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Archives de Tag: Georges Duby

Chercheur à l’Institut Destrée

1 juillet 2022
Démocratie, Histoire, Prospective
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Namur, Assemblée générale de l’Institut Destrée,  le 28 juin 2022

Depuis plus de trente ans, lorsqu’on m’interroge sur ma profession, je réponds généralement que je suis chercheur. Chercheur à l’Institut Destrée, un centre de recherche indépendant en développement régional. Chercheur, historien, prospectiviste, enseignant…

 

Comment devient-on chercheur ?

Comment devient-on chercheur ? Certainement par des errances et des fulgurances. Des écoutes et des lectures. Même si, personnellement, j’ai toujours été plus prompt à lire qu’à écouter. Ceux qui m’ont marqué en face à face et assurément façonné s’appellent Jules Boulard, Maurice Devaux et Albert Teygeman à l’Athénée de Châtelet, Robert Demoulin, Étienne Hélin, Charles Hyart, Pierre Lebrun, et aussi Georges Duby lors de son séjour à l’Université de Liège. Ils m’ont transmis à la fois la curiosité, l’exigence et la passion, car ils étaient curieux, exigeants et passionnés. Je n’oublie pas non plus René Van Santbergen, Francine Faite et Minna Azjenberg qui, parallèlement à la recherche, m’ont si bien coaché sur les voies d’un certain type d’enseignement dont le virus ne m’a jamais quitté.

Mais mon chemin heuristique et méthodologique doit surtout aux grands classiques de la critique historique de Léon-E Halkin [1], de la philosophie critique de l’histoire de Raymond Aron [2], des méthodes des sciences sociales de Madeleine Grawitz [3], dont j’ai acquis en 1975 les trois maîtres ouvrages, et aussi, près de dix ans plus tard, de la théorie générale du système social d’Henri Janne [4] et de la synthèse écologique de Paul Duvigneaud [5]. Tous les cinq sont toujours restés à portée de main.

Les fulgurances ont été nombreuses, mais trois m’ont marquées davantage : Hervé Hasquin en 1981, Dominique Schnapper au début des années 1990 et Jacques Lesourne dix ans plus tard.

1. Je l’ai souvent rappelé : je dois à Hervé Hasquin ma découverte de l’Institut Destrée. Lors d’une conférence à l’Association des Historiens de l’Université de Liège, à laquelle j’assistais le 27 novembre 1980, il mit en application, de manière brillante, l’appareil critique des historiens, en démontant le modèle d’une histoire finaliste de la Belgique. Celle-ci n’était autre que celle qui m’avait été encore enseignée à l’Université, à côté bien sûr, de l’histoire de la Principauté de Liège. En faisant immédiatement l’acquisition des volumes La Wallonie le Pays et les Hommes, j’ai découvert, d’une part, l’histoire de la Wallonie et son caractère underground, et d’autre part, que certains de mes professeurs, comme Léon-E Halkin, Robert Demoulin, Jacques Stiennon ou Étienne Hélin en étaient également des pionniers.Lors de sa conférence, puis dans l’échange que j’ai ensuite eu avec le professeur de l’ULB, Hervé Hasquin avait largement évoqué l’Institut Destrée, dont je n’avais alors jamais entendu parler. Ainsi, je découvre l’institution à l’origine du premier cours d’histoire de la Wallonie que donne précisément Hervé Hasquin à Bruxelles. Quelques mois plus tard, je reçois l’ouvrage Historiographie et Politique, dont le futur recteur avait déjà largement évoqué le contenu lors de son exposé.  Mieux, au sortir de cette conférence, j’adhère à l’Institut Destrée puis en parle à ma collègue historienne à l’École normale de l’État à Liège (aujourd’hui, Haute École Charlemagne) où j’enseigne. Surprise : France Truffaut, fille de l’auteur de l’État fédéral en Belgique (1938), était également membre de l’Institut Destrée et fort proche du président Jacques Hoyaux. France me fait rejoindre la section de Liège de l’Institut Destrée dont je deviens vite – prérogative du jeune intellectuel fraîchement arrivé, secrétaire d’un président haut en couleur, Dieudonné Boverie [6]. Dès le 15 mars 1981, je participe à l’Assemblée générale de l’Institut Destrée à Hôtel de Ville de Charleroi. De même, le 21 mars 1982, selon mes agendas de l’époque. Mes interventions ne sont pas toujours bien comprises dans une association où je viens chercher « du Hasquin » et où je trouve souvent « du Charles-François Becquet » [7], c’est-à-dire de la littérature historique plus militante que professionnelle. J’ai évoqué dans mon introduction à l’Encyclopédie du Mouvement wallon, comment, avec l’appui de France Truffaut, puis plus tard celui de Michèle Libon, à partir l’AG du 13 mars 1983, nous avons ouvert un chemin vers ce qui deviendra, au sein de l’Institut Destrée, le Centre interuniversitaire d’Histoire de la Wallonie et du Mouvement wallon dont Paul Delforge fut le premier chercheur recruté [8]. Comme administrateur de l’Institut Destrée, puis directeur des travaux, donc des éditions, j’ai dû mener pendant de longs mois un combat difficile pour refuser la publication du troisième tome de Le Différend wallo-flamand de Becquet, en trouvant d’ailleurs en Christiane Hoyaux, historienne, un soutien dont je ne disposais pas chez Jacques Hoyaux, ni d’ailleurs chez mon prédécesseur, Guy Galand.

