La participation des acteurs se présente sous plusieurs formes, et les méthodes peuvent varier au cours d’un exercice de prospective. La séquence de définition des enjeux peut faire apparaître des préoccupations pour lesquelles les acteurs clés ne sont pas représentés dans l’exercice (comme les sciences du vivant, l’école maternelle, les services aux personnes âgées, etc.) Ces acteurs doivent donc être intégrés dans les phases ultérieures, soit en les associant directement en tant que participants, soit en les invitant en tant que témoins privilégiés ou experts dans des forums ou des séminaires. Il faut également leur garantir un suivi de l’information au-delà de cette participation ponctuelle. Il est également judicieux d’associer les acteurs sceptiques ou opposés à l’exercice, non seulement pour tenter de les impliquer, mais aussi pour prendre en compte leur avis. Cela permet d’anticiper toute résistance future qui pourrait survenir au moment de la mise en œuvre de la stratégie.
  3. Le processus d’apprentissage sociétal : outre l’objectif de la prospective de soutenir la réflexion stratégique, on peut également souligner ses aspects cognitifs en termes d’apprentissage individuel, collectif et organisationnel. À cet égard, un exercice de prospective a des vertus pédagogiques. Il s’agit d’un processus de prise de conscience et de conquête intellectuelle de l’environnement géographique, de la société et du monde par leurs habitants. En exprimant leurs conceptions des enjeux, leurs réponses en termes d’alternatives sur le ou les futurs possibles ou souhaitables, les participants à l’exercice de prospective établissent les bases d’informations utiles à l’apprentissage sociétal. Ces conceptions feront ensuite l’objet d’une confrontation collective avec des éléments de la réalité effective, notamment par l’utilisation des bases informationnelles du diagnostic prospectif et par le recours à des experts. En même temps – et parallèlement au processus d’apprentissage – se produit un processus de désapprentissage, de remise en cause des certitudes et des mythes. Il est essentiel qu’une compréhension commune des différents concepts et enjeux soit construite progressivement afin de stimuler le dialogue sur la vision de l’avenir et sur la stratégie.
  4. Le processus de diffusion : plusieurs besoins peuvent être satisfaits lorsque les délibérations et les résultats d’un exercice de prospective sont diffusés, aussi largement que possible, tout au long du processus :

– la transparence de l’exercice est assurée, ainsi que sa compréhension par tous les observateurs ;

– l’implication, l’imputabilité et la cohésion des acteurs et des participants à l’exercice sont renforcées ;

– les parties prenantes extérieures sont tenues informées des progrès accomplis ;

– etc.

Le rapport MLP Foresight insistait aussi sur le rapport entre l’appropriation et l’implication. Cela apparaît très important pour la prospective de la R&I. Ainsi, les acteurs et les citoyens associés à l’exercice s’approprieront la démarche et ses résultats dans la mesure où ils ont été activement impliqués dans le développement de l’exercice. Il s’agit donc non pas d’une démarche de consultation passive sollicitant des avis sur des options déjà énoncées, mais d’une véritable participation à la concrétisation des idées. Cette approche nécessite la définition de règles du jeu strictes :

– recruter le plus large éventail possible de parties prenantes en les définissant au sens le plus large du terme, les citoyens étant les premiers concernés par les politiques à mener sur leur territoire ;

– de véritables mécanismes et compétences d’animation pour favoriser l’écoute, la prise de parole, l’échange d’idées, la culture du débat et de la démocratie délibérative ;

– une logique pédagogique pour clarifier et expliquer les objectifs, les buts et les enjeux afin que les acteurs les comprennent ;

– un processus d’apprentissage et de réflexion dans lequel l’expérience réelle prime sur les théories générales, même si la connaissance et l’expertise sont des ressources essentielles [12].

  

3.3. Impacts et résultats concrets de la prospective R&I pour les citoyens 

L’idée de distinction entre deux formes différentes de prospective dans laquelle une première prospective (foresight for policy) serait conçue dans un but de fonction consultative et stratégique, outil d’information, et un second type de prospective (foresight as a policy instrument) aurait un rôle de transformation et de changement structurel, pourrait devenir obsolète [13]. C’est précisément le nouveau type de gouvernance associant les acteurs et les citoyens qui rend ce modèle de plus en plus caduc. En effet, la motivation de la prospective se fonde de plus en plus par un désir collectif d’innovation et de transformation qui ne peut être assouvi que par la concrétisation de ce changement qui, seul, donne de la crédibilité à l’exercice. En fait, il n’est pas raisonnable, voire impossible, de vouloir associer des acteurs et des citoyens uniquement sur un volet exploratoire et non sur le volet normatif, impliquant que le ou les décideurs se retirent du jeu pour in fine prendre seuls les décisions et les mettre en œuvre. La coconstruction est une manière de faire qui exige que tout le processus de la prospective soit parcouru ensemble, du diagnostic à l’évaluation d’impact, en passant par les choix budgétaires et la mise en œuvre de terrain. En fait, l’impact qui sera recherché par les acteurs et les citoyens sera moins de constater les déficiences du système de recherche et d’innovation – ce qui reste évidemment fondamental dans les phases de diagnostic prospectif et d’identification des enjeux de long terme – que d’apporter des réponses concrètes à ces déficiences et les mettre en œuvre.

Comme on peut le voir dans différents travaux, il existe encore une tendance très forte à se concentrer sur la détermination de la nature des exercices de prospective et de leurs catégories en termes de méthodes utilisées, telles que les scénarios, et les résultats des exercices entrepris. Or les produits sont vraiment ce qui détermine l’opérationnalité et donc l’utilité de l’activité prospective, non seulement dans le processus de décision publique, privée ou collective, mais aussi et surtout dans la mise en œuvre de ces produits pour en faire des instruments de transformation des systèmes dans lesquels ils évoluent. On retrouve d’ailleurs cette confusion dans certains documents clefs de la Commission comme dans le Modus Operandi de l’European Foresight Hub, dans lequel les visions cohabitent avec des scénarios, de l’analyse de conducteurs (drivers) et de tendances, etc. [14]

Ce constat débouche évidemment sur un autre qui reste un obstacle fondamental aux yeux de certaines chercheuses et de certains chercheurs dès lors qu’on associe la prospective à des processus de recherche, c’est la barrière épistémologique qui subsiste entre une prospective exploratoire et une prospective normative, celle de la transformation du système qui pour certaines et certains ne peut être du ressort du chercheur qui devrait rester à distance respectable du système pour ne pas perdre son âme. Par expérience, on peut observer que cette propension peut s’accroître dans le cadre d’une institutionnalisation forte de la prospective qui peut créer des îlots qui se perçoivent à vocation scientifique dans un environnement politique et administratif fort où la mise en œuvre et la transformation de la société constituent le quotidien. Ce qui peut être identifié comme étant davantage qu’un malaise ne saurait être occulté, même si la question est aussi ancienne que la prospective.

L’institutionnalisation de la prospective a été définie par Jennifer Cassingena Harper comme la transformation et l’intégration de l’activité et de sa pratique dans un système structuré ou hautement formalisé par une norme, sous la forme d’une institution, au sein d’une organisation ou d’un secteur [15]. Pour intéressant qu’il soit, le modèle de mise en place d’une prospective institutionnalisée fondé sur les travaux récents de l’OCDE devra être challengé par le présent texte qui, lui, a pour vocation de prendre en compte l’engagement citoyen dans les activités de prospective appliquées à la Recherche et à l’Innovation. En effet, par nature – et sans lui faire de procès – l’OCDE oriente son activité vers les gouvernements. Néanmoins, nous pensons qu’une gouvernance démocratique multiniveaux doit être à la fois fondée sur les acteurs et impliquer les citoyennes et les citoyens, voire les résidents – la distinction peut être nécessaire [16]. En effet, il n’est pas toujours certain qu’en matière de demande, le niveau gouvernemental soit toujours la garantie d’attribution de ressources à la prospective surtout pour la recherche et d’innovation, domaine dans lequel les entreprises ont un poids essentiel. De même, le cadre gouvernemental et administratif ne constitue pas le gage de qualité pour des compétences de haut niveau en matière de prospective ni d’ailleurs de R&I, les universités, les centres de recherches privés, les think tanks, les sociétés de consultances et les experts indépendants, se présentant parfois comme « simples citoyens », en disposant largement. On peut également challenger l’idée de la mise en place d’un cadre institutionnel pour l’intégration des pratiques de prospective dans les différents départements du gouvernement et dans les processus décisionnels centraux, notamment par une unité principale de prospective. Des exemples montrent que cette intégration, souvent marquée par le centralisme, voire le monopole de l’action prospective, limite fortement l’initiative dans les différents départements de l’administration et constitue finalement un désinvestissement en motivation et en compétence dans ces départements pourtant plus proches des enjeux et des réalités. S’y ajoute la question épistémologique soulevée plus haut qui empêche souvent les chercheurs de ces unités de s’inscrire à la fois dans la proximité du terrain et des acteurs, ainsi que dans la mise en œuvre du volet stratégique de la prospective. L’évaluation et le feedback se fondent dès lors trop souvent sur la mise à distance et l’analyse des méthodes plutôt que sur la recherche des impacts véritables en termes de transformation collective du système.

Ainsi, dans le cadre de l’évolution des capacités des acteurs – au premier rang d’ailleurs les entreprises et les associations environnementales – et des citoyennes et citoyens connectés et davantage organisés, un autre modèle s’élabore fondé sur la coconstruction de politiques collectives s’associant au parlement, au gouvernement et à l’administration dans le cadre d’ouvertures voulues ou forcées, voire prenant carrément l’initiative de lancer des travaux prospectifs dans l’écosystème de la R&I.

 

A suivre : 4. Pratiques de la participation citoyenne dans la prospective de la R&I

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] to inform or reform innovation policy and strategy, an activity which sometime ago called ‘‘wiring up the innovation system’’. Luke GEORGHIOU & Jennifer CASSINGENA HARPER, From priority-Setting to articulation of demandd: Foresight for research and innovation policy and strategy, in Futures, 43 (2011) p. 243-251, p. 243.

[2] Henry CHESBROUGH, Wim VANHAVERBEKE & Joel WEST, New Frontiers in Open Innovation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014.

[3] The role of foresight in such contexts needs both to be enhanced and better understood. L. GEORGHIOU & J. CASSINGENA, op. cit., p. 244.

[4] Jean-Philippe BOOTZ, Strategic Foresight and Organizational Learning: Survey and Critical Analysis, in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 77, 10, 2010, p. 1588-1594. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0040162510001368 – J-Ph. BOOTZ, Prospective et apprentissage organisationnel, coll. Travaux et recherches de prospective, Paris, Futuribles international, LIPSOR, Datar, Commissariat général du Plan, 2001.

[5] Cornelia DAHEIM, R&I Foresight: An Introduction to and Overview of the Current State of Play, Draft Discussion Paper, European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Horizon Europe Policy Support Facility, 2022.

[6] Paulo CARVALHO, A Brief History of Futures Studies and Foresight, Lisbon, Dec. 5, 2022.

[7] Cornelia DAHEIM, R&I Foresight: An Introduction to and Overview of the Current State of Play, Draft Discussion Paper, European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Horizon Europe Policy Support Facility, 2022.

[8] Ph. DESTATTE, Foresight as a strategic intelligence tool, University of Liège, September 2016, Blog PhD2050, January 19, 2018. https://phd2050.org/2018/01/19/spit/

[9] Jean-Claude BURGELMAN, Jarka CHLOUPKOVA & Werner WOBBE, Foresight in support of European research and innovation policies: The European Commission is preparing the funding of grand societal challenge, in European Journal of Futures Research, 2, 55, 10 December 2014, p. 1. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s40309-014-0055-4.pdf?pdf=button

[10] Günter CLAR & Philippe DESTATTE, Regional Foresight, Boosting Regional Potential, Mutual Learning Platform Regional Foresight Report, p. 6, Brussels, European Commission, 2006

Philippe-Destatte-&-Guenter-Clar_MLP-Foresight-2006-09-25

Philippe DESTATTE, La construction d’un modèle de processus prospectif, dans Philippe DURANCE & Régine MONTI dir., La prospective stratégique en action, Bilan et perspectives d’une indiscipline intellectuelle, p. 301-331, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2014. – You can find the Working Paper in English: Ph. DESTATTE, The construction of a foresight process model based on the interest in collective knowledge and learning platforms, The Destree Institute, May 13, 2009. #

Philippe-Destatte_Foresight-process-model_2009-05-13bis

[11] Jean-Philippe BOOTZ, Philippe DURANCE & Régine MONTI, Foresight and knowledge management, New Developments in theory and practice, in Technological Foresight and Social Change, Vol. 140, March 2019, p. 80-83. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0040162518319942

[12] Günter CLAR & Ph. DESTATTE, Regional Foresight, Boosting Regional Potential, Mutual Learning Platform Regional Foresight Report…, p. 17-21.

[13] Jennifer CASSINGENA HARPER, Impact of Technology Foresight, Nesta Working Paper 13/16, November 2013, p. 8.

https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/1316_impact_of_technology_foresight_final_version.pdf

See also: Jennifer CASSINGENA HARPER, Institutionalising foresight capability and creating wide foresight communities in the R&I system, Discussion Paper, p. 11, European Commission, Directorate for Research and Innovation, Horizon Europe Policy Support Facility, 2022.

[14] J.-Cl. BURGELMAN, J. CHLOUPKOVA & W. WOBBE, Foresight in support of European…, Diagram, p. 3. – See also: Eckhard STÖRMER, Laurent BONTOUX, Maciej KRZYSZTOFOWICZ, Elisabeta FLORESCU, Anne-Katrin BOCK, Fabiana SCAPOLO, Foresight – Using Science and Evidence to Anticipate and Shape the Future, in Vladimír ŠUCHA & Marta SIENKIEWICZ, Science for Policy Handbook, p. 128-142, Elsevier, 2020, p. 129 & 133.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128225967000127

[15] The term « institutionalising » is the act of making an activity established as part of the normal systems and practices, or mainstreaming an activity as a norm either at the level of an organisation or more broadly sector-wide. Institutionalisation entails turning the practice into an institution or embedding the practice into a structured or highly formalized system. Jennifer CASSINGENA HARPER, Institutionalising foresight capability and creating wide foresight communities in the R&I system, Discussion Paper, p. 6, European Commission, Directorate for Research and Innovation, Horizon Europe Policy Support Facility, 2022.

[16] Archon Fung wrote in 2006: I use the phrase citizen participation throughout this article. By citizens, I do not mean to indicate individuals who possess the legal status of formal citizenship but rather individuals who possess the political standing to exercise voice or give consent over public decisions that oblige or affect them. Therefore, undocumented immigrants whose children attend public schools are citizens in this sense because they can make claims over the ways in which schools treat their children, just as native-born American parents can make such claims. A. FUNG, Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance…,  p. 74, n1.

 2. Les transformations et la gouvernance du système de la Recherche-Innovation

 

Bruxelles, le 19 mars 2024

Il semble banal aujourd’hui de rappeler que la mondialisation, son champ d’action quasi illimité, l’accélération générale des technologies, leur convergence, les stress environnementaux et de ressources, non seulement de matières, mais aussi d’énergie, les transformations climatiques ont contribué à nous faire entrer dans une nouvelle conscience planétaire que l’on désigne par l’anthropocène [1]. Celle-ci nous inscrit à la fois dans le temps et dans l’espace. Ce cadre conceptuel renvoie directement à la nécessité de créer de nouvelles connaissances, d’innover dans tous les domaines capables de répondre à ces enjeux et d’approfondir une trajectoire de durabilité dans laquelle la prospective constitue un instrument central tant dans le domaine de la recherche que dans celui de la gouvernance des politiques [2]. Il s’agit également d’une nécessité pour la prospective pour qu’elle ouvre ou renforce son champ d’application dans les sciences et qu’elle se nourrisse davantage des disciplines, méthodes et innovations qui émergent ou se développent autour d’elle.

 

2.1. Le cadre porteur de la Recherche et l’Innovation responsables

Cette mutation aux multiples facteurs induit de nouvelles exigences en matière de Recherche et d’Innovation pour faire face à des changements majeurs de nature écologique comme l’abandon progressif des énergies fossiles, de nature économique comme le passage de processus de production linéaire à des processus circulaires, de nature politique où l’on retrouve l’impact des technologies numériques sur la gouvernance démocratique, etc. Ainsi que l’indiquent Robert Gianni et Philippe Goujon, respectivement professeurs aux universités de Maastricht et de Namur, tous ces éléments ont contribué à attirer l’attention sur la R&I en tant que réponse potentielle à tous ces enjeux différents. Parallèlement, les préoccupations concernant les effets potentiels de la recherche et de l’innovation ont également contribué à la nécessité de promouvoir un cadre conceptuel capable d’orienter la R&I vers des objectifs sociétaux. En ce sens, écrivaient-ils en 2020, la Recherche et l’Innovation responsables (RRI) constituent un cadre assez récent visant à créer une dialectique significative et fructueuse entre les ambitions techniques et économiques (R&I) et les revendications normatives présentes dans ou provenant de la société [3].

Dans différents travaux qui lui sont consacrés, la Recherche et l’Innovation responsables est présentée comme une approche proactive, participative et multidimensionnelle de la responsabilité dans la gouvernance de la Science, de la Technologie et de l’Innovation (STI), fondée sur les engagements mutuels des acteurs sociétaux, et constituant ainsi un paradigme distinct [4]. En 2013, René Von Schomberg, membre de la DG Recherche, en avait tenté une définition qui faisait de la recherche et de l’innovation responsables un processus transparent et interactif par lequel les acteurs de la société et les innovateurs se répondent mutuellement en vue de l’acceptabilité éthique, la durabilité et la désirabilité sociétale du processus d’innovation et de ses produits commercialisables [5].

Cette évolution apparaît comme une conséquence de l’émergence du modèle de Nouvelle gouvernance, également appelée gouvernance distribuée [6], gouvernance constructive (constructive governance) [7] ou expérimentation démocratique [8]. Elle repose sur des outils d’informations partenariales, l’échange de bonnes pratiques, le dialogue social, la délibération locale et la participation des parties prenantes. Comme le soulignent Simone Arnaldi de l’Université de Padoue et ses collègues, cette nouvelle gouvernance va plus loin que la délibération d’experts au sein d’agences ou de comités de réglementation européens, mais permet aux parties prenantes de participer directement aux processus décisionnels et fait de la participation du public une de ses caractéristiques essentielles. Un de ses défis majeurs consiste d’ailleurs à trouver un équilibre entre flexibilité et efficacité, en termes d’orientation comportementale des parties [9]. Alors que le principe de précaution reste lié à un espace dans lequel les positions s’affrontent, la RRI vise à changer le contexte en s’inscrivant dans une logique de coopération lorsqu’il s’agit de décisions sur les trajectoires d’innovation. Ainsi, la RRI motive les acteurs sociétaux à assumer volontairement une responsabilité précoce et partagée des processus de recherche et d’innovation au-delà du simple respect des devoirs ou de la conformité aux règles [10].

La nouvelle métamorphose de l’appellation « Science in Society » en « Science for Society, with Society » [11], ainsi que l’orientation de la Recherche et de l’Innovation vers les Grand Challenges sociétaux à la faveur de la Déclaration de Lund de juillet 2009 [12] a, pour Richard Owen et d’autres, constitué un vrai moment d’émergence, en particulier pour la RRI. Le professeur à l’Université de Bristol y voit la volonté de faciliter systématiquement l’engagement inclusif avec les objectifs, les motivations, les impacts attendus et les politiques d’innovation de la Commission et des acteurs associés. Ainsi la RRI s’affirme alors comme une innovation de processus, en proposant différentes manières d’organiser, de financer, d’entreprendre et de s’engager dans l’innovation et la recherche. Évolutive par nature, elle s’appuie sur des fondements comme l’évaluation des choix technologiques, l’engagement des parties prenantes et du public, la gouvernance anticipative, l’intégration sociotechnique, l’innovation ouverte, ainsi que sur des concepts apparentés comme le développement responsable [13]. L’intérêt de cette approche apparaît particulièrement pertinent pour la prospective de la R&I, surtout quand Owen écrit : à cet égard, la RRI reconnaît le pouvoir de transformation de l’innovation pour créer des futurs, le fait que les innovations sont souvent socialement et politiquement constituées et qu’elles intègrent des valeurs. La RRI s’efforce de manière proactive de créer des espaces et des processus permettant d’ouvrir ces futurs, le rôle de l’innovation dans leur création et les valeurs sur lesquelles ils reposent, à une discussion et à un débat inclusifs, et de répondre à ces discussions, c’est-à-dire à un processus délibératif, participatif, anticipatif et réflexif [14].

Dès lors, la RRI nous apparaît comme un cadre particulièrement pertinent pour déployer une prospective participative étendue aux citoyennes et citoyens. Comme la prospective, la RRI a capitalisé sur l’évaluation des choix technologiques (TA), a intégré les principes normatifs et éthiques de la technologie de conception et les principes de la gouvernance démocratique. Comme l’écrit Niklas Gudowsky, comprendre l’avenir est essentiel pour la RRI, et les activités de prospective font donc partie intégrante du concept. C’est pourquoi la prospective a été intégrée dans les boîtes à outils de la RRI [15].

 

2.2. Participation, inclusion et engagement dans la gouvernance de la R&I

Voici plus de 20 ans que des observateurs avertis notaient l’existence d’un véritable désir des citoyens de participer de manière importante aux développements scientifiques et technologiques en considérant que ces derniers ont des conséquences réelles pour les individus et la société. Ainsi, Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott et Michael Gibbons observaient le passage d’une culture de l’autonomie scientifique à une culture de l’imputabilité, bien que, notaient-ils, celle-ci soit encore trop réactive et risquait d’être interprétée de manière formaliste et bureaucratique [16].

Pour Kathy Sykes et Phil Macnaghten, respectivement professeurs à l’Université de Bristol et à Wageningen, l’engagement public a représenté une réponse capable d’aborder quatre dynamiques principales dans la relation entre la science et la société :

– la nouvelle politique de contestation de certains projets et visions technologiques, visible surtout lors de la croissance des mouvements environnementaux et antinucléaires à partir des années 1960 ;

– l’exigence pour les gouvernements et les parlements d’avoir une connaissance solide des impacts des nouvelles sciences et technologies afin de mieux anticiper leurs conséquences sociétales ;

– la nécessité perçue d’étendre les espaces de participation des citoyens, généralement par le biais de groupes organisés de la société civile, afin de rendre la gouvernance de la science et de la technologie plus responsable ;

– les demandes des communautés scientifiques pour améliorer la compréhension de la science par le public (PUS), où les conflits et les tensions sont supposés provenir de l’ignorance et de l’incompréhension du public [17].

