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Foresight

Monterrey (Mexico), September 26, 2024

Dear Colleagues [1],

First of all, I would like to say how pleased I am to be able to share a few moments with you. Of course, this does not make up for my regret that I cannot be in Monterrey. This is due to the narrow-mindedness of the US Administration, which cannot imagine anyone else going to Iraq.

In my presentation, I would like to focus my remarks on two points. The first, very briefly, is to tell you that while the Brussels Area Node is pursuing a wide range of activities in the field of foresight, particularly with its European partners, including the European Commission, it is also open to new initiatives.

 

1. A wide range of foresight activities

Six main developments can be briefly mentioned:

1.1. The continuation of our activities at regional, federal, interregional and European levels, particularly during the first half of 2024 as part of the Belgian Presidency of the European Union (foresight work on the European Territorial Agenda and anticipating the effects of climate change on spatial planning, etc.).

1.2. Participation with the European Commission’s DG RTD on innovation foresight in the framework of Horizon Europe. Report:

Citizens’ engagement approaches and methods in R&I foresight

1.3. Investment in global issues in partnership with the Millennium Project: Human Security for All, Establishing the common good by arming wisdom, WAAS Conference, May 2024.

1.4. Continuation of work at Wallonia level, particularly a wide-ranging foresight mission for the Government of Wallonia, with the Foresight College to prepare policy recommendations for 2024 (for a new government in July) and 2029, based on a 2050 foresight horizon. This College is made up of about twenty young people under the age of 35, mostly women. 24 recommendations were made to the government and the main social players – including the political parties – in Wallonia on subjects as diverse as preserving biodiversity, developing a more sustainable agricultural market, mapping infrastructure, social cohesion in regional planning, supporting housing renovation policies, providing educational information on public budgets, anticipating changes at local level, developing medical centres, school nutrition programmes, sharing the burden of contraception, etc.

1.5. Strong involvement in education and training in foresight at the universities of Reims (Foresight course applied to the environment and ecological transition in a new master in Sustainability Science) and Paris-Diderot / Cité (Foresight methods in Master 2) and different seminars about biodiversity, mobility and the future of religions).

The Destree Institute continues to organize its Executive Certificate in Operational Foresight: 100-hour course spread throughout the year, 4 hours every Monday afternoon with a dozen high-level speakers.

1.6. The Millennia2025 Women and Innovation Foundation continues its work to empower women and promote equality. Building on its international foresight research process, it is working to translate its six strategic axes into concrete actions.

https://www.millennia2025-foundation.org/processus_prospective.html

The inauguration of the meeting room named after Ted Gordon at The Destree Institute on the 28th of May 2024 [2] was an opportunity to welcome Nikos Kastrinos, former Foresight Leader at the EC’s DG Research, to our own planning committee. He sits alongside Marie-Anne Delahaut, President of Millennia2025 Women and Innovation Foundation – who has been active in the MP for years -, Thomas Deridder, the new CEO of The Destree Institute, as well Giovanna Sacco and Frédéric Moray, the initiators of the Open Changin’ School project.

2. The Open Changin’ School project

This new project is the second element I would like to talk about. It is supported by the Brussels Area Node of the Millennium Project and currently brings together in a fruitful exchange the Liège University College (HELMo) and the State University of Liège, the King Baudouin Foundation and The Destree Institute. This project is, by definition, open to other partnerships and I would like to invite all the nodes to participate. Our contacts with the team in charge go back to 2018 and the keynote speech I had the opportunity to give at the beginning of the academic year at this University College on « Jobs of Tomorrow ». I presented our MP work and scenarios on Future Work/Technology 2050.

This project, called Open Changin’ School, aims to help current educational models evolve in the face of the many challenges of the future by showcasing, through film, the innovative educational initiatives that are emerging around the world [3]. As Giovanna Sacco explained, for each target school, the documentary will address themes such as the school’s culture and vision of learning, the content and curricula, the skills developed, the organization of the school, the methods used, the points of view of the children, parents and teachers, and the challenges to be met. These subjects will be covered using an immersive and authentic approach, with interviews with key players in the education community, extracts from original interviews and video illustrations explaining the answers to the documentary’s ‘key’ questions. The team, consisting of an education specialist and a filmmaker, will be supported by a scientific advisory board. Of course, this can only be done effectively by building partnerships between our different countries to identify the places and processes of educational innovation that anticipate and address our 15 global challenges.

Examples of inspiring schools have already been identified: in Denmark, the United States, Uruguay, Canada, Norway and so on. But this work needs to be continued and represents a real opportunity to analyse and understand experiences. We will promote them among ourselves and try to make them inspiring objects for adapting our education systems to the changes we want to see in tomorrow’s world.

That’s why I’m listening carefully to what you have to say and I’m counting on your commitment to this project, which is so necessary for the future generations.

 

Philippe Destatte

PhD2050

 

[1]  This paper is the finalized version of my presentation to the Planning Committee of the Millennium Project, held in Monterrey, Mexico, on 26 and 27 September 2024, as chair of the Brussels’ Area Node of the Millennium Project.

[2] Ph. DESTATTE, Tribute to Ted J. Gordon (1930-2024), Brussels, May 29, 2024, https://phd2050.org/2024/05/29/ted/

[3] Giovanna SACCO & Frédéric MORAY, Open Changin’ School ou l’Ecole ouverte (sur le monde) en changement (dans son propre système), May 28, 2024, 22p.

Brussels, May 29, 2024

On Tuesday 28 May 2024, the Brussels’Area Node of the Millennium Project paid tribute to Theodore J. Gordon (1930-2024).

As some of you may know, each room at The Destree Institute in Namur, Wallonia, which hosts the Node, is named after a role model whose legacy we want to pass on. Alongside offices named after Donella Meadows, Lise Thiry, Gaston Berger, Fernand Braudel, Aurelio Peccei, Robert Jungk, Eleonora Barbieri Masini among others, a large meeting room on the first floor of our building is now named after Ted Gordon.

Our will was to honor Ted, an aeronautical engineer, already famous for his contribution to the Apollo programme, who has served the foresight community so well. He is both as a pioneer in the methods he developed or improved (Trend Impact Analysis, Technology Sequence Analysis, Cross-Impact Analysis, Real-time Delphi, State if the Future Index,  etc.) within the Rand Corporation, the Futures Group and, above all, The Millennium Project which he co-founded in 1996 in the framework of the American Council for United Nations University.

Marie-Anne Delahaut, President of the Millennia2025 Women and Innovation Foundation and co-chair of The Millennium Project Brussels Area Node, recalled Ted’s active presence in some initiatives of the Node and its European partners:

– at the international conference organised by the European Millennium Project Nodes Initiative (EUMPI) at the Aula Magna in Louvain-la-Neuve (Wallonia, BE) in 2005, The futures of European in the Global Knowledge Society, and the subsequent Planning Committee,

– at the 2008 Conference at the Palais des Congrès in Liège: Millennia2015, Women actors of development for the global challenges,

– at the 2012 international conference Millennia2015, An action plan for women’s empowerment  at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris, and the foresight training courses that followed this event and enabled dozens of participants from several continents to learn from this great futurist.

Since that time, we have continued to learn from Ted Gordon, still participating with him in various projects, in particular those in which the Millennium Project and The Destree Institute were involved with NATO and various services in the anticipation of terrorism [1].

The thoughts and gratitude of the Brussels-Node Area team, The Destree Institute and the Millennia2025 Women and Innovation Foundation go out to Ted and Ann’s family, as well as to his lifelong companions, foremost among them Jerry Glenn and Elizabeth Florescu.

You can see the photo of this celebration, with, from left to right, Marie-Anne Delahaut, Nikos Kastrinos, Thomas Deridder, Philippe Destatte, Frédéric Moray and Giovanna Sacco (Open Changin’ School Project).

From the moment I met Ted Gordon for the first time 24 years ago in Houston until recently, I have never stopped learning from his teachings, his advice and his kindness.

I experienced a very rich moment of complicity with him at UNESCO in Paris in 2012 when, under Marie-Anne’s initiative and leadership, we shared during two days after the Millennia2015 Conference the training of dozens of young women from Africa and Asia who wanted to be introduced to foresight.

I also remember Ted’s constant encouragement during our Millennium Project planning committee meetings. After each high-quality presentation – and there were many – he would regularly say something particularly curing: « this is really excellent ».

Thank you so much for everything you’ve given, dear Ted.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] Philippe DESTATTE, Elisabeta FLORESCU, Garry KESSLER, Hélène von REIBNITZ, Karlheinz STEINMÜLLER, Identifying Some Issues in the NATO Zone Through Trajectories About the Future of Terrorism and Counter-Terror Strategies, in Theodore J. GORDON e.a., Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning, p. 16-24, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, IOS Press, 2017.

Philippe DESTATTE, Counter-Terrorism in Europe 2030; Managing Efficiency and Civil Rights, in Theodore J. GORDON e.a., Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning, p. 87-105, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, IOS Press, 2017.

https://phd2050.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Philippe-Destatte_Counter-terrorism-Europe_NATO-IOS_2017.pdf

Brussels, May 16, 2024

 

1. Continually embracing the complexity of the world

It is always extremely difficult to objectivise a trend towards increasing global violence or the escalating risks of conflagration we face [1]. Today, it is claimed that the return to power struggles and brutal initiatives are characteristics of the 21st century. Without diminishing them, the historian must observe that these have instead been a characteristic of humanity for more than 40 centuries.

Nevertheless, as the data collected by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Swedish University of Uppsala shows, while the number of wars has remained fairly constant since 1946, minor conflicts have increased significantly since 2010, after a decrease in the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall and its consequences on the rest of the world.

Davies SHAWN, Therese PETTERSSON & Magnus ÖBERG, Organized violence 1989-2022 and the return of conflicts between states? in Journal of Peace Research, 2023. https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/charts/

According to Peter Wallenstein, for the world as a whole, the total number of armed conflicts is staggering. Despite great efforts at conflict resolution, it appears that, for each conflict solved between parties with international efforts, a new one emerges, often pursued by splinter groups, requiring the same mix of improvisation and standard operating procedures by the international community [2].

The very nature of these conflicts is evolving to such an extent that the classic distinction between inter-state war and civil war is being replaced by a trichotomy for conflict analysis. The first category includes inter-state conflicts over territory and government [3]. The second category identifies intra-state conflicts over government and a third category contains intra-state conflicts over territory. It should be noted that, whereas during the period 2000-2010, there were only 4 out of 73, from 2011 to 2021, inter-state conflicts represent 7 out of a total of 110. Over the entire period 1989-2021, inter-state conflicts amounted to 14 out of 190 [4].

The professor of foresight, meanwhile, has long been saying that to regard the fall of the Berlin Wall or the collapse of the USSR as events that definitively marked the end of the Cold War could only be established over a long period which we have clearly not achieved. Today, we are facing a high-intensity war in Ukraine. One possible outcome is that it leads to a partition of that country along the Dnieper River – or some demarcation further eastwards or westwards – and that a new iron curtain will eventually descend across the continent of Europe for a long time. There seems no question, however, that we are currently facing an ominous bifurcation as a result of a new geopolitical upheaval in the world [5].

So let us simply note, that, in 2024, in some regions, such as in Europe, there is increased media pressure surrounding the issues, along with a challenge to our way of life resulting from greater awareness of climate change and the ravages of the Covid-19 pandemic. The latter, it should be remembered, has caused more than 6.7 million deaths to date.

Determining an underlying cause for all these symptoms seems rather pointless and could even highlight a linearity which our awareness of global complexity would not accept. This is precisely the view expressed by Garry Jacobs and Janani Ramanathan and their co-authors in March 2024: a piecemeal focus on single issues would be inadequate at a time when the inter-linkages and interdependencies between issues, disciplines, sectors, regions and cultures of an increasingly globalized world had become so evident and determinative [6].

The fact remains that, specifically, all the efforts and initiatives, including those undertaken by the World Academy of Art & Science (WAAS) and by the Millennium Project, in particular regarding education, to highlight this complexity and the inter-linkages between the various issues that preoccupy us are worthwhile.

But such complexity reminds us that there is no simple response to the obstacles hampering the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and that it will be necessary to continue our efforts in a series of different directions to enable beneficial accelerations and favourable outcomes.

 

2. The lack of public interest and common good at the international level

Those who are acculturated to strategic or operational foresight know how difficult it is to progress together towards a common goal such as peace, security, harmony or sustainability without including the idea of the common good as an ultimate aim in a shared vision.

Yet, as stated by the Swiss jurist Robert Kolb, the common good present in international society is blatantly deficient and structurally inadequate. In international law, this concept is the quest for a harmonious equilibrium between general interests and individual interests, between the individual and the collective at every moment in history… Embodied in the social order, this common good becomes a principle which is relevant for the application of the law: it governs the interpretation of the rules by giving them an ultimate purpose which they must pursue [7].

The idea of genuine international community based on common values is constantly being challenged by exaggerated State sovereignty. Thus, international society does not seem to actually exist or assume a specific, active form, being merely a society of societies, whose component societies fully believe that they can be self-sufficient. For Kolb, Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva, this conventional primacy of the individual good over the collective good is reflected in a serious distortion of the spectre of the common good. In the essential sectors, this spectre borders on anarchy and gives free rein to power. And, indeed, sovereignty, nationalism and particularism reign supreme in our world. Universal common good is still simply the aspiration of some enlightened circles [8].

What could this common good look like? Perhaps an overriding interest, as conceived or observed by the French philosopher and historian Raymond Aron. During the 1960s, Aron, author of Peace and War, A Theory of International Relations, noted this interest in the solidarity of the two Greats against total war [9], a solidarity not to self-destruct. For the United States and Russia, it was a means of moving beyond global concepts and ideologies that were seemingly irreconcilable. It was the reciprocal threat of nuclear weapons and the shadow of death for all that would have ensured that established this interest in the absence of a common good. But the common good was clearly present: it was – and, to a degree, remains – the protection of civilisation, or the aspiration of harmonious civilisation.

Other major powers have emerged since the Cold War period – China and India, for example – along with other self-destruction elements: although nuclear apocalypse has not been eliminated, climate change has increased in magnitude and constitutes an additional threat in a world whose population has risen from 3 to 8 billion people in sixty years.

Tackling climate change ought to be the overriding interest of nations and the common good of civilisation: a battle in whose name all wars and international crises should be banned. In this way, international peace and justice could be achieved if all States truly acknowledged the common good represented by universal society, nature and the biosphere. In the words of Robert Kolb, this international community could establish a sort of constitutional law [10] on a global scale. Collective solidarity would prevail over state sovereignty and disproportionate individual ambitions.

Endowed with a common purpose, therefore, how should this collective ambition be applied?

 

 3. Arming wisdom? The collapse of diplomacy and dissuasion

Tomorrow we will try to arm wisdom, but we will not let the human values he taught us be prescribed, values of which he was the living example, stated Raymond Aron on 27 January 1945 in tribute to the French philosopher Léon Brunschvicg (1869-1944) [11].

 

3.1. The United Nations

Arming wisdom is the hope and the necessity of this Post-War period. The aims and principles of the United Nations Charter embody this hope. The first, well-known Article sets out the organisation’s ambition: 

  1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
  2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
  3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
  4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends [12].

Unfortunately, Articles 45 and 47 of the Charter are less well-known, since they have remained unheeded to date[13]:

Article 45: In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47:

1.There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

  1. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
  2. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
  3. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees [14].

These articles represent the armed wing of wisdom and must be endorsed by the international community and the institutions that support it.

Although Raymond Aron stated that military force remains the bedrock of international order, he recognised that it is not decisive everywhere or at every point[15]. We can see this in the Vietnam of his era or the Afghanistan of our own.

But to take just a few recent examples, Congo, Yemen, Sudan, Ukraine and Gaza demonstrate the simultaneous collapse of international diplomacy and dissuasion. These are all examples of our inability to establish peace and protect people: inability in global governance as well as inability in the governance of continental Europe as far as the war in Ukraine is concerned.

 

3.2. Europe

I will spend a bit of time on Europe’s inability, particularly in view of the need for it to keep its own house in order rather than criticise the United Nations yet again. In addition to NATO, there are three institutions that are, to varying degrees, responsible for security in its different dimensions: the European Union, the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which is often forgotten but which was one of the architects of the Minsk Agreements of September 2014 [16].

Since the rejection of the European Defence Community by the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954 and, in its wake, the creation of the Western European Union, considerable efforts have been made to establish a European defence system that would offer a way to arm the declared diplomatic wisdom of Europe – inside or outside NATO [17]. These efforts have had little effect.

Thus, at the time of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the European Union became aware of its inability, both diplomatically and politically, to intervene on its own continent and it had to stand aside in favour of NATO on two occasions: in 1995, in Bosnia-Herzegovina and, in 1999, in Kosovo [18]. There have been numerous European Councils (including Cologne and Helsinki in 1999) aimed at revising the treaties (particularly Maastricht in 1992, Nice in 2001 and Lisbon in 2007) and initiatives to implement programmes, create institutions and raise funds, all with the aim of constructing a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The Union established a Political and Security Committee (PSC) and set up a Military Committee (EUMC) and a Military Staff unit (EUMS) with a view to pre-emptive deployment of military forces. It decided to create a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops, a decision which has had little impact to date. You can judge for yourselves: in April 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron, in a speech at the Sorbonne, again argued in favour of achieving the critical size of 5000 soldiers under the European flag.

Although the Maastricht Treaty had placed the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the hands of the President of the European Council, the Lisbon Treaty instituted the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Article 18 of the TEU) which has an administration and is therefore a sort of Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Union.

External representation of the European is thus exercised by three actors: the President of the European Council, the Commission and the High Representative, which creates a degree of tension and does not facilitate diplomatic action[19] – a fact not lost on anyone.

Following the Russian attack on Ukraine in 2022, the Union adopted a common strategy (the Strategic Compass) and set up a European Defence Fund which will total nearly 8 billion euro by 2027. However, this may seem a paltry sum given the geopolitical challenges and compared with the resources allocated by some European countries to modernise their armies: 100 billion euro for Germany, 120 billion for Poland[20]. Such joint European initiatives have not always been encouraged by the United States and have sometimes been hampered by the European States themselves, particularly those that had adopted a position of international neutrality while still being members of the Union (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Austria) [21]. But we should not deceive ourselves: it is particularism and State sovereignty, corollaries of the lack of awareness of the common good, that are the main barrier. As that great promoter of European integration, Jean Monnet, wrote in 1976: the sovereign nations of the past are no longer the framework for solving the problems of the present [22].

The time has come to build up the European Union’s strategic, and therefore military, autonomy, so that it can play an influential role in world diplomacy and help to promote the values of peace and solidarity that led to the founding of the Union.

Therefore, if we cannot support President Macron in what he describes as strategic ambiguity when speaking of sending European troops to the Ukrainian front, we must salute his proactive notion of identifying a new paradigm in the area of defence: a credible defence for the European continent. For Europe, he reminded us, shouldering our responsibilities means deciding for ourselves and leading our European defence efforts. It means building a new paradigm, more cohesion and concrete initiatives together. This defence power obviously relies on diplomacy that enables us to continue to form partnerships with third countries, in other words to build a Europe which can show that it is never the vassal of the United States and that it can talk to other world regions, to emerging countries, to Africa, to Latin America. Not just through trade agreements, but through genuinely balanced and reciprocal strategic partnerships [23].

 

Conclusion: a more preventive diplomacy

Five practices of international law were developed over several centuries before being enshrined in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter in 1945:

  1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
  1. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means [24].

Negotiation, the traditional diplomatic route with a preventive aim. Taking the form of good offices, it offers a way to establish a negotiation process without participating in it or imposing a solution.

International enquiry, instituted by the Hague Convention of 29 July 1899, along with arbitration, aims, through various investigative means, to uncover the facts behind a dispute and to report these facts to the parties.

Mediation proposes the bases for negotiation and intervenes in the process.

Conciliation not only involves examining the constituent elements of a dispute: conciliation committees must also reach a solution.

Arbitration is a judicial process for preventing and resolving international disputes which has developed since the 19th century[25].

As we are reminded by the French historian Laurence Badel, diplomacy may take the form, both at the United Nations and within the European bodies, of a negotiation instrument before being a discussion forum [26]. Active preventive diplomacy, a subject dear to Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961) [27], seems far removed from the diplomacy of appeasement characterised by the shadow of the Munich crisis in 1938. How often have we alluded to this in recent years: raising the subject of diplomatic negotiation with the Kremlin equates to being labelled a “Munich sympathiser”. According to Peter Wallenstein, the prominent professor and former director of the Peace and Conflict Department at the University of Uppsala, the concept of preventive diplomacy contains the constructive actions undertaken to avoid the likely threat, use or diffusion of armed force by parties in political dispute [28].

Although this approach was revived by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace in January 1992, the European organisations tried to make it an essential foundation of their practice after the fall of the Berlin Wall[29]. They perhaps failed to make it credible, however, for the reasons we have mentioned.

The importance for the WAAS of cultivating the values that underpin its principles is paramount: peaceful coexistence, fellowship, shared humanity, universal solidarity and shared responsibility for common futures[30]. These could form the basis of the universal common good whose need we have stressed. I do not need to remind you that this common good can only be established through dialogue between people brought up not only on such values, but also on an understanding of the world and on dialogue itself. Learning to understand each other and talk to each other is of great importance. European culture turns negotiation into the art of knowing the Other, states Laurence Badel. Knowing the person’s culture and reflecting on the best method of communication to deal with them are considered key elements in negotiation[31]. Naturally, therefore, education must remain central in any global construction effort. Such education must be that which frees us from our certainties in order, as expressed so clearly by the educationalist Philippe Meirieu, to exchange views on convictions and knowledge [32]. Clearly, such knowledge comes from understanding other people and the trajectories of temporalities: retrospective, present and prospective. That I mention this point will come as no surprise to anyone.

The WAAS also knows the extent to which any challenge approach, such as that relating to peace and security, can only be resolved in the diplomatic and military fields of negotiation and violence. There has been much emphasis, in relations with Russia, on the collapse of a peace model founded on trade and the movement of goods and capital. The complex and systemic dimensions of global relations require us to consider such economic and social dimensions. In 2001, when examining relations between the European Security and Defence policy and NATO, the National Defence Research Institute of the RAND Corporation clearly noted that, in future, it would also depend on transatlantic economic relations[33]. The aim of turning NATO into a global system after 9/11 clearly has not altered this issue, in which, at that time, Russia still seemed to be a stakeholder.

In addition, some of the governance methods and techniques highlighted by the WAAS in its ambitions can be investigated and developed. Preventive diplomacy essentially takes place through impact prior analysis before decisions are taken [34]. The world cannot create itself by rolling the dice. Rational decision-making requires thought and elaboration.

It was Raymond Aron, once again, who asserted this point:  the reasonable conduct of politics is the only rational one if the goal of the intercourse among states is the survival of all, common prosperity and the sparing of the peoples’ blood [35].

The blood of the people – of men, women and children – is clearly what is at stake when we talk about security. And it is a key reason for grasping this issue with all the necessary intelligence and determination.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] This text is the background paper for my speech in the session « Root Causes and Remedies for Rising Insecurity, Social Unrest, War and Violence and Global Turbulence » at the 64th Conference and General Assembly of the World Academy of Art and Science, on 16 May 2024. I would like to thank the organisers, and in particular Garry Jacobs and Janani Ramanathan, for giving me the opportunity to speak on this sensitive subject.

[2] Peter WALLENSTEEN, Understanding Conflict Resolution, p. 38, Los Angeles, Sage, 2023.

[3] Source UCDP, March 2022, in P. WALLENSTEIN, Understanding Conflict Resolutions…, p. 76.

[4] P. WALLENSTEEN, Understanding Conflict Resolution…, p. 82-83.

[5] Emmanuel TODD et Baptiste TOUVEREY, La défaite de l’Occident, p. 19, Paris, Gallimard, 2024.

[6] Garry JACOBS, Janani RAMANATHAN e.a., Origins and Pathways for the Future of the World Academy of Art & Science Strategic Perspectives and Opportunities, in Cadmus, March 6, 2024. https://cadmusjournal.org/article/volume5-issue3-p1/origins-and-pathways-future-of-waas

[7] Robert KOLB, Théorie du Droit international, 3ed., p. 421-424 et 429, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2022.