Ne fut-ce que comme règle élémentaire de management, l’implication des parties prenantes et des autres acteurs intéressés dans la construction de politiques publiques constitue un principe fort inspirant la Commission européenne, y compris dans le domaine de la Recherche et de l’Innovation. Des textes de références y sont mobilisés ou en témoignent comme la Déclaration universelle des Droits humains [18], la Charte des Droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne [19] ou encore le Code de conduite sur les nanotechnologies [20].

Des efforts ont ainsi été fournis pour développer les moyens d’une communication et d’un dialogue constructif et plus efficace entre la recherche et les citoyens ainsi que pour permettre à la société d’exercer une influence sur la gouvernance de la science, de la technologie et de l’innovation. Dès 2002, une décision du Conseil européen prônait clairement ce développement [21]. Le passage du Sixième Programme-cadre vers le Septième avait d’ailleurs accentué cette volonté d’inclusivité et d’engagement du public en prônant l’utilisation du concept de Science in Society (SIS), en remplacement de l’initiative Science and Society. Ce champ d’action renouvelé comprenait la gouvernance, la communication, les questions sociales et éthiques autour de la science. Celle-ci était d’ailleurs comprise dans son sens le plus large du mot allemand Wissenschaft [22].

En 2009, le groupe d’expert MASIS chargé d’examiner pour la DG Recherche le rôle de la science dans la société s’interrogeait pour savoir quelles étaient les parties prenantes de la SIS en s’appuyant sur Stakeholder Theory de Freeman et Reed [23], puis en essayant de la dépasser. Néanmoins, les citoyens n’y apparaissaient pas en première ligne…

 Paysage des parties prenantes selon le groupe d’experts MASIS

Le groupe d’experts constatait que les citoyens sont de plus en plus concernés par l’Espace européen de la Recherche et par la science de manière plus générale [24]. Les experts identifiaient deux enjeux qui faisaient alors débat et le font encore dans une certaine mesure. Le premier enjeu posait la question de savoir si chaque citoyen devait être considéré comme une partie prenante dans le domaine de la science, déterminer les programmes de recherche et en évaluer les résultats. La tension peut être forte de considérer cette option dès lors que, notait le rapport, de nombreux scientifiques considèrent les citoyens (et aussi les élus, notaient-ils) comme des êtres irrationnels, peu capables de comprendre les travaux des scientifiques. D’un autre côté, les experts ne voyaient aucune raison valable d’exclure les citoyens des délibérations sur l’orientation et la valeur de la science. Ils considéraient que ce qui est important, c’est d’expérimenter des modes d’interaction et d’évaluer où ils peuvent mener. Le second enjeu d’implication citoyenne du groupe MASIS portait sur la distinction entre, d’une part, l’identification de l’intérêt public et la détermination des barrières (the boundary conditions) pour la science et la technologie et, d’autre part, l’association des réels acteurs, principalement les utilisateurs, dans l’élaboration des réelles technologies (produits, systèmes). Ainsi, les experts constataient que la notion de participation a un double sens :

Alors qu’à l’origine, il s’agissait d’une question relevant des théories de la démocratie, revendiquant un renouvellement de la démocratie représentative plus formelle et l’enrichissant par des formes de démocratie délibérative et interactive, il est désormais également utilisé pour décrire l’implication des usagers dans l’élaboration de technologies spécifiques, ce qui serait judicieux dans de nombreux cas, mais n’a pas grand-chose à voir avec la démocratie politique. La participation publique perd sa connotation traditionnelle et emphatique de démocratie délibérative et devient de plus en plus un moyen d’impliquer les usagers dans la conception de nouveaux produits, motivés par des besoins économiques plutôt que politiques. Nous ne plaidons pas pour ou contre l’une ou l’autre forme de participation, mais nous soulignons qu’il existe deux formes différentes de gouvernance dans ce domaine : via les institutions démocratiques au niveau politique et sur le marché via de nouvelles constellations d’ingénieurs, de scientifiques, d’utilisateurs et de citoyens. Les deux formes ont un rôle à jouer, mais leurs raisons d’être sont différentes [25].

Manifestement, la réflexion restait difficile [26] et devait se poursuivre. Comme cela avait été observé et mis en exergue dans le groupe MASIS, en principe, chaque personne dans la société est une partie prenante lorsqu’il s’agit du rôle de la science dans la société, néanmoins tous ces acteurs ne sont pas actifs [27].

La même année 2009, le groupe d’experts de la DG Recherche sur la Global Governance of Science, piloté par Žaneta Ozoliņa, professeur à l’Université de Lettonie, constatait que les développements destinés à impliquer le public dans la gouvernance de la science restaient embryonnaires [28]. Des initiatives intéressantes, mais parfois anciennes, étaient mentionnées comme les conférences consensus du Danemark [29], le programme Sciencewise du Royaume-Uni [30] et la délibération citoyenne Meeting of Minds sur la science du cerveau, menée à l’échelle de l’Union européenne [31]. La recommandation numéro 5 du groupe d’experts sur la gouvernance globale de la science était particulièrement liée à nos préoccupations : la recherche de l’Espace européen de la Recherche (ERA) devrait être développée de manière à promouvoir la réflexion critique et le débat sur les moyens et les fins de la science – par le biais, par exemple, de projets de recherche sélectifs et d’activités publiques qui nécessitent une collaboration interdisciplinaire et la participation des citoyens, y compris une réflexion sur la manière dont les principes de la gouvernance européenne et les droits fondamentaux de base servent de lignes directrices appropriées et applicables pour la pratique de la science [32].

Les dynamiques participatives (participation, inclusion, engagement) sont considérées comme importantes pour ouvrir la Recherche et l’Innovation au grand public, mais aussi pour accroître la connaissance, la légitimité et l’efficacité de la R&I pour autant que ces processus répondent à un certain nombre de critères. Roberti Gianni et Philippe Goujon observent sur base d’autres travaux et de quelques expériences qu’il serait naïf de voir la participation comme une panacée pour le développement légitime et efficace de la R&I alors qu’elle peut s’avérer faible en production, peut ouvrir la porte aux intérêts particuliers et à la manipulation ou ne pas avoir d’influence sur le processus décisionnel [33].

En s’appuyant notamment sur les travaux de Bert-Jaap Koops, professeur à l’Université de Tilburg, ainsi que sur ceux de plusieurs de ses collègues, portant sur les interactions entre le droit et les technologies, Gianni et Goujon mettent en évidence l’engagement des parties prenantes comme facteur commun et déterminant des pratiques de l’innovation responsable [34]. Ce que la participation, l’engagement et l’inclusion semblent avoir en commun est la nécessité principale d’être ouvert à des positions alternatives. Ces alternatives peuvent justifier l’existant, apporter des modifications ou proposer des perspectives différentes. Ce point est considéré comme crucial aux trois niveaux pris en compte : l’épistémique, le moral et le politique :

– le cadre épistémique : une croissance quantitative des connaissances pourrait conduire à une augmentation de la qualité globale de la production R&I ;

– d’un point de vue moral, l’inclusion d’acteurs externes dans le développement de la R&I constitue une ouverture aux demandes de la société et génère un niveau plus élevé de légitimité, voire aussi d’amélioration de l’efficacité d’un processus en augmentant les attentes d’acceptation des nouveaux produits par la société.

– d’un point de vue politique, un processus participatif répond aux revendications de démocratisation de la science.

Les deux chercheurs observent néanmoins qu’il faut distinguer le côté quantitatif de la participation du côté qualitatif. Cela implique que l’équation selon laquelle une augmentation de la quantité génère automatiquement une amélioration de la qualité pourrait s’avérer discutable. La participation ne doit pas être considérée comme une solution autonome et doit être définie en fonction de son objectif, de son influence réelle sur le processus décisionnel et du cadre sous-jacent [35].

Dans le cadre de la préparation du programme Horizon Europe, la Commission, mais aussi le Parlement et le Conseil ont, en 2018, clairement ouvert les portes à la participation citoyenne et de la société civile, mais aussi à la coconstruction de politiques publiques et collectives dans le domaine de recherche et d’innovation responsables :

Dans le but d’approfondir la relation entre la science et la société et de maximiser les avantages de leurs interactions, le programme devrait engager et impliquer les citoyens et les organisations de la société civile dans la co-conception et la co-création d’agendas et de contenus de recherche et d’innovation responsables, la promotion de l’enseignement des sciences, l’accès public aux connaissances scientifiques et la facilitation de la participation des citoyens et des organisations de la société civile à ses activités. Il devrait le faire dans l’ensemble du programme et par le biais d’activités spécifiques dans la partie « Renforcement de l’Espace européen de la recherche ». L’engagement des citoyens et de la société civile dans la recherche et l’innovation devrait être associé à des activités de sensibilisation du public afin de générer et de maintenir le soutien du public au programme. Le programme devrait également s’efforcer de supprimer les obstacles et de renforcer les synergies entre la science, la technologie, la culture et les arts afin d’obtenir une nouvelle qualité d’innovation durable [36].

La co-construction vise l’inclusion des acteurs parties prenantes dans les processus de management de projet que ce soit dans les organisations, les associations ou les collectivités territoriales. Selon cette approche, la définition du projet et sa mise en œuvre résultent d’un travail collectif incluant tous les acteurs concernés.

Ainsi, la co-construction peut être brièvement définie comme un processus de management de projet par lequel des acteurs différents exposent puis confrontent leurs points de vue et cherchent à élaborer une définition partagée au travers de compromis et s’accordent sur cette dernière [37].

Cette méthodologie est particulièrement adaptée pour construire des interventions associant aux élus des organisations, des entreprises, des collectivités territoriales ainsi que des citoyennes et citoyens et visant à transformer la société. Ces interventions vont de la conception à la mise en œuvre et à l’évaluation partenariale. En effet, les enjeux des politiques publiques et collectives deviennent de plus en plus complexes, aucun acteur ne pouvant à lui seul maitriser l’ensemble des dimensions constitutives d’un projet. De plus, ce management permet de répondre à la demande croissante des acteurs, citoyens-usagers à l’élaboration des décisions qui pourraient affecter leur vie ou la trajectoire de leur organisation ou de leur territoire [38]. Pour les acteurs, participer à la co-construction démocratique des politiques publiques n’est pas faire du lobbying. Dans le lobbying, la partie prenante concernée cherche légitimement à convaincre les élus de prendre une décision politique à son avantage. Dans la coconstruction démocratique, les parties prenantes délibèrent, ensemble et avec les décideurs, pour construire un compromis et une politique visant l’intérêt général. Dans la logique de coconstruction, la participation des acteurs de la société civile a une portée décisionnelle et pas seulement consultative, ce qui veut dire qu’elle a un impact sur le contenu des connaissances ou des politiques. La  relation entre les élus et les acteurs de la société civile demeure néanmoins asymétrique, c’est-à-dire à l’avantage des élus qui ont le dernier mot [39].

Au-delà de la mobilisation et de l’implication des parties prenantes concernées, la coconstruction démocratique doit permettre de créer les conditions d’une délibération productive qui débouche sur des décisions de politiques publiques pertinentes. Ce travail suppose une méthodologie robuste. Les méthodes d’écoute, d’animation, de médiation et de production développées, testées et construites au profit de la prospective stratégique et opérationnelle peuvent être mobilisées très heureusement dans le cadre de cette coconstruction.

 

2.3. La compréhension et l’évaluation des mécanismes de participation

De récents efforts menés dans le domaine de l’évaluation des choix technologiques (TA) pour inclure le public dans ces travaux peut apporter des éclairages utiles sur les mécanismes de participation. Les initiatives de clarifications de ces questions prises dans le cadre de l’ECAST (Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and Technology) sont intéressantes dans la mesure où les chercheurs essaient d’articuler les apports des citoyens et ceux des experts. Ainsi, sur base de près de 40 délibérations citoyennes menées surtout aux États-Unis, de 2012 à 2021, dans divers domaines liés aux technologies, à la biodiversité, au climat, à la défense, les auteurs discutent concepts, méthodes et pratiques nées de ces expériences. Ce qui nous intéresse probablement le plus pour notre démarche de prospective en R&I, c’est la typologie des acteurs établie par les auteurs. Ils ont en effet le mérite d’avoir apporté des définitions à des catégories dont les frontières sont parfois floues ou mal établies:

– les experts : les personnes qui étudient la science ou la technologie au cœur d’une question sociotechnique donnée. Il s’agit notamment de spécialistes des sciences physiques et naturelles, d’ingénieurs et d’autres professionnels qui mènent des recherches techniques ou développent une technologie. Sont également inclus les spécialistes des sciences sociales, les sciences humaines et les autres chercheurs qui étudient l’impact sociétal d’une science ou d’une technologie donnée, ainsi que les fonctionnaires des agences fédérales qui jouent un rôle dans l’élaboration des connaissances techniques et la manière dont elles sont utilisées.

– les parties prenantes : les acteurs du gouvernement, des organisations non gouvernementales, des organisations philanthropiques et de l’industrie qui ne sont pas directement impliqués dans le développement d’une technologie, mais qui se considèrent tout de même comme concernés par les résultats. Nous distinguons ces acteurs des membres du grand public. Ces acteurs disposent déjà de voies formelles pour influencer les décisions relatives aux questions sociotechniques par le biais de groupes de défense, de lobbying ou d’autres canaux politiques.

– les citoyens : les membres du grand public qui n’ont pas d’intérêt formel dans une question. L’utilisation du terme « citoyen » n’est pas liée au statut légal de citoyenneté d’un individu, mais souligne plutôt le rôle de l’individu en tant qu’acteur non expert dans une société démocratique.

Les auteurs reconnaissent bien sûr que les parties prenantes ont leur propre forme d’expertise. Ils distinguent l’expertise contributive des « experts », c’est-à-dire la capacité de contribuer à la science d’un domaine, de l’expertise interactionnelle des parties prenantes, une compréhension du contexte et de la communauté dans laquelle le travail est mené. Ils notent également que certaines personnes peuvent posséder les deux formes d’expertise [40].

De son côté, Archon Fung a développé un cadre pour tenter de comprendre l’éventail des possibilités institutionnelles de la participation citoyenne. Le professeur à la JFK School of Government à Harvard considère que les mécanismes de participation au travers de trois dimensions :

– qui participe ;

– comment les participants communiquent entre eux et prennent des décisions ensemble, et – comment les discussions sont liées aux politiques publiques et à l’action ;

Cette approche permet d’aborder les enjeux importants de la gouvernance démocratique tels que la légitimité, la justice et l’efficacité de l’administration [41].

Afin d’évaluer la participation, Fung propose de l’analyser selon les deux principaux aspects que sont la sélection des participants et la communication ou l’influence sur la prise de décision découlant de ces processus. La sélection des participants peut comprendre huit niveaux différents, allant du plus exclusif (administrateurs experts) au plus englobant (sphère publique).

Méthodes de sélection des participants selon Archon Fung

Fung identifie six modes de communication et de prise de décision dans les exercices participatifs.

  1. La grande majorité des personnes n’expriment pas du tout leurs opinions, sont spectateurs pour recevoir des informations.
  2. Un certain nombre de citoyens et de militants sont là pour exprimer d’emblée leur opinion.
  3. Un certain nombre de personnes vont s’investir dans les processus qui sont déployés pour analyser et mettre en débat des alternatives puis se positionner, parfois sur des compromis.

Ces trois premiers modes ne débouchent guère sur des choix collectifs, au-delà du témoignage des participants.

Trois autres modes de décision sont utilisés :

Modes de communication et de prise de décision selon Archon Fung

  1. L’agrégation et le marchandage (aggregation and bargaining) : l’exploration et les concessions du marchandage permettent aux participants de trouver les meilleures alternatives disponibles pour faire avancer les préférences communes qu’ils ont.
  2. Délibération et négociation : des processus basés sur du matériel éducatif et des échanges permettent de déboucher sur des options communes, de clarifier les dissensions et de faire émerger des accords de principe.
  3. Déploiement de l’expertise technique de fonctionnaires dont la formation et la spécialisation professionnelle permettent la résolution de problèmes particuliers. Ce mode n’implique généralement pas les citoyens.

Fung introduit également une approche fondée sur le niveau d’autorité et de pouvoir qui est assigné aux participants. Alors que, rarement, certains mécanismes de participation permettent l’exercice d’un pouvoir direct, dans d’autres cas, les citoyens participent à une gouvernance partenariale avec des fonctionnaires pour élaborer et développer des stratégies d’action publique.

Niveaux de pouvoir et d’autorité attribué par Fung aux participants

Dans la figure ci-dessous, Fung illustre les différences de conception institutionnelle entre les audiences publiques classiques et les initiatives telles que les groupes délibératifs et les cercles d’étude. Presque toutes ces initiatives tentent d’améliorer la représentativité des participants, soit par une sélection aléatoire, soit par un recrutement ciblé, ce qui est indiqué par la flèche bleue dans la figure. Tous visent également à rendre les discussions entre les participants plus informées et réfléchies, ce qui est indiqué par la flèche verte.

Cadre de délibération à la légitimité renforcée d’Archon Fung

 

2.4. La réflexivité et l’encapacitation comme corolaires qualitatifs à la participation

Avons-nous encore besoin de convoquer Goethe, qui a donné une voix aux inquiétudes qui poussent à l’objectivité mécanique lorsqu’il prêchait la prudence dans l’interprétation des résultats expérimentaux ? Sa pensée nous rappelle les dangers de la recherche, ceux qui menacent ceux qui mettent la main à la science :

On ne saurait donc se tenir assez en garde contre les conséquences prématurées que l’on tire si souvent des expériences; car c’est en passant de l’observation au jugement, de la connaissance d’un fait à son application, que l’homme se trouve à l’entrée d’un défilé où l’attendent tous ses ennemis intérieurs, l’imagination, l’impatience, la précipitation, l’amour-propre, l’entêtement, la forme des idées, les opinions préconçues, la paresse, la légèreté, l’amour du changement, et mille autres encore dont les noms m’échappent. Ils sont tous là, placés en embuscade, et surprennent également l’homme de la vie pratique et l’observateur calme et tranquille qui semble à l’abri de toute passion [42].

La recherche contemporaine nous adresse au moins deux messages. D’une part, celui de la rigueur. Celle-ci consiste d’abord à savoir de quoi on parle, quel est le problème, ce que l’on cherche. Ce positionnement nécessite non seulement une culture générale, une expérience, mais aussi un apprentissage sur le sujet. C’est une phase de tout processus de recherche, mais aussi de participation à une consultation ou à un processus délibératif, y compris prospectif. Le deuxième message nous renvoie à la relativité, à l’objectivité face au sujet ainsi qu’à l’interprétation de l’expérience. Si la passion qui souvent motive positivement le chercheur peut aussi en être son ennemi intérieur, comme en préserver le citoyen, l’acteur, la partie prenante qui participent à un processus de recherche et d’innovation ?

Par réflexivité, Brian Wynne entend des processus plus systématiques d’exploration des engagements préalables encadrant la connaissance, de la manière dont elle a été introduite dans les débats sociologiques sur la modernité, plutôt que le principe plus méthodologique-épistémologique de cohérence tel qu’il a été développé en sociologie des sciences [43]. Le chercheur de l’Université de Lancaster considère que le cadrage dominant de la question de la compréhension de la science par le public correspond à des hypothèses plus larges sur la relation entre la science et les profanes. Ces derniers sont supposés être essentiellement défensifs, réfractaires au risque et à l’incertitude, et non réflexifs. Wynne remarque qu’à l’inverse, la science est censée être l’exemple même de l’autocritique réflexive. Il montre que les citoyens ont des difficultés à se positionner intellectuellement à l’égard de la science et les institutions scientifiqus. Ces institutions font preuve d’une très profonde résistance à reconnaître et remettre en question les modèles qui structurent leurs discours scientifiques [44].

La participation de citoyens à la recherche et à l’innovation implique non seulement la capacité de mobiliser des connaissances utiles au fil du processus engagé, mais aussi, comme pour tout acteur de la R&I, de pouvoir objectiver la place qui est la leur au sein d’un dispositif, de les interroger et de les faire s’interroger sur les conditions sociales de leur production intellectuelle. Ainsi, l’empowerment et la réflexivité apparaissent comme des corollaires de leur implication dans le but d’améliorer la qualité des produits de sortie des exercices et travaux. Il ne fait aucun doute que ces points sont cruciaux et plaident en faveur d’une approche prospective solide où la clarté est réalisée sur le rôle de chacun des acteurs au sein du système analysé, où l’ambiguïté des concepts est levée de telle sorte que le dialogue puisse se réaliser dde manière rationnelle, où enfin, l’utilisation du long terme permet de mettre à distance les trajectoires personnelles au profit de la recherche d’un intérêt commun au profit de la société tout entière et des générations à venir.

Ainsi, revient-on également sur les bases d’une heuristique qui comporte, d’une part, sa capacité à identifier les sources d’une production intellectuelle  de qualité, correspondant aux besoins de la recherche et aux exigences de légitimation de la communauté scientifique et, d’autre part, une méthode de tri permettant de distinguer le vrai du faux, de construire une véritable critique des sources et de mettre en cause pour les écarter ce qui ne correspond pas aux standards de l’honnêteté et de la raison [45]. La prospective, comme véritable « machine à se poser des questions », à la fois manière de penser et manière de faire est bien une heuristique, source potentielle de créativité. Ainsi, comme théorie de l’action, praxéologie, on observe que deux processus encadrent la prospective : le processus de rationalité et le processus de créativité. La méthodologie permet de stimuler l’une ou l’autre [46].

Si les processus participatifs sont largement reconnus comme des composantes fructueuses des approches de gouvernance actuelles, ils ne sont pas toujours suffisants pour établir une solide légitimité du processus de R&I. La réflexivité apparaît comme un renfort qualitatif indispensable à la participation des parties prenantes, mais aussi de l’ensemble du processus de Recherche et d’Innovation. Agissant à un niveau épistémique, la réflexivité constitue un outil permettant d’améliorer la qualité des connaissances disponibles pour les chercheurs et les innovateurs ainsi que pour les citoyens. Outil opérationnel crucial pour accroître la contribution d’un individu au développement de la recherche et de l’innovation, elle constitue aussi un argument pour surmonter les logiques paternalistes qui conçoivent les citoyens comme incompétents ou incapables d’évaluer les résultats de la science. Ainsi, la réflexivité a pour vocation d’ajouter une couche qualitative à la participation et d’orienter consciemment le processus de R&I, en augmentant son efficacité et sa légitimité [47].

 

A suivre : 3. Prospective, R&I et engagement citoyen : surmonter les ambiguïtés

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] Simon L. LEWIS, Mark A. MASLIN, Definiting the Antropocene, in Nature, Vol. 519 (2), 2015, p. 128-146. https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14258 – Rémi BEAU & Catherine LARRERE, Penser l’Anthropocène, Paris, Presses de SciencesPo – Fondation de l’Écologie politique, 2018.

[2] Ph. DESTATTE, Foresight: A Major Tool in tackling Sustainable Development, in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Volume 77, Issue 9, November 2010, p. 1575-1587.

PhilippeDestatte_Foresight_as_a_major_tool_for_Sustainable_Development_TFSC-2010

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0040162510001538

[3] In this sense, Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is a fairly recent framework aimed at creating a meaningful and fruitful dialectic between technical and economic ambitions (R&I) and the normative claims present in or arising from society. Robert GIANNI et Philippe GOUJON, What are the conditions for the ethical implementation of RRI?, Responsible governance and second-ordre reflexivity, in Robert GIANNI, John PEARSON and Bernard REBER, Responsible Research and Innovation, From concepts to practices, p. 172-173, Routledge Studies in Innovation, Organizations and Technology, Routledge, 2020.

[4] Simone ARNALDI, Guido GORGONI & Elena PARIOTTI, Responsible Research and Innovation between « New Governance » and fundamental rights, in Robert GIANNI, John PEARSON and Bernard REBER, Responsible Research and Innovation, From concepts to practices, p. 154, Routledge Studies in Innovation, Organizations and Technology, Routledge, 2020.

[5] Responsible Research and Innovation is a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products. René von SCHOMBERG, A vision of responsible research and innovation, in Richard OWEN, John BESSANT and Maggy HEINTZ ed., Responsible Innovation. Managing the Responsible Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society, p. 51-74, Hoboken NJ, John Wiley & Sons, 2013. – Mirjam BURGET, Emanuele BARDONE, Margus PEDASTE, Definitions and conceptual dimensions of responsible research and innovation: a literature review, in Science and
Engineering Ethics, Vol. 23 (1), 2017, p. 1–19. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-016-9782-1

[6] Challenging Futures of Science in Society, Emerging Trends and Cutting-Edge Issues, Monitoring Activities of Science in Society in Europe Experts Group (MASIS), European Commission, Directorate-General for Research, Luxembourg, 2009.

[7] Zaneta OZOLINA, Carl MITCHAM, Jack STILGOE, Global Governance of Science, Report of the Expert Group on Global Governance of Science to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, p. 17, Brussels, Directorate-General for Research, European Commission, 2009.

[8] Erika SZYSZCAK, Experimental governance: The open method of coordination, in European Law Journal, vol. 12 (4), 2006, p. 486-502. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2006.00329.x

[9] Simone ARNALDI, Guido GORGONI & Elena PARIOTTI, Responsible Research and Innovation between « New Governance » and fundamental rights…, p. 156-157. – Simone ARNALDI & Luca BIANCHI, Responsibility in Science and Technology, Wiesbaden, Springer, 2016.

[10] S. ARNALDI ea, Responsible Research and Innovation between « New Governance » and fundamental rights…, p. 159.

[11] Niamh DELANEY, Zeno TORNASI, Raluca IAGHER, Roberta MONACHELLO, Colombe WARIN, Science with and for Society in Horizon 2020, Achievements and Recommendations for Horizon Europe, European Commission, Directorate for Research and Innovation, 2020.

[12] Lund Declaration, Conference: New Worlds, New Solutions. Research and Innovation as a Basis for Developing Europe in a Global Context, Lund, Sweden, 7–8 July 2009.

https://www.vr.se/download/18.6969eb1a16a5bec8b59338/1556886570218/Lund%20Declaration%202009.pdf

[13] Richard OWEN, Responsible Research and Innovation, Options for research and innovation policy in the EU, 2014.

Cliquer pour accéder à RRI-option-of-policy-in-EU.pdf

[14] In this regard RRI acknowledges the transformative power of innovation to create futures, that innovations are often socially and politically constituted and that they embed values. RRI pro-actively seeks to create spaces and processes to allow these futures, the role of innovation in creating them, and the values on which they are based, to be opened up to inclusive discussion and debate, and for such discussions to be responded to i.e. as a deliberative, participatory, anticipatory and reflexive process. Ibidem, p. 3.

[15] Niklas GUDDOWSKY & Walter PEISSI, Human centred science and technology – transdisciplinary foresight and co-creation as tools for active needs-based innovation governance, in European Journal of Futures Research, Vol. 4, (8), 2016. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40309-016-0090-4

[16] Helga NOWOTNY, Peter B. SCOTT and Michaël T. GIBBONS, Re-Thinking Science: Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 118-119, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001.

[17] Kathy SYKES. and Phil MACNAGHTEN, Responsible Innovation, Opening Up Dialogue and Debate, in Richard OWEN, John BESSANT and Maggy HEINTZ ed., Responsible Innovation. Managing the Responsible Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society, p. 85–107, Hoboken NJ, John Wiley & Sons, 2013.- Phil MACNAGHTEN, The Making of Responsible Innovation, Cambridge University Press, 2020. Robert GIANNI et Philippe GOUJON, p. 84-185.

[18] Universal Declaration of Human Right, Article 27: 1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of his community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

[19] Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (2012/C 326/02).

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN

[20] Commission Recommandation on a Code of Conduct for responsible nanosciences and nanotechnologies research, February 7, 2009 C(2008) 424. https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/fp7/89918/nanocode-recommendation_en.pdf – Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies: An Action plan for Europe 2005-2009, Second Implementation Report 2007-2009, Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, (SEC(2009)1468, Brussels, 29.10.2009.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0607:FIN:EN:PDF

[21] This programme will (…) develop the means for more constructive and effective communication and dialogue between research and citizens in general, so as to enable society at large to have a better-informed and more constructive influence on the future development and governance of science, technology and innovation. European Council decision of 30 September 2002 adopting a specific programme for research, technological development and demonstration: « structuring the European Research Area » (2002–2006), p. 4, 2002/835/EC.

[22] Challenging Futures of Science in Society, Emerging Trends and Cutting-Edge Issues, (MASIS)…, p. 6 & 7.

[23] Edward R. FREEMAN and David L. REED, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A new perspective on Corporate Governance in California Management Review, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 1983, p. 88‐106.

[24] Challenging Futures of Science in Society, Emerging Trends and Cutting-Edge Issues, (MASIS)…, p. 4 et 10.

[25] While initially it was an issue in theories of democracy, claiming a renewal of the more formal representative democracy and enriching it by forms of a deliberative and interactive democracy, it is now also used to describe the involvement of users in the shaping of specific technologies which would be sensible in many cases but does not have much to do with political democracy. Public participation loses its traditional and emphatic connotation of deliberative democracy and becomes more and more a means of involving users in the design of new products, driven by economic rather than political needs. We are not arguing for or against one or other form of participation, but we are highlighting that there are two different forms of governance in this field: via democratic institutions at the political level and in the marketplace via new constellations of engineers, scientists, users and citizens. Both forms have a role to play, but their rationales are different. Challenging Futures of Science in Society, (MASIS)…, p. 22-24.

[26] One can find the same skepticism in Brian WYNNE dir., Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously, Report of the Expert Group on Science and Governance to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, p. 58sv (New European Regimes of Public Engagement), Directorate-General for Research. European Commission, Brussels, January 2007.

[27] Ibidem, p. 20.

[28] Zaneta OZOLINA, Carl MITCHAM, Jack STILGOE, Global Governance of Science, Report of the Expert Group on Global Governance of Science to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, p. 29, Brussels, Directorate-General for Research, European Commission, 2009.

[29] Lars KLÜVER, Consensus Conferences in the Danish Board of Technology, in Simon JOSS and John DURANT eds., Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe, p. 41-49,London, Science Museum, 1995. – John S. DRYZEK and Aviezer TUCKER, Deliberative Innovation to Different Effect: Consensus Conferences in Denmark, France, and the United States, in Public Administration Review, vol. 68, no. 5 (2008), p. 864–76. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.00928.x

[30] Sciencewise, Supporting socially informed policy making. https://sciencewise.org.uk/

[31] The link on Cordis is lost but the evaluation was done by Professor Ortwin Renn’s team : European Citizen’s Deliberation on Brain Science (ECD) project, https://www.dialogik-expert.de/en/projects/meeting-of-minds

[32] ERA research should be developed to promote critical reflection and discussion with regard to both the means and ends of science – by means, e.g., of selective research projects and public activities that require interdisciplinary collaboration and citizen participation, including reflection of the ways in which the principles of European governance and basic fundamental rights serve as appropriate and applicable guidelines for the practice of science. Z. OZOLINA e.a., Global Governance of Science…, p. 42.

[33] R. GIANNI & Ph. GOUJON, op. cit., p. 184 & 190.

[34] Bert-Jaap KOOPS, Ilse OOSTERLAKEN, Henny ROMIJN, Tsjalling SWIERSTRA, Jeroen VAN den HOVEN ed., Responsible Innovation 2: Concepts, Approaches and Applications, p. 5, Dordrecht, Springer 2015.

[35] Participation should not be considered as an self-standing solution and needs to be defined in terms of its objective, actual influence in the decision-making process and underlying framework. R. GIANNI & Ph. GOUJON, op. cit., p. 185.

[36] With the aim of deepening the relationship between science and society and maximising benefits of their interactions, the Programme should engage and involve citizens and civil society organisations in co-designing and co-creating responsible research and innovation agendas and contents, promoting science education, making scientific knowledge publicly accessible, and facilitating participation by citizens and civil society organisations in its activities. It should do so across the Programme and through dedicated activities in the part ‘Strengthening the European Research Area’. The engagement of citizens and civil society in research and innovation should be coupled with public outreach activities to generate and sustain public support for the Programme. The programme should also seek to remove barriers and boost synergies between science, technology, culture and the arts to obtain a new quality of sustainable innovation. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, Brussels, June 7, 2018. COM/2018/435 final. (26) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0435&from=EN

[37] Pour être plus précis, on dira avec Michel Foudriat que la co-construction peut se définir comme un processus par lequel un ensemble d’acteurs différents :

– expriment et confrontent les points de vue qu’ils ont sur le fonctionnement organisationnel, sur leur représentation de l’avenir d’un territoire, sur une innovation technique, sur une problématique de connaissance ;

– s’engagent dans un processus d’intercompréhension des points de vue respectifs et de recherche de convergence entre ceux-ci ;

– cherchent à trouver un accord sur des traductions de leurs points de vue qu’ils ne jugeraient pas incompatibles entre elles pour arrêter un accord (un compromis) sur un objet matériel (une innovation technique, un nouveau produit industriel) ou immatériel (un projet). Concrètement, le processus de construction aboutit à un document formel qui devient la traduction acceptable et acceptée par les différents acteurs parties prenantes.

Michel FOUDRIAT, La co-construction en actes, Comment l’analyser et la mettre en œuvre, p. 17-18, Paris, ESF, 2021. – M. FOUDRIAT, La Co-construction. Une alternative managériale, Rennes, Presses de l’EHESP, 2016.

[38] Ibidem.

[39] Yves VAILLANCOURT, De la co-construction des connaissances et des politiques publiques, dans SociologieS, 23 mai 2019, 39sv. http://journals.openedition.org/sociologies/11589 – Y. Vaillancourt, La co-construction des politiques publiques. L’apport des politiques sociales, dans Bouchard M. J. (dir.), L’Économie sociale vecteur d’innovation. L’expérience du Québec, p. 115-143, Québec, Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2011. – Y. Vaillancourt, La co-construction des politiques publiques : balises théoriques, dans L. Gardin & F. Jany-Catrice dir., L’Économie sociale et solidaire en coopérations, Rennes, p. 109-116,  Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2016.

[40] Leah R. KAPLAN, Mahmud FAROOQUE, Daniel SAREWITZ and David TOMBLIN, Designing Participatory Technology Assessments: A Reflexive Method for Advancing the Public Role in Science Policy Decision-making, in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 171, October 2021.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162521004066?casa_token=FVIz2ifcDnIAAAAA:CVqvotCDx5853FuLs7GPFUuAaxqRdP87H5U1JHMcMiv3aauUQ7L_g3SxGIt6IfwnagVigQO9Geq9 – Harry M. COLLINS & Robert EVANS, The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience, in Social Studies of Science, vol. 32, (2), June 29, 2016. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0306312702032002003

[41] Archon FUNG, Varieties of participation in complex governance, in Public Administration Review, Dec. 2006, Vol. 66 (Special Issue 1), p. 66–75. https://faculty.fiu.edu/~revellk/pad3003/Fung.pdf

[42] Johann Wolfgang GOETHE, Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt, in Goethe’s Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe, p. 13, Munich, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2002, p. 10-2). https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/goethe/nat92-97/chap011.html

https://www.natureinstitute.org/article/goethe/experiment-as-mediator-of-object-and-subject – Johann Wolfgang Goethe, The Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject (1792, publ. 1823) , in J. W. GOETHE, Scientific Studies, ed. and trans. Douglas Miller, p. 14, New York, Suhrkamp,1988. – Lorraine DASTON, The moral Economy of Science, in Osiris, 10, 1995, p. 18-23. https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2276978/component/file_3321600/content – Nicolas CLASS, Goethe et la méthode de la science, in Astérion, vol. 3, 2005. http://journals.openedition.org/asterion/413 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/asterion.413

[43] Pierre Bourdieu observait en 1993 qu’adopter le point de vue de la réflexivité ne constitue pas un renoncement à l’objectivité. C’est travailler à rendre compte du sujet empirique dans les termes mêmes de l’objectivité construite par le sujet scientifique, notamment en le situant en un lieu déterminé de l’espace-temps social. Pour le sociologue français, il s’agit alors de « se donner la conscience et la maîtrise des contraintes qui peuvent s’exercer sur le sujet  à travers tous les liens qui l’attachent au sujet empirique, à ses intérêts, à ses pulsions, à ses présupposés – liens qu’il doit rompre pour se constituer pleinement« .Pierre BOURDIEU, Réflexivité narcissique et réflexivité scientifique (1993), dans P. BOURDIEU, Retour sur la réflexivité,  p. 58, Paris, EHESS, 2022.

[44] Brian WYNNE, Public uptake of science: a case for institutional reflexivity, in Public Understanding of Science, Vol.  2 (4), 1993, p. 321–337. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1088/0963-6625/2/4/003 – See also: B. WYNNE, Elephants in the rooms where public encounter « science »?, A response to Darrin Durant, Accounting for expertise: Wynne and the autonomy of the lay public, in Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 17, 2008, p. 21-33.

https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/22453/ssoar-2008-1-wynne-elephants_in_the_rooms_where.pdf;jsessionid=CE7E52866567FBD3F6C80011B6C8DE0F?sequence=1

[45] Daniel KAHNEMAN, Olivier SIBONY and Cass R. SUNSTEIN, Noise, A flaw in Human Judgment, p. 166-167, New York – Boston – London, Little Brown Spark, 2021. – Philippe DESTATTE, Les opinions partiales altèrent la rectitude du jugement, Heuristique et critique des sources dans les sciences, Conférence présentée à la Salle académique de l’Université de Mons, dans le cadre du Réseau EUNICE, le 21 octobre 2021, Blog PhD2050, 1er novembre 2021. https://phd2050.org/2021/11/01/heuristique/

[46] Pierre GONOD , Conférence faite à la Plateforme d’Intelligence territoriale wallonne, Namur, Institut Destrée, 19 mai 2009. – P. GONOD, Dynamique des systèmes et méthodes prospectives, p. 35-36, coll. Travaux et recherches de prospective, Paris, 1996.

[47] R. GIANNI & Ph. GOUJON, op. cit., p. 189.

Namur (Wallonia), May 5, 2023

The Regional Policy Declaration of 16 September 2019 indicated the desire of the Government of Wallonia to implement risk management tools to warn and react quickly in crises and during climate and health hazards [1]. The declaration also stated that measures would be adopted to protect water resources, particularly in the face of contamination risks, the need to maintain and develop natural wetland habitats, and supply problems [2]. There was also a need to anticipate other types of risks, such as digital and health risks (exposure to flooding [3]), risks leading to the exclusion and poverty [4], and chemical risks (phytosanitary [5]).

The major events experienced by Wallonia since the adoption of this document – the Covid-19 pandemic, climate stresses (brutal floods in 2021 with nearly 40 deaths, drought in 2022), and the multifactor energy crisis – have challenged all actors and citizens. The impacts of these events were, and still are, significant, even if they have been felt and experienced differently according to stakeholders and location. The pandemic did not affect the various regions in the same way: it had a greater impact on regions with higher population density, the flood-affected valleys where the presence of significant urbanisation and the resulting creation of artificial ground coverings was called into question, and the drought and heatwaves affected countryside and urban areas in different ways. In addition to housing density, there are other vulnerabilities and risk exposure factors, such as increasing age, the low socio-economic level of many residents, and their ability to meet the challenges, in other words, their resilience. There are also structural risk management issues across all sectors and at all administrative levels [6]. Location is also critical where the effects of the energy crisis are concerned: heating costs, travel costs, access to fossil fuels and renewable energies, etc. One could also examine the impacts of terrorism – which sometimes seems to have emerged from our intellectual outlook – in the light of location.

Photo Igor Kutnii – Dreamstime

 

1. The risks are associated with perfectly describable events

Twenty years ago, Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe observed that the notion of risk is closely linked to the notion of rational decision-making. In their view, rational decision-making requires three conditions to be met before the decision-maker can draw comparisons between the options available to them. Firstly, there is the ability to draw up an exhaustive list of the available options. Next, for each option, the decision-maker must be able to describe the elements and entities that make up the world assumed by that option. Finally, an inventory must be produced of the significant interactions that are likely occur between the various elements and entities. Consequently, the authors highlight the notion of possible states of the world, which are like the scenarios used by futurists [7].

With some adjustments and amendments, the recommendations made by the OECD in its report entitled Boosting Resilience through Innovative Risk Governance (2014) could serve as the basis for a new approach to regional and territorial development matters:

– promoting future-oriented risk governance and taking account of complex risks;

– emphasising the role of trust and highlighting the long-term action taken by the public authorities to protect the population;

– adoption of a common definition of acceptable risk levels by stakeholders at all levels;

– defining an optimal array of tangible and intangible resilience measures (infrastructure measures and planning measures, for instance);

– adopting a whole society approach in order to involve all stakeholders in boosting resilience;

– acknowledging the important role played by institutions and institutional blocks in the effectiveness of risk management measures in order to increase resilience levels;

– using diagnostic frameworks to identify institutional barriers and to restructure incentives to promote resilience [8].

In Risk Society, the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1944-2015) went further, pointing out that risks were not only about the consequences and damage that occur, but that they could also indicate a future that had to be prevented from happening. Our awareness of the risk lies not in the present but principally in the future, he writes [9]. Futurists know this: they manipulate the wild cards to identify the jokers that may appear in our trajectory, and they use them as stress tests for the system and as a means of measuring the extent to which such events can be transformed into genuine opportunities to implement a desirable vision of the future.

 

2. Uncertainty, the product of our ignorance

Although the terms risk and uncertainty are often used interchangeably, they are not the same. Risk indicates a clearly defined danger associated with the occurrence of a perfectly describable event or series of events; it is not known if such events will occur, but it is known that they may occur [10]. Where statistical tools can be employed, risk is defined as the probability of an undesirable or unwanted event occurring and the scale of the impact of such an occurrence on the variable or system according to its vulnerability. Therefore, in addition to the probability factor regarding an event occurring, there is also a severity factor regarding the consequences of the event. This results in a third, subjective, factor which, based on the first two factors, assesses, and possibly quantifies the level of risk [11].

It is because the notion of risk plays a central role in the theory of rational decision-making and in the choice it assumes between several states of the world, or scenarios, that it is sensible – as stated by Callon et al. – to reserve its use for such perfectly codified situations [12]. Consequently, in uncertain situations, use of this notion of risk makes it impossible to list and to precisely describe either the options available to the decision-maker or the possible states of the world through which reliable foresight can be developed.

Uncertainty is the product of our incomplete knowledge of the state of the world – past, present or future –, observe the economists John Kay (University of Oxford) and Mervyn King (London School of Economics) [13]. Frequently, as highlighted by their French colleague Philippe Silberzahn, uncertainty results not from our difficulty in acquiring information, but from the fact that this information does not exist – or not yet [14]. The fundamental inability to predict the result of the change based on probability diverts us from risk culture. In his work Noise, A Flaw on Human Judgment, Daniel Kahneman, winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics, uses the concepts of objective ignorance (the absolute limit of our ability to predict), imperfect information (what could be known but is not), and irreducible uncertainty (what it is impossible to know). This form of semantic radicalisation, in which Kahneman, a professor at Princeton, uses the word ignorance where we generally use uncertainty, allows him to limit the confusion with noise. Noise, which can be conceived as random dispersal, is also a form of uncertainty. It affects not only the state of the world, but also the judgments we make. Kahneman also uses this semantic change to warn us that we systematically underestimate objective ignorance, and therefore uncertainty. The internal signal is a self-administered reward, one people work hard (or sometimes not so hard) to achieve when they reach closure on a judgment. It is a satisfying emotional experience, a pleasing sense of coherence, in which the evidence considered and the judgment reached feel right [15].

In a broadened natural, political, economic, social and cultural space and a complex world, the constant emergence [16] of new factors and actors makes it impossible to build up and to have at our disposal reasonable, if not complete, knowledge of the environment and its effects – including disruptive effects – on the system and, therefore, of how the system will evolve.

 

3. Dealing with uncertainty

As the authors of Acting in an uncertain world have shown, in uncertain situations, foresight is impossible for decision-makers due to a lack of specific knowledge about the behaviours and interactions of the elements that make up the system, and of the actors and factors that constitute the environment. But ignorance is not inevitable and thinking in terms of uncertainty will in itself help to facilitate better understanding [17].

Ignorance is not new, and it did not emerge in the 21st century. What is new, and hopefully increasing, is awareness of this ignorance. However, as highlighted in a text produced back in 1982 by Daniel Kahneman and his psychologist colleague from Stanford University Amos Tversky (1937-1996), uncertainty is a fact with which all forms of life must be prepared to contend. For Kahneman and Tversky, the inventors of Prospect Theory [18], at all levels of biological complexity there is uncertainty about the significance of signs or stimuli and about the possible consequences of actions. At all levels, action must be taken before the uncertainty is resolved, and a proper balance must be achieved between a high level of specific readiness for the events that are most likely to occur and a general ability to respond appropriately when the unexpected happens[19].

Although the disruptive shocks we have experienced since the start of 2020 could be anticipated, their magnitude and complexity have taken all analysts by surprise [20]. It is possible that disasters of this type may happen again, and that others, which are currently of little or no concern, may happen in the future.

It therefore seems essential to question the various policies adopted in the light of new emergences, disasters, or other potential risks, whether natural or anthropogenic, a distinction which is difficult to draw on account of the increasing transformation of biophysical environments [21]. The concept of disaster can be enriched not only by its etymology, which indicates a sudden, dreadful shock causing significant loss of life, but also by systemics through the works of the mathematicians René Thom (1923-2002) and Erik Christopher Zeeman (1925-2016). It is therefore a question of discontinuities [22] that may arise in the evolution of a variable or system, leading to changes in its morphological stability. Consequently, disasters have more to do with system inputs and parameter space than with the changes they bring about. For Zeeman, a disaster occurs where a continuous variety of causes leads to a discontinued variation in effects [23].