[8] Ibidem, 431.

[9] Raymond ARON, Paix et Guerre entre les nations, Préface de la quatrième édition, p. 7, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1966.

[10] R. KOLB, Théorie du Droit international…, p. 440.

[11] Raymond ARON, La philosophie de Léon Brunschvicg, dans Revue de métaphysique et de morale, t. LV, n° 1-2, 1945, pp. 127-140, p. 140. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40899141

[12] United Nations Charter, Peace, dignity and equality on healthy planet, United Nations.

https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text

[13] R. KOLB, Théorie du Droit international…, p. 433.

[14] United Nations Charter, Peace, dignity and equality on healthy planet, United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text

[15] R. ARON, Paix et guerre entre les nations, Préface de la quatrième édition, p. 11.

[16] Laurence BADEL, Diplomaties européennes, XIXe-XXIe siècles, p. 433-434, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 2021.

[17] Voir Daniel MÖCKLI, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War, Health, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity, London-New York, Tauris, 2009. – Sylvain KAHN, Histoire de la construction de l’Europe depuis 1945, Paris, PUF, 2021. – Pierre HAROCHE, Dans la forge du monde, Comment le choc des puissances façonne l’Europe, Paris, Fayard, 2024.

[18] Ibidem, p. 434.

[19] Federica BICCHI & Nikla BREMBERG, European Diplomacy in Practice, Interrogating Power, Agency and Change, London-New York, Routledge, 2018.

[20] Francisco Juan GOMEZ MARTOS, La défense commune européenne : ambition légitime ou vœu pieux ? dans Pascale JOANNIN dir., L’État de l’Union, Rapport Schuman 2023 sur l’Europe, p. 164, Paris, Fondation Robert Schuman, Éditions Marie B, 2024.

[21] Nicolas BADALASSI, Histoire de la sécurité européenne depuis 1945, De la Guerre froide à la guerre en Ukraine, p. 182, Paris, A. Colin, 2024.

[22] les nations souveraines du passé ne sont plus le cadre où peuvent se résoudre les problèmes du présent. Jean MONNET, Mémoires, p. 617, Paris, Fayard, 1976.

[23] E. MACRON, Europe Speech, 25 April 2024, Elysée, 2024 https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2024/04/24/europe-speech

[24] United Nations Charter : https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-6

[25] L. BADEL, Diplomaties européennes…, p. 427-428.

[26] L. BADEL, Diplomaties européennes…, p. 376, 406, 425, 430.

[27] Dag Hammarskjöld, Le rôle vital des Nations unies dans une diplomatie de la réconciliation., Londres, 2 avril 1958. #

[28] Peter WALLENSTEEN, Preventing Violent Conflict, Past Record and Futures Challenges, p. 34, DPCR-Uppsala University, 1998. – P. WALLENSTEEN, Understanding Conflict Resolution… p. 286sv.

[29] L. BADEL, Diplomaties européennes…, p. 431.

[30] Garry JACOBS, Janani RAMANATHAN e.a., Origins and Pathways…

[31] L. BADEL, Diplomaties européennes…, p. 377.

[32] Philippe MEIRIEU, Ce que l’école peut encore pour la démocratie, Deux ou trois choses que je sais(peut-être) de l’éducation et de la pédagogie, p. 37-52, Paris, Éditions Autrement, 2020.

[33] Robert E. HUNTER, The European Security and Defense Policy, NATO’s Companion or Competitor?, p. 159-161, Arlington, Rand – Rand Europe, National Defense Research Institute, 2002.

[34] Ph. DESTATTE, Increasing rationality in decision-making through policy impact prior analysis, Blog PhD2050, Namur, July 12, 2021. https://phd2050.org/2021/07/12/pipa_en/

[35] R. ARON, Peace and War, A Theory of International Relations (1966), p. 45, New Brunswick (USA) and London, Transaction Publishers, 2003.

3. Prospective, R&I et engagement citoyen : surmonter les ambiguïtés 

 

Bruxelles, le 26 mars 2024

3.1. La prospective comme processus d’innovation et de transformation stratégique

Comme le rappelaient en 2010 Luke Georghiou et Jennifer Cassingena Harper, la prospective peut être utilisée pour informer ou réformer la politique et la stratégie d’innovation, une activité qui, il y a quelque temps, a été appelée « câblage du système d’innovation » [1]. Comme ils l’indiquent heureusement, la prospective permet de construire des politiques sur mesure dans le domaine de la recherche et de l’innovation dans des contextes national, régional, local ou sectoriel. C’est d’autant plus vrai que les instrument de R&I évoluent et nécessitent des visions communes entre les acteurs (entreprises, pouvoirs publics, universités, centres de recherche, incubateurs, acteurs impliqués, utilisateurs et donc citoyens, etc.) et des feuilles de route solides : plateformes d’innovation, clusters, pôles de compétitivité, etc. dans des logiques d’innovation ouverte, elles-mêmes en profondes mutations [2]. Les deux chercheurs de l’Université de Manchester notaient également en 2010 que le rôle de la prospective dans de tels contextes doit à la fois être renforcé et mieux compris [3].

Surmonter les ambiguïtés, c’est-à-dire les interprétations incertaines ou les sens multiples, est une des vocations de la prospective, avec la capacité d’appréhender le futur, de rendre compte de la complexité et des dynamiques des systèmes, ainsi que prendre la mesure des incertitudes présentes et futures. Ainsi, la prospective constitue-t-elle bien elle-même un processus d’innovation et de transformation stratégique, fondé sur la systémique et le long terme, pour mettre en œuvre des actions présentes et opérationnelles. Dès lors, la prospective bien comprise n’est pas un instrument de simple ajustement de la trajectoire donnée, mais un outil de transformation qui réinterroge les fondations système dont elle se préoccupe. Jean-Philippe Bootz a montré que la prospective opérait selon des modèles d’apprentissage organisationnel en double boucle, c’est-à-dire que sa vocation était de porter des stratégies de rupture, d’opérer des changements structurels, intentionnels et non routiniers [4].

Comme observé dans la note introductive au R&I Foresight Mutual Learning Exercise, la prospective a fait l’objet ces dernières années d’une promotion certaine au sein de l’Union européenne, de ses institutions et parmi un certain nombre d’États membres [5]. Les initiatives ne manquent pas même si elles ne s’inscrivent pas toutes dans la même compréhension de ce qui constitue les fondements de la prospective européenne telle qu’elle s’est constituée au début des années 2000 par les efforts de convergence entre le Foresight anglo-saxon et la prospective latine [6]. Comme le rappelait Cornelia Daheim, la prospective en matière de R&I remplit des fonctions très variées et couvre des activités différentes dont les développements et les impacts ne sont pas toujours clairs par manque d’évaluations formelles, externes ou partenariales [7]. On pourrait même ajouter que l’objet même du R&I Foresight n’est pas toujours très bien défini par rapport à un riche environnement dans lequel on retrouve STI Foresight, Innovation-system Foresight, Technology Foresight, Foresight in Science, Forward-thinking in R&D, Research Foresight, Foresight on Innovation Policy, Forward-looking R&I policies, etc. autant de concepts ou de pratiques qui semblent parfois utilisés indifféremment l’un pour l’autre. Certes, dans le temps, la prospective a pris différentes formes, approches et méthodologies notamment lors de sa transformation d’activité académique en instrument pour le policy-making au sein de la DG Recherche et Innovation de la Commission européenne.

Pendant longtemps, la prospective est restée de nature informative, tentant d’influencer la réflexion sur les politiques plutôt que s’atteler à leur élaboration. Elle a ensuite été davantage acceptée comme un outil de connaissance pour la prise de décision [8] avant qu’elle devienne, au-delà du fait de penser et de débattre de l’avenir, un outil pour le façonner au moyen d’un processus structuré  [9].

 

 3.2. Construire et suivre le processus de prospective

 Un modèle de processus complet de prospective a été élaboré en 2006 par la plateforme d’apprentissage mutuel (MLP). La MLP était une initiative conjointe des DG Entreprises et industrie, Recherche et Politique régionale de la Commission, avec la participation du Comité des régions. L’objectif était d’accroître les investissements dans la recherche et l’innovation et d’aider à définir des politiques pour rendre l’innovation régionale plus efficace.

Dans ce cadre, un processus de prospective tourné vers l’innovation a émergé à partir du partage d’expérience de nombreux acteurs de la prospective et de l’évaluation des choix technologiques (TA) engagés dans les régions européennes. Ce modèle permet, au-delà du diagnostic prospectif et de l’identification des enjeux de long terme, de construire une vision et de concevoir la stratégie et le moyen de leur mise en œuvre opérationnelle, afin de procéder à celle-ci, de la monitorer puis de l’évaluer. Trois grandes phases apparaissaient nettement dans tous les exercices analysés :

  1. une phase de préparation et de maturation, parfois très longue, qui sert à envisager les objectifs de l’exercice de prospective, son positionnement sur l’horizon temporel, ses limites géographiques, la gouvernance et les structures de pilotage de l’exercice, sa programmation, les budgets mobilisables et le financement des différents travaux, y compris ceux de la communication et de l’implication des acteurs.
  2. une phase de Prospective, comprenant l’analyse du système, des interrelations entre les variables, l’étude de sa dynamique et de sa trajectoire, avec les alternatives et évolutions potentielles. Cette phase comprend trois séquences :

– l’identification des acteurs et des facteurs du système et l’ensemble du diagnostic prospectif;

– la définition des enjeux à long terme, c’est-à-dire les véritables questions révélées par l’exploration des futurs possibles ;

– la construction d’une vision commune et partagée du futur qui réponde réellement en termes de futurs souhaitables aux questions de long terme identifiées ci-dessus.

 

  1. une phase stratégique qui va à la fois permettre de répondre aux enjeux de long terme par des initiatives de terrain et de réaliser concrètement la vision en prenant des mesures entre aujourd’hui et l’horizon choisi de cette vision. Quatre séquences habitent cette phase d’opérationnalisation :

– la définition des axes stratégiques;

– le choix des actions concrètes et leur intensité (mesure);

– le pilotage et le monitoring de la mise en œuvre;

– l’évaluation du processus et des produits de l’exercice (effets, impacts, résultats, etc.) [10].

Ce processus, largement expérimenté depuis sur de nombreux exercices et par différentes institutions, est applicable tant en prospective technologique, industrielle, territoriale ou générale et donc également pour la R&I. Il n’est évidemment nullement contraignant et certaines phases ou séquences peuvent être inversées et modifiées. il peut et doit être adapté selon les besoins et les demandes. Néanmoins, nous considérons que la prospective comprend tout le cycle, qui peut d’ailleurs se poursuivre dans la logique d’une prospective continue permettant l’encapacitation (empowerment) et donc le développement des compétences prospectives des acteurs, citoyens et parties prenantes.

Dans la plupart des circonstances, il nous paraît indispensable que les parties prenantes, les acteurs et les citoyens soient associés et interagissent à chacune des étapes du processus. Le risque est grand en effet qu’ils soient à l’avenir démotivés à participer à d’autres exercices s’ils observent que les décideurs les ont  éloignés dans des moments cruciaux de stratégie, de répartition des budgets, de mise en œuvre ou d’évaluation du processus.

Le processus de la prospective (Clar et Destatte, 2006)

Ce modèle a d’ailleurs évolué au sein de l’équipe prospective de l’Institut Destrée pour prendre mieux en compte la dynamique des systèmes non linéaires, la complexité et l’incertitude qui nécessite un travail soutenu de veille tout au long du processus pour continuer à l’alimenter et mieux appréhender les signaux faibles, les émergences ainsi que les wildcards. Les progrès du Knowledge management, les nouveaux liens qui se sont tissés avec la prospective, de même que le dialogue avec l’intelligence stratégique ont permis d’intégrer ces dimensions comme processus internes [11].

Processus de la Prospective (DESTATTE, 2022)

On peut encore capitaliser sur les travaux de la plateforme mise en place en 2006 par l’Unité Science & Technology Foresight de la DG Recherche en évoquant les quatre processus transversaux identifiés au sein même du processus général et auxquels il faut apporter une attention particulière : appropriation, implication, apprentissage sociétal, participation.

Quatre processus transversaux (CLAR & DESTATTE, 2006)

  1. L’appropriation résulte de la compréhension, de l’assimilation et du partage des résultats du processus. En effet, l’appropriation intériorise chez chaque acteur à la fois le chemin qui mène au résultat de la démarche prospective et le résultat lui-même. Lorsque l’exercice est approprié, il transforme toutes les parties prenantes en acteurs conscients des enjeux, motivés par les réponses élaborées, et déterminés à participer à la mise en œuvre du programme d’action produit collectivement.
  2. Le processus d’implication des parties prenantes, acteurs et citoyens : dès lors que la prospective s’affirme comme un lien d’interaction et un forum, il est essentiel d’associer les différentes sphères de la gouvernance : le privé, le public et la société civile. Il est parfois difficile d’impliquer les entreprises, même sur des sujets qui les importent. C’est pourtant indispensable dès lors que l’on considère que leur rôle s’accroît dans la société, mais aussi dans la gouvernance où elles sont souvent devenues les premiers partenaires des gouvernements. Le poids qui est le leur dans la recherche et l’innovation fait que l’on voit mal comment elles pourraient ne pas être autour de la table. Trop souvent, leur présence se fait au travers de leurs associations, ce qui est très insuffisant pour bénéficier de leur apport de terrain. La participation des acteurs se présente sous plusieurs formes, et les méthodes peuvent varier au cours d’un exercice de prospective. La séquence de définition des enjeux peut faire apparaître des préoccupations pour lesquelles les acteurs clés ne sont pas représentés dans l’exercice (comme les sciences du vivant, l’école maternelle, les services aux personnes âgées, etc.) Ces acteurs doivent donc être intégrés dans les phases ultérieures, soit en les associant directement en tant que participants, soit en les invitant en tant que témoins privilégiés ou experts dans des forums ou des séminaires. Il faut également leur garantir un suivi de l’information au-delà de cette participation ponctuelle. Il est également judicieux d’associer les acteurs sceptiques ou opposés à l’exercice, non seulement pour tenter de les impliquer, mais aussi pour prendre en compte leur avis. Cela permet d’anticiper toute résistance future qui pourrait survenir au moment de la mise en œuvre de la stratégie.
  3. Le processus d’apprentissage sociétal : outre l’objectif de la prospective de soutenir la réflexion stratégique, on peut également souligner ses aspects cognitifs en termes d’apprentissage individuel, collectif et organisationnel. À cet égard, un exercice de prospective a des vertus pédagogiques. Il s’agit d’un processus de prise de conscience et de conquête intellectuelle de l’environnement géographique, de la société et du monde par leurs habitants. En exprimant leurs conceptions des enjeux, leurs réponses en termes d’alternatives sur le ou les futurs possibles ou souhaitables, les participants à l’exercice de prospective établissent les bases d’informations utiles à l’apprentissage sociétal. Ces conceptions feront ensuite l’objet d’une confrontation collective avec des éléments de la réalité effective, notamment par l’utilisation des bases informationnelles du diagnostic prospectif et par le recours à des experts. En même temps – et parallèlement au processus d’apprentissage – se produit un processus de désapprentissage, de remise en cause des certitudes et des mythes. Il est essentiel qu’une compréhension commune des différents concepts et enjeux soit construite progressivement afin de stimuler le dialogue sur la vision de l’avenir et sur la stratégie.
  4. Le processus de diffusion : plusieurs besoins peuvent être satisfaits lorsque les délibérations et les résultats d’un exercice de prospective sont diffusés, aussi largement que possible, tout au long du processus :

– la transparence de l’exercice est assurée, ainsi que sa compréhension par tous les observateurs ;

– l’implication, l’imputabilité et la cohésion des acteurs et des participants à l’exercice sont renforcées ;

– les parties prenantes extérieures sont tenues informées des progrès accomplis ;

– etc.

Le rapport MLP Foresight insistait aussi sur le rapport entre l’appropriation et l’implication. Cela apparaît très important pour la prospective de la R&I. Ainsi, les acteurs et les citoyens associés à l’exercice s’approprieront la démarche et ses résultats dans la mesure où ils ont été activement impliqués dans le développement de l’exercice. Il s’agit donc non pas d’une démarche de consultation passive sollicitant des avis sur des options déjà énoncées, mais d’une véritable participation à la concrétisation des idées. Cette approche nécessite la définition de règles du jeu strictes :

– recruter le plus large éventail possible de parties prenantes en les définissant au sens le plus large du terme, les citoyens étant les premiers concernés par les politiques à mener sur leur territoire ;

– de véritables mécanismes et compétences d’animation pour favoriser l’écoute, la prise de parole, l’échange d’idées, la culture du débat et de la démocratie délibérative ;

– une logique pédagogique pour clarifier et expliquer les objectifs, les buts et les enjeux afin que les acteurs les comprennent ;

– un processus d’apprentissage et de réflexion dans lequel l’expérience réelle prime sur les théories générales, même si la connaissance et l’expertise sont des ressources essentielles [12].

  

3.3. Impacts et résultats concrets de la prospective R&I pour les citoyens 

L’idée de distinction entre deux formes différentes de prospective dans laquelle une première prospective (foresight for policy) serait conçue dans un but de fonction consultative et stratégique, outil d’information, et un second type de prospective (foresight as a policy instrument) aurait un rôle de transformation et de changement structurel, pourrait devenir obsolète [13]. C’est précisément le nouveau type de gouvernance associant les acteurs et les citoyens qui rend ce modèle de plus en plus caduc. En effet, la motivation de la prospective se fonde de plus en plus par un désir collectif d’innovation et de transformation qui ne peut être assouvi que par la concrétisation de ce changement qui, seul, donne de la crédibilité à l’exercice. En fait, il n’est pas raisonnable, voire impossible, de vouloir associer des acteurs et des citoyens uniquement sur un volet exploratoire et non sur le volet normatif, impliquant que le ou les décideurs se retirent du jeu pour in fine prendre seuls les décisions et les mettre en œuvre. La coconstruction est une manière de faire qui exige que tout le processus de la prospective soit parcouru ensemble, du diagnostic à l’évaluation d’impact, en passant par les choix budgétaires et la mise en œuvre de terrain. En fait, l’impact qui sera recherché par les acteurs et les citoyens sera moins de constater les déficiences du système de recherche et d’innovation – ce qui reste évidemment fondamental dans les phases de diagnostic prospectif et d’identification des enjeux de long terme – que d’apporter des réponses concrètes à ces déficiences et les mettre en œuvre.

Comme on peut le voir dans différents travaux, il existe encore une tendance très forte à se concentrer sur la détermination de la nature des exercices de prospective et de leurs catégories en termes de méthodes utilisées, telles que les scénarios, et les résultats des exercices entrepris. Or les produits sont vraiment ce qui détermine l’opérationnalité et donc l’utilité de l’activité prospective, non seulement dans le processus de décision publique, privée ou collective, mais aussi et surtout dans la mise en œuvre de ces produits pour en faire des instruments de transformation des systèmes dans lesquels ils évoluent. On retrouve d’ailleurs cette confusion dans certains documents clefs de la Commission comme dans le Modus Operandi de l’European Foresight Hub, dans lequel les visions cohabitent avec des scénarios, de l’analyse de conducteurs (drivers) et de tendances, etc. [14]

Ce constat débouche évidemment sur un autre qui reste un obstacle fondamental aux yeux de certaines chercheuses et de certains chercheurs dès lors qu’on associe la prospective à des processus de recherche, c’est la barrière épistémologique qui subsiste entre une prospective exploratoire et une prospective normative, celle de la transformation du système qui pour certaines et certains ne peut être du ressort du chercheur qui devrait rester à distance respectable du système pour ne pas perdre son âme. Par expérience, on peut observer que cette propension peut s’accroître dans le cadre d’une institutionnalisation forte de la prospective qui peut créer des îlots qui se perçoivent à vocation scientifique dans un environnement politique et administratif fort où la mise en œuvre et la transformation de la société constituent le quotidien. Ce qui peut être identifié comme étant davantage qu’un malaise ne saurait être occulté, même si la question est aussi ancienne que la prospective.

L’institutionnalisation de la prospective a été définie par Jennifer Cassingena Harper comme la transformation et l’intégration de l’activité et de sa pratique dans un système structuré ou hautement formalisé par une norme, sous la forme d’une institution, au sein d’une organisation ou d’un secteur [15]. Pour intéressant qu’il soit, le modèle de mise en place d’une prospective institutionnalisée fondé sur les travaux récents de l’OCDE devra être challengé par le présent texte qui, lui, a pour vocation de prendre en compte l’engagement citoyen dans les activités de prospective appliquées à la Recherche et à l’Innovation. En effet, par nature – et sans lui faire de procès – l’OCDE oriente son activité vers les gouvernements. Néanmoins, nous pensons qu’une gouvernance démocratique multiniveaux doit être à la fois fondée sur les acteurs et impliquer les citoyennes et les citoyens, voire les résidents – la distinction peut être nécessaire [16]. En effet, il n’est pas toujours certain qu’en matière de demande, le niveau gouvernemental soit toujours la garantie d’attribution de ressources à la prospective surtout pour la recherche et d’innovation, domaine dans lequel les entreprises ont un poids essentiel. De même, le cadre gouvernemental et administratif ne constitue pas le gage de qualité pour des compétences de haut niveau en matière de prospective ni d’ailleurs de R&I, les universités, les centres de recherches privés, les think tanks, les sociétés de consultances et les experts indépendants, se présentant parfois comme « simples citoyens », en disposant largement. On peut également challenger l’idée de la mise en place d’un cadre institutionnel pour l’intégration des pratiques de prospective dans les différents départements du gouvernement et dans les processus décisionnels centraux, notamment par une unité principale de prospective. Des exemples montrent que cette intégration, souvent marquée par le centralisme, voire le monopole de l’action prospective, limite fortement l’initiative dans les différents départements de l’administration et constitue finalement un désinvestissement en motivation et en compétence dans ces départements pourtant plus proches des enjeux et des réalités. S’y ajoute la question épistémologique soulevée plus haut qui empêche souvent les chercheurs de ces unités de s’inscrire à la fois dans la proximité du terrain et des acteurs, ainsi que dans la mise en œuvre du volet stratégique de la prospective. L’évaluation et le feedback se fondent dès lors trop souvent sur la mise à distance et l’analyse des méthodes plutôt que sur la recherche des impacts véritables en termes de transformation collective du système.

Ainsi, dans le cadre de l’évolution des capacités des acteurs – au premier rang d’ailleurs les entreprises et les associations environnementales – et des citoyennes et citoyens connectés et davantage organisés, un autre modèle s’élabore fondé sur la coconstruction de politiques collectives s’associant au parlement, au gouvernement et à l’administration dans le cadre d’ouvertures voulues ou forcées, voire prenant carrément l’initiative de lancer des travaux prospectifs dans l’écosystème de la R&I.

 

A suivre : 4. Pratiques de la participation citoyenne dans la prospective de la R&I

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] to inform or reform innovation policy and strategy, an activity which sometime ago called ‘‘wiring up the innovation system’’. Luke GEORGHIOU & Jennifer CASSINGENA HARPER, From priority-Setting to articulation of demandd: Foresight for research and innovation policy and strategy, in Futures, 43 (2011) p. 243-251, p. 243.

[2] Henry CHESBROUGH, Wim VANHAVERBEKE & Joel WEST, New Frontiers in Open Innovation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014.

[3] The role of foresight in such contexts needs both to be enhanced and better understood. L. GEORGHIOU & J. CASSINGENA, op. cit., p. 244.

[4] Jean-Philippe BOOTZ, Strategic Foresight and Organizational Learning: Survey and Critical Analysis, in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, vol. 77, 10, 2010, p. 1588-1594. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0040162510001368 – J-Ph. BOOTZ, Prospective et apprentissage organisationnel, coll. Travaux et recherches de prospective, Paris, Futuribles international, LIPSOR, Datar, Commissariat général du Plan, 2001.

[5] Cornelia DAHEIM, R&I Foresight: An Introduction to and Overview of the Current State of Play, Draft Discussion Paper, European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Horizon Europe Policy Support Facility, 2022.

[6] Paulo CARVALHO, A Brief History of Futures Studies and Foresight, Lisbon, Dec. 5, 2022.