The French geographer Jérôme Dunlop notes, in turn, that whereas a risk results from the combination of a vulnerability and a hazard, whose possible occurrence would destroy all or part of the stakes exposed to it (humans and wealth), the term disaster is used where the destroyed stakes are considered significant by the human group affected. The magnitude of the risk itself varies according to how high the stakes are and how probable it is that the hazard will occur. Human occupation also increases the probability of risks occurring in natural environments. The risk of flooding is generally increased through urbanisation of the major river basins and water courses and through the impermeablisation of the ground resulting from development of road networks and urban growth, and through changes in agricultural landscapes.[24] Consequently, the historian Niall Ferguson, professor at Oxford and at Harvard, rightly observes that the distinction between natural disasters and disasters caused by humans is purely artificial. There is, he notes, constant interaction between human societies and nature. The example he gives is one we have highlighted previously when referring to the Lisbon disaster: an endogenous shock destroyed human life and health according to the proximity of residents to the place of impact [25].

 

Conclusion: disruptive shocks as opportunities for structural transformations in a system that is initially cumbersome or blocked

There is a new focus on the global impact of humanity on the earth system as a whole. This is what we refer to today as the Anthropocene, interpreting this era as a rupture[26]. One could argue, therefore, that if human activity has affected nature in such a way that natural, hydrometeorological and geophysical disasters are on the rise, resulting in large numbers of victims, it is today essential for us to gain a clearer understanding of disasters and to anticipate risks [27].

For several decades, the research has recognised the vulnerability of territories and communities. Vulnerability, referred to above, could be described as a circumstance or a context specific to certain groups (or territories) which find themselves in a fragile situation in relation to certain risks, a situation caused by the constant social construction of risks. From that perspective, resilience would indicate the development, by the group or territory, of capabilities to deploy processes – which affect practices – to reduce their vulnerability to certain risks [28]. Researchers have created new concepts for understanding this phenomenon and identifying its various types: differential or differentiated vulnerability, accumulated vulnerability, and global vulnerability, etc. Now that our focus has been increased through the shocks we are experiencing in practice, we need to translate these questions into public and collective anticipation and prevention policies by determining, space by space, territory by territory, which risks we are facing, what our vulnerabilities are, and how the global vulnerabilities vary from place to place. Lastly, although there are links between vulnerability, underdevelopment and poverty, it appears that the ability to recover from a disaster and prepare for risks is more critical than the level of poverty [29] Analysis of risk factors, including climate-related [30], is encouraged by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR, formerly UNISDR) [31]. The works produced by this institution, particularly its assessment reports, may help to construct a helpful methodological framework.

In addition, we cannot ignore one of the conclusions of the works of the anthropologist and historian Virginia Garcia-Acosta, namely that the recurring presence of certain natural phenomena, such as storms, has led certain groups of humans to make cultural changes in their lives and in their material organisation, which may result in the implementation of survival strategies and adaptation possibilities [32]. As previously indicated by Edgar Morin in La Méthode, when mentioning the concept of disaster, the rupture and disintegration of an old form is the very process by which the new form is created [33]. In other words, disruptive shocks may represent genuine opportunities for structural transformations in a system that is initially cumbersome or blocked.

Any approach to risks and disasters involves grasping the issue of acceptable risk in a strategy and its implementation in practice, and therefore also addressing the difficult question of the precautionary principle, with the multiple regional development and land management tools [34].

Equipping ourselves with predictive tools, devices and processes for confronting uncertainty represents basic good sense for all forms of contemporary governance in our societies [35]. This approach would also mean that disruptive shocks could be regarded as opportunities for structural transformations in a system which initially seems cumbersome or blocked when faced with the scale of the challenges.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

[1] Déclaration de Politique régionale wallonne, 2019-2024, Namur, 16 septembre 2019, 122 p., p. 75. https://www.wallonie.be/sites/default/files/2019-09/declaration_politique_regionale_2019-2024.pdf

[2] Ibidem, p. 82.

[3] Ibidem, p. 90.

[4] Ibidem, p. 117.

[5] Ibidem, p. 118.

[6] In his report Boosting Resilience through Innovative Risk Governance, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, p. 16, Paris, OECD, 2014, OECD writes: Nearly all OECD countries systematically consider disaster risk in sectoral public investment strategies and planning. the importance attributed to the local responsibilities, including risk sensitive regulation in land zoning and private real estate development – Also see: Bassin de la Loire, France, Étude de l’OCDE sur la gestion des risques d’inondation, Paris, OECD, 2010.

[7] Michel CALLON, Pierre LASCOUMES & Yannick BARTHES, Acting in an uncertain world: An essay on technical democracy, Harvard, MIT Press, 2009. p. 37-39 of the Paris, Seuil, 2001 edition.

[8] Boosting Resilience through Innovative Risk Governance, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, p. 17-18, Paris, OECD, 2014.

[9] Ulrich BECK, Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity, London, SAGE, 1992. – La société du risque, Sur la voie d’une autre modernité (1986), p. 60-61, Paris, Flammarion, 2008.

[10] M. CALLON, P. LASCOUMES et Y. BARTHES, op. cit., p. 37.

[11] Carl L. PRITCHARD, Risk Management, Concepts and Guidance, p. 7-8, Arlington VA, ESI, 1997.

[12] Ibidem, p. 39.

[13] John KAY & Mervyn KING, Radical Uncertainty, p. 37, London, The Bridge Press, 2021.

[14] Philippe SILBERZAHN, Bienvenue en incertitude ! Survivre et prospérer dans un monde de surprises, p. 82, Paris, Diateino, 2021.

[15] Daniel KAHNEMAN, Olivier SIBONY, Carl R. SUNSTEIN, Noise, A Flaw in Human Judgment, p. 144-146, New York, Little, Brown, Spark, 2021..

[16] Emergence can be defined as the unexpected appearance or evolution of a variable or system that cannot result from or be explained by the system’s constituents or previous conditions. The microbiologist Janine Guespin sees in this the existence of singular qualities of a system that can only exist under certain conditions: they can possibly be inter-converted while the system retains the same constituents subject to interactions of the same nature, if a parameter regulating the intensity of these interactions crosses a critical threshold during its variation. Janine GUESPIN-MICHEL coord. , Lucien SEVE e.a., Émergence, Complexité et dialectique, Sur les systèmes dynamiques non linéaires, p. 42, Paris, O. Jacob, 2005.

[17] M. CALLON, P. LASCOUMES et Y. BARTHES, Acting in an uncertain world…, p. 40sv.

[18] See: Frédéric MARTINEZ, L’individu face au risque : l’apport de Kahneman et Tversky, dans  Idées économiques et sociales, vol. 161, no. 3, 2010, p. 15-23. https://www.cairn.info/revue-idees-economiques-et-sociales-2010-3-page-15.html

[19] Uncertainty is a fact with which all forms of life must be prepared to contend. At all levels of biological complexity there is uncertainty about the significance of signs or stimuli and about the possible consequences of actions. At all levels, action must be taken before the uncertainty is resolved, and a proper balance must be achieved between a high level of specific readiness for the events that are most likely to occur and a general ability to respond appropriately when the unexpected happens. Daniel KAHNEMAN, Paul SLOVIC & Amos TVERSKY, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, p. 509-510, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[20] See: Philippe DESTATTE, We are expected to look far ahead even though the future does not exist, Namur, Wallonia, August 28, 2021. Blog PhD2050, https://phd2050.org/2021/08/28/anticipation-3/

[21] Cyria EMILIANOFF, Risque, in Jacques LEVY et Michel LUSSAULT, Dictionnaire de la Géographie, p. 804-805, Paris, Belin, 2003. The definition of risk in this book is: the probability of a danger threatening or affecting the life and, more generally, the environment of an individual or a group. – See also: Yannick LUNG, Auto-organisation, bifurcation, catastrophe… les ruptures de la dynamique spatiale, Talence, Presses universitaires de Bordeaux, 1987.

[22] Discontinuity refers to rapid and significant shifts in trajectories without the aspect of being mostly unanticipated or deeply surprising. Ozcan SARITAS & Jack SMITH, The Big Picture – trends, drivers, wild cards, discontinuities and weak signals, in Futures, vol. 43, 3, April 2011, p. 292-312.

[23] E.C. ZEEMAN, Catastrophe Theory, Selected Papers, 1972-1977, p. 615-638, Addison Wesley Publishing Co, Reading, Mass. – London – Amsterdam, 1977. – R. THOM, Paraboles et catastrophes, Entretiens sur les mathématiques, la science et la philosophie, p. 59sv, Paris, Flammarion, 1983.

[24] Jérôme DUNLOP, Les 100 mots de la géographie, p. 71-72, Paris, PUF, 2009.

[25] Ph. DESTATTE, We are expected to look far ahead even though the future does not exist…, https://phd2050.org/2021/08/28/anticipation-3/

[26] Clive HAMILTON, The Anthropocene as rupture, in The Anthropocene Review, 3, 2, 2016, p. 93-106.

[27] Virginia GARCIA-ACOSTA, Catastrophes non naturelles et anthropocène, Leçons apprises à partir de perspectives anthropologiques et historiques, dans Rémi BEZAU & Catherine LARRERE dir., Penser l’anthropocène, p. 325sv, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2018.

[28] V. GARCIA-ACOSTA, Catastrophes non naturelles et anthropocène…, p. 33.

[29] V. GARCIA-ACOSTA, Catastrophes non naturelles et anthropocène…, p. 329-330.

[30] And the links between climate and health : Jacques BLAMONT, Introduction au siècle des menaces, p. 505sv, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2004

[31] The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction was established in 1999 to ensure the implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.  https://www.undrr.org/

[32] V. GARCIA-ACOSTA, Prevencion de desastres, estrategias adaptivas y capital social, in Harlan KOFF ed., Social Cohesion bin Europe and the Americas, Power, Time and Space, p. 115-130, Berne, Peter Lang, 2009. – Catastrophes non naturelles et anthropocène…, p. 332.

[33] Edgar MORIN, La Méthode, 1. La nature de la nature, p. 44, Paris, Seuil, 1977. – René THOM, Stabilité culturelle et Morphogénèse, Essai d’une théorie génétique des modèles, Paris, Ediscience, 1972.

[34] An acute and difficult question if ever there was one in the « risk society ». See in particular: Dominique BOURG et Jean-Louis SCHLEGEL, Parer aux risques de demain, le principe de précaution, Paris, Seuil, 2001. – Ulrich BECK, Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity, London, Sage, 1992. – François EWALD, Aux risques d’innover, Les entreprises face au principe de précaution, Paris, Autrement, 2009.

[35] All governments, international bodies, universities and companies should have their own Cassandras, their « National Warning Office », to identify worst-case scenarios, measure risks and design protection, prevention and mitigation strategies. See: Niall FERGUSON, Doom, The Politics of Catastrophe, New York, Penguin Press, 2021.

Paris, Cloud Business Center, March 30, 2023

The question posed to me by the French Ministry of Ecological Transition and Territorial Cohesion during the fourth meeting of their national land-use planners’ network (RNA) concerns the innovative or even disruptive lessons that are emerging from the European foresight work on the cities of the future[1]. Among the multitude of works undertaken within the European Commission – particularly by the Directorate General for Regional Policies and the Directorate General for Research –, the Committee of the Regions and networks such as ESPON, some drastic choices have been necessary to try, at the same time, to find a common thread for this intervention. As with any foresight process, this contribution will start with aspirations and imagination and end with the genuine anticipation strategy: how to act before events occur, to trigger them or prevent them? [2]

 Consequently, after reviewing the very creative, community-based Stories from 2050, we will examine two structured foresight reports, Cities of Tomorrow (2011) and The Future of Cities (2020), which, along with other sources, helped to construct the New Leipzig Charter of 30 November 2020. I shall conclude with the issue of the means for the policies advocated, which I believe to be a fundamental issue in most European countries and especially in France and Wallonia.

 

1. Stories from 2050

Although, as a rule, I am not particularly keen on the use of individual storytelling in foresight, preferring collective intelligence as a methodological principle, it is important to acknowledge the interest in the initiative launched by the DG Research and Innovation of the European Commission concerning the stories from 2050 [3]. From listening to their authors, these are radical, inspiring, and stimulating accounts of the challenges and opportunities presented by our future. Some of them focus on the future of cities. Written in 2020 and 2021, they are largely characterised by the traumas caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and by the increased awareness of the challenges arising from this new period in global history which is called the Anthropocene [4].

The European Commission conceived this work as a process for listening to society. Our duty observes Jean-Éric Paquet, is not only to tell but also to listen [5]. Thus, the Director-General for Research is increasingly of the opinion that foresight constitutes a space for engaging with citizens and listening to what they have to say. This approach is consistent with the efforts made by his department to fall within the scope of citizen science.

In the dozens of texts gathered and drafted in a variety of formats and with wide-ranging content, the Commission has faced a few observations. Firstly, the fact that creativity and innovation are needed more than ever to deal with the challenges of this century. Next, the idea that searching for another Earth, which features prominently in these stories, is an important ambition, but that what humans need to focus on most of all is to protect the only planet we currently have. Lastly, the notion that the European research and innovation policy can make good use of these works, as mentioned by Nikos Kastrinos and Jürgen Wengel [6].

These two DG Research managers note that the narrative that technology and innovation will solve problems and bring happiness for everyone in cities where life is good and where businesses flourish without detrimental externalities does not exist. This discourse has become pointless and obsolete. Nikos Kastrinos and Jürgen Wengel also observe that, according to the foresight stories, the source of the problems lies not in a lack of creativity and innovation, but rather in the primary and egoistical reality of human beings, who are fundamentally predatory. The community stories themselves seem to express notions of empathy, respect for others and constant striving. While this distances us from Research and Innovation, this society of the future certainly brings us closer to a better humanity [7].

I have picked out three of these stories which I think are characteristic of the effort made. The first is entitled The Foresighter Pledge and places great emphasis on anticipation [8]. The second story I have chosen concerns the construction of the city of Nüwa, on Mars, and highlights local autonomy and self-sufficiency [9]. The third is the story of the future protopians, who focus on a non-violent, inclusive world made up of “radical tenderness”, tolerance and celebration of life [10].

The Stories from 2050 project demonstrate the capacity of citizens to engage in long-term reflection and generate useful ideas for shaping a new society. The citizens themselves really enjoyed this exercise [11]. For the European Commission’s DG Research and Innovation, the interest in the initiative helps to move away from a model of technological and scientistic thought in which all the problems of the future can be solved and instead, by listening to society, demonstrate that the challenges are complex and that, in a modest way, human beings have a central role to play in solving the problems.

 

2. A European model of urban development

Moving from foresight to strategy, which is itself an integral part of foresight, there are two works on the future of cities that should be mentioned. The first is called Cities of Tomorrow, Challenges, visions, ways forward, a work in which my colleagues of The Destree Institute and I were involved as foresight experts for the Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy of the European Commission in 2010 and 2011, under the direction of Corinne Hermant – de Callattaÿ and Christian Svantfeldt [12]. The second, more recent work, entitled The Futures of Cities, was overseen by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in 2019 and published in 2020.

 

2.1. Cities of Tomorrow (2011)

The first exercise addressed several issues, including the question of whether a European urban development model existed [13]. The response was positive, and this model was clearly described in the work: an integrated and long-term approach, advanced places for social progress, platforms for democracy, places for green regeneration, and mechanisms for attractiveness and economic growth.

The shared vision of the European urban development model is an integrated approach which takes account of all aspects of sustainable development. Thus, the European cities of tomorrow are:

– advanced places for social progress;

– platforms for democracy, cultural dialogue and diversity;

– places for green, ecological or environmental regeneration;

– attractive places that are engines of economic growth [14].

 This vision brings together the main aims behind all the European policies in the 2010s, incorporating sustainability, territorial balance, polycentrism, limited urban sprawl, and quality and well-being of habitat and environment. The authors state as follows: The future urban territorial development pattern reflects a sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and balanced territorial organisation with a polycentric urban structure; contains strong metropolitan regions and other strong urban areas, such as regional centres, especially outside the core areas of Europe, which provide good accessibility to the services of general economic interest; is characterised by a compact settlement structure with limited urban sprawl through a strong control of land supply and speculative development; enjoys a high level of protection and quality of the environment around cities – nature, landscape, forestry, water resources, agricultural areas, etc. – and strong links and articulation between cities and their environments [15].

The issue of climate change and its energy corollary may not appear prominently, as has generally been the case in most works since the Paris Agreements of 12 December 2015, although they do feature heavily in the earlier works and in the report itself. In the preface by European Commissioner Johannes Hahn, the city is still regarded as an essential asset for mitigating the impact of climate change[16]. Thus, continues the report, cities have a critical role to play in reducing CO2 emissions and tackling climate change. It goes on to explain that energy consumption in urban areas is associated mainly with transport and housing and is therefore responsible for a large proportion of CO2 emissions. Referring to the World Energy Outlook, the report observes that around two thirds of final energy demand is associated with urban consumption and up to 70% of CO2 emissions are generated in cities. The authors are therefore able to conclude that the urban way of life is both the problem and the solution [17].

The most promising model is that of the diverse city, a place of social cohesion and cultural and human diversity in which the different spatial and social perspectives of the inhabitants are taken into account [18]. The Leipzig Charter on the Sustainable European Cities, adopted in 2007, is used to design a compact, environmentally friendly city: grouped habitats, planning methods to prevent urban sprawl, management of land supply, restriction of speculative trends, district diversity, involvement of stakeholders and inhabitants, and so on [19].

 

2.2. The Future of Cities (2019)

At least three of the key messages of the report entitled The Future of Cities, produced in 2019 by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, are of interest to us in the first instance: the performance of cities in terms of resource use and their energy efficiency, the imbalances, disparities and even divergences that affect them, and the interaction which they can develop with themselves, in other words, their inhabitants. The three messages are as follows:

The fight for sustainability will be greatly influenced by what happens in cities. While cities usually place greater pressure on natural resources, they perform better in the use of resources and have a greater potential for energy efficiency. Actions on environmental sustainability, including climate change, are already being taken by many cities.

(…)

– There is a risk of polarisation both within and between cities. On the one hand, being unable to take stock of the issues highlighted will lead to even more inequalities within a city. On the other hand, a diverging path between cities falling behind and cities capitalising on emerging trends may cause additional social and economic imbalance between different urban areas.

– The close linkage between space/service/people is at the core of cities’ capacities to respond to people’s needs and to manage new challenges in a wider context, beyond administrative boundaries and sectorial domains.  A truly holistic approach is needed to optimise the provision of services and create an intelligent interaction between the city and its inhabitants while maintaining or enhancing quality of life. [20]

The report helpfully presents the challenges faced by cities in the form of a system, with fourteen subsystems in which health, climate, resilience, environmental footprint, urban governance and innovation coexist with mobility, housing, services, the environment, etc.

The exercise conveys the ambitions set out during the 2018 European Mayors’ Convention [21], which linked the climate and energy objectives with the European time frames for reducing carbon emissions. At the Convention, the 8,800 ambitious cities pledged to contribute to the objectives to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% by 2020, by 40% by 2030, and to decarbonise their cities by 2050.

Governance is placed at the service of the climate and energy objectives, with strategic guidelines for achieving them:

– government by offering services and especially financial resources;

– co-construction and civic facilitation of policies;

– municipal autonomy;

– regulation and planning for the transport, mobility, lighting, urban planning, development, and renewable energy sectors.

It is also the responsibility of these cities of the future to exploit their innovation potential. The report highlights the Future Agenda 2017 formula, whereby cities are often places of great energy and optimism and that is where most humans choose to live, work, and interact with each other. Consequently, according to this same source, cities are places of innovation, where ideas are generated from which, to a large extent, economic growth emerges [22]. Thus, the Joint Research Centre report emphasises the fact that, within a co-construction rationale, citizens can play a major role in identifying and solving urban challenges.

 

3. The New Leipzig Charter (2020)

The New Leipzig Charter of 20 November 2020, which is familiar to all developers and urban planners, is partly the result of the foresight works to which it refers. The Charter calls for alignment of European urban development policies in a model highlighted through its three priority areas: the just city (inclusive, cohesive, learning), the green city (decarbonised, low-waste, regenerative) and the productive city [23] At the heart of its vision, its purposes are the common good, public well-being, quality of services and empowerment of the actors who enable participation, deliberation, and co-construction of collective policies.

The integrated, place-based approach, which had already been included in the 2007 Charter, is still the guiding principle in the 2020 text. However, the perspective is widened to incorporate deprived neighbourhoods, functional areas and the entire urban context.

Multilevel governance highlights the need for strong, coordinated urban policies, in other words, sound financial policies, from European to local level, that are consistent with sustainability.

Citizen participation must be combined with co-creation, co-design and tackling inequalities and social breakdown in cities, by employing tools and mechanisms in the areas of housing, attractiveness for business, land-use planning, and environmental regeneration.

For its implementation, the signatories of the charter sought a stronger strategic alignment between the Union’s Territorial Agenda 2030 [24], the urban aspect of the cohesion policy, the national urban policy frameworks, and the Urban Agenda for the European Union [25].

 

4. Conclusion: a city which generates economic and financial value

The idea that cities contribute to both problems and solutions is well established today in our mental landscape. Although they may be places with a concentration of problems – idleness, unemployment, social breakdown, transmission of disease, exclusion, segregation, racism, xenophobia, violence –, they are also the preferred places for curing such ills by mobilising the appropriate resources.

The urban governance survey carried out in 2016 by the London School of Economics, before the most recent spate of crises, showed that half of city representatives regarded the lack of funds as the greatest challenge in urban governance, followed by politicisation of local issues, the complexity of managing contemporary urban problems, and inadequate or outdated political silos [26]. The JRC report also noted that the inadequacy of budgetary resources was one of the major challenges in urban governance [27].

Cities which do not produce economic or financial excesses are, and will be, incapable of coping with the current and future challenges, which, as we know, are vast. I hardly need to restate that decarbonisation will be very expensive. The effects of climate change will require costly repair and preventive work.

The crises already suffered, the “whatever it costs” mentality in the public responses to social rebellions [28], the Covid-19 pandemic, and the effects of the war in Ukraine and its consequences in terms of energy regulation and military investment, have considerably exacerbated a major public finance crisis. This has already been part of our political, economic, and social landscape since the beginning of the century and has been amplified by the major shock of 2008-2009, whose consequences continue to affect us today. In addition to the budgetary deficit, there is, as we have seen, the egotism of societal individualism which, in some people – both rich and poor –, goes as far as refusing to pay tax. The worries are real when one measures the scale of our countries’ debt and the negative primary balances of our budgets.