[7] Cornelia DAHEIM, R&I Foresight: An Introduction to and Overview of the Current State of Play, Draft Discussion Paper, European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Horizon Europe Policy Support Facility, 2022.

[8] Ph. DESTATTE, Foresight as a strategic intelligence tool, University of Liège, September 2016, Blog PhD2050, January 19, 2018. https://phd2050.org/2018/01/19/spit/

[9] Jean-Claude BURGELMAN, Jarka CHLOUPKOVA & Werner WOBBE, Foresight in support of European research and innovation policies: The European Commission is preparing the funding of grand societal challenge, in European Journal of Futures Research, 2, 55, 10 December 2014, p. 1. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s40309-014-0055-4.pdf?pdf=button

[10] Günter CLAR & Philippe DESTATTE, Regional Foresight, Boosting Regional Potential, Mutual Learning Platform Regional Foresight Report, p. 6, Brussels, European Commission, 2006

Philippe-Destatte-&-Guenter-Clar_MLP-Foresight-2006-09-25

Philippe DESTATTE, La construction d’un modèle de processus prospectif, dans Philippe DURANCE & Régine MONTI dir., La prospective stratégique en action, Bilan et perspectives d’une indiscipline intellectuelle, p. 301-331, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2014. – You can find the Working Paper in English: Ph. DESTATTE, The construction of a foresight process model based on the interest in collective knowledge and learning platforms, The Destree Institute, May 13, 2009. #

Philippe-Destatte_Foresight-process-model_2009-05-13bis

[11] Jean-Philippe BOOTZ, Philippe DURANCE & Régine MONTI, Foresight and knowledge management, New Developments in theory and practice, in Technological Foresight and Social Change, Vol. 140, March 2019, p. 80-83. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0040162518319942

[12] Günter CLAR & Ph. DESTATTE, Regional Foresight, Boosting Regional Potential, Mutual Learning Platform Regional Foresight Report…, p. 17-21.

[13] Jennifer CASSINGENA HARPER, Impact of Technology Foresight, Nesta Working Paper 13/16, November 2013, p. 8.

https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/1316_impact_of_technology_foresight_final_version.pdf

See also: Jennifer CASSINGENA HARPER, Institutionalising foresight capability and creating wide foresight communities in the R&I system, Discussion Paper, p. 11, European Commission, Directorate for Research and Innovation, Horizon Europe Policy Support Facility, 2022.

[14] J.-Cl. BURGELMAN, J. CHLOUPKOVA & W. WOBBE, Foresight in support of European…, Diagram, p. 3. – See also: Eckhard STÖRMER, Laurent BONTOUX, Maciej KRZYSZTOFOWICZ, Elisabeta FLORESCU, Anne-Katrin BOCK, Fabiana SCAPOLO, Foresight – Using Science and Evidence to Anticipate and Shape the Future, in Vladimír ŠUCHA & Marta SIENKIEWICZ, Science for Policy Handbook, p. 128-142, Elsevier, 2020, p. 129 & 133.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780128225967000127

[15] The term « institutionalising » is the act of making an activity established as part of the normal systems and practices, or mainstreaming an activity as a norm either at the level of an organisation or more broadly sector-wide. Institutionalisation entails turning the practice into an institution or embedding the practice into a structured or highly formalized system. Jennifer CASSINGENA HARPER, Institutionalising foresight capability and creating wide foresight communities in the R&I system, Discussion Paper, p. 6, European Commission, Directorate for Research and Innovation, Horizon Europe Policy Support Facility, 2022.

[16] Archon Fung wrote in 2006: I use the phrase citizen participation throughout this article. By citizens, I do not mean to indicate individuals who possess the legal status of formal citizenship but rather individuals who possess the political standing to exercise voice or give consent over public decisions that oblige or affect them. Therefore, undocumented immigrants whose children attend public schools are citizens in this sense because they can make claims over the ways in which schools treat their children, just as native-born American parents can make such claims. A. FUNG, Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance…,  p. 74, n1.

 2. Les transformations et la gouvernance du système de la Recherche-Innovation

 

Bruxelles, le 19 mars 2024

Il semble banal aujourd’hui de rappeler que la mondialisation, son champ d’action quasi illimité, l’accélération générale des technologies, leur convergence, les stress environnementaux et de ressources, non seulement de matières, mais aussi d’énergie, les transformations climatiques ont contribué à nous faire entrer dans une nouvelle conscience planétaire que l’on désigne par l’anthropocène [1]. Celle-ci nous inscrit à la fois dans le temps et dans l’espace. Ce cadre conceptuel renvoie directement à la nécessité de créer de nouvelles connaissances, d’innover dans tous les domaines capables de répondre à ces enjeux et d’approfondir une trajectoire de durabilité dans laquelle la prospective constitue un instrument central tant dans le domaine de la recherche que dans celui de la gouvernance des politiques [2]. Il s’agit également d’une nécessité pour la prospective pour qu’elle ouvre ou renforce son champ d’application dans les sciences et qu’elle se nourrisse davantage des disciplines, méthodes et innovations qui émergent ou se développent autour d’elle.

 

2.1. Le cadre porteur de la Recherche et l’Innovation responsables

Cette mutation aux multiples facteurs induit de nouvelles exigences en matière de Recherche et d’Innovation pour faire face à des changements majeurs de nature écologique comme l’abandon progressif des énergies fossiles, de nature économique comme le passage de processus de production linéaire à des processus circulaires, de nature politique où l’on retrouve l’impact des technologies numériques sur la gouvernance démocratique, etc. Ainsi que l’indiquent Robert Gianni et Philippe Goujon, respectivement professeurs aux universités de Maastricht et de Namur, tous ces éléments ont contribué à attirer l’attention sur la R&I en tant que réponse potentielle à tous ces enjeux différents. Parallèlement, les préoccupations concernant les effets potentiels de la recherche et de l’innovation ont également contribué à la nécessité de promouvoir un cadre conceptuel capable d’orienter la R&I vers des objectifs sociétaux. En ce sens, écrivaient-ils en 2020, la Recherche et l’Innovation responsables (RRI) constituent un cadre assez récent visant à créer une dialectique significative et fructueuse entre les ambitions techniques et économiques (R&I) et les revendications normatives présentes dans ou provenant de la société [3].

Dans différents travaux qui lui sont consacrés, la Recherche et l’Innovation responsables est présentée comme une approche proactive, participative et multidimensionnelle de la responsabilité dans la gouvernance de la Science, de la Technologie et de l’Innovation (STI), fondée sur les engagements mutuels des acteurs sociétaux, et constituant ainsi un paradigme distinct [4]. En 2013, René Von Schomberg, membre de la DG Recherche, en avait tenté une définition qui faisait de la recherche et de l’innovation responsables un processus transparent et interactif par lequel les acteurs de la société et les innovateurs se répondent mutuellement en vue de l’acceptabilité éthique, la durabilité et la désirabilité sociétale du processus d’innovation et de ses produits commercialisables [5].

Cette évolution apparaît comme une conséquence de l’émergence du modèle de Nouvelle gouvernance, également appelée gouvernance distribuée [6], gouvernance constructive (constructive governance) [7] ou expérimentation démocratique [8]. Elle repose sur des outils d’informations partenariales, l’échange de bonnes pratiques, le dialogue social, la délibération locale et la participation des parties prenantes. Comme le soulignent Simone Arnaldi de l’Université de Padoue et ses collègues, cette nouvelle gouvernance va plus loin que la délibération d’experts au sein d’agences ou de comités de réglementation européens, mais permet aux parties prenantes de participer directement aux processus décisionnels et fait de la participation du public une de ses caractéristiques essentielles. Un de ses défis majeurs consiste d’ailleurs à trouver un équilibre entre flexibilité et efficacité, en termes d’orientation comportementale des parties [9]. Alors que le principe de précaution reste lié à un espace dans lequel les positions s’affrontent, la RRI vise à changer le contexte en s’inscrivant dans une logique de coopération lorsqu’il s’agit de décisions sur les trajectoires d’innovation. Ainsi, la RRI motive les acteurs sociétaux à assumer volontairement une responsabilité précoce et partagée des processus de recherche et d’innovation au-delà du simple respect des devoirs ou de la conformité aux règles [10].

La nouvelle métamorphose de l’appellation « Science in Society » en « Science for Society, with Society » [11], ainsi que l’orientation de la Recherche et de l’Innovation vers les Grand Challenges sociétaux à la faveur de la Déclaration de Lund de juillet 2009 [12] a, pour Richard Owen et d’autres, constitué un vrai moment d’émergence, en particulier pour la RRI. Le professeur à l’Université de Bristol y voit la volonté de faciliter systématiquement l’engagement inclusif avec les objectifs, les motivations, les impacts attendus et les politiques d’innovation de la Commission et des acteurs associés. Ainsi la RRI s’affirme alors comme une innovation de processus, en proposant différentes manières d’organiser, de financer, d’entreprendre et de s’engager dans l’innovation et la recherche. Évolutive par nature, elle s’appuie sur des fondements comme l’évaluation des choix technologiques, l’engagement des parties prenantes et du public, la gouvernance anticipative, l’intégration sociotechnique, l’innovation ouverte, ainsi que sur des concepts apparentés comme le développement responsable [13]. L’intérêt de cette approche apparaît particulièrement pertinent pour la prospective de la R&I, surtout quand Owen écrit : à cet égard, la RRI reconnaît le pouvoir de transformation de l’innovation pour créer des futurs, le fait que les innovations sont souvent socialement et politiquement constituées et qu’elles intègrent des valeurs. La RRI s’efforce de manière proactive de créer des espaces et des processus permettant d’ouvrir ces futurs, le rôle de l’innovation dans leur création et les valeurs sur lesquelles ils reposent, à une discussion et à un débat inclusifs, et de répondre à ces discussions, c’est-à-dire à un processus délibératif, participatif, anticipatif et réflexif [14].

Dès lors, la RRI nous apparaît comme un cadre particulièrement pertinent pour déployer une prospective participative étendue aux citoyennes et citoyens. Comme la prospective, la RRI a capitalisé sur l’évaluation des choix technologiques (TA), a intégré les principes normatifs et éthiques de la technologie de conception et les principes de la gouvernance démocratique. Comme l’écrit Niklas Gudowsky, comprendre l’avenir est essentiel pour la RRI, et les activités de prospective font donc partie intégrante du concept. C’est pourquoi la prospective a été intégrée dans les boîtes à outils de la RRI [15].

 

2.2. Participation, inclusion et engagement dans la gouvernance de la R&I

Voici plus de 20 ans que des observateurs avertis notaient l’existence d’un véritable désir des citoyens de participer de manière importante aux développements scientifiques et technologiques en considérant que ces derniers ont des conséquences réelles pour les individus et la société. Ainsi, Helga Nowotny, Peter Scott et Michael Gibbons observaient le passage d’une culture de l’autonomie scientifique à une culture de l’imputabilité, bien que, notaient-ils, celle-ci soit encore trop réactive et risquait d’être interprétée de manière formaliste et bureaucratique [16].

Pour Kathy Sykes et Phil Macnaghten, respectivement professeurs à l’Université de Bristol et à Wageningen, l’engagement public a représenté une réponse capable d’aborder quatre dynamiques principales dans la relation entre la science et la société :

– la nouvelle politique de contestation de certains projets et visions technologiques, visible surtout lors de la croissance des mouvements environnementaux et antinucléaires à partir des années 1960 ;

– l’exigence pour les gouvernements et les parlements d’avoir une connaissance solide des impacts des nouvelles sciences et technologies afin de mieux anticiper leurs conséquences sociétales ;

– la nécessité perçue d’étendre les espaces de participation des citoyens, généralement par le biais de groupes organisés de la société civile, afin de rendre la gouvernance de la science et de la technologie plus responsable ;

– les demandes des communautés scientifiques pour améliorer la compréhension de la science par le public (PUS), où les conflits et les tensions sont supposés provenir de l’ignorance et de l’incompréhension du public [17].

Ne fut-ce que comme règle élémentaire de management, l’implication des parties prenantes et des autres acteurs intéressés dans la construction de politiques publiques constitue un principe fort inspirant la Commission européenne, y compris dans le domaine de la Recherche et de l’Innovation. Des textes de références y sont mobilisés ou en témoignent comme la Déclaration universelle des Droits humains [18], la Charte des Droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne [19] ou encore le Code de conduite sur les nanotechnologies [20].

Des efforts ont ainsi été fournis pour développer les moyens d’une communication et d’un dialogue constructif et plus efficace entre la recherche et les citoyens ainsi que pour permettre à la société d’exercer une influence sur la gouvernance de la science, de la technologie et de l’innovation. Dès 2002, une décision du Conseil européen prônait clairement ce développement [21]. Le passage du Sixième Programme-cadre vers le Septième avait d’ailleurs accentué cette volonté d’inclusivité et d’engagement du public en prônant l’utilisation du concept de Science in Society (SIS), en remplacement de l’initiative Science and Society. Ce champ d’action renouvelé comprenait la gouvernance, la communication, les questions sociales et éthiques autour de la science. Celle-ci était d’ailleurs comprise dans son sens le plus large du mot allemand Wissenschaft [22].

En 2009, le groupe d’expert MASIS chargé d’examiner pour la DG Recherche le rôle de la science dans la société s’interrogeait pour savoir quelles étaient les parties prenantes de la SIS en s’appuyant sur Stakeholder Theory de Freeman et Reed [23], puis en essayant de la dépasser. Néanmoins, les citoyens n’y apparaissaient pas en première ligne…

 Paysage des parties prenantes selon le groupe d’experts MASIS

Le groupe d’experts constatait que les citoyens sont de plus en plus concernés par l’Espace européen de la Recherche et par la science de manière plus générale [24]. Les experts identifiaient deux enjeux qui faisaient alors débat et le font encore dans une certaine mesure. Le premier enjeu posait la question de savoir si chaque citoyen devait être considéré comme une partie prenante dans le domaine de la science, déterminer les programmes de recherche et en évaluer les résultats. La tension peut être forte de considérer cette option dès lors que, notait le rapport, de nombreux scientifiques considèrent les citoyens (et aussi les élus, notaient-ils) comme des êtres irrationnels, peu capables de comprendre les travaux des scientifiques. D’un autre côté, les experts ne voyaient aucune raison valable d’exclure les citoyens des délibérations sur l’orientation et la valeur de la science. Ils considéraient que ce qui est important, c’est d’expérimenter des modes d’interaction et d’évaluer où ils peuvent mener. Le second enjeu d’implication citoyenne du groupe MASIS portait sur la distinction entre, d’une part, l’identification de l’intérêt public et la détermination des barrières (the boundary conditions) pour la science et la technologie et, d’autre part, l’association des réels acteurs, principalement les utilisateurs, dans l’élaboration des réelles technologies (produits, systèmes). Ainsi, les experts constataient que la notion de participation a un double sens :

Alors qu’à l’origine, il s’agissait d’une question relevant des théories de la démocratie, revendiquant un renouvellement de la démocratie représentative plus formelle et l’enrichissant par des formes de démocratie délibérative et interactive, il est désormais également utilisé pour décrire l’implication des usagers dans l’élaboration de technologies spécifiques, ce qui serait judicieux dans de nombreux cas, mais n’a pas grand-chose à voir avec la démocratie politique. La participation publique perd sa connotation traditionnelle et emphatique de démocratie délibérative et devient de plus en plus un moyen d’impliquer les usagers dans la conception de nouveaux produits, motivés par des besoins économiques plutôt que politiques. Nous ne plaidons pas pour ou contre l’une ou l’autre forme de participation, mais nous soulignons qu’il existe deux formes différentes de gouvernance dans ce domaine : via les institutions démocratiques au niveau politique et sur le marché via de nouvelles constellations d’ingénieurs, de scientifiques, d’utilisateurs et de citoyens. Les deux formes ont un rôle à jouer, mais leurs raisons d’être sont différentes [25].

Manifestement, la réflexion restait difficile [26] et devait se poursuivre. Comme cela avait été observé et mis en exergue dans le groupe MASIS, en principe, chaque personne dans la société est une partie prenante lorsqu’il s’agit du rôle de la science dans la société, néanmoins tous ces acteurs ne sont pas actifs [27].

La même année 2009, le groupe d’experts de la DG Recherche sur la Global Governance of Science, piloté par Žaneta Ozoliņa, professeur à l’Université de Lettonie, constatait que les développements destinés à impliquer le public dans la gouvernance de la science restaient embryonnaires [28]. Des initiatives intéressantes, mais parfois anciennes, étaient mentionnées comme les conférences consensus du Danemark [29], le programme Sciencewise du Royaume-Uni [30] et la délibération citoyenne Meeting of Minds sur la science du cerveau, menée à l’échelle de l’Union européenne [31]. La recommandation numéro 5 du groupe d’experts sur la gouvernance globale de la science était particulièrement liée à nos préoccupations : la recherche de l’Espace européen de la Recherche (ERA) devrait être développée de manière à promouvoir la réflexion critique et le débat sur les moyens et les fins de la science – par le biais, par exemple, de projets de recherche sélectifs et d’activités publiques qui nécessitent une collaboration interdisciplinaire et la participation des citoyens, y compris une réflexion sur la manière dont les principes de la gouvernance européenne et les droits fondamentaux de base servent de lignes directrices appropriées et applicables pour la pratique de la science [32].

Les dynamiques participatives (participation, inclusion, engagement) sont considérées comme importantes pour ouvrir la Recherche et l’Innovation au grand public, mais aussi pour accroître la connaissance, la légitimité et l’efficacité de la R&I pour autant que ces processus répondent à un certain nombre de critères. Roberti Gianni et Philippe Goujon observent sur base d’autres travaux et de quelques expériences qu’il serait naïf de voir la participation comme une panacée pour le développement légitime et efficace de la R&I alors qu’elle peut s’avérer faible en production, peut ouvrir la porte aux intérêts particuliers et à la manipulation ou ne pas avoir d’influence sur le processus décisionnel [33].

En s’appuyant notamment sur les travaux de Bert-Jaap Koops, professeur à l’Université de Tilburg, ainsi que sur ceux de plusieurs de ses collègues, portant sur les interactions entre le droit et les technologies, Gianni et Goujon mettent en évidence l’engagement des parties prenantes comme facteur commun et déterminant des pratiques de l’innovation responsable [34]. Ce que la participation, l’engagement et l’inclusion semblent avoir en commun est la nécessité principale d’être ouvert à des positions alternatives. Ces alternatives peuvent justifier l’existant, apporter des modifications ou proposer des perspectives différentes. Ce point est considéré comme crucial aux trois niveaux pris en compte : l’épistémique, le moral et le politique :

– le cadre épistémique : une croissance quantitative des connaissances pourrait conduire à une augmentation de la qualité globale de la production R&I ;

– d’un point de vue moral, l’inclusion d’acteurs externes dans le développement de la R&I constitue une ouverture aux demandes de la société et génère un niveau plus élevé de légitimité, voire aussi d’amélioration de l’efficacité d’un processus en augmentant les attentes d’acceptation des nouveaux produits par la société.

– d’un point de vue politique, un processus participatif répond aux revendications de démocratisation de la science.

Les deux chercheurs observent néanmoins qu’il faut distinguer le côté quantitatif de la participation du côté qualitatif. Cela implique que l’équation selon laquelle une augmentation de la quantité génère automatiquement une amélioration de la qualité pourrait s’avérer discutable. La participation ne doit pas être considérée comme une solution autonome et doit être définie en fonction de son objectif, de son influence réelle sur le processus décisionnel et du cadre sous-jacent [35].

Dans le cadre de la préparation du programme Horizon Europe, la Commission, mais aussi le Parlement et le Conseil ont, en 2018, clairement ouvert les portes à la participation citoyenne et de la société civile, mais aussi à la coconstruction de politiques publiques et collectives dans le domaine de recherche et d’innovation responsables :

Dans le but d’approfondir la relation entre la science et la société et de maximiser les avantages de leurs interactions, le programme devrait engager et impliquer les citoyens et les organisations de la société civile dans la co-conception et la co-création d’agendas et de contenus de recherche et d’innovation responsables, la promotion de l’enseignement des sciences, l’accès public aux connaissances scientifiques et la facilitation de la participation des citoyens et des organisations de la société civile à ses activités. Il devrait le faire dans l’ensemble du programme et par le biais d’activités spécifiques dans la partie « Renforcement de l’Espace européen de la recherche ». L’engagement des citoyens et de la société civile dans la recherche et l’innovation devrait être associé à des activités de sensibilisation du public afin de générer et de maintenir le soutien du public au programme. Le programme devrait également s’efforcer de supprimer les obstacles et de renforcer les synergies entre la science, la technologie, la culture et les arts afin d’obtenir une nouvelle qualité d’innovation durable [36].

La co-construction vise l’inclusion des acteurs parties prenantes dans les processus de management de projet que ce soit dans les organisations, les associations ou les collectivités territoriales. Selon cette approche, la définition du projet et sa mise en œuvre résultent d’un travail collectif incluant tous les acteurs concernés.

Ainsi, la co-construction peut être brièvement définie comme un processus de management de projet par lequel des acteurs différents exposent puis confrontent leurs points de vue et cherchent à élaborer une définition partagée au travers de compromis et s’accordent sur cette dernière [37].

Cette méthodologie est particulièrement adaptée pour construire des interventions associant aux élus des organisations, des entreprises, des collectivités territoriales ainsi que des citoyennes et citoyens et visant à transformer la société. Ces interventions vont de la conception à la mise en œuvre et à l’évaluation partenariale. En effet, les enjeux des politiques publiques et collectives deviennent de plus en plus complexes, aucun acteur ne pouvant à lui seul maitriser l’ensemble des dimensions constitutives d’un projet. De plus, ce management permet de répondre à la demande croissante des acteurs, citoyens-usagers à l’élaboration des décisions qui pourraient affecter leur vie ou la trajectoire de leur organisation ou de leur territoire [38]. Pour les acteurs, participer à la co-construction démocratique des politiques publiques n’est pas faire du lobbying. Dans le lobbying, la partie prenante concernée cherche légitimement à convaincre les élus de prendre une décision politique à son avantage. Dans la coconstruction démocratique, les parties prenantes délibèrent, ensemble et avec les décideurs, pour construire un compromis et une politique visant l’intérêt général. Dans la logique de coconstruction, la participation des acteurs de la société civile a une portée décisionnelle et pas seulement consultative, ce qui veut dire qu’elle a un impact sur le contenu des connaissances ou des politiques. La  relation entre les élus et les acteurs de la société civile demeure néanmoins asymétrique, c’est-à-dire à l’avantage des élus qui ont le dernier mot [39].

Au-delà de la mobilisation et de l’implication des parties prenantes concernées, la coconstruction démocratique doit permettre de créer les conditions d’une délibération productive qui débouche sur des décisions de politiques publiques pertinentes. Ce travail suppose une méthodologie robuste. Les méthodes d’écoute, d’animation, de médiation et de production développées, testées et construites au profit de la prospective stratégique et opérationnelle peuvent être mobilisées très heureusement dans le cadre de cette coconstruction.

 

2.3. La compréhension et l’évaluation des mécanismes de participation

De récents efforts menés dans le domaine de l’évaluation des choix technologiques (TA) pour inclure le public dans ces travaux peut apporter des éclairages utiles sur les mécanismes de participation. Les initiatives de clarifications de ces questions prises dans le cadre de l’ECAST (Expert and Citizen Assessment of Science and Technology) sont intéressantes dans la mesure où les chercheurs essaient d’articuler les apports des citoyens et ceux des experts. Ainsi, sur base de près de 40 délibérations citoyennes menées surtout aux États-Unis, de 2012 à 2021, dans divers domaines liés aux technologies, à la biodiversité, au climat, à la défense, les auteurs discutent concepts, méthodes et pratiques nées de ces expériences. Ce qui nous intéresse probablement le plus pour notre démarche de prospective en R&I, c’est la typologie des acteurs établie par les auteurs. Ils ont en effet le mérite d’avoir apporté des définitions à des catégories dont les frontières sont parfois floues ou mal établies:

– les experts : les personnes qui étudient la science ou la technologie au cœur d’une question sociotechnique donnée. Il s’agit notamment de spécialistes des sciences physiques et naturelles, d’ingénieurs et d’autres professionnels qui mènent des recherches techniques ou développent une technologie. Sont également inclus les spécialistes des sciences sociales, les sciences humaines et les autres chercheurs qui étudient l’impact sociétal d’une science ou d’une technologie donnée, ainsi que les fonctionnaires des agences fédérales qui jouent un rôle dans l’élaboration des connaissances techniques et la manière dont elles sont utilisées.