Budgetary depletion leaves the door open to developers who go against the common interests highlighted by the New Leipzig Charter. The elected representatives, formerly builders, and today transients, as one mayor pointed out, could tomorrow be financially powerless. Some of them already are, those who have no purpose other than trying to give meaning to the predations of those who supplant them and the common interest they hold.

The main remedy for this problem lies in multilevel participation, which ranges from traditional consultation to discussion, community deliberation and co-construction with stakeholders [29]. In his concept of the plural city, the sociologist Jan Vranken, from the University of Antwerp, invited us as citizens, or as mere residents, to several forums in which the city’s financial issues could be discussed freely since, as he pointed out, the public budgeting exercise affects everyone [30].

The remedy can also be found in the productive city section in the New Leipzig Charter. This implies, as in the 1987 Brundtland Report, Our Common Future, an economy that produces excesses as a guarantee of its sustainability. Thus, maintaining high levels of productivity will be critically important in retaining production within city boundaries. As highlighted in a 2020 report by the European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion (ORATE), if we wish to maintain and develop productive activities in cities in the long term, it is essential to understand the reasons why manufacturing activities have been able to take place in cities and to promote innovation and entrepreneurial activities. Identifying and developing appropriate sites should promote the return of industry in cities[31].

This is certainly the price of ensuring the autonomy and well-being of the inhabitants of our European cities and their elected representatives.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] Quatrième rencontre du Réseau national français des Aménageurs (RNA), Ministère de la Transition écologique et de la Cohésion des Territoires, Paris, March, 30 2023.

[2] Philippe DESTATTE, What is foresight? Blog PhD2050, Brussels, May 30, 2013.

https://phd2050.org/2013/05/30/what-is-foresight/ – Ph. DESTATTE, From anticipation to action: an essential foresight path for businesses and organisations, Blog PhD2050, Namur, February 1st,  2014. https://phd2050.org/2014/02/01/anticipation-2/

[3] Tanja SCHINDLER, Graciela GUADARRAMA BAENA, ea, Stories from 2050, Radical, inspiring and thought-provoking narratives around challenges and opportunities of our futures, Brussels, European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, October 2021.

https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/stories-2050-radical-inspiring-and-thought-provoking-narratives-around-challenges-and-opportunities-2021-12-09_en

https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/87769c66-5d5a-11ec-9c6c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-245938989

[4] We live in the Anthropocene, the geological age where humans have the most significant impact and influence on climate, the environment, and the entire planet. Biodiversity on Earth is shrinking at a frightening pace. The extinction of animal species caused by human activity may lead to the next wave of mass extinction since the disappearance of the dinosaurs. No wonder space travel has always fascinated humankind, therefore fictional space travel was used in this process to question whether it is one – possible and second – desirable, to leave Earth behind and disrupt another planet. Furthermore, space travel fantasies and aspirations are linked to the quest for knowledge and exploration, encouraging participants to go beyond their usual thinking and leave current barriers and obstacles behind. Stories from 2050…, p. 13.

[5] Our duty is not only to tell, but also to listen, Jean-Eric PAQUET, Foreword, in Stories from 2050…, p. 5.

[6] Nikos KASTRINOS & Jürgen WENGUEL, Epilogue: What can EU R&I policy lean from Stories from 2050? in Stories from 2050…, p. 107sv.

[7] Ibidem, p. 108-109.

[8] The Foresight Pledge, in Stories from 2050, p. 75, EC, DG Research, 2021.

[9] Totti KONNOLA, Inside the first self-sustainable city on Mars, ready for humans in 2100, March 24, 2021. https://www.storiesfrom2050.com/discuss/message-from-the-future/inside-the-first-self-sustainable-city-on-mars-ready-for-humans-in-2100

[10] Protopian Future, in Stories from 2050…, p. 95. – Protopia refers to a society that, instead of solving all its problems as in a utopia, or falling into severe dysfunction as in a dystopia, progresses gradually over a long period of time, thanks to the way technological advances reinforce the natural process of evolution. Kevin KELLY, What Technology wants, London, Penguin, 2011.

[11] Tanjia SCHINDLER, Stories from 2050, Project Overview and Process, Mutual Learning Exercise, Research and Innovation Foresight, Policy and Practice, Citizens’ Engagement Approaches & Methods on good practices in the use of Foresight in R&I policy planning and programming, Strengthening the role of foresight in the process of identifying research priorities, 31 January, 1 & 2 February 2023.

[12] Corinne HERMANT- de CALLATTAŸ et Christian SVANTFELDT, Cities of Tomorrow, Challenges, visions, ways forward, Brussels, European Commission, Directorate General for Regional Policy, 2011. EC_Cities-of-Tomorrow_Report_2011-10-30 – See also: Chr. SVANFELDT, C. HERMANT- de CALLATAŸ, La “ville de demain” vue par l’Union européenne, in Les Cahiers du Développement social urbain, 2012/2 (N° 56), p. 52-54.

https://www.cairn.info/revue-cahiers-du-developpement-social-urbain-2012-2-page-52.htm

[13] The ‘European model of the city’ is a fascinating issue. On the one hand, it captures essential features of European cultural history, and it is deeply rooted in the past and, hence, related to the identity question. On the other, it captures essential aspects of the political vision of the European Union and, hence, of the future as envisaged by the underlying society. Cities of Tomorrow…, p. 1.

[14] Cities of Tomorrow…, p. 10-11.

[15] Cities of Tomorrow…, p. 12.

[16] Cities of Tomorrow, p. III.

[17] Cities of Tomorrow, p. 5. – The report highlights that 2/3 of final energy demand is linked to urban consumption and up to 70% of CO2 emissions are generated in cities, even though they are inhabited by 50% of the world’s population in 2010), referring to the World Energy Outlook 2008. Let us note that according to the World Energy Outlook 2022: 70% of the world’s population could be living in cities in 2050, i.e. an increase of 2 billion inhabitants in cities worldwide (p. 110 and 464 – This analysis can be found in the report Futures of Cities in 2019: While being responsible for a high level of energy consumption and, therefore, generating about 70% of global GHG emissions, cities are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Cities are most effective at taking measures to tackle climate change when aligned with each other and with national- and regional-level actors with whom they can share greater climate ambition and capacity. In the last two decades, city ambition has risen remarkably to go beyond the national governments’ climate-change targets as the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C warns that current nationally determined contributions for the Paris Agreement are not sufficient. Cities need support from their partners in national and regional governments, the private sector, academia, and civil society to fully meet and exceed these ambitious targets. The Future of Cities, JRC, 2019, p. 82.

[18] Cities of Tomorrow, p. 35.

[19] Cities of Tomorrow, p. 43-48.

[20] The Future of Cities, Main messages, European Commission, Urban Data Platform, 2019. https://urban.jrc.ec.europa.eu/thefutureofcities/executive-summary#the-chapterThe Future of Cities…, p. 8-9.

[21] Covenant of Mayors: cities at the forefront of climate action, February 19, 2018.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180216STO98009/covenant-of-mayors-cities-at-the-forefront-of-climate-action

[22] Cities are often places of great energy and optimism. They are where most of us choose to live, work and interact with others. As a result, cities are where innovation happens, where ideas are formed from which economic growth largely stems. Future of Cities, Insights from Multiple Expert Discussions Around the World, p. 3, London, Futureagenda 2017. https://www.futureofcities.city/pdf/full/Future%20of%20Cities%20Report%202017.pdf – The Future of Cities, p. 105.

[23] The New Leipzig Charter, The Transformative power of cities for the common good, 30 November 2020.

https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/brochure/new_leipzig_charter/new_leipzig_charter_en.pdf

[24] Territorial Agenda, A future for all places, December 1st 2020. https://territorialagenda.eu/

[25] Implementing the New Leipzig Charter through multi-level governance, Next Steps for the Urban Agenda for the EU, p. 4, EU2020.de, 2020. https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2021-03/new_leipzig_charter_implem_en.pdf

[26] The Urban Governance Survey, 2016, Cities UN Habitat and the United Cities and Local Governments, London School of Economics, 2016. – The Future of Cities…, p. 129 & 149. https://unhabitat.org/the-urban-governance-survey-by-un-habitat-uclg-and-lse-cities

[27] The Future of Cities…, p. 106.

[28]According to Anne de Guigné, the budgetary impact of the Yellow Vests crisis amounted to €17 billion in new expenditure or lower revenue.. Anne DE GUIGNE, Emmanuel Macron et la dette : six ans de rendez-vous manqués, dans Le Figaro Économie, 29 mars 2023, p. 24.

[29] Michel FOUDRIAT, La co-construction en actes, Savoirs et savoir-faire pratiques pour faciliter sa mise en œuvre, Montrouge, ESF, 2021.

[30] Cities of Tomorrow…, p. 35.

[31] Europe’s productive cities and metros, Policy Brief, p. 2, Luxembourg, European Union, ESPON, 2021.

Washington, September 8, 2021

200 Leaders Call for New UN Office to Coordinate Global Research to Prevent Human Extinction

Earth’s magnetic shield weakening, ocean-poisoning hydrogen-sulfide gas from advanced global warning, out-of-control nanotech and AI, are among the possible future threats to humanity, warn The Millennium Project, World Futures Studies Federation, and the Association of Professional Futurists.

In an open letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres, internet pioneer Vint Cerf, Nobel Prize Laureate Oscar Arias, and other technological, business, political, technological, environmental, and academic leaders around the world are calling for a new UN Office of Strategic Threats to coordinate global research on long-range strategic or existential threats to humanity, and to their prevention.

The letter [attached] requests that the UN Secretariat conduct a feasibility study for the proposed UN Office. « The immediate crises always seem to overrule the long-term concerns about the future of humanity. So, we need a specific UN Office that just focuses on what could make us go extinct and how to prevent it, » said Jerome Glenn, CEO of The Millennium Project. »

The UN already has agencies that are addressing many of the serious trends today—such as decreasing fresh water per capita, concentration of wealth, and ethnic violence—but these do not pose a threat to the survival of our species.

Long-term threats

However, there are long-term threats that do, such as the ten below:

  • Weakening of the Earth’s magnetic shield that protects us from deadly solar radiation
  • Massive discharges of hydrogen sulfate (H2S) from de-oxygenated oceans, caused by advanced global warming
  • Malicious nanotechnology (including the « gray goo » problem)
  • Loss of control over future forms of artificial intelligence
  • A single individual acting alone, who could one day create and deploy a weapon of mass destruction (most likely from synthetic biology)
  • Nuclear war escalation
  • Uncontrollable, more-severe pandemics
  • A particle accelerator accident
  • Solar gamma-ray bursts
  • An asteroid collision.

« There is no single point for collaboration in the UN system that addresses such long-term threats to human survival, » said Ambassador Héctor Casanueva, former Chilean Ambassador to UN multilateral organizations in Geneva. « A UN Office on Strategic and Existential Threats to humanity could identify, monitor, anticipate, and coordinate strategic research on a global scale to prevent these threats, he suggested. « It would serve international agencies, multilateral organizations, nation-states, and humanity in general. »

The idea of a new UN Office was raised during the celebration of the annual « World Future Day » on March 1, 2021, a global online conference of nearly a thousand experts from 65 countries. The Millennium Project, which hosts World Future Day, suggested that a resolution be offered at the next UN General Assembly, to be held in September 2021. It would give the UN Secretariat the mandate to conduct a feasibility study of the proposed UN Office of Strategic Threats.

Open letter to the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres for feasibility study of a UN Office of Strategic Threats

September 8, 2021

Dear Mr. Secretary General,

Long-range strategic threats to the survival of humanity are well-documented, ranging from the potential of advanced artificial intelligence growing beyond human control to weakening magnetic fields that protect life on Earth.

Although the United Nations includes agencies that are addressing many of the problems facing humanity today, there is no central office to identify, monitor, anticipate, and coordinate research on long-term strategic threats to humanity.

A UN Office on Strategic Threats, which would centralize and coordinate information and prospective studies on a global scale, could serve international agencies, multilateral organizations, nation-states, the private sector, academia, and humanity in general. We think that the Office could be created without putting pressure on the budget of the organization, reallocating resources and coordinating its work with universities and research centers around the world.

This idea was raised and discussed in detail during World Future Day, March 1, 2021, a 24-hour conversation of nearly a thousand experts from 65 countries, organized by several international associations of futurists and think tanks to discuss strategies for improving the global future.

The signatories of this open letter – academics, diplomats, scientists, and experts in foresight and strategy from different countries and sectors – ask Your Excellency to welcome and facilitate the adoption of a UN General Assembly Resolution at this September’s General Assembly that would give the General Secretariat the mandate to conduct a feasibility study on establishing a UN Office on Strategic Threats.

Sincerely,

  1. Asanga Abeyagoonasekera, Author, Geostrategist, Former Dir. of Foreign Policy & Security Think Tank, Sri Lanka
  2. Nancy Ellen Abrams, Author, Philosopher of Science, Attorney at Law, USA
  3. Sergio Abreu, Secretary General, Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), Uruguay
  4. Philip Omoniyi Adetiloye, Professor, Federal University of Agriculture, Nigeria
  5. Rosa Alegria, Representative, Teach the Future Brazil, Brazil
  6. Soledad, Alvear, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Former Senator, Chile
  7. Jan Amkreutz, Author, futurist, speaker, The Netherlands & USA
  8. Janna Q. Anderson, Executive Director, Imagining the Internet Center, Elon University, USA
  9. Yul Anderson, President, African American Future Society, USA
  10. Amara D. Angelica, Editor-at-Large, KurzweilAI, USA
  11. Shahar Avin, Senior Research Associate, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk University of Cambridge, UK
  12. Diana Baciuna, Local Councillor, Bucharest Borough 4, Romania
  13. Guillermina Baena Paz, VP Latin America WFSF, National Autonomous University of Mexico, Mexico
  14. Ying Bai, Vice President, Academy of Soft Technology, China
  15. SJ  Beard, Academic Programme Manager, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk Cambridge, UK
  16. Clem Bezold, Co-Founder, Institute for Alternative Futures, USA
  17. James Boyd, Complex Systems, SingularityNet, USA
  18. Pedro Bretes Amador, CEO and Co-Founder, NewWay, Foresight, Portugal
  19. Gregory Brown, Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University, Senior Analyst, CENTRA Technology, USA
  20. Steve Brown, Founder, The Futures Collaborative, USA
  21. James E. Burke, Foresight and Solutions Navigator, DeepDive Foresight, USA
  22. Iurie Calestru, Program Director, Institute for Development and Expertise of Projects, Moldova
  23. Franklin A. Carrero-Martinez, Sr. Dir. Global Sustainability, National Academy of Sciences, Eng., and Med., USA
  24. Hector Casanueva, VP Chilean Council of Foresight and Strategy, Former Amb. Geneva, Prof.-Res. University of Alcalá, Chile & Spain
  25. Shiela R. Castillo, Futures Learning Advisor, The Center For Engaged Foresight, Philippines
  26. Vint Cerf, Internet Pioneer, Google, USA
  27. Sadok Chaabane, Former Min. of Justice & Higher Educ., GM, Polytechnique Internationale University, Tunisia
  28. Richard J. Chasdi, Professorial Lecturer, George Washington University, USA
  29. Puruesh Chaudhary, Founder &President , AGAHI, Pakistan
  30. Marvin Cheung, Board Member, Unbuilt Labs, USA
  31. Thomas J. Christiffel, Principal, Regional Intelligence-Regional Communities, USA
  32. Epaminondas Christophilopoulos, Deputy Chair Foresight Team, Office of the President of  Greece, Greece
  33. Reynaldo Treviño, Cisneros, Consultant, Systems and Strategic Planning, Mexico
  34. Anthony Clayton, Professor, University of West Indies, Jamaica
  35. Deborah Clifford, Head of Finance, Woolworths, South Africa
  36. Jose Cordeiro, Executive Director, Ibero-American Foresight Network, Venezuela and Spain
  37. Raluca Coscodaru, Consultant/Professor, Innovation and entrepreneurship, Romania
  38. Catherine, Cosgrove, Futurist, Canada
  39. William Cosgrove, Former Vice President, World Bank, Canada
  40. Shermon Cruz, Executive Director, Center for Engaged Foresight, Philippines
  41. Cornelia Daheim, Founder & Dir. Future Impacts; Chair, Futures Circle, Min. of Educ. and Res., Germany
  42. Jim Dator, Professor Emeritus, University of Hawaii, Manoa, Hawaii
  43. Philippe Destatte, Director, The Destree Institute, Belgium
  44. Mara Di Berardo, Technologist, Institute Nanoscience of the National Research Council , Italy
  45. Simone Di Zio, Associate Professor, University G. d’Annunzio, Italy
  46. Pedro Miguel Diegues, Consultant, Foresight & Strategy, Portugal
  47. Peachie Dioquino-Valera, Advisor, Center for Engaged Foresight, Philippines
  48. Hugh T. Dugan, Former Special Assistant to the President, National Security Council, USA
  49. Paul Epping, Chairman, Xponential, The Netherlands
  50.  Jelel Ezzine, President, Tunisian Association for the Advancement of ST&I (TAASTI), Tunisia
  51. Daniel Faggella, CEO, Emerj Artificial Intelligence Research, USA
  52. Horacio Martin Ferber, Faculty, National University of Avellaneda, Argentina
  53. Elizabeth Florescu, Director of Research, The Millennium Project, Canada
  54. Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Former President of Chile, Chile
  55. Michael Friebe, Prof. Health Tech., Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Germany
  56. Caroline Figuères, Former Director, International Inst. for Com. and Dev.(IICD), The Netherlands
  57. Luciano Gallón, Professor, Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, Colombia
  58. Adolfo Arreola García, Professor, Anáhuac University, Mexico
  59. Banning Garrett, Faculty, Singularity University, USA
  60. Lydia Garrido Luzardo, UNESCO Chair Anticipation and Resilience, SARAS Institute, Uruguay
  61. Jose María Gil Robles, Former President , European Parliament, Spain
  62. Fausto Carbajal Glass, Member, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)., Mexico
  63. Jerome C. Glenn, CEO, The Millennium Project, USA
  64. Willis Goldbeck, Founder, Foresight Education, USA
  65. Blaž Golob, CEO GFS Institute, Chair, Forum on Future of Europe, Slovenia
  66. Abhik Gupta, Vice-Chairperson, Tripura State Higher Education Council, India
  67. Antonio Gutelli, Docente, Juan A. Maza University, Argentina
  68. Miguel Angel Gutierrez, Director, Centro Latinomericano de Globalización y Prospectiva, Argentina
  69. Mohammad Habib, Partner, Director, MENA Region, Siegel® MCAN, Jordan
  70. Cathy Hackl, Chief Metaverse Officer, Futures Intelligence Group, USA
  71. William E. Halal, CEO, TechCast International, USA
  72. Aharon Hauptman, Fellow, Zvi Meitar Institute for Implications of Emerging Technologies, Israel
  73. Peter Hayward, Co-host, Futurepod.org, Australia
  74. Sirkka Heinonen, Professor Emeriti, Finland Futures Research Centre, Finland
  75. Lucio Mauricio Henao Vélez, CEO, Prospectiva.org, Colombia
  76. Éva Hideg, Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
  77. Brock Hinzmann, Partner, Business Futures Network, USA
  78. Cyrus Hodes, Chair AI Initiative, The Future Society, France
  79. Razvan, Hoinaru, Former Chief of Staff, EPP Romanian Delegation, EU Parliament, Romania
  80. Philip Horvath, Partner, Luman, Germany
  81. Adriana Hoyos, Professor/Senior Fellow, Instituto de Empresa (IE) Harvard University, Spain & USA
  82. Arnoldo de Hoyos, Professor, Pontificial Catholic University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
  83. Claudio Huepe, Director, Center of Sustainable Energy, Universidad Diego Portales, Chile
  84. Barry B. Hughes, Professor, University of Denver, USA
  85. Jan Hurwitch, Director, Visionary Ethics Foundation, Costa Rica
  86. Asif Iftikhar, Teaching Fellow, Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan
  87. Enrique V. Iglesias, Former President, Intern-American Development Bank, Uruguay
  88. Lester Ingber, CEO, Physical Studies Institute LLC, USA
  89. Jose Miguel Insulza, former Secretary General, Organization of American States (OAS), Chile
  90. Silvia Iratchet, Institutional Relations, Suma Veritas Foundation, Argentina
  91. Abulgasem Issa, Associate Professor, Libyan Authority for Scientific Researches, Libya
  92. Garry Jacobs, President & CEO, World Academy of Art and Science, India
  93. Maciej Jagaciak, Member of the Board, Polish Society for Futures Studies, Poland
  94. Alejandro Jara, Former Associate DG WTO Geneva, Former Ambassador, Chile
  95. Robert E. Jarrett, Senior Fellow (ret.), US Army Environmental Policy Institute, USA
  96. Weiquing Jiang, Chairman, UN Ethics Chinese Union, China
  97. Zhouying Jin, Prof. and Former Director, Center for Technology Innovation and Strategy, Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, China
  98. Maria João Rodrigues, Pres. Foundation for European Progressive Studies, Former Min. Employment, Former MEP and VP of the Group of the Socialists and Democrats, European Parliament, Portugal
  99.  Christopher B. Jones, Faculty, Walden University, USA
  100.  Michel Judkiewicz, Managing Director, Silver-Brains, Belgium
  101. Ted M. Kahn, CEO, DesignWorlds for Learning, USA
  102. David Kalisz, Head of Department , Management & Strategy, Paris School of Business, France
  103. Nikolaos Kastrinos, (signed in personal capacity) Foresight Team Leader, DG Research & Innovation, European Commission, Belgium
  104. Charlotte Kemp, Vice President, Global Speakers Federation, South Africa
  105. Stephen Killelea, Founder & Executive Chairman, Institute for Economics and Peace, Australia
  106. Tony Kim, President, Future Design Lab, South Korea
  107. Yusuke Kishita, Associate Professor, University of Tokyo, Japan
  108. Eric Klien, President, Lifeboat Foundation, USA
  109. Dana Klisanin, CEO, Evolutionary Guidance Media R&D, USA
  110. Norbert Kołos, Managing Partner, 4CF, Poland
  111. Tamás Kristóf, Associate Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
  112. Martin Kruse, Senior Executive Advisor & Futurist, Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies, Denmark
  113. Osmo Kuusi, Adjunct Professor, Aalto University, Helsinki, Finland
  114. Annah Kyoya, CEO, Leadership Impressions Ltd, Kenya
  115. Mounir Labib, Academy of Scientific Research & Technology, Egypt
  116. Patricio Leiva Lavalle, Dir. Latin American Inst. of Intl Relations, Miguel de Cervantes Univ., Chile
  117. Gerd Leonhard, CEO, The Futures Agency, Zurich, Switzerland
  118. Tiziano Li Piani, R&D Engineer, Leonardo Labs, Italy
  119. Marilyn Lienbrenz-Himes, Assoc. Prof. Emeritus , George Washington University, USA
  120. Lt-Gen Naeem Khalid Lodhi, Former Secretary of Defence, Pakistan
  121. Thomas Lombardo, Director, Center for Future Consciousness, USA
  122. José A. LugoSantiago, Chief Futurist, Institute for Leadership & Strategic Foresight, USA
  123. Pavel Luksha, Founder, Global Education Futures, Russia
  124. Patricia Lustig, Chief Executive, LASA Insight Ltd, UK
  125. François Mabille, General Secretary, International Federation of Catholic Universities, France
  126. Luciano Rodrigues Marcelino, Director General, Interinstitutional Relations, DGRI, Private Technical University of Loja – UTPL, Ecuador
  127. Carlos Alonso von Marschall Murillo, Head, Prospective Analysis and Public Policy, Min. of Planning and Political Economy, Costa Rica
  128. Jorge Máttar, Executive Director, Centro Tepoztlán Víctor L. Urquidi, Mexico
  129. Philip McMaster, Co-Founder, World Sustainability Coop, China
  130. John F. Meagher, Consultant, Futurist/Occupational and Environmental Health, USA
  131. Ricardo Torres Medrano, Professor, Catholic University of La Plata, Argentina
  132. Alvaro Mendez, Co-Dir. Global South Unit, London School of Economics, United Kingdom
  133. Maria Mezentseva, Member of Parliament, Chair of Ukrainian Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Ukraine
  134. Alvaro Cedeño, Molinari, Former Ambassador in Geneva, Costa Rica
  135. Cesar Monsalve Rico, Consultant, Development and Innovation Professional, Colombia
  136. Caryl Monte, CEO, International Wisdom Academy, Curaçao
  137. Iván Alonso, Montoya-Restrepo, Professor, National University of Colombia, Colombia
  138. Luz Alexandra Montoya-Restrepo, Professor, National University of Colombia, Colombia
  139. Juan Carlos Mora Montero, Professor of Planning & Foresight, National University, Costa Rica
  140. Morne Mostert, Director, Inst. for Futures Research, Stellenbosch University, South Africa
  141. Victor V. Motti, Director, World Futures Studies Federation, USA
  142. Leopold P. Mureithi, Professor of Economics, University of Nairobi, Kenya
  143. Eric Noël, Founder, Canada Towards 2030, Canada
  144. Kacper Nosarzewski, Partner, 4CF, Poland
  145. Pavel Nováček, Head Development & Environmental Studies, Palacký University, Czech Republic
  146. Erzsébet Nováky, Professor Emeritus, Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary
  147. Concepcion Olavarrieta Rodriguez, Pres. Nodo Mexicano. El Proyecto del Milenio; Exec-Sec, RIBER, Mexico
  148. Erick Øverland, President, World Futures Studies Federation, Norway
  149. Karla Paniagua Ramírez, Head of Futures Studies, Center of Design and Communication, Mexico
  150. Ioan Mircea Pașcu, Former V.P., European Parliament; Former Minister of Defence of Romania, Romania
  151. Robert A., Pavlik, Futures/Environmental Studies, Marquette University, USA
  152. Martha Beatriz Peluffo Argón, Dean, Faculty of Education Sciences, Universidad de la Empresa, Uruguay
  153. Charles Perrottet, Principal, Futures Strategy Group, USA
  154. Jahna Perricone, Director of Mindfulness Programs, Center for Conscious Creativity, USA
  155. Jeremy Pesner, Doctoral Student, Carnegie Mellon University, USA
  156. Adrian Pop, Professor, National University of Political Science and Public Administration, Romania
  157. Mila Popovich, Founder, EVOLbing leadership, USA & Montenegro
  158. Patty Rangel, Author, International Astronautical Congress, Australia & Germany
  159. Kristian Ravić, Advisor, Office of the Mayor of Zagreb, Croatia
  160. Andrew W. Reynolds, Adjunct Professor, University of Virginia and DOS (ret.), USA
  161. Álvaro Ramírez Restrepo, Director, Futurion Ltda, Colombia
  162. Roman Retzbach, CEO, FutureInstitute Zukunftsinstitut, Germany
  163. Saphia Richou, Chercheur au LAREQUOI, Conseil en Prospective Stratégique et Coopétition, France
  164. Xiaobing Rong, Deputy Secretary General, UN international collaboration & coordination agency, China
  165. Stuart Russell, Center for Human Compatible Artificial Intelligence, University of California, USA
  166. Torben Riise, CEO, ExecuTeam; Founder, Institute for Futures Studies, Copenhagen, USA
  167. Clarissa Rios Rojas, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge, UK
  168. Stanley G. Rosen, Consultant, Strategy Analyst, USA
  169. Rebecca Ryan, Founder, CEO, NEXT Generation Consulting, USA
  170. Paul Saffo, Professor, Stanford University, USA
  171. Óscar Arias Sánchez, Former President of Costa Rica (1986-1990, 2006-2010), Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Costa Rica
  172. Rocco Santoro, Senior Statistician, Daccude, Italy
  173. Ramón Santoyo, President, WFS Mexican Chapter, Mexico
  174. Carlos Alberto Sarti Castañeda, Director, Fundación Propaz, Guatemala
  175. John M. Schmidt, Founder, CANSYNTH, Australia
  176. Kamal Zaky Mahmoud Shaeer, Chair, Council of Futures Studies and Risk Management, Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, Egypt
  177. Yair Sharan, Director, FIRS2T, Israel
  178. Mario Silberman, Former Ambassador, CTA, UNIDO/UNDP, Chile
  179. Mihaly , Simai, Former Chairman, United Nations University, Hungary
  180. Alexandra Sokol, Chief Sustainability Officer, EnviroDynamix, Santa Monica, CA, USA
  181. Roger Spitz, Founder, Disruptive Futures Institute, USA
  182. Maarten Steinbuch, Professor, Technical Univ. Eindhoven, Netherlands
  183. Veerappan Swaminathan, Founder & CEO, Sustainable Living Lab Pte Ltd, Singapore
  184. David Tal, President, Quantumrun Foresight, Canada
  185. Amos Taylor, Project Researcher, Finland Futures Research Center, Finland
  186. Rohit Talwar, CEO, Fast Future, UK
  187. Sadia Tariq, Research Associate, Sanjan Nagar Institute of Philosophy and Arts, Pakistan
  188. Paul Tero, Principal Consultant, Dellium Advisory, Australia
  189. Mohan Tikku, Journalist, Author, Futurist, Former Senior Fellow, Indian Council of Soc. Sci. Res., India
  190. Nicoleta Topoleanu, Human Resources Coach and Consultant, Romania
  191. Peter VanderWel, Principal Futurist, FutureVision, Netherlands
  192. Koen Vegter, Founder, Might Futures Design, Netherlands
  193. Sanja Vlahovic, Former Amb. of Montenegro to Italy, Malta and UN organizations in Rome, Montenegro
  194. Paul Werbos, Program Director(ret.), National Science Foundation, USA
  195. Jeremy Wilken, Broadcaster, Design for Voice podcast, USA
  196. Wilson Wong, Head of Insight & Futures, Horizon Scanning UK, UK
  197. Peter P Yim, CEO (retired), CIM3, Hong Kong & USA
  198. Jesús E. Caldera Ynfante, Dir., Intl and Interinstitutional Relations, La Gran Colombia University, Colombia
  199. Amy Zalman, CEO, Prescient, USA
  200. Xialin Zhang, Secretary-General, Intl. Cooperation Center for Future Strategic Research, China
  201. Duoyin Zhou, Deputy Director, UN International Collaboration &Coordination Agency, China
  202. Ibon Zugasti Gorostidi, Director, Prospektiker, Spain

Namur (Wallonia), August 28, 2021

Anticipating means visualising and then acting before the events or actions occur. This implies taking action based on what is visualised, which just goes to show how complex the process is and how problematic our relationship is with the future. The saying “to govern means to foresee » is at odds with this complexity principle. It also refers to individual responsibility. Blaming politics is a little simplistic and unfair, as it is up to each of us to govern ourselves, which means we must “anticipate”. Yet we are constantly guilty of not anticipating in our daily lives.

 

1. Our relationship with the future

 Our relationship with the future is problematic. There are five different attitudes, of which anticipation is merely the fifth. The first is common: we go with the flow; in other words, we wait for things to happen. We hope everything will go well. It is business as usual, or we have always done this as they say in Wallonia. We can also echo the words used by the miners whenever the colliery tunnels were shored up: it can’t hurt, it’s not dangerous, it’s strong, it’s reliable, etc. My father taught me to ridicule this cavalier attitude and, above all, to challenge it.

The second attitude is more active: it involves playing by the rules and working within the norms. The elected officials pay close attention to this, and so do we all. We have to have an extinguisher in our car in case of fire, but mostly to comply with the legal obligations, regulations, technical checks, and so on. Note that public buildings and businesses are also required to have them and to ensure that they are checked regularly. Very few people have one or more fire extinguishers in their house or apartment, and, even if they do, they may not be in working order or suitable for the different types of fire that may occur. We know that it is not a legal requirement, so most people don’t bother about it.

The third attitude towards the future is responsiveness: we respond to external stimuli, and we adapt quickly to the situations that arise. Images of firefighters and emergency workers come to mind, of course, and entrepreneurs as well. Responsiveness may be a virtue, but we know that it is sometimes ineffective in the face of fast-moving events. In defence of their discipline, futurists often quote a saying which they attribute to the statesman Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754-1838): when it’s urgent, it’s already too late.

The fourth attitude towards the future is preactivity: our ability – or lack of – to prepare for changes once they are foreseeable. The word foreseeable is clearly related to forecasting, in other words, an assumption is made about the future which is usually quantified and associated with a confidence index based on an expectation. This involves taking a number of variables and system elements into account against a background of previous structural stability and analysing them and their possible evolutions. The likelihood of these possible evolutions is then calculated. Validation is always uncertain due to the complexity of the systems created by the variables. A common example is the weather forecast: it gives me a probability of rain at a given time. If I am preactive, I take my umbrella or I pile sandbags in front of my doors.

The fifth attitude towards the future is proactivity. In his work on the Battle of Stalingrad – 55 years after the event –, British historian and former officer Antony Beevor criticises the German general Friedrich Paulus (1890-1957) for not, as the military commander, being prepared to confront the threat of encirclement which had been facing him for weeks, particularly by not retaining a strong, mobile, armoured capability. This would have enabled the Sixth Army of the Wehrmacht to defend itself effectively at the crucial moment. But, Beevor adds, that implied a clear assessment of the actual danger [1]. This means that, faced with expected and identified changes (I would say exploratory foresight), or even desired changes, which I will cause or create (I would then say normative foresight), I will take action. Anticipating means both visualising and then acting in advance, in other words, acting before the events or actions occur. That is why we could also say, with Riel Miller, that if the future does not exist in the present, anticipation does. The form the future takes in the present is anticipation [2].

 

2. A threefold problem to comprehend the future

We are all faced with a threefold problem when confronting the future. The first problem is that, in the tradition of Gaston Berger (1896-1960) [3], we are expected to look far ahead but, in reality, the future does not exist as an object of knowledge. Clearly, it does not exist because it is not written and is not determined, as Marx believed or as some collapse theorists today believe.

We are also expected to take a broad view and to reflect systemically. But forecasts only focus on a limited number of variables, even in the era of Big Data. Yet we find ourselves faced with systems which are all complex and interwoven in a tangle of unlikely events. We are all familiar with emergences [4] or sudden occurrences linked to the relationships between participants and factors within the system. When driving my car, I can anticipate a puddle, to avoid aquaplaning, or a patch of ice by telling myself that I must not break. But, in reality, I never know what my reaction will be when I feel my wheels shaking, or how my car, my tyres or the road surface will react. Similarly, I never know what the reaction will be of the drivers in front of me or behind me, or in the other lanes, or of the bird that happens to strike my windscreen at that precise moment. So, I have to deal with the complexity, but I cannot reduce it.

The third problem is that, faced with world systems of such complexity, my own knowledge tools are limited. We are trained in disciplines, epistemologies, knowledge methods, vocabularies, and scientific jargon which do not encourage multidisciplinarity (studying one discipline through several disciplines), interdisciplinarity (transferring methods from one discipline to another) or transdisciplinarity (a demanding approach which moves between, across and beyond disciplines), to echo the distinctions expressed by the Franco-Romanian physicist Basarab Nicolescu in response to the works of Jean Piaget (1896-1980) [5]. Our narrowmindedness and reluctance to open up affect our humility, encourage received ideas, create ambiguity (words do not have the same meanings), prevent the necessary constructive dialogue, and adversely affect collective intelligence.

A key achievement of the French economists and futurists Jacques Lesourne (1928-2020) and Michel Godet was to demonstrate the limits of forecasting, which looks to the past for invariants or relationship models to suggest its permanence or its relatively constant evolution in the future, leading to conditional forecasts: ceteris paribus, all things being equal”. Michel Godet’s major work is entitled The Crisis in Forecasting and the Emergence of the « La Prospective », (Pergamon, 1979). In it, he writes that it was on account of the philosopher Gaston Berger, who was himself nurtured on the reflections of Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) and Maurice Blondel (1861-1949), and numerous Anglo-Saxon sources of inspiration, that the foresight approach developed. This intellectual stance involves taking the past and future into consideration over the long-term, comprehending the entire system in a seamless way, and exploring capabilities and means of action collectively.

Against our cultural, mental, intellectual, scientific, social and political background, this approach is not encouraged. It does, however, move us on from the question “what is going to happen” to the question “what may happen” and, therefore, “what if?”. This is also linked to one of our major preoccupations: the short-, medium-, and long-term impact prior analysis of the decisions we take.

Foresight has developed methods based precisely on the issue of these emergences. In addition to analysing trends and trajectories – which can identify crises such as the global financial crash in 2008 –, it also works with wildcards: major surprises and unexpected, remarkable, and unlikely events, which may have significant impacts if they occur: the 9/11 attacks, the Icelandic volcano in April 2010, the Covid crisis in 2019, the floods in July 2021, and so on.

There is also much talk today of black swan events as a result of the work of Nassim Nicholas Taleb, formerly a trader and now professor of risk engineering at the University of New York. This involves identifying events that are statistically almost impossible – so-called statistical dissonance – but which happen anyway [6].

 

3. Constructing a political agenda for complexity

First of all, we must be sceptical about the retrospective biases highlighted by the economist, psychologist and future Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman and his colleague Amos Tversky, which involve exaggerating, retrospectively, the fact that events could have been anticipated. These biases are linked to the need we all have to make sense of things, including the most random events [7]. When the unpredictable happens, it is intellectually quite easy for us to see it as predictable.

Next, it should be noted that political leaders are faced with the core issues of appropriation, legitimacy, and acceptability – especially budgetary – of a decision taken at the end of a dialogue and negotiation process involving multiple participants. The public will not necessarily be in favour of the government spending significant amounts on understanding problems they cannot yet visualise. Like St. Thomas, if they can’t touch it, they won’t believe it. At the outset, the population is not ready to hear what the politicians have to tell them on the matter, whether it involves a “stop-concrete” strategy or a perishable supply of masks. For experts and elected officials alike, it is no longer enough to make claims. They now have to provide scientific proof, and, above all, avoid denial, as the emotional link can be considerable. The significant role played by the media should also not be overlooked. For a long time, it was thought that a pandemic was an acceptable risk, as in the 1960s with the Hong Kong flu which caused at least a million deaths globally between 1968 and 1970, whereas the sight of Covid-19 victims in intensive care is unbearable and makes us less willing to accept the number of deaths. Remember how, in France, Health Minister Roselyne Bachelot was criticised and accused of squandering public money when she bought health masks and vaccines for swine flu (H1N1 virus) in 2009-2010. At the same time, humans have a great capacity to become accustomed to risk. Think of the nuclear sword of Damocles that was the Cold War, which continued until the early 1990s. We should also question whether this military nuclear risk – the anthropic apocalypse – has disappeared.

We constantly find ourselves needing to agree on the priority of the challenges facing us. Constructing a political agenda for such complexity is by no means clear, and political leaders wonder whether they will be criticised for starting works that may not seem urgent or sufficiently important to merit sustained attention, stakeholder mobilisation, and the resulting budgets.

Finally, governing not only means solving organisational problems, allocating resources and planning actions over time. It also means making things intelligible, as the French historian Pierre Rosanvallon points out [8]. The political world does not appreciate the importance of the educational aspect. In Belgium, politicians no longer go on television to talk to people directly and explain an issue that needs to be addressed. Government communications have disappeared; now, there are only televised addresses from the Head of State, who in this way becomes the last actor to communicate values to the public in this way.

 

Conclusion: uncertainty, responsibility, and anticipation

In May 2020, during the Covid-19 lockdown, the host of Signes des Temps on France-Culture radio, Marc Weitzmann, had the bright idea of recalling the first major debate of the Age of Enlightenment on natural disasters and their consequences for human populations [9], a debate between Voltaire (1694-1778) and Rousseau (1712-1778) about the Lisbon disaster of 1755 [10].

HRP5XD Lisbon Tsunami, 1755 – Woodcut – The Granger – NYC

On 1 November 1755 (All Saints Day), Lisbon was hit by a huge earthquake. Three successive waves between 5 and 15 metres high destroyed the port and the city centre [11], and tens of thousands of inhabitants lost their lives in the earthquake, tsunami and huge fire that followed. When he heard the news, Voltaire was deeply affected and, several weeks later, in view of the gravity of the event, he wrote a famous poem in which his intention was to go beyond mere evocation of the disaster and compassion for the victims.

Come, ye philosophers, who cry, “All’s well,”

And contemplate this ruin of a world.

Behold these shreds and cinders of your race,

This child and mother heaped in common wreck,

These scattered limbs beneath the marble shafts—

A hundred thousand whom the earth devours,

Who, torn and bloody, palpitating yet,

Entombed beneath their hospitable roofs,

In racking torment end their stricken lives.

To those expiring murmurs of distress,

To that appalling spectacle of woe,

Will ye reply: “You do but illustrate

The iron laws that chain the will of God »? [12]

In this “Poem on the Lisbon disaster”, from which these lines are a short excerpt, Voltaire ponders the appropriateness of attributing the event to divine justice, when, according to some so-called optimistic philosophers at the time, everything natural is a gift from God and, therefore, ultimately good and just [13]. Without calling divine power into question, Voltaire counters this concept, rejects the idea of a specific celestial punishment to atone for vices in the Portuguese capital, and instead declares fate responsible for the disaster.

As mentioned by Jean-Paul Deléage, who, in 2005, published in the Écologie et Politique review the letter which Rousseau sent to Voltaire on 18 August 1756, Voltaire went on to propose a new concept of human responsibility. This concept was social and political rather than metaphysical and religious. Thus, in his reply to Voltaire, Rousseau states as follows:

 (…), I believe I have shown that with the exception of death, which is an evil almost solely because of the preparations which one makes preceding it, most of our physical ills are still our own work. Is it not known that the person of each man has become the least part of himself, and that it is almost not worth the trouble of saving it when one has lost all the rest Without departing from your subject of Lisbon, admit, for example, that nature did not construct twenty thousand houses of six to seven stories there, and that if the inhabitants of this great city had been more equally spread out and more lightly lodged, the damage would have been much less, and perhaps of no account. All would have fled at the first disturbance, and the next day they would have been seen twenty leagues from there, as gay as if nothing had happened; but it is necessary to remain, to be obstinate around some hovels, to expose oneself to new quakes, because what one leaves behind is worth more than what one can bring along. How many unfortunate people have perished in this disaster because of one wanting to take his clothes, another his papers, another his money?  Is it not known that the person of each man has become the least part of himself, and that it is almost not worth the trouble of saving it when one has lost all the rest? [14] 

Whereas, for Voltaire, the Lisbon disaster was an accident and an unfortunate combination of circumstances, Rousseau feels that the natural seismic effects were compounded by the actions, urban choices and attitude of the people during the disaster. It is the responsibility of human behaviour that Rousseau highlights. In essence, he believes that, although Lisbon was destroyed, this was linked to the human decision to build a city on the coast and near a fault line. A lack of anticipation, perhaps.

Rousseau returned to these matters in his Confessions, in which he again absolves Providence and maintains that, of all the evils in people’s lives, there was not one to be attributed to Providence, and which had not its source rather in the abusive use man made of his faculties than in nature [15].

In the appropriately named Signes des Temps, or Sign of the Times, programme, Marc Weitzmann established a link between this debate, the question of uncertainty, nature and mankind, and the thoughts of French urbanist Paul Virilio (1932-2018). Scarred by the blitzkrieg and his lost childhood, and the idea that acceleration prevents anticipation and can lead to coincidence, Virilio, author of Speed and Politics (MIT Press, 2006), The Original Accidentl (Polity Press, 2007), and The Great Accelerator (Polity Press, 2012), emphasised that industrial and natural disasters progressed not only geometrically but also geographically, if not cosmically. In his view, this progress of contemporary coincidence requires a new intelligence in which the principle of responsibility permanently supplants the principle of technoscientific effectiveness, which is, considers Virilio, arrogant to the point of delusion [16].

Thus, as in Rousseau, our natural disasters seem increasingly inseparable from our anthropic disasters. All the more so since, as we now know, we have through our human and industrial actions altered the course of time in all its meanings: climate time, as well as speed time, or acceleration.

The fine metaphor used by futurists on the need to have good headlights at night – the faster we travel, the brighter they need to be – seems somewhat outdated. While, today, we are collectively wondering whether the road still exists, we can still enjoy inventing, plotting, and carving out a new path. For, in the words of Gaston Berger, the future is not only what may happen or what is most likely to happen, but is also, and increasingly so, what we want it to be. Predicting a disaster is conditional: it involves predicting what would happen if we did nothing to change the situation rather than what will happen in any event [17].

Risk management will remain a fundamental necessity on the path we choose. What is more, any initiative involves a degree of uncertainty which we can only ever partially reduce. This uncertainty will never absolve our individual and collective responsibilities as elected representatives or citizens. This uncertainty, in turn, creates a duty of anticipation [18].

Anticipation culture must feature at the heart of our public and collective policies. To that end, we must employ foresight methods that are genuinely robust and operational, along with impact prior analyses for the actions to be taken. That is the only way to tackle a new future without false impressions.

In his conclusions of The Imperative of Responsability, Hans Jonas decreed that, facing the threat of nuclear war, ecological ravage, genetic engineering, and the like, fear was a requirement for tackling the future [19]. We must treat anticipation in the same way. Thus anticipation meets hope, each being a consequence of the other.

 

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

Related paper: Increasing rationality in decision-making through policy impact prior analysis (July 12, 2021)

 

Direct access to PhD2050’s English papers

 

[1] Free translation from: Antony BEEVOR, Stalingrad, p. 231-232 et 252 , Paris, de Fallois, 1999.