– les parties prenantes : les acteurs du gouvernement, des organisations non gouvernementales, des organisations philanthropiques et de l’industrie qui ne sont pas directement impliqués dans le développement d’une technologie, mais qui se considèrent tout de même comme concernés par les résultats. Nous distinguons ces acteurs des membres du grand public. Ces acteurs disposent déjà de voies formelles pour influencer les décisions relatives aux questions sociotechniques par le biais de groupes de défense, de lobbying ou d’autres canaux politiques.

– les citoyens : les membres du grand public qui n’ont pas d’intérêt formel dans une question. L’utilisation du terme « citoyen » n’est pas liée au statut légal de citoyenneté d’un individu, mais souligne plutôt le rôle de l’individu en tant qu’acteur non expert dans une société démocratique.

Les auteurs reconnaissent bien sûr que les parties prenantes ont leur propre forme d’expertise. Ils distinguent l’expertise contributive des « experts », c’est-à-dire la capacité de contribuer à la science d’un domaine, de l’expertise interactionnelle des parties prenantes, une compréhension du contexte et de la communauté dans laquelle le travail est mené. Ils notent également que certaines personnes peuvent posséder les deux formes d’expertise [40].

De son côté, Archon Fung a développé un cadre pour tenter de comprendre l’éventail des possibilités institutionnelles de la participation citoyenne. Le professeur à la JFK School of Government à Harvard considère que les mécanismes de participation au travers de trois dimensions :

– qui participe ;

– comment les participants communiquent entre eux et prennent des décisions ensemble, et – comment les discussions sont liées aux politiques publiques et à l’action ;

Cette approche permet d’aborder les enjeux importants de la gouvernance démocratique tels que la légitimité, la justice et l’efficacité de l’administration [41].

Afin d’évaluer la participation, Fung propose de l’analyser selon les deux principaux aspects que sont la sélection des participants et la communication ou l’influence sur la prise de décision découlant de ces processus. La sélection des participants peut comprendre huit niveaux différents, allant du plus exclusif (administrateurs experts) au plus englobant (sphère publique).

Méthodes de sélection des participants selon Archon Fung

Fung identifie six modes de communication et de prise de décision dans les exercices participatifs.

  1. La grande majorité des personnes n’expriment pas du tout leurs opinions, sont spectateurs pour recevoir des informations.
  2. Un certain nombre de citoyens et de militants sont là pour exprimer d’emblée leur opinion.
  3. Un certain nombre de personnes vont s’investir dans les processus qui sont déployés pour analyser et mettre en débat des alternatives puis se positionner, parfois sur des compromis.

Ces trois premiers modes ne débouchent guère sur des choix collectifs, au-delà du témoignage des participants.

Trois autres modes de décision sont utilisés :

Modes de communication et de prise de décision selon Archon Fung

  1. L’agrégation et le marchandage (aggregation and bargaining) : l’exploration et les concessions du marchandage permettent aux participants de trouver les meilleures alternatives disponibles pour faire avancer les préférences communes qu’ils ont.
  2. Délibération et négociation : des processus basés sur du matériel éducatif et des échanges permettent de déboucher sur des options communes, de clarifier les dissensions et de faire émerger des accords de principe.
  3. Déploiement de l’expertise technique de fonctionnaires dont la formation et la spécialisation professionnelle permettent la résolution de problèmes particuliers. Ce mode n’implique généralement pas les citoyens.

Fung introduit également une approche fondée sur le niveau d’autorité et de pouvoir qui est assigné aux participants. Alors que, rarement, certains mécanismes de participation permettent l’exercice d’un pouvoir direct, dans d’autres cas, les citoyens participent à une gouvernance partenariale avec des fonctionnaires pour élaborer et développer des stratégies d’action publique.

Niveaux de pouvoir et d’autorité attribué par Fung aux participants

Dans la figure ci-dessous, Fung illustre les différences de conception institutionnelle entre les audiences publiques classiques et les initiatives telles que les groupes délibératifs et les cercles d’étude. Presque toutes ces initiatives tentent d’améliorer la représentativité des participants, soit par une sélection aléatoire, soit par un recrutement ciblé, ce qui est indiqué par la flèche bleue dans la figure. Tous visent également à rendre les discussions entre les participants plus informées et réfléchies, ce qui est indiqué par la flèche verte.

Cadre de délibération à la légitimité renforcée d’Archon Fung

 

2.4. La réflexivité et l’encapacitation comme corolaires qualitatifs à la participation

Avons-nous encore besoin de convoquer Goethe, qui a donné une voix aux inquiétudes qui poussent à l’objectivité mécanique lorsqu’il prêchait la prudence dans l’interprétation des résultats expérimentaux ? Sa pensée nous rappelle les dangers de la recherche, ceux qui menacent ceux qui mettent la main à la science :

On ne saurait donc se tenir assez en garde contre les conséquences prématurées que l’on tire si souvent des expériences; car c’est en passant de l’observation au jugement, de la connaissance d’un fait à son application, que l’homme se trouve à l’entrée d’un défilé où l’attendent tous ses ennemis intérieurs, l’imagination, l’impatience, la précipitation, l’amour-propre, l’entêtement, la forme des idées, les opinions préconçues, la paresse, la légèreté, l’amour du changement, et mille autres encore dont les noms m’échappent. Ils sont tous là, placés en embuscade, et surprennent également l’homme de la vie pratique et l’observateur calme et tranquille qui semble à l’abri de toute passion [42].

La recherche contemporaine nous adresse au moins deux messages. D’une part, celui de la rigueur. Celle-ci consiste d’abord à savoir de quoi on parle, quel est le problème, ce que l’on cherche. Ce positionnement nécessite non seulement une culture générale, une expérience, mais aussi un apprentissage sur le sujet. C’est une phase de tout processus de recherche, mais aussi de participation à une consultation ou à un processus délibératif, y compris prospectif. Le deuxième message nous renvoie à la relativité, à l’objectivité face au sujet ainsi qu’à l’interprétation de l’expérience. Si la passion qui souvent motive positivement le chercheur peut aussi en être son ennemi intérieur, comme en préserver le citoyen, l’acteur, la partie prenante qui participent à un processus de recherche et d’innovation ?

Par réflexivité, Brian Wynne entend des processus plus systématiques d’exploration des engagements préalables encadrant la connaissance, de la manière dont elle a été introduite dans les débats sociologiques sur la modernité, plutôt que le principe plus méthodologique-épistémologique de cohérence tel qu’il a été développé en sociologie des sciences [43]. Le chercheur de l’Université de Lancaster considère que le cadrage dominant de la question de la compréhension de la science par le public correspond à des hypothèses plus larges sur la relation entre la science et les profanes. Ces derniers sont supposés être essentiellement défensifs, réfractaires au risque et à l’incertitude, et non réflexifs. Wynne remarque qu’à l’inverse, la science est censée être l’exemple même de l’autocritique réflexive. Il montre que les citoyens ont des difficultés à se positionner intellectuellement à l’égard de la science et les institutions scientifiqus. Ces institutions font preuve d’une très profonde résistance à reconnaître et remettre en question les modèles qui structurent leurs discours scientifiques [44].

La participation de citoyens à la recherche et à l’innovation implique non seulement la capacité de mobiliser des connaissances utiles au fil du processus engagé, mais aussi, comme pour tout acteur de la R&I, de pouvoir objectiver la place qui est la leur au sein d’un dispositif, de les interroger et de les faire s’interroger sur les conditions sociales de leur production intellectuelle. Ainsi, l’empowerment et la réflexivité apparaissent comme des corollaires de leur implication dans le but d’améliorer la qualité des produits de sortie des exercices et travaux. Il ne fait aucun doute que ces points sont cruciaux et plaident en faveur d’une approche prospective solide où la clarté est réalisée sur le rôle de chacun des acteurs au sein du système analysé, où l’ambiguïté des concepts est levée de telle sorte que le dialogue puisse se réaliser dde manière rationnelle, où enfin, l’utilisation du long terme permet de mettre à distance les trajectoires personnelles au profit de la recherche d’un intérêt commun au profit de la société tout entière et des générations à venir.

Ainsi, revient-on également sur les bases d’une heuristique qui comporte, d’une part, sa capacité à identifier les sources d’une production intellectuelle  de qualité, correspondant aux besoins de la recherche et aux exigences de légitimation de la communauté scientifique et, d’autre part, une méthode de tri permettant de distinguer le vrai du faux, de construire une véritable critique des sources et de mettre en cause pour les écarter ce qui ne correspond pas aux standards de l’honnêteté et de la raison [45]. La prospective, comme véritable « machine à se poser des questions », à la fois manière de penser et manière de faire est bien une heuristique, source potentielle de créativité. Ainsi, comme théorie de l’action, praxéologie, on observe que deux processus encadrent la prospective : le processus de rationalité et le processus de créativité. La méthodologie permet de stimuler l’une ou l’autre [46].

Si les processus participatifs sont largement reconnus comme des composantes fructueuses des approches de gouvernance actuelles, ils ne sont pas toujours suffisants pour établir une solide légitimité du processus de R&I. La réflexivité apparaît comme un renfort qualitatif indispensable à la participation des parties prenantes, mais aussi de l’ensemble du processus de Recherche et d’Innovation. Agissant à un niveau épistémique, la réflexivité constitue un outil permettant d’améliorer la qualité des connaissances disponibles pour les chercheurs et les innovateurs ainsi que pour les citoyens. Outil opérationnel crucial pour accroître la contribution d’un individu au développement de la recherche et de l’innovation, elle constitue aussi un argument pour surmonter les logiques paternalistes qui conçoivent les citoyens comme incompétents ou incapables d’évaluer les résultats de la science. Ainsi, la réflexivité a pour vocation d’ajouter une couche qualitative à la participation et d’orienter consciemment le processus de R&I, en augmentant son efficacité et sa légitimité [47].

 

A suivre : 3. Prospective, R&I et engagement citoyen : surmonter les ambiguïtés

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] Simon L. LEWIS, Mark A. MASLIN, Definiting the Antropocene, in Nature, Vol. 519 (2), 2015, p. 128-146. https://www.nature.com/articles/nature14258 – Rémi BEAU & Catherine LARRERE, Penser l’Anthropocène, Paris, Presses de SciencesPo – Fondation de l’Écologie politique, 2018.

[2] Ph. DESTATTE, Foresight: A Major Tool in tackling Sustainable Development, in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Volume 77, Issue 9, November 2010, p. 1575-1587.

PhilippeDestatte_Foresight_as_a_major_tool_for_Sustainable_Development_TFSC-2010

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0040162510001538

[3] In this sense, Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is a fairly recent framework aimed at creating a meaningful and fruitful dialectic between technical and economic ambitions (R&I) and the normative claims present in or arising from society. Robert GIANNI et Philippe GOUJON, What are the conditions for the ethical implementation of RRI?, Responsible governance and second-ordre reflexivity, in Robert GIANNI, John PEARSON and Bernard REBER, Responsible Research and Innovation, From concepts to practices, p. 172-173, Routledge Studies in Innovation, Organizations and Technology, Routledge, 2020.

[4] Simone ARNALDI, Guido GORGONI & Elena PARIOTTI, Responsible Research and Innovation between « New Governance » and fundamental rights, in Robert GIANNI, John PEARSON and Bernard REBER, Responsible Research and Innovation, From concepts to practices, p. 154, Routledge Studies in Innovation, Organizations and Technology, Routledge, 2020.

[5] Responsible Research and Innovation is a transparent, interactive process by which societal actors and innovators become mutually responsive to each other with a view to the (ethical) acceptability, sustainability and societal desirability of the innovation process and its marketable products. René von SCHOMBERG, A vision of responsible research and innovation, in Richard OWEN, John BESSANT and Maggy HEINTZ ed., Responsible Innovation. Managing the Responsible Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society, p. 51-74, Hoboken NJ, John Wiley & Sons, 2013. – Mirjam BURGET, Emanuele BARDONE, Margus PEDASTE, Definitions and conceptual dimensions of responsible research and innovation: a literature review, in Science and
Engineering Ethics, Vol. 23 (1), 2017, p. 1–19. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11948-016-9782-1

[6] Challenging Futures of Science in Society, Emerging Trends and Cutting-Edge Issues, Monitoring Activities of Science in Society in Europe Experts Group (MASIS), European Commission, Directorate-General for Research, Luxembourg, 2009.

[7] Zaneta OZOLINA, Carl MITCHAM, Jack STILGOE, Global Governance of Science, Report of the Expert Group on Global Governance of Science to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, p. 17, Brussels, Directorate-General for Research, European Commission, 2009.

[8] Erika SZYSZCAK, Experimental governance: The open method of coordination, in European Law Journal, vol. 12 (4), 2006, p. 486-502. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2006.00329.x

[9] Simone ARNALDI, Guido GORGONI & Elena PARIOTTI, Responsible Research and Innovation between « New Governance » and fundamental rights…, p. 156-157. – Simone ARNALDI & Luca BIANCHI, Responsibility in Science and Technology, Wiesbaden, Springer, 2016.

[10] S. ARNALDI ea, Responsible Research and Innovation between « New Governance » and fundamental rights…, p. 159.

[11] Niamh DELANEY, Zeno TORNASI, Raluca IAGHER, Roberta MONACHELLO, Colombe WARIN, Science with and for Society in Horizon 2020, Achievements and Recommendations for Horizon Europe, European Commission, Directorate for Research and Innovation, 2020.

[12] Lund Declaration, Conference: New Worlds, New Solutions. Research and Innovation as a Basis for Developing Europe in a Global Context, Lund, Sweden, 7–8 July 2009.

https://www.vr.se/download/18.6969eb1a16a5bec8b59338/1556886570218/Lund%20Declaration%202009.pdf

[13] Richard OWEN, Responsible Research and Innovation, Options for research and innovation policy in the EU, 2014.

Cliquer pour accéder à RRI-option-of-policy-in-EU.pdf

[14] In this regard RRI acknowledges the transformative power of innovation to create futures, that innovations are often socially and politically constituted and that they embed values. RRI pro-actively seeks to create spaces and processes to allow these futures, the role of innovation in creating them, and the values on which they are based, to be opened up to inclusive discussion and debate, and for such discussions to be responded to i.e. as a deliberative, participatory, anticipatory and reflexive process. Ibidem, p. 3.

[15] Niklas GUDDOWSKY & Walter PEISSI, Human centred science and technology – transdisciplinary foresight and co-creation as tools for active needs-based innovation governance, in European Journal of Futures Research, Vol. 4, (8), 2016. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40309-016-0090-4

[16] Helga NOWOTNY, Peter B. SCOTT and Michaël T. GIBBONS, Re-Thinking Science: Knowledge and the Public in an Age of Uncertainty, p. 118-119, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2001.

[17] Kathy SYKES. and Phil MACNAGHTEN, Responsible Innovation, Opening Up Dialogue and Debate, in Richard OWEN, John BESSANT and Maggy HEINTZ ed., Responsible Innovation. Managing the Responsible Emergence of Science and Innovation in Society, p. 85–107, Hoboken NJ, John Wiley & Sons, 2013.- Phil MACNAGHTEN, The Making of Responsible Innovation, Cambridge University Press, 2020. Robert GIANNI et Philippe GOUJON, p. 84-185.

[18] Universal Declaration of Human Right, Article 27: 1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of his community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights

[19] Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, (2012/C 326/02).

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=EN

[20] Commission Recommandation on a Code of Conduct for responsible nanosciences and nanotechnologies research, February 7, 2009 C(2008) 424. https://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/data/ref/fp7/89918/nanocode-recommendation_en.pdf – Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies: An Action plan for Europe 2005-2009, Second Implementation Report 2007-2009, Communication from the Commission to the Council, The European Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee, (SEC(2009)1468, Brussels, 29.10.2009.

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0607:FIN:EN:PDF

[21] This programme will (…) develop the means for more constructive and effective communication and dialogue between research and citizens in general, so as to enable society at large to have a better-informed and more constructive influence on the future development and governance of science, technology and innovation. European Council decision of 30 September 2002 adopting a specific programme for research, technological development and demonstration: « structuring the European Research Area » (2002–2006), p. 4, 2002/835/EC.

[22] Challenging Futures of Science in Society, Emerging Trends and Cutting-Edge Issues, (MASIS)…, p. 6 & 7.

[23] Edward R. FREEMAN and David L. REED, Stockholders and Stakeholders: A new perspective on Corporate Governance in California Management Review, Vol. 25, Issue 3, 1983, p. 88‐106.

[24] Challenging Futures of Science in Society, Emerging Trends and Cutting-Edge Issues, (MASIS)…, p. 4 et 10.

[25] While initially it was an issue in theories of democracy, claiming a renewal of the more formal representative democracy and enriching it by forms of a deliberative and interactive democracy, it is now also used to describe the involvement of users in the shaping of specific technologies which would be sensible in many cases but does not have much to do with political democracy. Public participation loses its traditional and emphatic connotation of deliberative democracy and becomes more and more a means of involving users in the design of new products, driven by economic rather than political needs. We are not arguing for or against one or other form of participation, but we are highlighting that there are two different forms of governance in this field: via democratic institutions at the political level and in the marketplace via new constellations of engineers, scientists, users and citizens. Both forms have a role to play, but their rationales are different. Challenging Futures of Science in Society, (MASIS)…, p. 22-24.

[26] One can find the same skepticism in Brian WYNNE dir., Taking European Knowledge Society Seriously, Report of the Expert Group on Science and Governance to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, p. 58sv (New European Regimes of Public Engagement), Directorate-General for Research. European Commission, Brussels, January 2007.

[27] Ibidem, p. 20.

[28] Zaneta OZOLINA, Carl MITCHAM, Jack STILGOE, Global Governance of Science, Report of the Expert Group on Global Governance of Science to the Science, Economy and Society Directorate, p. 29, Brussels, Directorate-General for Research, European Commission, 2009.

[29] Lars KLÜVER, Consensus Conferences in the Danish Board of Technology, in Simon JOSS and John DURANT eds., Public Participation in Science: The Role of Consensus Conferences in Europe, p. 41-49,London, Science Museum, 1995. – John S. DRYZEK and Aviezer TUCKER, Deliberative Innovation to Different Effect: Consensus Conferences in Denmark, France, and the United States, in Public Administration Review, vol. 68, no. 5 (2008), p. 864–76. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2008.00928.x

[30] Sciencewise, Supporting socially informed policy making. https://sciencewise.org.uk/

[31] The link on Cordis is lost but the evaluation was done by Professor Ortwin Renn’s team : European Citizen’s Deliberation on Brain Science (ECD) project, https://www.dialogik-expert.de/en/projects/meeting-of-minds

[32] ERA research should be developed to promote critical reflection and discussion with regard to both the means and ends of science – by means, e.g., of selective research projects and public activities that require interdisciplinary collaboration and citizen participation, including reflection of the ways in which the principles of European governance and basic fundamental rights serve as appropriate and applicable guidelines for the practice of science. Z. OZOLINA e.a., Global Governance of Science…, p. 42.

[33] R. GIANNI & Ph. GOUJON, op. cit., p. 184 & 190.

[34] Bert-Jaap KOOPS, Ilse OOSTERLAKEN, Henny ROMIJN, Tsjalling SWIERSTRA, Jeroen VAN den HOVEN ed., Responsible Innovation 2: Concepts, Approaches and Applications, p. 5, Dordrecht, Springer 2015.

[35] Participation should not be considered as an self-standing solution and needs to be defined in terms of its objective, actual influence in the decision-making process and underlying framework. R. GIANNI & Ph. GOUJON, op. cit., p. 185.

[36] With the aim of deepening the relationship between science and society and maximising benefits of their interactions, the Programme should engage and involve citizens and civil society organisations in co-designing and co-creating responsible research and innovation agendas and contents, promoting science education, making scientific knowledge publicly accessible, and facilitating participation by citizens and civil society organisations in its activities. It should do so across the Programme and through dedicated activities in the part ‘Strengthening the European Research Area’. The engagement of citizens and civil society in research and innovation should be coupled with public outreach activities to generate and sustain public support for the Programme. The programme should also seek to remove barriers and boost synergies between science, technology, culture and the arts to obtain a new quality of sustainable innovation. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, Brussels, June 7, 2018. COM/2018/435 final. (26) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0435&from=EN

[37] Pour être plus précis, on dira avec Michel Foudriat que la co-construction peut se définir comme un processus par lequel un ensemble d’acteurs différents :

– expriment et confrontent les points de vue qu’ils ont sur le fonctionnement organisationnel, sur leur représentation de l’avenir d’un territoire, sur une innovation technique, sur une problématique de connaissance ;

– s’engagent dans un processus d’intercompréhension des points de vue respectifs et de recherche de convergence entre ceux-ci ;

– cherchent à trouver un accord sur des traductions de leurs points de vue qu’ils ne jugeraient pas incompatibles entre elles pour arrêter un accord (un compromis) sur un objet matériel (une innovation technique, un nouveau produit industriel) ou immatériel (un projet). Concrètement, le processus de construction aboutit à un document formel qui devient la traduction acceptable et acceptée par les différents acteurs parties prenantes.

Michel FOUDRIAT, La co-construction en actes, Comment l’analyser et la mettre en œuvre, p. 17-18, Paris, ESF, 2021. – M. FOUDRIAT, La Co-construction. Une alternative managériale, Rennes, Presses de l’EHESP, 2016.

[38] Ibidem.

[39] Yves VAILLANCOURT, De la co-construction des connaissances et des politiques publiques, dans SociologieS, 23 mai 2019, 39sv. http://journals.openedition.org/sociologies/11589 – Y. Vaillancourt, La co-construction des politiques publiques. L’apport des politiques sociales, dans Bouchard M. J. (dir.), L’Économie sociale vecteur d’innovation. L’expérience du Québec, p. 115-143, Québec, Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2011. – Y. Vaillancourt, La co-construction des politiques publiques : balises théoriques, dans L. Gardin & F. Jany-Catrice dir., L’Économie sociale et solidaire en coopérations, Rennes, p. 109-116,  Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2016.

[40] Leah R. KAPLAN, Mahmud FAROOQUE, Daniel SAREWITZ and David TOMBLIN, Designing Participatory Technology Assessments: A Reflexive Method for Advancing the Public Role in Science Policy Decision-making, in Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Vol. 171, October 2021.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0040162521004066?casa_token=FVIz2ifcDnIAAAAA:CVqvotCDx5853FuLs7GPFUuAaxqRdP87H5U1JHMcMiv3aauUQ7L_g3SxGIt6IfwnagVigQO9Geq9 – Harry M. COLLINS & Robert EVANS, The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience, in Social Studies of Science, vol. 32, (2), June 29, 2016. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0306312702032002003

[41] Archon FUNG, Varieties of participation in complex governance, in Public Administration Review, Dec. 2006, Vol. 66 (Special Issue 1), p. 66–75. https://faculty.fiu.edu/~revellk/pad3003/Fung.pdf

[42] Johann Wolfgang GOETHE, Der Versuch als Vermittler von Objekt und Subjekt, in Goethe’s Werke, Hamburger Ausgabe, p. 13, Munich, Verlag C. H. Beck, 2002, p. 10-2). https://www.projekt-gutenberg.org/goethe/nat92-97/chap011.html

https://www.natureinstitute.org/article/goethe/experiment-as-mediator-of-object-and-subject – Johann Wolfgang Goethe, The Experiment as Mediator between Object and Subject (1792, publ. 1823) , in J. W. GOETHE, Scientific Studies, ed. and trans. Douglas Miller, p. 14, New York, Suhrkamp,1988. – Lorraine DASTON, The moral Economy of Science, in Osiris, 10, 1995, p. 18-23. https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_2276978/component/file_3321600/content – Nicolas CLASS, Goethe et la méthode de la science, in Astérion, vol. 3, 2005. http://journals.openedition.org/asterion/413 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/asterion.413

[43] Pierre Bourdieu observait en 1993 qu’adopter le point de vue de la réflexivité ne constitue pas un renoncement à l’objectivité. C’est travailler à rendre compte du sujet empirique dans les termes mêmes de l’objectivité construite par le sujet scientifique, notamment en le situant en un lieu déterminé de l’espace-temps social. Pour le sociologue français, il s’agit alors de « se donner la conscience et la maîtrise des contraintes qui peuvent s’exercer sur le sujet  à travers tous les liens qui l’attachent au sujet empirique, à ses intérêts, à ses pulsions, à ses présupposés – liens qu’il doit rompre pour se constituer pleinement« .Pierre BOURDIEU, Réflexivité narcissique et réflexivité scientifique (1993), dans P. BOURDIEU, Retour sur la réflexivité,  p. 58, Paris, EHESS, 2022.

[44] Brian WYNNE, Public uptake of science: a case for institutional reflexivity, in Public Understanding of Science, Vol.  2 (4), 1993, p. 321–337. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1088/0963-6625/2/4/003 – See also: B. WYNNE, Elephants in the rooms where public encounter « science »?, A response to Darrin Durant, Accounting for expertise: Wynne and the autonomy of the lay public, in Public Understanding of Science, Vol. 17, 2008, p. 21-33.

https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/22453/ssoar-2008-1-wynne-elephants_in_the_rooms_where.pdf;jsessionid=CE7E52866567FBD3F6C80011B6C8DE0F?sequence=1

[45] Daniel KAHNEMAN, Olivier SIBONY and Cass R. SUNSTEIN, Noise, A flaw in Human Judgment, p. 166-167, New York – Boston – London, Little Brown Spark, 2021. – Philippe DESTATTE, Les opinions partiales altèrent la rectitude du jugement, Heuristique et critique des sources dans les sciences, Conférence présentée à la Salle académique de l’Université de Mons, dans le cadre du Réseau EUNICE, le 21 octobre 2021, Blog PhD2050, 1er novembre 2021. https://phd2050.org/2021/11/01/heuristique/

[46] Pierre GONOD , Conférence faite à la Plateforme d’Intelligence territoriale wallonne, Namur, Institut Destrée, 19 mai 2009. – P. GONOD, Dynamique des systèmes et méthodes prospectives, p. 35-36, coll. Travaux et recherches de prospective, Paris, 1996.

[47] R. GIANNI & Ph. GOUJON, op. cit., p. 189.

Brussels, 16 December 2023

Participation is at the centre of the questioning of contemporary governance, as a condition for the effectiveness of collective policies aimed at the common development and metamorphosis of society, in particular by relying on R&I. It is here that foresight takes on its full meaning through its vocation to articulate the past, present and future in a process of stakeholder involvement. This raises the question of the relationship with representative democracy and the risk of conflict with decision makers, in particular elected officials, that these approaches entail.

You can find here the report on Citizens’ engagement approaches and methods in R&I foresight written as part of the work of the Mutual Learning Exercise carried out by the European Commission’s DG Research in 2022 and 2023 under the leadership of my German colleague, the futurist Cornelia Daheim.

I would like to thank the Commission officials, Idea Consult for their support, and all the colleagues who contributed to this work at our workshops organised in Brussels, Lisbon, Bucharest and Prague along 2022 and 2023.

Philippe-Destatte_Citizens-Engagement_R&I-Foresight_EC_2023

Enjoy!

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

Namur, October 20, 2023

Abstract:

Foresight, particularly when applied to territories, bases its process first on the identification of long-term challenges, issues which need to be addressed by the parties and experts involved. Employing both a broad, rigorous information base, which is subject to criticism of sources and facts, and resources resulting from creativity, foresight itself wants to be heuristic and an innovation process. Creativity and rationality are thus combined, not in conflict with each other but rather with the aim of generating novel visions in which dreams engender reality. In a world in which misinformation is presented as the fifth horseman of the Apocalypse, rigour in the conceptual framework, reflexivity, independent thought and validation all play an integral part. Lastly, the robustness of the process must make it possible to address the issues of the present and to anticipate those of the future. That means not only reflecting but also equipping oneself with the capabilities to proceed before, or in order that, actions take place.

 

Introduction: Unlocking the Future Means Creating It

It is through geography, the subject of this part of the 2023 Science Congress [1], that we will address the topic of territorial foresight and its heuristics. I understand from your geographer colleagues Antoine Le Blanc (University of the Littoral Opal Coast) and Olivier Milhaud (Sorbonne University) that the link is essential from the outset, irrespective of concerns over territorial planning and development. They write that we explore the Earth and we explore science, knowing that the journey is inevitably unfinished yet delighting in it. And they add that this could be the heuristic positioning of geographers. Let’s keep exploring: if we experience limitations, we will be able to take control of our journey [2].

Proactively negotiating a path consisting of questioning and reflecting on [3] one’s approach with the goal of taking control of our journey: that is what futurists find appealing. The humility of this heuristic questioning, so dear to historians such as myself, is also at the heart of our reflection, even if it is more common among French geographers based in the Department of Geography, History, Economics and Societal Studies (GHES) than among our Belgian colleagues, located – sometimes far too assuredly – within science faculties. In any event, foresight, with its own ambition, and like some great geographical grassroots’ initiatives [4], tries to be open to the burning issues but, in doing so, is implemented to pluri-, multi- and interdisciplinary excess.

That is also why the contributors to that book which try to define what is geography highlight the manifest poster entitled Geography, a key for our future distributed in 2016 on the initiative of their Belgian colleagues to underline the involvement of geography in today’s world and even in tomorrow’s world at a time when the discipline was under threat, particularly from the Minister for Education of the French-speaking Community of Belgium. In doing so, the systemic representation endorsed by this document becomes part of one of the principles of foresight. The Belgian National Committee for Geography combines the following variables within a single group: climate change, natural and technological risks, living conditions, geolocation, urbanisation, weather forecasts, environmental protection, territorial and urban planning, geomatics, impact of economic activities, demographic policies, energy policy, mobility, nature conservation, geopolitical conflicts and evolution of landscapes [5].

These initial elements, highlighted from geography, provide bridges to the objectives of this contribution: defining territorial foresight, discussing its process and questioning its heuristics at a time when the issue of information quality and traceability of sources appears to be neglected by some people, including in the scientific world itself.

 

1. An Attitude, a Method, a Discipline and an Indiscipline

Prior to being a method or a discipline, foresight is an attitude – so stated the French philosopher and teacher Gaston Berger (1896-1960), creator of this approach and proponent of the concept. In 1959, when he was Director General of French Higher Education, Berger described foresight through five requirements which, today, are more important than ever:

Look far ahead: foresight is essentially the study of the distant future (…) and of the impetus for change (…)

Take a broad view: linear extrapolations, which give our reasoning an appearance of scientific rigour, are dangerous if we forget that they are abstract (…)

Analyse in detail: foresight assumes utmost attention and unrelenting work (…)

Take risks: forecasting and foresight do not use the same methods. Nor should they be implemented by the same people. Foresight assumes a freedom not permitted by our requirement for urgency (…)

Think of Man: the future is not only what may “happen” or what is most likely to occur. It is also, and to an ever-increasing extent, what we hoped it would be[6].

Derived also from the thinking of pragmatist philosopher Maurice Blondel (1861-1949) [7], action is therefore going to be central to the futurist’s concerns. And, as highlighted by Jacques Lesourne (1928-2020), who studied at the Ecole Polytechnique, was an engineer of the Corps des Mines in Paris and who was one of the greatest pioneers of Foresight application and its teaching, there is a vast difference in outlook between futurists who reflect with a view to taking action and scientists who work with a view to broadening knowledge. The latter may reject a problem as premature. The former must accept it if it is important for stakeholders, and their duty is therefore to consider any relevant and plausible information, even if it is expressed in vague terms [8]. Although their focus is on the quest for knowledge, futurists will also be men and women of practical experience and concrete action.

Drawing his inspiration from the work carried out in the United States, as Gaston Berger had also done [9], the economist Michel Godet, who succeeded Jacques Lesourne to the Chair of Industrial Foresight at the Conservatoire des Arts et Métiers in Paris, also helped to give foresight its strong strategic dimension. Basing his views on the works of the American organisational theorist Russell L. Ackoff (1919-2009), Godet emphasised foresight’s prescriptive vocation as well as its exploratory dimension [10]. Consequently, he added planning, which, in the words of Ackoff, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania, involves conceiving a desirable future and devising the ways and means to achieve it [11].

With the benefit of his practical experience, particularly within businesses and territories, Michel Godet also added three further requirements to the five characteristics advocated for foresight by Gaston Berger:

See differently: distrust received ideas.

The consensual dream of current generations is often a temporary agreement to leave everything unchanged and to pass the burden of our collective irresponsible actions on to future generations.

Do it together: appropriation.

It is a bad idea to want to impose a good idea.

Use methods that are as rigorous and participatory as possible in order to reduce the inevitable collective inconsistencies. (…) Without cognitive foresight, declared Godet, President of the Scientific Council of DATAR [Interministerial Delegation for Regional Planning and Regional Attractiveness], in 2004, participatory foresight will drift aimlessly and go round in circles [12].

It is this notion of foresight that Michel Godet continues to describe as intellectual indiscipline, using this phrase as the subtitle of the first volume of his Manuel de prospective stratégique[13]. In this work, Godet, the former Director of Foresight at SEMA, points out that the wording is that of Pierre Massé (1898-1987). In his foreword to the first edition of the Prospective review, in 1973, Massé, who was the former General Commissioner of Planning under General de Gaulle, observed that the term, whose modern acceptance was attributable to Gaston Berger, was explicitly neither a science nor a doctrine but rather a pursuit. Straining the words, wrote Massé, might have raised questions over whether Foresight’s vocation for uncertainty condemned it to being, by definition, not a discipline, but an indiscipline which challenges cursory, dangerous forecasting based on extrapolation [14]. Massé, author of Le Plan ou l’Anti-hasard (1965) [15], answered his question himself: I don’t believe so, however, since we need a science of approximations, a sort of social topology that helps us find our way in an increasingly complex and changing world in which imagination, supplemented by discernment, attempts to identify significant future trends. (…) The object of foresight is not to dream, but to transform our dreams into projects. It is not a question of guessing the future as prophets and futurologists do, and not without some risk, but of helping to construct it, setting chance against the anti-chance created through human desire [16].

Thus, as a tool based on temporality, in other words, the complex relationship which the present establishes both backwards and forwards with the past and the future [17], foresight goes beyond the historicity of our thought mechanisms to project itself into the future and explore the possible, desirable and achievable paths before taking action.

Strengthened by the convergence of the Anglo-Saxon foresight and the Latin prospective works carried out in the early 2000s under the guidance of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research, foresight is a process of innovation and strategic transformation, based on systemics and the long term, for implementing present, operational actions. Systemics, because it involves complex systems analysis as well as modelling theory and practice. Long term, because it takes into account the long timescale dear to Fernand Braudel (1902-1985) [18] and presents a plural representation of the future in order to identify alternatives with a view to creating a single future [19]. Present, operational actions, because it constructs and implements a strategic desire to transform, set in motion and take action on history, territory and organisation.

This is the basis of a definition which I have continued to refine over time since the first version I wrote, initially for the European Commission [20], then for the Wallonia Evaluation and Foresight Society and DATAR [21].

Foresight is an independent, dialectic, rigorous approach conducted in an interdisciplinary manner and based on the long term.

Foresight can explain questions relating to the present and the future, firstly, by considering them within their holistic, systemic and complex framework and, secondly, by positioning them, beyond their historicity, within temporality. With a deliberate focus on project and action, its aim is to bring about one or more transformations within the system which it perceives through the use of collective intelligence[22].

Thus we can echo and supplement the elegant phrase of Jacques Lesourne: whenever there is a foresight reflection, there is decision to be taken [23], adding the words “and implemented”. We will confirm this in the analysis of the process.

Numerous debates have taken place within the futurist community on whether territorial foresight is different to business, industrial or technological foresight. Such discussions are rather pointless and I do not wish to be involved in them. I will, however, mention that one of the top experts in French territorial foresight, Guy Loinger (1943-2012) defined it as the activity whose purpose is to express alternative representations of the possible and desirable futures for a territory, with a view to developing territorial projects and local and regional public policies [24]. As Loinger, Director of the Interregional Observatory for Regional Foresight (OIPR), rightly observed, this definition clearly highlights the fact that foresight is a strategic reflection activity which takes place before the decision-making processes. It must be able to result in the operationalisation of the collectivity’s intervention within the territory. Practical experiments of this type have been carried out by The Destree Institute for twenty years, in addition to those undertaken at Walloon regional level. The following can be mentioned by way of example: Luxembourg 2010, Pays de Herve in the Future, Charleroi 2020, the Urban Community of Dunkirk, Picard Wallonia 2025, Côtes d’Armor 2020, Development Vision for the Basque Country, Sustainable Development Scheme for the Picardy Region, Normandie 2020+, Midi-Pyrénées Region, Lorraine Region, Bassin Cœur du Hainaut 2025, Regional Development Scheme for the Grande Région, etc. These are all territorial foresight works undertaken alone or in partnership, and an entire conference could be dedicated to describing them one by one.

Activity, attitude, approach, process, method, technique, tool – defining the purpose of foresight can be a confusing process. At a lecture he gave in Namur in 2009, Pierre Gonod (1925-2009), an expert in complex systems analysis, described foresight as heuristics, a process of rationality and a potential source of creativity, a veritable machine for asking questions [25].

I do not need to remind you that heuristics is the area of science whose purpose is to uncover the facts, and therefore the sources and the documents that underpin those facts, the latter part of this definition recalling, according to the philosophical vocabulary of André Lalande (1867-1963), the occupation of historians [26]. In my view, however, it is a necessity for all disciplines and approaches, scientific or otherwise. This reference to science is difficult to apply to all of the concerns in any discipline, but it can undoubtedly describe their processes and approaches. Heuristics is like a Russian doll. It aims to identify as exhaustively as possible all the relevant documentation on a subject, and, in addition to collecting the documents, to offer a detailed critique of the sources. As the sociologist and psychologist Claude-Pierre Vincent pointed out, heuristics also contains the ingredients of creation, intuition, creativity and strategic innovation. Vincent defines it broadly: all intellectual tools, all processes and all procedures, as well as all approaches that encourage “The art of discovery” and all approaches aimed at fostering “invention in science” [27]. It is also worth noting that the American mathematician George Pólya (1887-1985) observes on the subject of heuristics, since it deals with problem-solving, that one of its specific tasks is to express, in general terms, reasons for choosing subjects which, if investigated, could help us achieve the solution [28].

Asking the right question is central to any scientific approach as well as to foresight. That is why the phase involving the definition of long-term challenges is so important.

 

 2. A Robust Operational Process

The purpose of the foresight process is change. Not change for change’s sake at any time, as denounced by Peter Bishop in his courses [29], but change which makes it possible to address the long-term challenges and achieve the desired vision within the chosen timeframe. Gaston Berger had previously referred to the works of the German-born American psychologist Kurt Lewin (1890-1947), who had developed a change management model consisting of three phases, the most important of which was called transition: during this phase, behaviours and attitudes become unstable and contradictory and are experimented with by stakeholders who adopt some of them[30]. Inspired by this line of thinking and by other change models, some futurist colleagues and I have developed a seven-stage foresight process model comprising three phases[31]:

Evolution and preparation phase (Defining objectives, temporal and spatial positioning, management, scheduling, budget, communication, etc.)

 Foresight phase

  1. Identification (actors and factors) and foresight diagnosis.
  2. Defining the long-term issues.
  3. Developing the common vision.

Strategic phase

  1. Designating the strategic priorities.
  2. Assessing and selecting the concrete actions.
  3. Managing and monitoring the implementation.
  4. Evaluating the process and the results of the exercise.

The process is enriched throughout its course, firstly, internally through collective intelligence and, secondly, through outward monitoring in order to be alert to the emergences that always occur. The journey is a societal learning process for collecting, decoding and, above all, consolidating the information by calling on experts and bringing them together in deliberative forums. The objective of the exercise is to co-construct a sound body of knowledge which, when shared, will serve as the basis for expressing possibilities, desirable futures and strategy.

Over the years, the participation processes have been strengthened to ensure that the stakeholders become true players and that the involvement of actors is not only designed as a series of consultation or deliberation mechanisms but also offers genuine momentum for co-conception, co-construction and even co-decision [32].

 

3. Defeating the five horsemen of the Apocalypse

Bill Bramhall’s cartoon The five horsemen of the Apocalypse, which appeared in the New York Daily News editorial of 16 August 2021, perfectly illustrated my thoughts on the need for formal heuristics. Alongside war, famine, pestilence and death rides a fifth horseman. Death asks him who he is. The horseman, who is holding a smart phone or tablet, replies: misinformation. Conceived when misinformation was wreaking havoc during the coronavirus pandemic and at a time of full-blown Trumpism, this image is still relevant in many areas other than the pandemic.

Piero Dominici, a professor at the University of Perugia and a member of the World Science Academy, was a guest at one of my foresight and roadmap courses at the National Engineering School of Tunisia. During this course, he discussed the five illusions of hyper-technological civilisation: the illusion of rationality, the illusion of total control, the illusion of predictability, the illusion of measurability and the illusion of the power to eliminate error in our social systems and our lives [33]. These various certainties were overturned during the great hoax played by the very serious popular scientist Étienne Klein on 31 July 2022. The celebrated physician and scientific philosopher tweeted an image of the star Proxima Centauri, describing it as the star closest to the Sun, located 4.2 light years away from us (which seems accurate), and said that it had been captured by the James Webb telescope (JWST), launched several months earlier. Faced with the frenzy and the real risk of media uproar surrounding this information, Étienne Klein announced that the photo published was in fact a picture of a slice of chorizo against a black background. In sharing this image, Klein, former Research Director at the Atomic Energy Commission, had sought to urge caution at the publishing of images on social media, not imagining that the lack of criticism would send his message viral. It should also be mentioned that a quick search shows that Étienne Klein had himself shared a tweet by the astrophysicist Peter Coles from the University of Cardiff, dated the previous day, which had not had the same impact on social media. The original photo of the chorizo is actually older as it had been posted on 27 July 2018 by Jan Castenmiller, a retired Dutchman living in Vélez-Málaga, in Andalucia, who described it as a photo of a lunar eclipse. The uproar surrounding this slice of meat can be explained by three factors: the higher quality of the image, which had been slightly retouched, the enthusiasm surrounding the results produced by the new telescope and, above all, the excellent credentials of the person sharing the image [34].

This necessary traceability of sources is essential to the quality and reliability of information. However, it is being undermined. Not only by technical advances, particularly in the digital sector and in the field of AI, which make it possible to alter text, voice and image, but also through a form of lowering of standards on the part of the researchers themselves. This includes the increasingly common use of the particularly poor method of referencing sources, the so-called Harvard method, and the practice of filling scientific texts with vague references to style (Destatte, 1997), referring here to a work of 475 pages, when that is not the case – excuse the comparison – (Hobbes, 1993), obliging the reader to search for the evidence of what is being claimed in the 780 pages of the third Sirey edition of the English philosopher’s work, as I had to do recently. As Marc Bloch (1886-1944) points out in simple terms, indicating the provenance of a document merely means obeying a universal rule of honesty [35].

But that is not all: it is this very traceability of thought that is being called into question. In a recent economic magazine, one that is generally considered serious, a columnist considered that footnotes were a nightmare: directing the comprehension of a text means compromising how the reader understands it, he stated, being of the opinion that if young people were turning to slam, hip-hop or rap texts, that was because, at least such texts don’t have footnotes [36]. Worse still, in une histoire des notes de bas de page, which has been on the foresight.fr website since October 2022, the following appears:

As tedious to read as they are difficult to produce, the footnote is quickly becoming a nightmare for readers and students. For British playwright Noel Coward [37], “having to read footnotes resembles having to go downstairs to answer the door while in the midst of making love.”

As an element of paratext, the footnote is more like a parasite. Yet it had all started so well. It began as a tale of historians. As the scientific nature of history increased, so the footnote became more important: the need to clearly cite one’s sources and the growing emphasis on evidence to support each hypothesis [38].

Describing notes as boring or unnecessary will do nothing to strengthen the heuristic qualities of our futurists, researchers, students and pupils. François Guizot (1787-1874), one of the first scientists to generalise the use of footnotes, would have described this attitude as regrettable levity. Guizot, the former head of government under King Louis-Philippe and also a historian, complained that he saw many informed minds limiting themselves to a few documents in support of their hypotheses rather than pursuing their research to establish the reality of the facts [39]. In this way, he highlighted the danger faced by teachers, researchers and “intellectuals”, the difficulty they have both in speaking or writing in a neutral, objective and dispassionate way, with the distance expected of the role or profession of someone who expresses their opinion, and in getting close to the truth or even speaking the truth.

Contemporary research sends us at least two messages. Firstly, that of rigour which, above all, involves knowing what one is talking about, what the problem is and what one is looking for. This positioning requires not only general culture and experience but also some learning about the subject. It is a phase in any research process, and also when participating in a consultation or a deliberative process, including foresight. The second message refers us to relativity and objectivity in relation to the subject and to the interpretation of the experience. If the passion that often motivates the researcher in a positive way can also be their internal enemy, how should we protect the citizens, actors and stakeholders who take part in a research and innovation process?

Most importantly, perhaps, Aristotle pointed out in the 4th century BC that persuading through the oratorical techniques of rhetoric does not mean demonstrating by means of persuasive techniques (inference, syllogisms and other enthymemes). Scientific practice involves proving, in other words establishing the evidence of one’s claim, which is completely different from rhetoric or dialectic [40]. In the world of foresight, but not only in that world, we have always argued in favour of seeking a balance between the factual (data gathering), interactive (deliberation) and conceptual (establishing the structural concepts) activities, in line with the creative method highlighted by Thierry Gaudin, former Director of Foresight and Evaluation at the French Research Ministry [41]. Such a balance can be sought based on the efforts and investments in time and resources made in the three approaches to a problem or challenge.

Well before our Renaissance thinkers, the North African scholar Ibn Khaldûn (1332-1406) called on people to combat the demon of lies with the light of reason. He encouraged the use of criticism to separate the wheat from the chaff and called on science to polish the truth so that critical insight may be applied to it [42]. The watchword here is analytical rigour, both qualitative and quantitative. In science, even in social science, logical rigour and empirical rigour come together to interpret, understand and explain [43]. Validation of data quality is universally essential: consistency of measurements, stability of series, continuity of measurement throughout the period analysed, existence of a genuine periodic variation, etc.[44]

Researchers who follow the path of foresight must be like the philosopher described by the grammarian and philosopher César Chesneau Dumarsais (1676-1756), who wrote the following definition in the Encyclopédie of 1765, edited by Denis Diderot, Jean Le Rond d’Alembert and Louis de Jaucourt:

Truth is not for the philosopher a mistress who corrupts his imagination and whom he believes is to be found everywhere; he contents himself with being able to unravel it where he can perceive it. He does not confound it with probability; he takes for true what is true, for false what is false, for doubtful what is doubtful, and for probable what is only probable. He does more, and here you have a great perfection of the philosopher: when he has no reason by which to judge, he knows how to live in suspension of judgment  [45].

Caution and rigour in heuristics cannot, however, lead to objectivism. Distinguishing truth from falsehood is absolutely essential. Remaining detached from the world and not intervening is definitely not the practice of either intellectuals [46] or futurists who, above all, are men and women of reflection and action.

 

Conclusion: Intellectual Courage

The quest for truth, detachment and autonomy of thought [47] are worthwhile only if they are accompanied by courage to tell the truth. We are all familiar with the wonderful words of SFIO [French Section of the Workers’ International] deputy Jean Jaurès (1859-1914) in his address to young people, given in Albi in 1903:

Courage is about seeking truth and speaking truth, not about submitting to a great triumphant lie or echoing ignorant applause or fanatical jeers with our hearts, our mouths or our hands [48].

We are much less familiar with the speech made by Raymond Aron (1905-1983) to the French Philosophy Society in June 1939, barely two months before the outbreak of the Second World War. Aron, the French historian and sociologist, underlined the importance of the qualities of discipline and technical competence and also intellectual courage to challenge everything and identify the issues on which the very existence of his country depended. Aron stated very clearly that the crisis would be lengthy and profound:

Whatever the immediate events, we will not emerge unscathed. The journey on which France and the countries of Europe are embarking does not have an immediate, miraculous conclusion. I think, therefore, that teachers like us can play a small part in this effort to safeguard the values we hold dear. Instead of shouting with the parties, we could strive to define, with the utmost good faith, the issues that have been raised and the means of addressing them [49].