[2] Riel MILLER, Futures Literacy: transforming the future, in R. MILLER ed., Transforming the Future, Anticipation in the 21st Century, p. 2, Paris, UNESCO – Abingdon, Routledge, 2018.

[3] Gaston BERGER, L’attitude prospective, dans Phénoménologie et prospective, p. 270sv, Paris, PUF, 1964.

[4] According to the systemist Edgar Morin, emergence is an organizational product which, although inseparable from the system as a whole, appears not only at the global level, but possibly at the level of the components. Emergence is a new quality in relation to the constituents of the system. It therefore has the virtue of an event, since it arises in a discontinuous manner once the system has been constituted; it has of course the character of irreducibility; it is a quality which cannot be broken down, and which cannot be deduced from previous elements. E. MORIN, La méthode, t.1, p. 108, Paris, Seuil, 1977. – The concept of emergence finds its origin in George Henry Lewes. To urge that we do not know how theses manifold conditions emerge in the phenomenon Feeling, it is to say that the synthetic fact has not been analytically resolved into all its factor. It is equally true that we do not know how Water emerges from Oxygen and Hydrogen. The fact of an emergence we know; and we may be certain that what emerges is the expression of its conditions, – every effect being the procession of its cause. George Henry LEWES, Problems of Life and Mind, t. 2, p. 412, London, Trübner & Co, 1874. – André LALANDE, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, p. 276-277, Paris, PUF, 1976.

[5] See: Transdisciplinarité in Ph. DESTATTE & Philippe DURANCE dir., Les mots-clés de la prospective territoriale, p. 51, Paris, La Documentation française, 2009. http://www.institut-destree.eu/wa_files/philippe-destatte_philippe-durance_mots-cles_prospective_documentation-francaise_2008.pdf

[6] Nassim Nicholas TALEB, The Black Swan, The Impact of the Highly Improbable, New York, Random House, 2007.

[7] Daniel KAHNEMAN & Amos TVERSKY, Prospect theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, in Econometrica, Journal of the econometric society, 1979, vol. 47, nr 2, p. 263-291. https://www.jstor.org/stable/1914185?seq=1

[8] Pierre ROSANVALLON, Counter-Democracy, Politics in an Age of Distrust, Cambridge University Press,  2008.

[9] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Lettre à Monsieur de Voltaire sur ses deux poèmes sur « la Loi naturelle » et sur « le Désastre de Lisbonne », présentée par Jean-Paul DELEAGE, dans Écologie & politique, 2005, 30, p. 141-154.

https://www.cairn.info/revue-ecologie-et-politique1-2005-1-page-141.htm

[10] Cfr Marc Weitzmann, Le Cygne noir, une énigme de notre temps, ou la prévision prise en défaut, avec Cynthia Fleury, Bruno Tertrais et Erwan Queinnec, Signes des Temps, France Culture, https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/signes-des-temps/le-cygne-noir-une-enigme-de-notre-temps-ou-la-prevision-prise-en-defaut

[11] Sofiane BOUHDIBA, Lisbonne, le 1er novembre 1755 : un hasard ? Au cœur de la polémique entre Voltaire et Rousseau, A travers champs, 19 octobre 2014. S. Bouhdiba est démographe à l’Université de Tunis. https://presquepartout.hypotheses.org/1023 – Jean-Paul POIRIER, Le tremblement de terre de Lisbonne, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2005.

[12] Translation taken from the Online Library of Liberty, https://oll.libertyfund.org/quote/voltaire-laments-the-destruction-of-lisbon-in-an-earthquake-and-criticises-the-philosophers-who-thought-that-all-s-well-with-the-world-and-the-religious-who-thought-it-was-god-s-will-1755.

VOLTAIRE, Poème sur le désastre de Lisbonne (1756), Œuvres complètes, Paris, Garnier, t. 9, p. 475. Wikisources : https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Page:Voltaire_-_%C5%92uvres_compl%C3%A8tes_Garnier_tome9.djvu/485

[13] We are talking about theodicy here. This consists in the justification of the goodness of God by the refutation of the arguments drawn from the existence. This concept was introduced by the German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716) in an attempt to reconcile the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, the misfortunes that prevail on earth and, on the other hand, the power and the goodness of God. LEIBNITZ, Essais de théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l’Homme et l’origine du mal, Amsterdam, F. Changuion, 1710. – See Patrick SHERRY, Theodicy in Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/theodicy-theology. Accessed 28 August 2021.

We know that in his tale Candide, or Optimism, published in 1759, Voltaire will deform and mock Leibnitzian thought through the caricatural character of Pangloss and the formula everything is at best in the best of all possible worlds … VOLTAIRE, Candide ou l’Optimisme, in VOLTAIRE, Romans et contes, Edition établie par Frédéric Deloffre et Jacques Van den Heuvel, p. 145-233, Paris, Gallimard, 1979.

[14] Translation from Internet Archive, Letter to Voltaire, Pl, IV, 1060-1062, p. 51.

 https://archive.org/details/RousseauToVoltairet.marshall/page/n1/mode/2up?q=lisbon,

Lettre à Monsieur de Voltaire sur ses deux poèmes sur la « Loi naturelle » et sur « Le Désastre de Lisbonne », 18 août 1756. in Jean-Paul DELEAGE, op. cit.

[15] J.-J. ROUSSEAU, Confessions, IX, Paris, 1767, cité par Sofiane BOUHDIBA, op. cit.

[16] Paul VIRILIO, L’accident originel, p. 3, Paris, Galilée, 2005.

[17] G. BERGER, Phénoménologie et prospective…, p. 275. (Free translation).

[18] Voir à ce sujet Pierre LASCOUMES, La précaution comme anticipation des risques résiduels et hybridation de la responsabilité, dans L’année sociologique, Paris, PUF, 1996, 46, n°2, p. 359-382.

[19] Hans JONAS, The Imperative of Responsability, In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, The University of Chicago Press, 1984.

Namur, July 12, 2021

Challenges such as the imminent strategic choices posed by the European structural funds, the Recovery programme underway within the Government of Wallonia, questions on the interest in and the value of installing 5G, and whether it is even necessary, along with issues surrounding the implementation of a guaranteed universal income, and other energy, climate and environmental issues, raise the question of the impact of the decisions made by both public and private operators [1].

In their recent work The Politics Industry, while analysing the shortcomings and failure of American democracy and the possibilities for reconstructing it, Katherine M. Gehl and Michael E. Porter call for policy innovation. Katherine Gehl, founder of the Institute for Political Innovation, argues that laboratories of democracy have a role to play in the transformations within the political and social system itself to help governments achieve their objectives and, above all, to achieve the results their citizens deserve [2]. Although the authors, who are immersed in the business and entrepreneurship culture, focus primarily on democratic engineering in order to restore its negative effects on economic competitiveness, the issue of prior, objective analysis or assessment of the impacts that political decisions can have on society and its economy is not high on their agenda. In the absence of this type of approach, we believe that criticising policymaking and its lack of rationality – along with demonstrating the absence of general interest and common good – appears futile.

The weakening of a strong impact analysis probably contributed to Philippe Zittoun’s description, based on the work of the celebrated economists, sociologists and political scientists Herbert Simon (1916-2001) and Charles Lindblom (1917-2018), of complex cognitive tinkering. In this tinkering process, the necessary rational links between problem, objective, solution, tools, values and causes are absent [3]. Ignorance, intuitions, ideology and inertia combine to give us answers that look plausible, promise much, and predictably betray us, write the recent winners of the Nobel Prize for Economics, Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo [4].

Dreamstime – Dzmitry Skazau

1. What is policy impact prior analysis?

The purpose of impact analysis is to establish a comparison between what has happened or will happen after the implementation of the measure or programme and what would have happened if the measure or programme had not been implemented. This comparison can be referred to as the programme impact [5].

Policy impact prior analysis can help to refine decisions before they are implemented and to comprehend their potential effects in different economic environments. The impact assessment provides a framework for understanding whether the beneficiaries do actually benefit from the programme, rather than from other factors or actors. A combination of qualitative and quantitative methods is useful to give an overview of the programme impact. There are two types of impact analysis: ex ante and ex post. An ex-ante impact analysis attempts to measure the expected impacts of future programmes and policies, taking into account the current situation of a target area, and may involve simulations based on assumptions relating to the functioning of the economy. Ex ante analyses are usually based on structural models of the economic environment facing the potential participants. The underlying assumptions for the structural models involve identifying the main economic actors in the development of the programme and the links between the actors and the different markets to determine the results of the programme. These models can predict the programme impacts [6].

In April 2016, in their common desire for Better Regulation, the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission decided to increase and strengthen impact assessments [7] as tools for improving the quality of EU legislation, in addition to consulting with citizens and stakeholders and assessing the existing legislation. In the view of these three institutions, impact assessments should map out alternative solutions and, where possible, potential short and long-term costs and benefits, assessing the economic, environmental and social impacts in an integrated and balanced way and using both qualitative and quantitative analyses. These assessments must respect the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as fundamental rights. They must also consider the impact of the various options in terms of competitiveness, administrative burdens, the effect on SMEs, digital aspects and other elements linked to territorial impact. Impact assessments should also be based on data that is accurate, objective, and complete [8].

In recent years, the European Commission has gone to great lengths to update its technical governance tools in its efforts to achieve better regulation. This concept means designing EU policies and laws so that they achieve their objectives at the lowest possible cost. For the Commission, better regulation does not involve regulating or deregulating, but rather adopting a way of working which ensures that policy decisions are taken openly and transparently, are guided by the best factual data available, and are supported by stakeholder participation. Impact assessment (or impact analysis) is an important element of this approach to policy issues, as are foresight (or forward-looking) tools, and tools used for stakeholder consultation and participation, planning, implementation, assessment, monitoring etc., which are part of the public or collective policy cycle, and even, by extension, the business policy cycle [9].

Better regulation covers the entire political cycle, from policy conception and preparation, to adoption, implementation, application (including monitoring and enforcement [10]), assessment and revision of measures. For each phase of the cycle, a number of principles, objectives, tools and procedures for improving regulation are used to build capacity for achieving the best possible strategy.

Although impact assessment is not a new tool, since it was theorised extensively in the 1980s and 1990s [11], its role in the process has been strengthened considerably by the European Commission, to the extent that, in our view, it is now of central importance. Even its content has been broadened. The Better Regulations Guidelines of 2017 highlight this transparency and draw a distinction with assessment practices: in an impact assessment process, the term impact describes all the changes which are expected to happen due to the implementation and application of a given policy option/intervention. Such impacts may occur over different timescales, affect different actors and be relevant at different scales (local, regional, national and EU).  In an evaluation context, impact refers to the changes associated with a particular intervention which occur over the longer term [12]. The Guidelines glossary also states that impact assessment is an integrated process for assessing and comparing the merits of a range of public or collective policy options developed to solve a clearly defined problem. Impact assessment is only an aid to policymaking / decision-making and not a substitute for it [13].

Thus, impact assessments refer to the ex-ante assessment carried out during the policy formulation phase of the policy cycle.

This process consists in gathering and analysing evidence to support policy development. It confirms the existence of a problem to be solved, establishes the objectives, identifies its underlying causes, analyses whether a public action is necessary, and assesses the advantages and disadvantages of the available solutions [14].

The Commission’s impact assessment system follows an integrated approach which assesses the environmental, social and economic impacts of a range of policy options, thereby incorporating sustainability into the drafting of EU policies. The impact reports formatted by the Commission also include the impacts on SMEs and on European competitiveness and a detailed description of the consultation strategy and the results achieved [15].

2. Complex, public-interest processes that make democracy more transparent

In a parliamentary context, impact studies designed as ex-ante assessments of legislation satisfy, firstly, an ambition to overhaul policy practices, secondly, an open government challenge to make public debate more transparent, and, thirdly, a desire for efficiency in the transformation of public and collective action, since assessment means better action. Generating knowledge on the objectives, the context, the resources, the expected results and the effects of the proposed policies means giving both parliamentarians and citizens the means to assess the consequences of the recommended measures. It also means supporting public decision-making by plainly revealing the budgetary impacts of the decisions policymakers want to make. These advantages are undoubtedly ways to revitalise our democracies [16].

Used for prior assessment of legislation, impact assessment aims to analyse all the behaviors and situations that present a direct or indirect causal link with the legislation being examined, to identify the unforeseen effects, the adverse effects [17]. It involves identifying the genuine changes expected in society which could be directly associated with the prescriptive (legislative or regulatory) measures implemented by the actors involved in the policy [18]. It is therefore understandable that questions relating to concerns such as the impact of technological choices on health or the extent to which the legislation is consistent with climate and sustainable development objectives are essential questions posed in impact studies [19].

Measuring the impact is therefore the key challenge of the assessment, but it is also the hardest issue to tackle from a methodological point of view [20]. As indicated in the Morel-L’Huissier-Petit report submitted to the French National Assembly in 2018, assessing the mobilisation of resources and the control of public expenditure when implementing legislation or a policy is the driving force for more effective public action which is able to innovate and evolve its management methods in order to adapt positively to the paradox of modern public action: how to do better with less, against a backdrop of cutting public expenditure, rising democratic demands and Public Service expectations, and accelerating economic and social trends [21]. This report also recommends expanding impact studies to cover tabled legislative proposals and substantial amendments in order to supplement the content, review the impact studies already accompanying the legislative proposals, develop robust impact and cost simulators and use them regularly, and, lastly, organise discussions within committees and at public hearings dedicated to assessing impact studies [22].

Concerning the low-carbon strategy, France’s High Council on Climate indicated, in December 2019, that, with regard to environmental and particularly climate assessment, the existing impact studies have not achieved their potential: they cover only a small portion of the legislation adopted (legislative proposals of parliamentary origin and amendments are not included), they are rarely used, and they are often incomplete [23].

However, these assessment works of the High Council on Climate are very interesting from a methodological perspective. When supplemented, impact prior analyses can be considered to follow a seven-stage process, guided by a compass as shown below.

Overall, it might be argued that the impact of a policy is all its effect on real-world conditions, including: 1. impact on the target situation or group, 2. impact on situations or groups other than the target (spill over effects), 3. impact on future as well as immediate conditions, 4. direct costs, in terms of resources devoted to the program, 5. indirect costs, including loss of opportunities to do other things. All the benefits and costs, both immediate and future, must be measured in both symbolic and tangible terms and be explained with concrete equivalences [24].

The main purpose of any ex-ante assessment is without doubt to clarify the political objectives from the outset, for example before voting on a law, and to help define or eliminate any incompatibilities within or between the general objectives and the operational objectives [25]. The fundamental problem seems to be that the impacts of changes brought about by public policies are often minor, or even marginal, compared with those caused by external social and economic developments. It then becomes hard to get the message across [26]. That is why demonstrating a significant public policy impact often means having to deal with a major programme, or series of programmes. The measures must be properly conceived, properly financed and made sustainable over time [27]. These measures can be discussed with stakeholders or even with citizens, as was the case with the measures in the independence insurance bill debated at the citizens’ panel on ageing, organised by the Parliament of Wallonia in 2017 and 2018 [28].

More than simply a judgment, impact assessment is a learning approach whereby lessons can be learned from the policy or action being assessed, and the content improved as a result. Any assessment requires collaboration and dialogue between its key participants, namely the representatives, assessors, beneficiaries of the policies, programmes, projects or functions, and stakeholders, in other words the individuals or bodies that have an interest in both the policy or programme being assessed and the results of the assessment. Assessment in this sense is merely a process in which the actors themselves adopt the thinking on the practices and the results of the subject being assessed [29]. The methods may be many and varied, but the key points are probably the ethics of the assessment and some essential quality criteria: a high-quality model, a large amount of robust data, meeting expectations, and genuine consideration of the common good [30].

 3. Interests and obstacles for a strategic intelligence tool

Impact prior analysis is one of the strategic policy intelligence tools promoted by the European Commission. It also respects the following principles:

principle of participation: foresight, evaluation or Technology Assessment exercises take care of the diversity of perspectives of actors in order not to maintain one unequivocal ‘truth’ about a given innovation policy theme;

principle of objectivisation: strategic intelligence supports more ‘objective’ formulation of diverging perceptions by offering appropriate indicators, analyses and information processing mechanism;

principle of mediation and alignment: strategic intelligence facilitates mutual learning about the perspectives of different actors and their backgrounds, which supports the finding of consensus;

principle of decision support: strategic intelligence processes facilitate political decisions and support their successful subsequent implementation  [31].

An impact assessment can therefore be broken down into traditional cost-benefit measures and measures relating to areas such as sustainable development, environment, technological innovation and social impact. The Sustainability Impact Assessment has been developed by the European Commission and includes a detailed analysis of the potential economic, social, human and environmental impacts of ongoing commercial negotiations. These assessments are an opportunity for stakeholders from the EU and the partner countries to share their points of view with the negotiators [32].

In recent decades, the literature on policy assessment has increased substantially and new methodologies have been developed to identify the causal effects of policies [33]. In addition, the openness approaches pursued by governments and parliaments are introducing democratic innovation aspects which need to be taken into account. Although the quality of the impact analysis methods, particularly environmental (air, water, ecological systems, socio-economic systems, etc.), has been improved and diversified considerably since the beginning of the 2000s, especially through the works of Christopher Wood [34] and Peter Morris and Riki Therivel [35], it must be acknowledged that, in practice, these processes are rarely applied and that, often, the public authorities prefer not to activate them. However, major clients such as the European Commission and the OECD are becoming increasingly demanding in this area in terms of assessment and climate/energy indicators. This is also a real opportunity to create closer links between impact assessments and public inquiries.

Beyond the technical sphere of civil servants and experts, many elected representatives tend to perceive policy impact prior analysis as an additional layer on top of the decision-making process – which generates a degree of indifference – rather than a beneficial layer which represents real added value for stakeholders.

We also know that, when taken to the extreme, impact assessment is a tool that can hinder or even prevent legislative and programme-based action. The Anglo-Saxons have an extreme vision of efficiency, even going as far as the concept – assumed – of a regulatory guillotine [36]. This fairly radical approach may involve two paths: one in which, faced with the proliferation of ex ante assessment procedures, the political system risks rigidity, the other in which, for fear of generating additional prescriptive complexity, the elected representatives avoid all legislative change. The OECD is interested in this aspect [37].

In this way, prior policy impact assessment could open a lively debate on legislative relevance. Something that is always healthy, particularly in parliamentary settings.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] I would like to thank Sarah Bodart, analyst and economist at The Destree Institute’s Wallonia Policy Lab, for her advice and suggestions for finalising this paper.

[2] Katherine M. GEHL & Michaël E. PORTER, The Politics Industry, How Political Innovation Can Break Partisan Gridlock and Save our Democracy, p. 179, Boston, Harvard Business Review Press, 2020.

[3] Philippe ZITTOUN, La fabrique politique des politiques publiques, p. 146, Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, 2013. – Charles E. LINDBLOM, The Policy-Making Process, Prentice-Hall, 1968.

[4] Abhijit BV. BANERJEE and Esther DUFLO, Économie utile pour des temps difficiles, p. 439-440, Paris, Seuil, 2020. – See also Esther DUFLO, Rachel GLENNESTER and Michael KREMER, Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit in T. Paul SCHULZ and John STRAUSS ed., Handbook of Development Economics, vol. 4, p. 3895–3962, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 2008.

[5] Lawrence B. MOHR, Impact Analysis for Program Evaluation, p. 2-3, Chicago, The Dorsey Press, 1988.

[6] Shahidur R. KHANDKER, Gayatri B. KOOLWAL, Hussain A. SAMAD, Handbook on Impact Evaluation: Quantitative Methods and Practices, p. 19-20, Washington, World Bank, 2010.

https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2693.

[7] The OECD defines impact as the positive or negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by an intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.  Niels DABELSTEIN dir., Glossaire des principaux termes relatifs à l’évaluation et à la gestion axées sur les résultats, p. 22, Paris, OECD, 2002. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/21/2754804.pdf

See also the EVALSED glossary: Nick BOZEAT (GHK) & Elliot STERN (Tavistock Institute) dir., EVALSED, The Resource for the Evaluation of Socio Economic Development, Sept. 2013: Impact: The change that can be credibly attributed to an intervention. Same as « effect » of intervention or « contribution to change ». – A consequence affecting direct beneficiaries following the end of their participation in an intervention or after the completion of public facilities, or else an indirect consequence affecting other beneficiaries who may be winners or losers. Certain impacts (specific impacts) can be observed among direct beneficiaries after a few months and others only in the longer term (e.g. the monitoring of assisted firms). In the field of development support, these longer-term impacts are usually referred to as sustainable results. Some impacts appear indirectly (e.g. turnover generated for the suppliers of assisted firms). Others can be observed at the macro-economic or macro-social level (e.g. improvement of the image of the assisted region); these are global impacts. Evaluation is frequently used to examine one or more intermediate impacts, between specific and global impacts. Impacts may be positive or negative, expected or unexpected. – Philippe DESTATTE, Evaluation of Foresight: how to take long-term impact into consideration? For-learn Mutual Learning Workshop, Evaluation of Foresight, Seville, IPTS-DG RTD, December 13-14, 2007. – Gustavo FAHRENKROG e.a., RTD Evaluation Tool Box: Assessing the Socio-economic Impact of RTD Policies. IPTS Technical Report Series. Seville, 2002.

[8] Better Regulation, Interinstitutional agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission, Brussels, 13 April 2016.

[9] Better Regulation Guidelines, Commission Staff Working Document, p. 5sv, 7 July 2017 (SWD (2017) 350.

[10] Application means the daily application of the requirements of the legislation after it has entered into force. EU regulations are applicable from their effective date, while rules set out in EU directives will apply only from the effective date of the national legislation that transposes the EU directive into national law. Application covers transposition and implementation. Better Regulation Guidelines…, p. 88.

[11] For example: Saul PLEETER ed., Economic Impact Analysis: Methodology and Application, Boston – The Hague – London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1980.

[12] Better regulation guidelines, p. 89, Brussels, EC, 2017.

[13] Ibidem.

[14] Szvetlana ACS, Nicole OSTLAENDER, Giulia LISTORTI, Jiri HRADEC, Matthew HARDY, Paul SMITS, Leen HORDIJK, Modelling for EU Policy support: Impact Assessments, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2019.

[15] Better Regulation Guidelines…, p. 13.

[16] Pierre MOREL-L’HUISSIER and Valérie PETIT, Rapport d’information par le Comité d’Évaluation et de Contrôle des politiques publiques sur l’évaluation des dispositifs d’évaluation des politiques publiques, p. 7-24,  Paris, National Assembly, 15 March 2018.

[17] Geneviève CEREXHE, L’évaluation des lois, in Christian DE VISSCHER and Frédéric VARONE ed., Évaluer les politiques publiques, Regards croisés sur la Belgique, p. 117, Louvain-la-Neuve, Bruylant-Academia, 2001.