 Leaving aside the idea that, as researchers, students or intellectuals, we would be in a privileged position due to the intellectual and material possibilities given to us[50], the fact remains that we have a great responsibility towards society. Do we exercise this responsibility to the extent demanded by our duty and the expectations of civil society? I do not think… not in Belgium, and especially not in Wallonia. The absence of an engaged, dynamic public space is a real problem. But it is not a fatal flaw.

With the increasingly glaring gap between, firstly, the public and collective policies pursued from European down to local level and, secondly, the needs created by the challenges arising from the Anthropocene era and the loss of social cohesion, it is time for the voices of the territories to be heard loud and clear again.

And for everything to be called into question again.

 

See also:

Ph. DESTATTE, What is foresight?, Blog PhD2050, May 30, 2013. https://phd2050.org/2013/05/30/what-is-foresight/

Ph. DESTATTE, Opinions which are partial have the effect of vitiating the rectitude of judgment », Heuristics and criticism of sources in science, University of Mons – EUNICE, Mons, 21 October 2021, Blog PhD2050, https://phd2050.org/2021/10/26/heuristics/

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] This text is the English version of my speech to the 2023 Science Congress, held at the University of Namur (Wallonia) on 23 and 24 August 2023.

[2] Antoine LE BLANC et Olivier MILHAUD, Sortir de nos enfermements ? Parcours géographiques, dans Perrine MICHON et Jean-Robert PITTE, A quoi sert la géographie?, p. 116, Paris, PuF, 2021.

[3] Pierre BOURDIEU, Science de la science et réflexivité, Cours au Collège de France 2000-2001, p. 173-174, Paris, Raisons d’agir Éditions, 2001. – Pierre BOURDIEU (1930-2002), Réflexivité narcissique et réflexivité scientifique (1993), in P. BOURDIEU, Retour sur la réflexivité,  p. 58, Paris, EHESS, 2022.

[4] Bernadette MERENNE-SCHOUMAKER et Anne BARTHELEMI dir., L’accès aux fonctions et l’aménagement des territoires face aux enjeux de notre société, dans Géo, n°85, Arlon, FEGEPRO, 2021. – Florian PONS, Sina SAFADI-KATOUZIAN et Chloë VIDAL, Penser et agir dans l’anthropocène, Quels apports de la prospective territoriale?, in Géographie et cultures, n°116, Hiver2020.

[5] La géographie, une clef pour notre futur, Comité national belge de Géographie, 30 mai 2016. https://uclouvain.be/fr/facultes/sc/actualites/la-geographie-une-cle-pour-notre-futur.html – A. LE BLANC et O. MILHAUD, op. cit., p. 117.

[6] L’attitude prospective, in L’Encyclopédie française, t. XX, Le monde en devenir, 1959, in Gaston BERGER, Phénoménologie du temps et prospective, p. 270-275, Paris, PuF, 1964. (1959).

[7] The French philosopher Maurice Blondel developed the concept of prospection, which refers to action-oriented thinking: Maurice BLONDEL, Sur Prospection, in André LALANDE, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, p. 846, Paris, PuF, 1976.

[8] Jacques LESOURNE, Un homme de notre siècle, De polytechnique à la prospective et au journal Le Monde, p. 475, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2000.

[9]  With particular reference to social psychology: Kurt Lewin, Ronald Lippitt, Jeanne Watson, Bruce Westley. G. BERGER, Phénoménologie du temps et prospective…, p. 271.

[10] Maurice Blondel proposes to call Normative the methodical research whose aim is to study and provide the normal process by which beings achieve the design from which they proceed, the destiny to which they tend. M. BLONDEL, L’être et les êtres, Essai d’ontologie concrète et intégrale, p. 255, Paris, Félix Alcan, 1935.

[11] Russell Lincoln ACKOFF, A Concept of Corporate Planning, New York, Wiley, 1969. – M. GODET, Prospective et planification stratégique, p. 31, Paris, Economica, 1985.

[12] Michel GODET, Les régions face au futur, Foreword to G. LOINGER dir., La prospective régionale, De chemins en desseins, p. 8, Paris, L’Aube – DATAR, 2004. – See also : Michel GODET, De la rigueur pour une indiscipline intellectuelle, Assises de la Prospective, Université de Paris-Dauphine, Paris, 8-9 décembre 1999, p. 13. – M. GODET, Creating Futures, Scenario Planning as a Strategic Management Tool, p. 2, London-Paris-Genève, Economica, 2006.

http://www.laprospective.fr/dyn/francais/articles/presse/indiscipline_intellectuelle.pdf

[13] Michel GODET, Manuel de prospective stratégique, t. 1, Une indiscipline intellectuelle, Paris, Dunod, 1997.

[14] Pierre MASSÉ, De prospective à prospectives, dans Prospectives, Paris, PuF, n°1, Juin 1973, p. 4.

[15] P. MASSÉ, Le Plan ou l’Anti-hasard, coll. Idées, Paris, nrf-Gallimard, 1965.  http://www.laprospective.fr/dyn/francais/memoire/texte_fondamentaux/le-plan-ou-lantihasard-pierre-masse.pdf

[16] P. MASSÉ, De prospective à prospectives…, p. 4.

[17] Jean CHESNEAUX, Habiter le temps, p. 18-19, Paris, Bayard, 1996. – Reinhart KOSSELECK, Le futur passé, Paris, EHESS, 1990.

[18] Fernand BRAUDEL, Histoire et Sciences sociales, La longue durée, dans Annales, 1958, 13-4, p. 725-753. https://www.persee.fr/doc/ahess_0395-2649_1958_num_13_4_2781

[19] Jacques LESOURNE, Les mille sentiers de l’avenir, p. 11-12, Paris, Seghers, 1981.

[20] Voir notamment : Günter CLAR & Philippe DESTATTE, Regional Foresight, Boosting Regional Potential, Mutual Learning Platform Regional Foresight Report, Luxembourg, European Commission, Committee of the Regions and Innovative Regions in Europe Network, 2006.

Philippe-Destatte-&-Guenter-Clar_MLP-Foresight-2006-09-25

[21] Ph. DESTATTE et Ph. DURANCE, Les mots-clés de la prospective territoriale, p. 46, Paris, La Documentation française, 2009. Philippe_Destatte_Philippe_Durance_Mots_cles_Prospective_Documentation_francaise_2009

[22] Ph. DESTATTE, What is foresight?, Blog PhD2050, May 30, 2013. https://phd2050.wordpress.com/2013/05/30/what-is-foresight/

[23] J. LESOURNE, Conclusion, Assises de la prospective, Paris, Université Dauphine, 8 décembre 1999.

[24] Guy LOINGER, La prospective territoriale comme expression d’une nouvelle philosophie de l’action collective, in G. LOINGER dir., La prospective régionale, De chemins en desseins, p. 44-45, Paris, L’Aube – DATAR, 2004.

[25] Pierre GONOD, Conférence faite à la Plateforme d’Intelligence territoriale wallonne, Namur, Institut Destrée, 19 mai 2009.

[26] André LALANDE, Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie, p. 413, Paris, PUF, 1976. About heuristics, see also: DESTATTE, Opinions which are partial have the effect of vitiating the rectitude of judgment », Heuristics and criticism of sources in science, University of Mons – EUNICE, Mons, 21 October 2021, Blog PhD2050, https://phd2050.org/2021/10/26/heuristics/

[27] Claude-Pierre VINCENT, Heuristique, création, intuition et stratégies d’innovation, p. 32, Paris, Editions BoD, 2012. – Cette définition est fort proche de celle de l’Encyclopaedia Universalis : Jean-Pierre CHRÉTIEN-GONI, Heuristique, dans Encyclopædia Universalis, consulté le 6 mars 2023. https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/heuristique/

[28] George PóLYA, L’Heuristique est-elle un sujet d’étude raisonnable?, in Travail et Méthodes, p. 279, Paris, Sciences et Industrie, 1958.

[29] For an idea of Peter Bishop’s work, see: P. BISHOP & Andy HINES, Teaching about the Future, New York, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2012.

[30] Kurt LEWIN, Field Theory in Social Science, Harper Collins, 1951. – Psychologie dynamique, Les relations humaines, Paris, PuF, 1972.

[31] Ph. DESTATTE, La construction d’un modèle de processus prospectif, dans Philippe DURANCE & Régine MONTI dir., La prospective stratégique en action, Bilan et perspectives d’une indiscipline intellectuelle, p. 301-331, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2014. – You can find the Working Paper in English: Ph. DESTATTE, The construction of a foresight process model based on the interest in collective knowledge and learning platforms, The Destree Institute, May 13, 2009.

https://www.institut-destree.eu/wa_files/philippe-destatte_foresight-process-model_2009-05-13bis.pdf

[32] Ph. DESTATTE, Citizens’ Engagement Approaches and Methods in R&I Foresight, Brussels, European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, Horizon Europe Policy Support Facility, 2023.

https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d5916d5f-1562-11ee-806b-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-288573394

[33] Piero DOMINICI, Managing Complexity ? Tunis, ENIT, 15 avril 2022.

[34] André GUNTHERT, Ce que montre le chorizo, in L’image sociale, 17 novembre 2022. https://imagesociale.fr/10853 – André Gunthert is Associate Professor at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences sociales in Paris.

[35] Marc BLOCH, Apologie pour l’histoire ou Métier d’historien (1942), in Marc BLOCH, L’histoire, la Guerre, la Résistance, coll. Quarto, p. 911, Paris, Gallimard, 2006.

[36] Paul VACCA, L’enfer des notes de bas de page, in Trends-Tendances, 2 mars 2023, p. 18.

[37] Sir Noël Peirce COWARD (1899-1973) Britannica, The Editors of Encyclopaedia. Noël Coward, Encyclopedia Britannica, 15 Sep. 2023, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Noel-Coward. Accessed 5 October 2023

[38] Histoire des notes de bas de page, Actualité prospective, 1er octobre 2022.

https://www.prospective.fr/histoire-des-notes-de-bas-de-page/

[39] François GUIZOT, History of the Origin of Representative Government in Europe, translated by Andrew E. Scobe, p. 4, London, Henry G. Bohn, 1852. https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/61250/pg61250-images.html#Page_1.

[40] ARISTOTE, According to Rhétorique, LI, 2, 1355sv, in Œuvres, coll. La Pléiade, p. 706 sv, Paris, Gallimard, 2014.

[41] Thierry GAUDIN, Discours de la méthode créatrice, Gordes, Ose Savoir – Le Relié, 2003.

[42] IBN KHALDÛN, Al-Muqaddima, Discours sur l’histoire universelle, p. 6, Arles, Acte Sud, 1997.

[43] Jean-Pierre OLIVIER de SARDAN, La rigueur du qualitatif, Les contraintes empiriques de l’interprétation socio-anthropologique, p. 8, Louvain-la-Neuve, Bruylant-Academia, 2008.

[44] Daniel CAUMONT & Silvester IVANAJ, Analyse des données, p. 244, Paris, Dunod, 2017.

[45] César CHESNEAU DU MARSAIS, Le philosophe, dans  Encyclopédie ou dictionnaire raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers…, t. XII, p. 509, Neufchâtel, 1765. http://enccre.academie-sciences.fr/encyclopedie/article/v12-1254-0/

[46] Gérard NOIRIEL, Dire la vérité au pouvoir, Les intellectuels en question, Paris, Agone, 2010.

[47] Norbert ELIAS, Involvement and Detachment, Basil Blackwell, 1987. –  Engagement et distanciation, Contribution à la sociologie de la connaissance (1983), p. 27-28, Paris, Fayard, 1993.

[48] Jean JAURES, Discours à la Jeunesse, Albi, 31 juillet 1903, in J. JAURES, Discours et conférences, coll. Champs classiques, p. 168, Paris, Flammarion, 2014.

[49] Raymond ARON, Communication devant la Société française de philosophie, 17 juin 1939, in R. ARON, Croire en la démocratie, 1933-1944, p. 102, Paris, Arthème Fayard – Pluriel, 2017.

[50] Noam CHOMSKY, The Responsability of Intellectuels, New York, The New York Press, 2017. – Noam CHOMSKY, De la responsabilité des intellectuels, p. 149, Paris, Agone, 2023.

Namur, October 15, 2023

The concept of terrorism is particularly sensitive when it is used to de-legitimize adversaries or opponents on the national and international stage in order to marginalize or even repress them [1]. The example of the Uighur separatists in Xinjiang is often cited because it implicates the Chinese government, but many other situations are similar [2]. Everyone can see how difficult it is to define terrorism outside the framework of the passions it generates through actions that are generally highly theatrical in order to have an impact that corresponds to its ultimate objectives. It is also quite classic to consider with one of its great specialists, the German-American historian Walter Z. Laqueur (1921-2018) that, given its diversity and the horror and fascination it inspires, defining terrorism and establishing a coherent theory of it would be an impossible task [3]. In fact, it is above all the notions of state terrorism and resistance or national liberation that pollute the academic and political efforts to base a definition on reason. Thus, we can follow Anthony Richards when he observes that viewing terrorism as a method rather than as inherent to any particular type of cause helps us to consider the phenomenon more objectively [4]. This method, as we know, consists of generating a psychological impact beyond the victims of the acts perpetrated. However, as the author, Professor of Law at the University of London, points out, the difficulty lies in showing the intention that is present or hidden behind the action taken [5].

So, we could try this definition inspired by the following reflections and the work of the French historian Jenny Raflik [6]: terrorism is a political project over a period, aimed at challenging the established order, attempting to bring it to an end and replacing it with a new order. To this end, it makes tactical use of transgressive violence, which, however, is presented and considered legitimate by the terrorist in the context of actuality.

That’s what we’re going to try to understand.

Photo Dreamstime – Aquarius83men

1. Two initial concerns

Returning to the issue of terrorism, I have two initial concerns. The first is that the issue is, of course, complex – more complex than is generally thought. It is far from being just a question of a few Arab countries and the Muslim religion. If I thought that was the case, I would have to stop writing now. Having studied Russian terrorism in Europe before the October Revolution as a historian, I know only too well that without a detailed knowledge of the language and culture, it is impossible to enter the mindset or networks, even retrospectively. This complexity must be considered, which is why I call my first approach The Road to Damascus, referring to the experience of the Apostle Paul of Tarsus. Like the former bounty hunter and persecutor of Christians, we have been blinded by the light of evidence, and we must pursue the truth with great humility if we are to regain a clear vision. This, of course, is the daily task of researchers and especially of foresighters. This idea was beautifully expressed by Michelangelo in the 16th century in a fresco in the Pauline Chapel in Rome and, closer to home, in a painting by Bertholet Flemalle in the 17th century in St Paul’s Cathedral in Liège (Wallonia). Incidentally, the New Testament is still relevant today: Jesus is said to have said, Go to Damascus, where it will be told you what to do. One thing is certain: contemporary interpretations are manifold…

My second initial concern is to point out that terrorism is not exempt from temporality, by which I mean the complex relationship of the present to both the past and the future. The public is regularly shocked by events that the media present as exceptional, unique or unprecedented. Yet we know that such events have occurred many times in the past, in one form or another, and that they are part of a long-standing trend and an already familiar pattern of development. For example, the accidental explosion of a bomb outside the Château de Villegas in Ganshoren, Brussels, at half past three on 23 February 1883, which killed its bearer, allowed the Belgian security services to partially uncover the network of the Narodovoletzi – the « bearers of the people’s will » of Odessa. It also allowed the historian who reconstructed the network to understand both how it worked and what motivated its members, to analyse how the anti-terrorist services viewed it, how they cooperated or did not cooperate, etc. This analysis is very useful for understanding and trying to explain what is happening today and what might happen tomorrow [7].

 

2. Some of the forms terrorism has taken in history

Temporality is based on the retrospective, or even – as we shall see – the retro-foresight. The retrospective is the basis of historicity that always subjective (or even intersubjective, as Edgar Morin would put it) connection we have with the past. Far from taking the past for granted, we are constantly revisiting it and finding there the questions we have about the present and, above all, the future. Is this not why the Italian historian Benedetto Croce (1866-1952) said that all history is contemporary?

I do not intend to recount the history of terrorism, or even of European terrorism, but it is certainly useful to keep in mind some of the forms it has taken in history – which is now beyond our power – to draw some conceptual or strategic lessons that we will need to face the future.

From the outset, temporality seems to be mixed with timelessness. The world-famous novel Alamut (1938) by the Slovenian writer Vladimir Bartol (Trieste, 1903 – Ljubljana, 1967) may be one of the keys to understanding the phenomenon of terrorism. On the one hand, it is inspired by the Ismaili sect and analyses the psychological traits of young fighters devoted to the cult of the Koran and raised with a fascination for duty and death that will allow them to enter paradise. Secondly, Alamut inspired the video game Assassin’s Creed, developed by Ubisoft Montreal for PlayStation3 and Xbox 360 in 2007 and for PC the following year. More than 100 million copies of the various entries in the series have been sold worldwide. Its influence has therefore been greater than an article in The Economist. The film realized in 2016 by the Australian director Justin Kurzel reinforced this messianic mythology whose formulas and principles are familiar: I divide mankind into two fundamentally different categories: a handful of people who understand reality and the huge majority who do not. Or again, Nothing is true; everything is permitted [8]. While researchers are aware of the importance of people’s worldviews in motivating individual or collective action, we must recognize that the frequency with which we now move between the real and the virtual world – not to mention our tendency to confuse the two – adds to the complexity of an issue such as terrorism.

Far from being the exclusive tool of cults, secret societies and resistance movements, terror is inherent in violence and war. In his Commentaries on the Gallic Wars, Julius Caesar recounts how the brilliance of his attacks – but also their brutality – both kept his friends loyal and, through fear, forced the wavering to accept offers of peace [9]. Experts in etymology and comparative linguistics know that variants of the Latin words terror and terrere have appeared in many forms over the centuries, long before the Terror proclaimed by the French National Assembly on 5 September 1793. We know of the terror inspired in us by the steppe peoples under Attila the Hun in the 5th century, the Mongol Genghis Khan in the 13th century and Tamerlane in the 14th century. The latter is known to have terrorized enemy cities and nations by building pyramids of severed heads, for example in Isfahan in 1387. But let us not jump to the conclusion that hell is other people. One of the field marshals at the head of the army of Maximilian of Bavaria’s Catholic League was Johann Tserclaes, Count of Tilly, who was sometimes said to be Walloon [10]. During a campaign against the Protestant Evangelical Union during the Thirty Years’ War, he seized the German city of Magdeburg on 25 May 1631, and permitted the slaughter of 20,000 people as well as the visitation of numerous other atrocities on the population in order to ensure the surrender of the neighbouring cities. The Marquis de Sourdis, in Richelieu’s service, did likewise at Chatillon-sur-Saône four years later. Many Belgian cities suffered similar treatment during the German invasion in the Great War, such as Dinant on the Meuse on 23 August 1914 (605 deaths). The Nanking Massacre in late 1937 and early 1938 probably claimed nearly 250,000 lives, and perhaps represented the pinnacle of this type of terrorism. And there are also civil wars, which can sometimes – whether in a revolutionary period or not – visit terror on the national population, as we have already mentioned regarding the French Revolution. Such circumstances legitimize the massacre by the citizens of the Republic’s enemies: this is what happened, for example, in Lyon on 14 December 1793, and perhaps too in Ankara on 15 July 2016.

In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu used the term ‘terror’ in 1748 to refer to the principle of despotic government [11]. Long before him, in 1690, John Locke had stated in the first essay of his two Treatises on Government that ‘the magistrate’s sword [is] for a terror to evil doers, and by that terror to enforce men to observe the positive laws of the society’[12]. The use of the words ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ began to spread from 1794, first in the sense of a regime of political terror and its partisans, and then in the broader sense of the systematic use of violence for political purposes. Incidentally, ‘anti-terrorism’ and ‘anti-terrorist’ appear just one year later, in 1795 [13].

Of course, modern mechanized weaponry makes mass violence possible on an unprecedented scale. The bombing of Guernica, the historic capital of the Basque country, on 23 April 1937, notoriously served as a kind of rehearsal for what was to ensue during the Second World War. The bombing of Rotterdam by the Luftwaffe on 14 May 1940 was undoubtedly also an act of terrorism. It is difficult to exempt from this sombre list the massive German, British and American bombardments of civilian targets, and especially of cities, during this conflict. As Ariel Merari points out, the ultimatum leaflets that were air-dropped in these areas attest to the desire to terrorize the civilian population directly [14]. The Allied and German services that counted the number of victims of the bombing raids on Germany estimated the death toll at around 400,000, more than 10% of whom were prisoners of war or foreigners. The number of civilians killed by the bombing of Japan was around 900,000, higher than the number of Japanese soldiers killed in combat [15].

The Second World War also provides an interesting illustration of the ambivalence of the concepts of terrorism and resistance. A striking example is the Manouchian network, which was so well known that it was the subject of a propaganda poster distributed by the Vichy regime in 1944. The Missak Manouchian group, made up of resistance fighters of foreign origin, Jews and communists, became known for its attacks on German pilots and soldiers on leave. Its members, who described themselves as irregular sharpshooters and partisans (‘francs-tireurs et partisans’, FTP), were condemned to death and executed by the Germans in 1944 as ‘terrorists’, then honoured as members of the resistance by Charles de Gaulle’s Free France after the liberation [16]. The same view was taken of the members of the Irgun when they attacked the British headquarters at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem on 22 July 1946, causing 91 deaths and numerous injuries among the British officials there. Another example of the difficulty of defining the concept of terrorism is the so-called Battle of Algiers, fought by French parachute regiments during the decolonization period from January to October 1957. It is clear that the radical anti-terrorist measures taken by the French military had some success because they themselves terrorized the nationalist indigenous peoples and the settlers who sympathized with them.

The very disparate actions that have been mentioned reveal the different forms that terrorism can take, and a longer-term process in which we are situated, which debunks the notion that what is happening to this generation is unique, novel or unprecedented. Confining our attention to modern times, we can also count as part of this process the numerous attacks and actions of anarchists, nihilists, revolutionary socialists, fascists and others throughout the 19th and 20th centuries: they include the assassination of Tsar Alexander II (1881), of President Sadi Carnot (1894) and of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Habsburg (1914), the Black September attacks at the Munich Olympics (1972), the actions of the Red Army Faction (Hanns-Martin Schleyer, 1977), the Red Brigade, Action directe and the Communist Combatant Cells, the bombing of Bologna railway station (2 August 1980), the attacks in Beirut against U.S. and French forces (23 October 1983), the killers of Brabant (28 deaths from 1983 to 1985), the attacks of the AIG such as the RER Line B bombing at Saint-Michel station in Paris on 28 July 1995, and that pivotal global moment on 11 September 2001 that has had so many repercussions for Europe.

This very incomplete inventory shows the diversity of forms that terrorism can assume [17]. It might have been expected to yield precise criteria for a general definition, but this is not in fact the case. As Ariel Merari shows, although terrorism may seem an immoral form of war, the profound collapse that the moral code of behaviour underwent in almost all wars on the part of all parties in the 20th century, including the targeting of civilians, shows that the difference between terrorism and other forms of war is one of interpretation [18].

If further demonstration of this relativity is required, take a look at the definition of ‘terrorisme’ in the French dictionary of Lachâtre in 1890. This was a popular dictionary, close to the labour movement. After recalling that the term refers to the reign of terror that reigned in France during part of the Revolution, Maurice Lachâtre added that terrorism is the most moving revolutionary era. He then defines a terrorist as a partisan, an agent of the system of terror, adding that the terrorists saved France [19].

What can we say other than that such comments on terrorism should make us humble?

 

3. Towards a definition of terrorism

It is conventional to begin discussions of terrorism by considering the difficulty of defining it in the scientific literature. We should avoid conflating it with all forms of political violence and ignoring state-sponsored forms of terrorism [20].

At a very early stage, however, in 1962, Raymond Aron made a decisive contribution by suggesting that ‘a terrorist action is referred to as such when its psychological effects are disproportionate to its purely physical results [21]. The various definitions offered by international organizations can help us understand this phenomenon. Thus, UN Resolution A/RES/54/110 of 2 February 2000 refers to criminal actions with political aims: criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes [22].

The 2021 NATO definition, taken from its English and French glossary, shares this idea of a political dimension: The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instiling fear and terror, against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives [23].

The Luxembourg Council of the European Union in 2002 identified an intent to seriously intimidate a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization [24], an idea often found in national legislation, such as the Belgian law of 19 December 2003. The French historian Jenny Raflik stresses the interest of the approach to the phenomenon taken by the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, adopted in Cairo on 22 April 1998, which is both innovative in several respects yet includes limitations such as the possibility of excluding from the scope of terrorism struggles that could the declared legitimate [25]. The important exploratory work of the historian at the French Institute for Higher National Defence Studies led her to propose a definition that we endorse: terrorism is a political project over a period of time that aims to challenge the established order, to try to put a stop to it and/or to substitute a new order for it. To this end, it makes tactical use of transgressive violence, which, however, is presented and regarded as legitimate by the terrorist, in the context of actuality [26]. This definition seems highly relevant to us. First, because it objectifies terrorism and takes it seriously as a political project rather than as a deviation, which would undermine its importance and purposes. Next, because Jenny Raflik emphasises the use of transgressive violence as a means, together with the subjective element – the variance of perspective between perpetrator and victim. Finally, because this definition takes into account the temporality in which the tension between the immediate event and its far-reaching effects lies.

 

Five Considerations to Close the Paper but Not the Subject

1. Terrorism is not a recent phenomenon. It is part of a long-term development from antiquity to the present. It should be seen in temporality (relationships between past, present and future).

2. Terrorism is a complex issue that takes many forms and can be used by very different actors, individual or collective, private or public, who are inspired by a political project and, therefore, a strategic determination to act in order to maintain or change an existing situation. In defining terrorism, we should avoid conflating it with all forms of political violence and ignoring state-sponsored forms of terrorism.

3. The use of terror and terrorism against citizens is inherent in the political philosophy of our liberal societies, as understood in particular by John Locke and Montesquieu.

4. The legitimacy of this political project is subjective; its means are transgressive and intended to be reinforced by their psychological impact and media coverage.

5. Several examples of the evolution of relations between groups that were clearly seen as terrorists, with whom it seemed impossible to negotiate, show that this is not the case and that yesterday’s transgressive actions do not necessarily prevent people from sitting down to start fruitful negotiations. The development of relations between London and the IRA after the bloody events of the Second World War is interesting in this respect.

Once again, we can find reasons for hope in a landscape of despair. Provided we make the necessary efforts, based on reason and not passion.

 

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

[1] A first and longer version of this paper has been written in the framework of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning, Emerging Technologies and New Counter-Terror Strategies, CSRA, Falls Church VA, 25 July 2016, edited:  Ph. DESTATTE, Counter-Terrorism in Europe 2030; Managing Efficiency and Civil Rights, in Theodore J. GORDON e.a., Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning, p. 87-105, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, IOS Press, 2017. Philippe-Destatte_Counter-terrorism-Europe_NATO-IOS_2017

See also: Philippe DESTATTE, Elisabeta FLORESCU, Garry KESSLER, Hélène von REIBNITZ, Karlheinz STEINMÜLLER, Identifying Some Issues in the NATO Zone Through Trajectories About the Future of Terrorism and Counter-Terror Strategies, in Theodore J. GORDON e.a., Identification of Potential Terrorists and Adversary Planning, p. 16-24, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series – E: Human and Societal Dynamics, IOS Press, 2017.

[2] Ben SAUL, Defining Terrorism to protect Human Rights, in Deborah STAINES ed., Interrogating the War on Terror, Interdisciplinary Perspectives, p. 201-202, Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007.

[3] Walter LAQUEUR, Le terrorisme, p. 15, Paris, PuF, 1979. – W. LAQUEUR, Terrorism, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1977. – W. LAQUEUR, No End to War, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, p. 238, London, Continuum International, 2003.

[4] Anthony RICHARDS, Defining Terrorism, in Andrew SILKE ed., Routledge Handbook of Terrorism and Counterterrorism, p. 17, London & New York, Routledge, 2020. – A. RICHARDS, Conceptualizing Terrorism, Oxford University Press, 2015.

[5] Ibidem, p. 19.

[6] Jenny RAFLIK, Terrorisme et mondialisation, approches historiques, p. 24, Paris, Gallimard, 2016. – Terrorismes en France, Une histoire XIXe-XXIe siècles, Paris, CERF, 2023.

[7] Ph. DESTATTE, Contribution à l’histoire de l’émigration russe à la fin du XIXe siècle, 1881-1899, Mémoire présenté pour l’obtention du grade de Licencié en Histoire, Liège, Université de Liège, Année académique 1978-1979, 240 p. – Ph. DESTATTE, Sûreté publique et Okhrana, Les Foyers d’émigrés russes en Belgique, 1881-1899, Conferentie Benerus: België, Nederland, Rusland: betrekkingen en beeldvorming, Rotterdam 7-8 mei 1987: Belgisch-Nederlandse conferentie over de politieke, economische en culturele betrekkingen tussen België c.q. Nederland en Rusland/de USSR met nadruk op de periode na 1917, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, Katholieke Universiteit (Leuven), Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, 1987.

[8] Vladimir BARTOL, Alamut, Libretto collection, Paris, Libella, 2012.

[9] Julius CAESAR, The Gallic Wars, translation by W. A. McDEVITTE and W. S. BOHN, Book 8, http://classics.mit.edu/Caesar/gallic.8.8.html – de BURY, Histoire de la vie de Jules César, suivie d’une dissertation sur la liberté où l’on montre les avantages du Gouvernement monarchique sur le républicain, Paris, Didot, 1758. For example, p. 86 : ‘he impressed upon them the importance of becoming masters of a rich and opulent city, which would give them all things in abundance, and strike terror into the hearts of all the other cities that had left his party, if they triumphed before it was rescued’.

[10] Deutsche Geschichte in Dokumenten und Bildern, Band 1, Von der Reformation bis zum Dreißigjährigen Krieg 1500-1648, Die Apokalypse vor Ort – Die Zerstörung Magdeburgs (1631) – A Local Apocalypse, The Sack of Magdeburg (1631), German Historical Institute, Washington DC, http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=4396

[11] The severity of punishments is fitter for despotic governments, whose principle is terror, than for a monarchy or a republic, whose spring is honour and virtue.’ MONTESQUIEU, The Spirit of the Laws, Book 6, Chapter 9, Geneva, 1748.

[12] (…) government being for the preservation of every man’s right and property, by preserving him from the violence or injury of others, is for the good of the governed: for the magistrate’s sword being for a “terror to evil doers,” and by that terror to enforce men to observe the positive laws of the society, made conformable to the laws of nature, for the public good, i.e., the good of every particular member of that society, as far as by common rules it can be provided for; (…) John LOCKE, Two Treatises of Government, Ch. IX, Of Monarchy by Inheritance from Adam, 92, London, Thomas Tegg & alii, 1823. McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought. http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/locke/government.pdf

[13] Alain REY, Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, vol.3, p. 3803, Paris, Robert, 2006.

[14] Ariel MERARI, Du terrorisme comme stratégie d’insurrection, in Gérard CHALIAND and Arnaud BLIN ed., Histoire du terrorisme, De l’Antiquité à Daech, p. 31, Paris, Fayard, 2015.

[15] Thomas HIPPLER, Le gouvernement du ciel, Histoire globale des bombardements aériens, p. 156-160, Paris, Les prairies ordinaires, 2014.

[16] Denis PESCHANSKI, Claire MOURADIAN, Astrig ATAMIAN, Manouchian: Missak et Mélinée Manouchian, deux orphelins du génocide des Arméniens engagés dans la Résistance française, Paris, Textuel, 2023.

[17] See Ugur GURBUZ ed, Future Trends and New Approaches in Defeating the Terrorism Threat, Amsterdam-Berlin-Tokyo-Washington DC, IOS Press, 2013, especially Ozden CELIK, Terrorism Overview, p. 1-17 and Zeynep SUTALAND & Ugur GÜNGÖR, Future Trends in Terrorism, p. 75-87

[18] Ariel MERARI, op.cit., p. 42.

[19] Maurice LACHÂTRE, Dictionnaire français illustré, vol. 2, p. 1413, Paris, Librairie du Progrès, 1890.

[20] Anne-Marie LE GLOANNEC, Bastien IRONDELLE, David CADIER, New and evolving trends in international security, Transworld, FP7 Working Paper, 13, April 2013, p. 14.

[21] Raymond ARON, Paix et guerre entre les Nations, p. 176, Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1962.

[22] United Nations, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, Measures to eliminate International Terrorism, A/RES/54/110 https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Terrorism-Proliferation-Narcotics/Documents/A-RES-54-110.pdf

[23] NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), NATO (NSO), 2021.

[24] Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA), Official Journal L 164 , 22/06/2002 P. 0003 – 0007.

[25] Jenny RAFLIK, Terrorisme et mondialisation, approches historiques, p. 24, Paris, Gallimard, 2016. – It could also be interesting to open a discussion in order to compare this with Abu Mus’ab al Suri’s definition and typology of terrorism. See Key excerpts of The Global Islamic Resistance Call in Brynjar LIA, Architect of Global Jihad, The Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, p. 382-383, London, Hurst & Company, 2014.

[26] J. RAFLIK, op. cit., p. 41.

Namur (Wallonia), May 5, 2023

The Regional Policy Declaration of 16 September 2019 indicated the desire of the Government of Wallonia to implement risk management tools to warn and react quickly in crises and during climate and health hazards [1]. The declaration also stated that measures would be adopted to protect water resources, particularly in the face of contamination risks, the need to maintain and develop natural wetland habitats, and supply problems [2]. There was also a need to anticipate other types of risks, such as digital and health risks (exposure to flooding [3]), risks leading to the exclusion and poverty [4], and chemical risks (phytosanitary [5]).

The major events experienced by Wallonia since the adoption of this document – the Covid-19 pandemic, climate stresses (brutal floods in 2021 with nearly 40 deaths, drought in 2022), and the multifactor energy crisis – have challenged all actors and citizens. The impacts of these events were, and still are, significant, even if they have been felt and experienced differently according to stakeholders and location. The pandemic did not affect the various regions in the same way: it had a greater impact on regions with higher population density, the flood-affected valleys where the presence of significant urbanisation and the resulting creation of artificial ground coverings was called into question, and the drought and heatwaves affected countryside and urban areas in different ways. In addition to housing density, there are other vulnerabilities and risk exposure factors, such as increasing age, the low socio-economic level of many residents, and their ability to meet the challenges, in other words, their resilience. There are also structural risk management issues across all sectors and at all administrative levels [6]. Location is also critical where the effects of the energy crisis are concerned: heating costs, travel costs, access to fossil fuels and renewable energies, etc. One could also examine the impacts of terrorism – which sometimes seems to have emerged from our intellectual outlook – in the light of location.

Photo Igor Kutnii – Dreamstime

 

1. The risks are associated with perfectly describable events

Twenty years ago, Michel Callon, Pierre Lascoumes and Yannick Barthe observed that the notion of risk is closely linked to the notion of rational decision-making. In their view, rational decision-making requires three conditions to be met before the decision-maker can draw comparisons between the options available to them. Firstly, there is the ability to draw up an exhaustive list of the available options. Next, for each option, the decision-maker must be able to describe the elements and entities that make up the world assumed by that option. Finally, an inventory must be produced of the significant interactions that are likely occur between the various elements and entities. Consequently, the authors highlight the notion of possible states of the world, which are like the scenarios used by futurists [7].

With some adjustments and amendments, the recommendations made by the OECD in its report entitled Boosting Resilience through Innovative Risk Governance (2014) could serve as the basis for a new approach to regional and territorial development matters:

– promoting future-oriented risk governance and taking account of complex risks;

– emphasising the role of trust and highlighting the long-term action taken by the public authorities to protect the population;

– adoption of a common definition of acceptable risk levels by stakeholders at all levels;

– defining an optimal array of tangible and intangible resilience measures (infrastructure measures and planning measures, for instance);

– adopting a whole society approach in order to involve all stakeholders in boosting resilience;

– acknowledging the important role played by institutions and institutional blocks in the effectiveness of risk management measures in order to increase resilience levels;

– using diagnostic frameworks to identify institutional barriers and to restructure incentives to promote resilience [8].

In Risk Society, the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1944-2015) went further, pointing out that risks were not only about the consequences and damage that occur, but that they could also indicate a future that had to be prevented from happening. Our awareness of the risk lies not in the present but principally in the future, he writes [9]. Futurists know this: they manipulate the wild cards to identify the jokers that may appear in our trajectory, and they use them as stress tests for the system and as a means of measuring the extent to which such events can be transformed into genuine opportunities to implement a desirable vision of the future.

 

2. Uncertainty, the product of our ignorance

Although the terms risk and uncertainty are often used interchangeably, they are not the same. Risk indicates a clearly defined danger associated with the occurrence of a perfectly describable event or series of events; it is not known if such events will occur, but it is known that they may occur [10]. Where statistical tools can be employed, risk is defined as the probability of an undesirable or unwanted event occurring and the scale of the impact of such an occurrence on the variable or system according to its vulnerability. Therefore, in addition to the probability factor regarding an event occurring, there is also a severity factor regarding the consequences of the event. This results in a third, subjective, factor which, based on the first two factors, assesses, and possibly quantifies the level of risk [11].

It is because the notion of risk plays a central role in the theory of rational decision-making and in the choice it assumes between several states of the world, or scenarios, that it is sensible – as stated by Callon et al. – to reserve its use for such perfectly codified situations [12]. Consequently, in uncertain situations, use of this notion of risk makes it impossible to list and to precisely describe either the options available to the decision-maker or the possible states of the world through which reliable foresight can be developed.

Uncertainty is the product of our incomplete knowledge of the state of the world – past, present or future –, observe the economists John Kay (University of Oxford) and Mervyn King (London School of Economics) [13]. Frequently, as highlighted by their French colleague Philippe Silberzahn, uncertainty results not from our difficulty in acquiring information, but from the fact that this information does not exist – or not yet [14]. The fundamental inability to predict the result of the change based on probability diverts us from risk culture. In his work Noise, A Flaw on Human Judgment, Daniel Kahneman, winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics, uses the concepts of objective ignorance (the absolute limit of our ability to predict), imperfect information (what could be known but is not), and irreducible uncertainty (what it is impossible to know). This form of semantic radicalisation, in which Kahneman, a professor at Princeton, uses the word ignorance where we generally use uncertainty, allows him to limit the confusion with noise. Noise, which can be conceived as random dispersal, is also a form of uncertainty. It affects not only the state of the world, but also the judgments we make. Kahneman also uses this semantic change to warn us that we systematically underestimate objective ignorance, and therefore uncertainty. The internal signal is a self-administered reward, one people work hard (or sometimes not so hard) to achieve when they reach closure on a judgment. It is a satisfying emotional experience, a pleasing sense of coherence, in which the evidence considered and the judgment reached feel right [15].

In a broadened natural, political, economic, social and cultural space and a complex world, the constant emergence [16] of new factors and actors makes it impossible to build up and to have at our disposal reasonable, if not complete, knowledge of the environment and its effects – including disruptive effects – on the system and, therefore, of how the system will evolve.

 

3. Dealing with uncertainty

As the authors of Acting in an uncertain world have shown, in uncertain situations, foresight is impossible for decision-makers due to a lack of specific knowledge about the behaviours and interactions of the elements that make up the system, and of the actors and factors that constitute the environment. But ignorance is not inevitable and thinking in terms of uncertainty will in itself help to facilitate better understanding [17].

Ignorance is not new, and it did not emerge in the 21st century. What is new, and hopefully increasing, is awareness of this ignorance. However, as highlighted in a text produced back in 1982 by Daniel Kahneman and his psychologist colleague from Stanford University Amos Tversky (1937-1996), uncertainty is a fact with which all forms of life must be prepared to contend. For Kahneman and Tversky, the inventors of Prospect Theory [18], at all levels of biological complexity there is uncertainty about the significance of signs or stimuli and about the possible consequences of actions. At all levels, action must be taken before the uncertainty is resolved, and a proper balance must be achieved between a high level of specific readiness for the events that are most likely to occur and a general ability to respond appropriately when the unexpected happens[19].

Although the disruptive shocks we have experienced since the start of 2020 could be anticipated, their magnitude and complexity have taken all analysts by surprise [20]. It is possible that disasters of this type may happen again, and that others, which are currently of little or no concern, may happen in the future.

It therefore seems essential to question the various policies adopted in the light of new emergences, disasters, or other potential risks, whether natural or anthropogenic, a distinction which is difficult to draw on account of the increasing transformation of biophysical environments [21]. The concept of disaster can be enriched not only by its etymology, which indicates a sudden, dreadful shock causing significant loss of life, but also by systemics through the works of the mathematicians René Thom (1923-2002) and Erik Christopher Zeeman (1925-2016). It is therefore a question of discontinuities [22] that may arise in the evolution of a variable or system, leading to changes in its morphological stability. Consequently, disasters have more to do with system inputs and parameter space than with the changes they bring about. For Zeeman, a disaster occurs where a continuous variety of causes leads to a discontinued variation in effects [23].

The French geographer Jérôme Dunlop notes, in turn, that whereas a risk results from the combination of a vulnerability and a hazard, whose possible occurrence would destroy all or part of the stakes exposed to it (humans and wealth), the term disaster is used where the destroyed stakes are considered significant by the human group affected. The magnitude of the risk itself varies according to how high the stakes are and how probable it is that the hazard will occur. Human occupation also increases the probability of risks occurring in natural environments. The risk of flooding is generally increased through urbanisation of the major river basins and water courses and through the impermeablisation of the ground resulting from development of road networks and urban growth, and through changes in agricultural landscapes.[24] Consequently, the historian Niall Ferguson, professor at Oxford and at Harvard, rightly observes that the distinction between natural disasters and disasters caused by humans is purely artificial. There is, he notes, constant interaction between human societies and nature. The example he gives is one we have highlighted previously when referring to the Lisbon disaster: an endogenous shock destroyed human life and health according to the proximity of residents to the place of impact [25].

 

Conclusion: disruptive shocks as opportunities for structural transformations in a system that is initially cumbersome or blocked

There is a new focus on the global impact of humanity on the earth system as a whole. This is what we refer to today as the Anthropocene, interpreting this era as a rupture[26]. One could argue, therefore, that if human activity has affected nature in such a way that natural, hydrometeorological and geophysical disasters are on the rise, resulting in large numbers of victims, it is today essential for us to gain a clearer understanding of disasters and to anticipate risks [27].

For several decades, the research has recognised the vulnerability of territories and communities. Vulnerability, referred to above, could be described as a circumstance or a context specific to certain groups (or territories) which find themselves in a fragile situation in relation to certain risks, a situation caused by the constant social construction of risks. From that perspective, resilience would indicate the development, by the group or territory, of capabilities to deploy processes – which affect practices – to reduce their vulnerability to certain risks [28]. Researchers have created new concepts for understanding this phenomenon and identifying its various types: differential or differentiated vulnerability, accumulated vulnerability, and global vulnerability, etc. Now that our focus has been increased through the shocks we are experiencing in practice, we need to translate these questions into public and collective anticipation and prevention policies by determining, space by space, territory by territory, which risks we are facing, what our vulnerabilities are, and how the global vulnerabilities vary from place to place. Lastly, although there are links between vulnerability, underdevelopment and poverty, it appears that the ability to recover from a disaster and prepare for risks is more critical than the level of poverty [29] Analysis of risk factors, including climate-related [30], is encouraged by the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR, formerly UNISDR) [31]. The works produced by this institution, particularly its assessment reports, may help to construct a helpful methodological framework.

In addition, we cannot ignore one of the conclusions of the works of the anthropologist and historian Virginia Garcia-Acosta, namely that the recurring presence of certain natural phenomena, such as storms, has led certain groups of humans to make cultural changes in their lives and in their material organisation, which may result in the implementation of survival strategies and adaptation possibilities [32]. As previously indicated by Edgar Morin in La Méthode, when mentioning the concept of disaster, the rupture and disintegration of an old form is the very process by which the new form is created [33]. In other words, disruptive shocks may represent genuine opportunities for structural transformations in a system that is initially cumbersome or blocked.

Any approach to risks and disasters involves grasping the issue of acceptable risk in a strategy and its implementation in practice, and therefore also addressing the difficult question of the precautionary principle, with the multiple regional development and land management tools [34].

Equipping ourselves with predictive tools, devices and processes for confronting uncertainty represents basic good sense for all forms of contemporary governance in our societies [35]. This approach would also mean that disruptive shocks could be regarded as opportunities for structural transformations in a system which initially seems cumbersome or blocked when faced with the scale of the challenges.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

[1] Déclaration de Politique régionale wallonne, 2019-2024, Namur, 16 septembre 2019, 122 p., p. 75. https://www.wallonie.be/sites/default/files/2019-09/declaration_politique_regionale_2019-2024.pdf

[2] Ibidem, p. 82.

[3] Ibidem, p. 90.

[4] Ibidem, p. 117.

[5] Ibidem, p. 118.

[6] In his report Boosting Resilience through Innovative Risk Governance, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, p. 16, Paris, OECD, 2014, OECD writes: Nearly all OECD countries systematically consider disaster risk in sectoral public investment strategies and planning. the importance attributed to the local responsibilities, including risk sensitive regulation in land zoning and private real estate development – Also see: Bassin de la Loire, France, Étude de l’OCDE sur la gestion des risques d’inondation, Paris, OECD, 2010.

[7] Michel CALLON, Pierre LASCOUMES & Yannick BARTHES, Acting in an uncertain world: An essay on technical democracy, Harvard, MIT Press, 2009. p. 37-39 of the Paris, Seuil, 2001 edition.

[8] Boosting Resilience through Innovative Risk Governance, OECD Reviews of Risk Management Policies, p. 17-18, Paris, OECD, 2014.

[9] Ulrich BECK, Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity, London, SAGE, 1992. – La société du risque, Sur la voie d’une autre modernité (1986), p. 60-61, Paris, Flammarion, 2008.

[10] M. CALLON, P. LASCOUMES et Y. BARTHES, op. cit., p. 37.

[11] Carl L. PRITCHARD, Risk Management, Concepts and Guidance, p. 7-8, Arlington VA, ESI, 1997.

[12] Ibidem, p. 39.

[13] John KAY & Mervyn KING, Radical Uncertainty, p. 37, London, The Bridge Press, 2021.

[14] Philippe SILBERZAHN, Bienvenue en incertitude ! Survivre et prospérer dans un monde de surprises, p. 82, Paris, Diateino, 2021.

[15] Daniel KAHNEMAN, Olivier SIBONY, Carl R. SUNSTEIN, Noise, A Flaw in Human Judgment, p. 144-146, New York, Little, Brown, Spark, 2021..

[16] Emergence can be defined as the unexpected appearance or evolution of a variable or system that cannot result from or be explained by the system’s constituents or previous conditions. The microbiologist Janine Guespin sees in this the existence of singular qualities of a system that can only exist under certain conditions: they can possibly be inter-converted while the system retains the same constituents subject to interactions of the same nature, if a parameter regulating the intensity of these interactions crosses a critical threshold during its variation. Janine GUESPIN-MICHEL coord. , Lucien SEVE e.a., Émergence, Complexité et dialectique, Sur les systèmes dynamiques non linéaires, p. 42, Paris, O. Jacob, 2005.

[17] M. CALLON, P. LASCOUMES et Y. BARTHES, Acting in an uncertain world…, p. 40sv.

[18] See: Frédéric MARTINEZ, L’individu face au risque : l’apport de Kahneman et Tversky, dans  Idées économiques et sociales, vol. 161, no. 3, 2010, p. 15-23. https://www.cairn.info/revue-idees-economiques-et-sociales-2010-3-page-15.html

[19] Uncertainty is a fact with which all forms of life must be prepared to contend. At all levels of biological complexity there is uncertainty about the significance of signs or stimuli and about the possible consequences of actions. At all levels, action must be taken before the uncertainty is resolved, and a proper balance must be achieved between a high level of specific readiness for the events that are most likely to occur and a general ability to respond appropriately when the unexpected happens. Daniel KAHNEMAN, Paul SLOVIC & Amos TVERSKY, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases, p. 509-510, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

[20] See: Philippe DESTATTE, We are expected to look far ahead even though the future does not exist, Namur, Wallonia, August 28, 2021. Blog PhD2050, https://phd2050.org/2021/08/28/anticipation-3/

[21] Cyria EMILIANOFF, Risque, in Jacques LEVY et Michel LUSSAULT, Dictionnaire de la Géographie, p. 804-805, Paris, Belin, 2003. The definition of risk in this book is: the probability of a danger threatening or affecting the life and, more generally, the environment of an individual or a group. – See also: Yannick LUNG, Auto-organisation, bifurcation, catastrophe… les ruptures de la dynamique spatiale, Talence, Presses universitaires de Bordeaux, 1987.