[18] In simple terms, a successful impact assessment aims to establish the situation that society would have experienced in the absence of the policy being assessed. By comparing this fictional, also called counterfactual, situation to the situation actually observed, a causal relationship can be deduced between the public intervention and an indicator deemed relevant (health, employment, education, etc.). Rozenn DESPLATZ and Marc FERRACCI, Comment évaluer les politiques publiques ? Un guide à l’usage des décideurs et praticiens, p. 5, Paris, France Stratégie, September 2016.

Cliquer pour accéder à guide_methodologique_20160906web.pdf

See also: Stéphane PAUL, Hélène MILET and Elise CROVELLA, L’évaluation des politiques publiques, Comprendre et pratiquer, Paris, Presses de l’EHESP, 2016.

[19] This extension can also be found in the AFIGESE definition: Impact: social, economic and environmental consequence(s) attributable to a public intervention. Marie-Claude MALHOMME e.a., Glossaire de l’Évaluation, p. 77, Paris, AFIGESE- Caisse d’Épargne, 2000.

[20] Jean-Pierre BATTERTI, Marianne BONDAZ and Martine MARIGEAUD e.a., Cadrage méthodologique de l’évaluation des politiques publiques partenariales : guide, Inspection générale de l’Administration, Inspection générale des Finances, Inspection générale des Affaires sociales, December 2012

http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/124000683-guide-cadrage-methodologique-de-l-evaluation-des-politiques-publiques-partenariales

[21] Pierre MOREL-L’HUISSIER and Valérie PETIT, Rapport d’information

[22] Pierre MOREL-L’HUISSIER and Valérie PETIT, Rapport d’information... p.11-13

[23] Where there is evidence that some provisions of a law have a potentially significant effect on the low-carbon trajectory, whether positive or negative, the text initiator decides to steer the text towards a detailed impact study relating to the national low-carbon strategy (SNBC). This detailed study is the subject of a detailed public opinion on its quality, produced by an independent authority with the capacity to do so. This process must be concluded before the legal text is tabled in Parliament. It is suggested that Parliament should expand detailed impact studies relating to the low-carbon strategy to cover legislative proposals. Évaluer les lois en cohérence avec les ambitions, p. 5-6, Paris, High Council on Climate, December 2019.

[24] Thomas R. DYE, Understanding Public Policy, p. 313, Upper Saddle River (New Jersey), Prentice Hall, 2002. The impact of a policy is all its effect on real-world conditions, including : impact on the target situation or group, impact on situations or groups other than the target (spillover effects), impact on future as well as immediate conditions, direct costs, in terms of resources devoted to the program, indirect costs, including loss of opportunities to do other things. All the benefits and costs, both immediate and future, must be measured in both symbolic and tangible effects. – See also: Shahidur R. KHANDKER, S.R., Gayatri B. KOOLWAL, & Hussain A. SAMAD, Handbook on Impact Evaluation, Quantitative methods and practices, Washington D.C, World Bank, 2010.

[25] Paul CAIRNEY, Understanding Public Policy, Theories and Issues, p. 39, London, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2012.

[26] Karel VAN DEN BOSCH & Bea CANTILLON, Policy Impact, in Michaël MORAN, Martin REIN & Robert E. GOODIN, The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, p. 296-318, p. 314, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006.

[27] Th. R. DYE, op. cit., p. 315.

[28] Ph. DESTATTE, Que s’est-il passé au Parlement de Wallonie le 12 mai 201 ?7 Blog PhD2050, Namur, 17 June 2017, https://phd2050.wordpress.com/2017/06/17/panel2/

[29] Philippe DESTATTE and Philippe DURANCE dir., Les mots-clefs de la prospective territoriale, p. 23-24, Paris, La Documentation française, 2009.

Cliquer pour accéder à philippe-destatte_philippe-durance_mots-cles_prospective_documentation-francaise_2008.pdf

[30] Jean-Claude BARBIER, A propos de trois critères de qualité des évaluations: le modèle, la réponse aux attentes, l’intérêt général, dans Ph. DESTATTE, Évaluation, prospective, développement régional, p. 71sv, Charleroi, Institut Destrée, 2001.

[31] Alexander TÜBKE, Ken DUCATEL, James P. GAVIGAN, Pietro MONCADA-PATERNO-CASTELLO ed., Strategic Policy Intelligence: Current Trends, the State of the Play and perspectives, S&T Intelligence for Policy-Making Processes, IPTS, Seville, Dec. 2001.

[32] Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/policy-making/analysis/policy-evaluation/sustainability-impact-assessments/index_en.htm

[33] Massimo LOI and Margarida RODRIGUES, A note on the impact evaluation of public policies: the counterfactual analysis, JRC Scientific & Policy Report, Brussels, European Commission, Joint Research Center, 2012. (Report EU 25519 EN).

[34] Christopher WOOD, Environmental Impact Assessment, A Comparative Review, Harlow, Pearson Education, 2003. (1st ed. 1993).

[35] Peter MORRIS & Riki THERIVEL, Methods of Environmental Impact Assessment, London – New York, Spon Press, 2001.

[36] Thanks to Michaël Van Cutsem for this remark. http://regulatoryreform.com/regulatory-guillotine/

[37] La réforme de la réglementation dans les pays du Moyen-Orient et d’Afrique du Nord, Paris, OCDE, 2013.

Reims, 7 November 2017

 

An innovative, global movement

In 2008, in his Change we can believe in project, Barack Obama highlighted the need to establish greater transparency in political institutions so that all citizens have access to information they need to evaluate the performance of the leaders. The candidate wrote that finally the governance of the country must be a source of inspiration for all Americans and must encourage them to act as citizens [1]. In addition to his desire to reduce unnecessary public expenditure, cut bureaucracy and cancel ineffective programmes, the future President of the United States announced that he wanted to open up democracy. The new Obama administration, he announced, will publish on line all information on the management of the State and will employ all available technologies to raise public awareness of State expenditure. It will invite members of the public to serve and take part, and it will reduce bureaucracy to ensure that all government agencies operate with maximum efficiency [2]. In addition to these priorities he announced compliance with the obligations on natural resources and on social inclusion and cohesion. The stated objective was to restore confidence in the institutions and to clean up Washington: imposing a strict ethical code on the elected representatives and limiting the influence of the lobbies and interest groups [3].

When President Obama entered the White House, one of his first initiatives, on 21 January 2009, was to send a memorandum on transparency and Open Government to the officials at the government ministries and agencies. In this document, the new president reaffirmed his pledge to create a government of this type and asked his departments to help create a political system founded on transparency, public participation and collaboration. This openness, he wrote, would strengthen democracy and promote the effectiveness and efficiency of the government. Firstly, the president wanted the government to be transparent and to promote accountability [4] and tell the public what it was doing. Next, the government should be participatory: when knowledge is shared between the public and private spheres, it is in the common interest for the public to participate in developing policies and allow their government to benefit from their collective intelligence. Finally, the government should be collaborative, which means that it should actively engage Americans in the work of their government, harnessing innovative tools and methods to ensure that all levels of the government and the administration cooperate with each other and with the non-profit organisations, businesses and individuals in the private sector [5]. After being gradually implemented in the United States, this movement, which follows an already long-standing Anglo-Saxon tradition [6], has inspired other countries and prompted an important multilateral initiative which, incidentally, The Destree Institute joined as a civil society partner in 2017.

Thus, in 2011, the Open Government Partnership (OGP) was launched by the governments of the United States, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa and the United Kingdom, who adopted a joint declaration [7]. The objective of the OGP is to set up a platform for good practices between innovators in order to secure concrete commitments from governments on transparency, public action, empowerment of citizens, public participation, democratic innovation and harnessing new technologies to promote better governance.

As the years have passed, more than 70 countries have joined the initiative. As of 2017, the Belgian Federal State has not yet done so [8]. France, which was a pioneer in deliberative processes and Open Data, only joined the OGP in 2014 but has held the joint presidency since 2015, becoming co-organiser of the 4th Global Summit for the Open Government Partnership, which was held in the French capital at the end of 2016. The Paris Declaration, which was adopted on 7 December 2016, reaffirms all the founding principles and values of the OGP and undertakes to push forward the frontiers of the reforms beyond transparency, to advance meaningful participation, accountability and responsiveness. The signatories to the Paris Declaration also pledge to create innovative alliances between civil society and government leading to more collaborative public services and decision-making processes. The document also calls for the development of Open Government at the local level and the launch of local participatory initiatives to bring public policies closer to citizens [9].

A citizen-centred culture of governance

To answer the question of what open government really is, we could examine the closed model of decision-making with Beth Simone Noveck, who ran the Open Government Initiative at the White House in 2009 and 2010. This legal expert and law professor, who is a Yale and Harvard graduate, considers that the closed model is the one that was created by Max Weber, Walter Lippmann and James Madison. This model would have us believe that only government professionals and their experts, who themselves claim to be strictly objective [10], possess the necessary impartiality, expertise, resources, discipline and time to make the right public decisions. This vision, which ought to be a thing of the past, restricts public participation to representative democracy, voting, joining interest groups and involvement in local civic or political activities. Yet, today, we know that, for many reasons, professional politicians do not have a monopoly on information or expertise [11].

Technological innovation and what is today called Digital Social Innovation (DSI) [12] are contributing to this change. However, we do not think they are the driving force behind the Open Government concepts as they are somewhat peripheral. Although technology does have some significance in this process, it is perhaps in relation to its toolkit rather than its challenges or purposes. Open Government forms part of a two-fold tradition. Firstly, that of transparency and free access to public information on civil society. This is not new. The British parliament endorsed it in the 1990s [13]. Secondly, Open Government finds its inspiration in the values of sharing and collaboration used within the communities linked to the free software and open science movements [14]. In this sense, public expectations could be raised, as is the case with some researchers who see in Open Government the extent to which citizens can monitor and influence government processes through access to government information and access to decision-making arenas [15].

Even if we consider that the idea of Open Government is still under construction [16], we can still try to establish a definition. Taking our inspiration from the OECD definition in English, Open Government can be conceived as a citizen-centred culture of governance that utilizes innovative and sustainable tools, policies and practices to promote government transparency, responsiveness and accountability to foster stakeholders’ participation in support of democracy and inclusive growth  [17]. The aim of this process is that it should lead to the co-construction of collective policies that involve all the parties involved in governance (public sphere, businesses, civil society, etc.) and pursue the general interest and the common good.

The international OGP organisation states that an Open Government strategy can only really develop where it is supported by an appropriate environment that allows it to be rolled out. The issue of the leadership of the political players is clearly very important, as is the capacity (empowerment) of the citizens to participate effectively in public action: this is central to the reforms it brings about, as the international organisation noted. Today, governments acknowledge the need to move from the role of simple providers of services towards the development of closer partnerships with all relevant stakeholders.[18].

Thus Open Government reconnects with one of the initial definitions of governance, as expressed by Steven Rosell in 1992: a process whereby an organisation or a society steers itself, using its players [19]. It has become commonplace to reiterate that the challenges we face today can no longer be resolved, given their magnitude, by a traditional government and several cohorts or even legions of civil servants.

Nevertheless, faced with these often enormous challenges, Professor of Business Administration Douglas Schuler rightly reflects on the capacity for action of the entire society that would have to be mobilised and poses the question: will we be smart enough soon enough? To answer this question, Schuler, who is also president of the Public Sphere Project, calls for what he refers to as civic intelligence, a form of collective intelligence centred on shared challenges, which focuses on improving society as a whole rather than just the individual. The type of democracy that is based on civic intelligence, writes Douglas Schuler, is one which, as the American psychologist and philosopher John Dewey wrote, can be seen as a way of life rather than as a duty, one in which participation in a participatory process strengthens the citizenship of individuals and allows them to think more in terms of community. To that end, deliberation is absolutely essential. It can be defined as a process of directed communication whereby people discuss their concerns in a reasonable, conscientious, and open manner, with the intent of arriving at a decision [20]. Deliberation occurs when people with dissimilar points of view exchange ideas with the intent of coming to an agreement. As futurists are well aware, the intended product of deliberation is a more coherent vision of the future [21].

Contrary to what is generally believed, true deliberation processes are rare, both in the civic sphere and in specifically political and institutional contexts. Moreover, Beth Simone Noveck describes deliberative democracy as timid, preferring the term collaborative democracy, which focuses more on results and decisions and is best promoted through technologies [22]. These processes do, however, constitute the basic methodology for more participative dynamics, such as the co-construction of public policies or collective policies, leading to contractualisation of players, additionality of financing and partnership implementation and evaluation. The distance between these simple, more or less formal consultation processes or these socio-economic discussion processes can be measured using Rhineland or Meuse models, which date back to the period just after the Second World War period and which, admittedly, are no longer adequate to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

The United Nations was right when it added a Goal 17, “Partnerships for the Goals”, to the already explicit Goal 16, which is one of the sustainable development goals focussing specifically on the emergence of peaceful and inclusive societies, access to justice for all, and building effective, accountable institutions at all levels. This Goal 17 calls for effective partnerships to be set up between governments, the private sector and civil society: these inclusive partnerships built upon principles and values, a shared vision, and shared goals that place people and the planet at the centre, are needed at the global, regional, national and local level [23].

Open regions and territories

In his speech at the Open Government Partnership Forum, which was held in parallel with the 72nd United Nations General Assembly on 19 September 2017, President Emmanuel Macron stated that local authorities have an increasing role to play and are an absolutely essential part of Open Government [24]. In his election campaign, the future French president also highlighted the fact that public policies are more effective when they are constructed with the constituents for whom they are intended. And in what he called the République contractuelle [Contractual Republic], a Republic which places trust in local districts, key players and society, the former minister saw a new idea for democracy: « these are not passive citizens who delegate the governance of the nation to their political leaders. A healthy, modern democracy is a system composed of active citizens who play their part in transforming the country » [25].

In keeping with the work already carried out since the start of the parliamentary term in the Parliament of Wallonia, the Wallonia Regional Policy Declaration of 28 July 2017 embodies this change by calling for a democratic revival and an improvement in public governance founded on the four pillars of transparency, participation, responsibility and performance. Transparency concerns the comprehensibility of the rules and regulations, the operating methods, and the mechanisms, content and financing of the decisions. The aim of participation is the involvement of citizens and private actors, businesses and the non-profit sector by giving them the initiative as a matter of priority, with the State providing support and strategic direction. The text invokes a new citizenship of cooperation, public debate, active information and involvement. The responsibility thus promoted is mainly that of the representative – elected or appointed – and sees an increase in accountability. The relations between public authorities and associations need to be clarified. The text states that performance is defined by evaluating the impact of public action in economic, budgetary, employment, environmental and social matters. It establishes a desire for a drastic simplification of public institutions rightly regarded as too numerous and too costly [26].

As we can see, these options are interesting and they undoubtedly represent a step forward inspired by the idea of Open Government we have been calling for lately [27], even if they have not yet moved on to genuine collaborative governance, deliberation with all actors and citizens or co-construction of public policies beyond experiments with public panels.

Conclusion: a government of the citizens, by the citizens, for the citizens

Open Government is a matter of democracy, not technology. This model reconnects with Abraham Lincoln’s idea of government of the people, by the people, for the people, which ended his Gettysburg address of 19 November 1863 [28]. This powerful idea can be advantageous for all of the regions in Europe, for its States and for the European process as a whole. Here, as in the United States, the principle of Open Government must be adopted by all representatives and applied at all levels of governance[29]. Parliaments and regional councils, who have often already embarked on pioneering initiatives, must grasp it [30].

As Douglas Schuler stated, Open Government would make no sense if it was not accompanied by informed, conscious and engaged citizenship, if it did not mean governance fully distributed within the population, the end of government as the sole place of governance. So this observation refers back to the initial question: what skills and information do citizens need in order to understand the issues they must face? [31] We know the response of Thomas Jefferson, writing from Paris to the philosopher Richard Price in 1789: a sense of necessity, and a submission to it, is to me a new and consolatory proof that, whenever the people are well informed, they can be trusted with their own government; that, whenever things get so far wrong as to attract their notice, they may be relied on to set them to rights [32]. This question certainly requires a response linked to lifelong critical education, the importance of philosophy and history, and the teaching of citizenship, foresight and complexity we have discussed recently [33]. As Pierre Rosanvallon notes, it is a question of making society comprehensible for the public, of ensuring that they can have effective knowledge of the social world and the mechanisms that govern it, to enable individuals to have access to what the Collège de France Professor calls real citizenship: an understanding of the effective social relationships, redistribution mechanisms and problems encountered when creating a society of equals [34].

As we have repeatedly stated, Open Government and governance by the players require an open society [35], in other words, a common space, a community of citizens where everyone works together to consider and address shared issues for the common good. Moving from Open Government to an open State happens by extension and through the application of the principles mentioned, from the executive to the legislature and the judiciary, and to all the players upstream and downstream.

Where national governments have not yet launched their open governance strategy, they should start with the districts, cities and regions, which often have the benefit of flexibility and proximity with the players and citizens. Naturally, this requirement also implies that private organisations, too, should be more transparent and more open and become more involved.

Aligning these global ambitions, which have been adopted by the United Nations and passed on by the OECD, Europe and more than 70 nations around the world, with the expectations of our regional players appears to be within reach. It is up to us to complete this task with enthusiasm and determination, wherever we are in this society that dreams of a better world.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

[1] Barack OBAMA, Change we can believe in, Three Rivers Press, 2008. Translated into French under the title Le changement, Nous pouvons y croire, p. 180, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2009.

[2] Ibidem.

[3] Ibidem, p. 181sv.

[4] Concerning accountability, which he prefers to translate by rendering of accounts, see Pierre ROSANVALLON, Le bon gouvernement, p. 269sv, Paris, Seuil, 2015.

[5] Memo from President Obama on Transparency and Open Government, January 21, 2009. Reproduced in Daniel LATHROP & Laurel RUMA ed., Open Government, Transparency, and Participation in Practice, p. 389-390, Sebastopol, CA, O’Reilly, 2010.

http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=85677

[6] For the background in the United States, see: Patrice McDERMOTT, Building Open Government, in Government Information Quarterly, no. 27, 2010, p. 401-413.

[7] Joint declaration on open government, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/d-claration-commune-pour-un-gouvernement-ouvert

[8] La Belgique n’est toujours pas membre du Partenariat pour un Gouvernement ouvert, in Le Vif-L’Express, 11 August 2017.

[9] Déclaration de Paris, 4e Sommet mondial du Partenariat pour un Gouvernement ouvert, Open Government Partnership, 7 December 2016. https://www.opengovpartnership.org/paris-declaration

[10] See Philip E. TETLOCK, Expert Political Judgment, How good is it? How can we know? Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005.

[11] Beth Simone NOVECK, Wiki Government: How technology can make government better, democracy stranger, and citizens more powerful, Brookings Institution Press, 2009. – The Single point of Failure, in Daniel LATHROP & Laurel RUMA ed., Open Government, Transparency, and Participation in Practice, p. 50, Sebastopol, CA, O’Reilly, 2010. For an empirical approach to Open Governance, see Albert J. MEIJER et al., La gouvernance ouverte: relier visibilité et moyens d’expression, in Revue internationale des Sciences administratives 2012/1 (Vol. 78), p. 13-32.

[12] Matt STOKES, Peter BAECK, Toby BAKER, What next for Digital Social Innovation?, Realizing the potential of people and technology to tackle social challenges, European Commission, DSI4EU, Nesta Report, May 2017. https://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/dsi_report.pdf

[13] Freedom of access to information on the environment (1st report, Session 1996-97) https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199697/ldselect/ldeucom/069xii/ec1233.htm

[14] Romain BADOUARD (lecturer at the Université Cergy-Pontoise), Open governement, open data: l’empowerment citoyen en question, in Clément MABI, Jean-Christophe PLANTIN and Laurence MONNOYER-SMITH dir., Ouvrir, partager, réutiliser, Regards critiques sur les données numériques, Paris, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 2017 http://books.openedition.org/editionsmsh/9067

[15] Albert J. MEIJER, Deirdre CURTIN & Maarten HILLEBRANDT, Open Government: Connecting vision and voice, in International Review of Administrative Sciences, 78, 10-29, p. 13.

[16] Douglas SCHULER, Online Deliberation and Civic Intelligence in D. LATHROP & L. RUMA ed., Open Government…, p. 92sv. – see also the interesting analysis by Emad A. ABU-SHANAB, Reingineering the open government concept: An empirical support for a proposed model, in Government Information Quarterly, no. 32, 2015, p. 453-463.

[17] A citizen-centred culture of governance that utilizes innovative and sustainable tools, policies and practices to promote government transparency, responsiveness and accountability to foster stakeholdersparticipation in support of democracy and inclusive growth. OECD, Open Government, The Global context and the way forward, p. 19, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2016.

[18] OECD, Panorama des administrations publiques, p. 198, Paris, OECD, 2017. – See also, p. 29 and 30 of the same work, some specific definitions developed in various countries.

[19] Steven A. ROSELL ea, Governing in an Information Society, p. 21, Montréal, 1992.

[20] Douglas SCHULER, Online Deliberation and Civic Intelligence... p. 93.

[21] Ibidem.

[22] B. S. NOVECK, op.cit., p. 62-63.

[23] Sustainable Development Goals, 17 Goals to transform our world. http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/globalpartnerships/

[24] Speech by the President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron at the Open Government Partnership event held in parallel with the 72nd United Nations General Assembly (19 September 2017) – http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x61l75r

[25] Emmanuel MACRON, Révolution, p. 255-256 and 259, Paris, XO, 2016.

[26] Parliament of Wallonia, Session 2016-2017, Déclaration de politique régionale, « La Wallonie plus forte », 28 July 2017, DOC 880(2016-2017) – No. 1, p. 3-5.

[27] Olivier MOUTON, Une thérapie de choc pour la Wallonie, in Le Vif-L’Express, no. 44, 3 November 2017, p. 35.

[28] Carl MALAMUD, By the People, in D. LATHROP & L. RUMA ed., Open Government…, p. 41.

[29] Ibidem, p. 46.

[30] David BEETHAM, Parlement et démocratie au vingt-et-unième siècle, Guide des bonnes pratiques, Geneva, Parliamentary Union, 2006.

[31] Douglas SCHULER, Online Deliberation and Civic Intelligence... p. 93.

[32] Letter To Richard Price, Paris, January 8, 1789, in Thomas JEFFERSON, Writings, p. 935, New-York, The Library of America, 1984.

[33] Ph. DESTATTE, Apprendre au XXIème siècle, Citoyenneté, complexité et prospective, Liège, 22 September 2017. https://phd2050.org/2017/10/09/apprendre/

[34] P. ROSANVALLON, Le bon gouvernement…, p. 246.

[35] Archon FUNG & David WEIL, Open Government and open society, in D. LATHROP & L. RUMA ed., Open Government…, p. 41.