[22] Discontinuity refers to rapid and significant shifts in trajectories without the aspect of being mostly unanticipated or deeply surprising. Ozcan SARITAS & Jack SMITH, The Big Picture – trends, drivers, wild cards, discontinuities and weak signals, in Futures, vol. 43, 3, April 2011, p. 292-312.

[23] E.C. ZEEMAN, Catastrophe Theory, Selected Papers, 1972-1977, p. 615-638, Addison Wesley Publishing Co, Reading, Mass. – London – Amsterdam, 1977. – R. THOM, Paraboles et catastrophes, Entretiens sur les mathématiques, la science et la philosophie, p. 59sv, Paris, Flammarion, 1983.

[24] Jérôme DUNLOP, Les 100 mots de la géographie, p. 71-72, Paris, PUF, 2009.

[25] Ph. DESTATTE, We are expected to look far ahead even though the future does not exist…, https://phd2050.org/2021/08/28/anticipation-3/

[26] Clive HAMILTON, The Anthropocene as rupture, in The Anthropocene Review, 3, 2, 2016, p. 93-106.

[27] Virginia GARCIA-ACOSTA, Catastrophes non naturelles et anthropocène, Leçons apprises à partir de perspectives anthropologiques et historiques, dans Rémi BEZAU & Catherine LARRERE dir., Penser l’anthropocène, p. 325sv, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2018.

[28] V. GARCIA-ACOSTA, Catastrophes non naturelles et anthropocène…, p. 33.

[29] V. GARCIA-ACOSTA, Catastrophes non naturelles et anthropocène…, p. 329-330.

[30] And the links between climate and health : Jacques BLAMONT, Introduction au siècle des menaces, p. 505sv, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2004

[31] The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction was established in 1999 to ensure the implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.  https://www.undrr.org/

[32] V. GARCIA-ACOSTA, Prevencion de desastres, estrategias adaptivas y capital social, in Harlan KOFF ed., Social Cohesion bin Europe and the Americas, Power, Time and Space, p. 115-130, Berne, Peter Lang, 2009. – Catastrophes non naturelles et anthropocène…, p. 332.

[33] Edgar MORIN, La Méthode, 1. La nature de la nature, p. 44, Paris, Seuil, 1977. – René THOM, Stabilité culturelle et Morphogénèse, Essai d’une théorie génétique des modèles, Paris, Ediscience, 1972.

[34] An acute and difficult question if ever there was one in the « risk society ». See in particular: Dominique BOURG et Jean-Louis SCHLEGEL, Parer aux risques de demain, le principe de précaution, Paris, Seuil, 2001. – Ulrich BECK, Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity, London, Sage, 1992. – François EWALD, Aux risques d’innover, Les entreprises face au principe de précaution, Paris, Autrement, 2009.

[35] All governments, international bodies, universities and companies should have their own Cassandras, their « National Warning Office », to identify worst-case scenarios, measure risks and design protection, prevention and mitigation strategies. See: Niall FERGUSON, Doom, The Politics of Catastrophe, New York, Penguin Press, 2021.

Paris, Cloud Business Center, March 30, 2023

The question posed to me by the French Ministry of Ecological Transition and Territorial Cohesion during the fourth meeting of their national land-use planners’ network (RNA) concerns the innovative or even disruptive lessons that are emerging from the European foresight work on the cities of the future[1]. Among the multitude of works undertaken within the European Commission – particularly by the Directorate General for Regional Policies and the Directorate General for Research –, the Committee of the Regions and networks such as ESPON, some drastic choices have been necessary to try, at the same time, to find a common thread for this intervention. As with any foresight process, this contribution will start with aspirations and imagination and end with the genuine anticipation strategy: how to act before events occur, to trigger them or prevent them? [2]

 Consequently, after reviewing the very creative, community-based Stories from 2050, we will examine two structured foresight reports, Cities of Tomorrow (2011) and The Future of Cities (2020), which, along with other sources, helped to construct the New Leipzig Charter of 30 November 2020. I shall conclude with the issue of the means for the policies advocated, which I believe to be a fundamental issue in most European countries and especially in France and Wallonia.

 

1. Stories from 2050

Although, as a rule, I am not particularly keen on the use of individual storytelling in foresight, preferring collective intelligence as a methodological principle, it is important to acknowledge the interest in the initiative launched by the DG Research and Innovation of the European Commission concerning the stories from 2050 [3]. From listening to their authors, these are radical, inspiring, and stimulating accounts of the challenges and opportunities presented by our future. Some of them focus on the future of cities. Written in 2020 and 2021, they are largely characterised by the traumas caused by the Covid-19 pandemic and by the increased awareness of the challenges arising from this new period in global history which is called the Anthropocene [4].

The European Commission conceived this work as a process for listening to society. Our duty observes Jean-Éric Paquet, is not only to tell but also to listen [5]. Thus, the Director-General for Research is increasingly of the opinion that foresight constitutes a space for engaging with citizens and listening to what they have to say. This approach is consistent with the efforts made by his department to fall within the scope of citizen science.

In the dozens of texts gathered and drafted in a variety of formats and with wide-ranging content, the Commission has faced a few observations. Firstly, the fact that creativity and innovation are needed more than ever to deal with the challenges of this century. Next, the idea that searching for another Earth, which features prominently in these stories, is an important ambition, but that what humans need to focus on most of all is to protect the only planet we currently have. Lastly, the notion that the European research and innovation policy can make good use of these works, as mentioned by Nikos Kastrinos and Jürgen Wengel [6].

These two DG Research managers note that the narrative that technology and innovation will solve problems and bring happiness for everyone in cities where life is good and where businesses flourish without detrimental externalities does not exist. This discourse has become pointless and obsolete. Nikos Kastrinos and Jürgen Wengel also observe that, according to the foresight stories, the source of the problems lies not in a lack of creativity and innovation, but rather in the primary and egoistical reality of human beings, who are fundamentally predatory. The community stories themselves seem to express notions of empathy, respect for others and constant striving. While this distances us from Research and Innovation, this society of the future certainly brings us closer to a better humanity [7].

I have picked out three of these stories which I think are characteristic of the effort made. The first is entitled The Foresighter Pledge and places great emphasis on anticipation [8]. The second story I have chosen concerns the construction of the city of Nüwa, on Mars, and highlights local autonomy and self-sufficiency [9]. The third is the story of the future protopians, who focus on a non-violent, inclusive world made up of “radical tenderness”, tolerance and celebration of life [10].

The Stories from 2050 project demonstrate the capacity of citizens to engage in long-term reflection and generate useful ideas for shaping a new society. The citizens themselves really enjoyed this exercise [11]. For the European Commission’s DG Research and Innovation, the interest in the initiative helps to move away from a model of technological and scientistic thought in which all the problems of the future can be solved and instead, by listening to society, demonstrate that the challenges are complex and that, in a modest way, human beings have a central role to play in solving the problems.

 

2. A European model of urban development

Moving from foresight to strategy, which is itself an integral part of foresight, there are two works on the future of cities that should be mentioned. The first is called Cities of Tomorrow, Challenges, visions, ways forward, a work in which my colleagues of The Destree Institute and I were involved as foresight experts for the Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy of the European Commission in 2010 and 2011, under the direction of Corinne Hermant – de Callattaÿ and Christian Svantfeldt [12]. The second, more recent work, entitled The Futures of Cities, was overseen by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission in 2019 and published in 2020.

 

2.1. Cities of Tomorrow (2011)

The first exercise addressed several issues, including the question of whether a European urban development model existed [13]. The response was positive, and this model was clearly described in the work: an integrated and long-term approach, advanced places for social progress, platforms for democracy, places for green regeneration, and mechanisms for attractiveness and economic growth.

The shared vision of the European urban development model is an integrated approach which takes account of all aspects of sustainable development. Thus, the European cities of tomorrow are:

– advanced places for social progress;

– platforms for democracy, cultural dialogue and diversity;

– places for green, ecological or environmental regeneration;

– attractive places that are engines of economic growth [14].

 This vision brings together the main aims behind all the European policies in the 2010s, incorporating sustainability, territorial balance, polycentrism, limited urban sprawl, and quality and well-being of habitat and environment. The authors state as follows: The future urban territorial development pattern reflects a sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and balanced territorial organisation with a polycentric urban structure; contains strong metropolitan regions and other strong urban areas, such as regional centres, especially outside the core areas of Europe, which provide good accessibility to the services of general economic interest; is characterised by a compact settlement structure with limited urban sprawl through a strong control of land supply and speculative development; enjoys a high level of protection and quality of the environment around cities – nature, landscape, forestry, water resources, agricultural areas, etc. – and strong links and articulation between cities and their environments [15].

The issue of climate change and its energy corollary may not appear prominently, as has generally been the case in most works since the Paris Agreements of 12 December 2015, although they do feature heavily in the earlier works and in the report itself. In the preface by European Commissioner Johannes Hahn, the city is still regarded as an essential asset for mitigating the impact of climate change[16]. Thus, continues the report, cities have a critical role to play in reducing CO2 emissions and tackling climate change. It goes on to explain that energy consumption in urban areas is associated mainly with transport and housing and is therefore responsible for a large proportion of CO2 emissions. Referring to the World Energy Outlook, the report observes that around two thirds of final energy demand is associated with urban consumption and up to 70% of CO2 emissions are generated in cities. The authors are therefore able to conclude that the urban way of life is both the problem and the solution [17].

The most promising model is that of the diverse city, a place of social cohesion and cultural and human diversity in which the different spatial and social perspectives of the inhabitants are taken into account [18]. The Leipzig Charter on the Sustainable European Cities, adopted in 2007, is used to design a compact, environmentally friendly city: grouped habitats, planning methods to prevent urban sprawl, management of land supply, restriction of speculative trends, district diversity, involvement of stakeholders and inhabitants, and so on [19].

 

2.2. The Future of Cities (2019)

At least three of the key messages of the report entitled The Future of Cities, produced in 2019 by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, are of interest to us in the first instance: the performance of cities in terms of resource use and their energy efficiency, the imbalances, disparities and even divergences that affect them, and the interaction which they can develop with themselves, in other words, their inhabitants. The three messages are as follows:

The fight for sustainability will be greatly influenced by what happens in cities. While cities usually place greater pressure on natural resources, they perform better in the use of resources and have a greater potential for energy efficiency. Actions on environmental sustainability, including climate change, are already being taken by many cities.

(…)

– There is a risk of polarisation both within and between cities. On the one hand, being unable to take stock of the issues highlighted will lead to even more inequalities within a city. On the other hand, a diverging path between cities falling behind and cities capitalising on emerging trends may cause additional social and economic imbalance between different urban areas.

– The close linkage between space/service/people is at the core of cities’ capacities to respond to people’s needs and to manage new challenges in a wider context, beyond administrative boundaries and sectorial domains.  A truly holistic approach is needed to optimise the provision of services and create an intelligent interaction between the city and its inhabitants while maintaining or enhancing quality of life. [20]

The report helpfully presents the challenges faced by cities in the form of a system, with fourteen subsystems in which health, climate, resilience, environmental footprint, urban governance and innovation coexist with mobility, housing, services, the environment, etc.

The exercise conveys the ambitions set out during the 2018 European Mayors’ Convention [21], which linked the climate and energy objectives with the European time frames for reducing carbon emissions. At the Convention, the 8,800 ambitious cities pledged to contribute to the objectives to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% by 2020, by 40% by 2030, and to decarbonise their cities by 2050.

Governance is placed at the service of the climate and energy objectives, with strategic guidelines for achieving them:

– government by offering services and especially financial resources;

– co-construction and civic facilitation of policies;

– municipal autonomy;

– regulation and planning for the transport, mobility, lighting, urban planning, development, and renewable energy sectors.

It is also the responsibility of these cities of the future to exploit their innovation potential. The report highlights the Future Agenda 2017 formula, whereby cities are often places of great energy and optimism and that is where most humans choose to live, work, and interact with each other. Consequently, according to this same source, cities are places of innovation, where ideas are generated from which, to a large extent, economic growth emerges [22]. Thus, the Joint Research Centre report emphasises the fact that, within a co-construction rationale, citizens can play a major role in identifying and solving urban challenges.

 

3. The New Leipzig Charter (2020)

The New Leipzig Charter of 20 November 2020, which is familiar to all developers and urban planners, is partly the result of the foresight works to which it refers. The Charter calls for alignment of European urban development policies in a model highlighted through its three priority areas: the just city (inclusive, cohesive, learning), the green city (decarbonised, low-waste, regenerative) and the productive city [23] At the heart of its vision, its purposes are the common good, public well-being, quality of services and empowerment of the actors who enable participation, deliberation, and co-construction of collective policies.

The integrated, place-based approach, which had already been included in the 2007 Charter, is still the guiding principle in the 2020 text. However, the perspective is widened to incorporate deprived neighbourhoods, functional areas and the entire urban context.

Multilevel governance highlights the need for strong, coordinated urban policies, in other words, sound financial policies, from European to local level, that are consistent with sustainability.

Citizen participation must be combined with co-creation, co-design and tackling inequalities and social breakdown in cities, by employing tools and mechanisms in the areas of housing, attractiveness for business, land-use planning, and environmental regeneration.

For its implementation, the signatories of the charter sought a stronger strategic alignment between the Union’s Territorial Agenda 2030 [24], the urban aspect of the cohesion policy, the national urban policy frameworks, and the Urban Agenda for the European Union [25].

 

4. Conclusion: a city which generates economic and financial value

The idea that cities contribute to both problems and solutions is well established today in our mental landscape. Although they may be places with a concentration of problems – idleness, unemployment, social breakdown, transmission of disease, exclusion, segregation, racism, xenophobia, violence –, they are also the preferred places for curing such ills by mobilising the appropriate resources.

The urban governance survey carried out in 2016 by the London School of Economics, before the most recent spate of crises, showed that half of city representatives regarded the lack of funds as the greatest challenge in urban governance, followed by politicisation of local issues, the complexity of managing contemporary urban problems, and inadequate or outdated political silos [26]. The JRC report also noted that the inadequacy of budgetary resources was one of the major challenges in urban governance [27].

Cities which do not produce economic or financial excesses are, and will be, incapable of coping with the current and future challenges, which, as we know, are vast. I hardly need to restate that decarbonisation will be very expensive. The effects of climate change will require costly repair and preventive work.

The crises already suffered, the “whatever it costs” mentality in the public responses to social rebellions [28], the Covid-19 pandemic, and the effects of the war in Ukraine and its consequences in terms of energy regulation and military investment, have considerably exacerbated a major public finance crisis. This has already been part of our political, economic, and social landscape since the beginning of the century and has been amplified by the major shock of 2008-2009, whose consequences continue to affect us today. In addition to the budgetary deficit, there is, as we have seen, the egotism of societal individualism which, in some people – both rich and poor –, goes as far as refusing to pay tax. The worries are real when one measures the scale of our countries’ debt and the negative primary balances of our budgets.

Budgetary depletion leaves the door open to developers who go against the common interests highlighted by the New Leipzig Charter. The elected representatives, formerly builders, and today transients, as one mayor pointed out, could tomorrow be financially powerless. Some of them already are, those who have no purpose other than trying to give meaning to the predations of those who supplant them and the common interest they hold.

The main remedy for this problem lies in multilevel participation, which ranges from traditional consultation to discussion, community deliberation and co-construction with stakeholders [29]. In his concept of the plural city, the sociologist Jan Vranken, from the University of Antwerp, invited us as citizens, or as mere residents, to several forums in which the city’s financial issues could be discussed freely since, as he pointed out, the public budgeting exercise affects everyone [30].

The remedy can also be found in the productive city section in the New Leipzig Charter. This implies, as in the 1987 Brundtland Report, Our Common Future, an economy that produces excesses as a guarantee of its sustainability. Thus, maintaining high levels of productivity will be critically important in retaining production within city boundaries. As highlighted in a 2020 report by the European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion (ORATE), if we wish to maintain and develop productive activities in cities in the long term, it is essential to understand the reasons why manufacturing activities have been able to take place in cities and to promote innovation and entrepreneurial activities. Identifying and developing appropriate sites should promote the return of industry in cities[31].

This is certainly the price of ensuring the autonomy and well-being of the inhabitants of our European cities and their elected representatives.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] Quatrième rencontre du Réseau national français des Aménageurs (RNA), Ministère de la Transition écologique et de la Cohésion des Territoires, Paris, March, 30 2023.

[2] Philippe DESTATTE, What is foresight? Blog PhD2050, Brussels, May 30, 2013.

https://phd2050.org/2013/05/30/what-is-foresight/ – Ph. DESTATTE, From anticipation to action: an essential foresight path for businesses and organisations, Blog PhD2050, Namur, February 1st,  2014. https://phd2050.org/2014/02/01/anticipation-2/

[3] Tanja SCHINDLER, Graciela GUADARRAMA BAENA, ea, Stories from 2050, Radical, inspiring and thought-provoking narratives around challenges and opportunities of our futures, Brussels, European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, October 2021.

https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/news/all-research-and-innovation-news/stories-2050-radical-inspiring-and-thought-provoking-narratives-around-challenges-and-opportunities-2021-12-09_en

https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/87769c66-5d5a-11ec-9c6c-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-245938989

[4] We live in the Anthropocene, the geological age where humans have the most significant impact and influence on climate, the environment, and the entire planet. Biodiversity on Earth is shrinking at a frightening pace. The extinction of animal species caused by human activity may lead to the next wave of mass extinction since the disappearance of the dinosaurs. No wonder space travel has always fascinated humankind, therefore fictional space travel was used in this process to question whether it is one – possible and second – desirable, to leave Earth behind and disrupt another planet. Furthermore, space travel fantasies and aspirations are linked to the quest for knowledge and exploration, encouraging participants to go beyond their usual thinking and leave current barriers and obstacles behind. Stories from 2050…, p. 13.

[5] Our duty is not only to tell, but also to listen, Jean-Eric PAQUET, Foreword, in Stories from 2050…, p. 5.

[6] Nikos KASTRINOS & Jürgen WENGUEL, Epilogue: What can EU R&I policy lean from Stories from 2050? in Stories from 2050…, p. 107sv.

[7] Ibidem, p. 108-109.

[8] The Foresight Pledge, in Stories from 2050, p. 75, EC, DG Research, 2021.

[9] Totti KONNOLA, Inside the first self-sustainable city on Mars, ready for humans in 2100, March 24, 2021. https://www.storiesfrom2050.com/discuss/message-from-the-future/inside-the-first-self-sustainable-city-on-mars-ready-for-humans-in-2100

[10] Protopian Future, in Stories from 2050…, p. 95. – Protopia refers to a society that, instead of solving all its problems as in a utopia, or falling into severe dysfunction as in a dystopia, progresses gradually over a long period of time, thanks to the way technological advances reinforce the natural process of evolution. Kevin KELLY, What Technology wants, London, Penguin, 2011.

[11] Tanjia SCHINDLER, Stories from 2050, Project Overview and Process, Mutual Learning Exercise, Research and Innovation Foresight, Policy and Practice, Citizens’ Engagement Approaches & Methods on good practices in the use of Foresight in R&I policy planning and programming, Strengthening the role of foresight in the process of identifying research priorities, 31 January, 1 & 2 February 2023.

[12] Corinne HERMANT- de CALLATTAŸ et Christian SVANTFELDT, Cities of Tomorrow, Challenges, visions, ways forward, Brussels, European Commission, Directorate General for Regional Policy, 2011. EC_Cities-of-Tomorrow_Report_2011-10-30 – See also: Chr. SVANFELDT, C. HERMANT- de CALLATAŸ, La “ville de demain” vue par l’Union européenne, in Les Cahiers du Développement social urbain, 2012/2 (N° 56), p. 52-54.

https://www.cairn.info/revue-cahiers-du-developpement-social-urbain-2012-2-page-52.htm

[13] The ‘European model of the city’ is a fascinating issue. On the one hand, it captures essential features of European cultural history, and it is deeply rooted in the past and, hence, related to the identity question. On the other, it captures essential aspects of the political vision of the European Union and, hence, of the future as envisaged by the underlying society. Cities of Tomorrow…, p. 1.

[14] Cities of Tomorrow…, p. 10-11.

[15] Cities of Tomorrow…, p. 12.

[16] Cities of Tomorrow, p. III.

[17] Cities of Tomorrow, p. 5. – The report highlights that 2/3 of final energy demand is linked to urban consumption and up to 70% of CO2 emissions are generated in cities, even though they are inhabited by 50% of the world’s population in 2010), referring to the World Energy Outlook 2008. Let us note that according to the World Energy Outlook 2022: 70% of the world’s population could be living in cities in 2050, i.e. an increase of 2 billion inhabitants in cities worldwide (p. 110 and 464 – This analysis can be found in the report Futures of Cities in 2019: While being responsible for a high level of energy consumption and, therefore, generating about 70% of global GHG emissions, cities are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. Cities are most effective at taking measures to tackle climate change when aligned with each other and with national- and regional-level actors with whom they can share greater climate ambition and capacity. In the last two decades, city ambition has risen remarkably to go beyond the national governments’ climate-change targets as the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C warns that current nationally determined contributions for the Paris Agreement are not sufficient. Cities need support from their partners in national and regional governments, the private sector, academia, and civil society to fully meet and exceed these ambitious targets. The Future of Cities, JRC, 2019, p. 82.

[18] Cities of Tomorrow, p. 35.

[19] Cities of Tomorrow, p. 43-48.

[20] The Future of Cities, Main messages, European Commission, Urban Data Platform, 2019. https://urban.jrc.ec.europa.eu/thefutureofcities/executive-summary#the-chapterThe Future of Cities…, p. 8-9.

[21] Covenant of Mayors: cities at the forefront of climate action, February 19, 2018.

https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/eu-affairs/20180216STO98009/covenant-of-mayors-cities-at-the-forefront-of-climate-action

[22] Cities are often places of great energy and optimism. They are where most of us choose to live, work and interact with others. As a result, cities are where innovation happens, where ideas are formed from which economic growth largely stems. Future of Cities, Insights from Multiple Expert Discussions Around the World, p. 3, London, Futureagenda 2017. https://www.futureofcities.city/pdf/full/Future%20of%20Cities%20Report%202017.pdf – The Future of Cities, p. 105.

[23] The New Leipzig Charter, The Transformative power of cities for the common good, 30 November 2020.

https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/brochure/new_leipzig_charter/new_leipzig_charter_en.pdf

[24] Territorial Agenda, A future for all places, December 1st 2020. https://territorialagenda.eu/

[25] Implementing the New Leipzig Charter through multi-level governance, Next Steps for the Urban Agenda for the EU, p. 4, EU2020.de, 2020. https://futurium.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2021-03/new_leipzig_charter_implem_en.pdf

[26] The Urban Governance Survey, 2016, Cities UN Habitat and the United Cities and Local Governments, London School of Economics, 2016. – The Future of Cities…, p. 129 & 149. https://unhabitat.org/the-urban-governance-survey-by-un-habitat-uclg-and-lse-cities

[27] The Future of Cities…, p. 106.

[28]According to Anne de Guigné, the budgetary impact of the Yellow Vests crisis amounted to €17 billion in new expenditure or lower revenue.. Anne DE GUIGNE, Emmanuel Macron et la dette : six ans de rendez-vous manqués, dans Le Figaro Économie, 29 mars 2023, p. 24.

[29] Michel FOUDRIAT, La co-construction en actes, Savoirs et savoir-faire pratiques pour faciliter sa mise en œuvre, Montrouge, ESF, 2021.

[30] Cities of Tomorrow…, p. 35.

[31] Europe’s productive cities and metros, Policy Brief, p. 2, Luxembourg, European Union, ESPON, 2021.