Faut-il dire que Hervé Hasquin est resté pour moi une référence professionnelle comme historien, et un soutien plus qu’intellectuel ? Nous avons toujours gardé d’ailleurs, ce que j’appellerais une « connivence distante », avec quelques complicités… et beaucoup de respect de ma part.

2. J’ai entendu la voix claire de Dominique Schnapper, sur France Culture, au tournant des années 1990, peut-être à l’époque de la sortie de son livre sur La France de l’intégration dans lequel la sociologue française revenait et développait, en les nuançant très fortement, sur les deux types-idéaux, les deux conceptions traditionnelles de la Nation, française et allemande afin, ensuite d’ajouter aux définitions historiques et philosophique, une définition sociologique. Ces questions étaient d’ailleurs bien présentes, non seulement dans le débat wallon, mais aussi dans celui de la conférence des communautés de langue française dans lesquelles je m’étais d’emblée investi dès mon arrivée comme directeur de l’Institut Destrée en 1988. Par sa clarté, la directrice d’études à l’École nationale des Hautes Études en Sciences sociales à Paris élargissait un champ de réflexion dans une problématique trop longtemps fermée, même si des conceptions très riches, à la fois fortes et nuancées, avaient également été apportées par un autre sociologue, le professeur Michel Molitor de l’UCL, dans le cadre des travaux La Wallonie au Futur. Les enseignements de Dominique Schnapper sur les questions d’identité et de citoyenneté ont été déterminants dans ma manière d’appréhender ces questions aussi difficiles que brûlantes. Peu d’amis savent d’ailleurs l’ampleur du débat qui me fit plier pour nommer mon livre de 1997 L’Identité wallonne, Essai sur l’affirmation politique de la Wallonie aux XIXe et XXe siècles plutôt que La Citoyenneté wallonne, avec le même sous-titre.

La fulgurance en fait, est venue du livre de Dominique Schnapper consacré à La Communauté des citoyens, Sur l’idée moderne de nation [9], dans lequel la sociologue montre avec force comment les approches ethniques peuvent être transcendées par la citoyenneté tout en montrant le risque pour nos démocraties de redevenir des groupes humains unis par un sentiment de communauté historique et d’identité collective et non plus par la volonté proprement civique de participer à une vie politique commune, en dépassant les enracinements particuliers. J’ai abondamment puisé mon inspiration dans ce travail [10] ainsi que dans les suivants : Qu’est-ce que la citoyenneté ? [11] et L’esprit démocratique des lois [12]. Ces travaux ont aussi constitué autant de passerelles vers ceux de son collègue historien, plus médiatisé, Pierre Rosanvallon…. Il m’a été donné d’échanger avec Madame Schnapper, après son départ du Conseil constitutionnel, de la rencontrer dans son bureau de l’EHSS à Paris, de l’inviter et l’accueillir à Namur le 17 novembre 2015, jour où la fille de Raymond Aron a fait une mémorable conférence à la tribune du Parlement de Wallonie, à l’initiative de l’Institut Destrée.

3. C’est à l’Université Paris-Dauphine, Salle Raymond Aron précisément, que j’ai entendu puis rencontré Jacques Lesourne. S’y tenaient, les 8 et 9 décembre 1999 les Assises de la Prospective, à l’initiative de Futuribles International et du laboratoire LESOD de cette université. Jacques Lesourne, polytechnicien et économiste, est alors professeur au Conservatoire national des Arts et Métiers et président de Futuribles International. Son discours sur la prospective est robuste, exigeant, structuré. Lorsque je me présente à lui pour la première fois, la réponse de ce disciple de Maurice Allais est immédiate : la prospective a besoin d’historiens : leur rigueur dans la recherche et l’analyse des sources, leur déontologie, leur perception des temporalités les y appellent et il me cite Braudel, Chaunu, Furet.

Je vais, ces années-là, m’inscrire systématiquement à la plupart des formations et conférences qu’il donne et puis le rencontrer plus régulièrement de 2004 à 2012, souvent au côté d’Hugues de Jouvenel, lorsque je rejoins le Conseil d’administration de Futuribles. D’emblée, il me raconte ses expériences de consultant pour la Société d’Économie et de Mathématiques appliquées (SEMA), ses visites dans le Borinage lors des fermetures des charbonnages, ses relations avec la Société générale de Belgique et ses jugements à l’égard de la matrone belge, que j’insérerai d’ailleurs dans La Nouvelle Histoire de Belgique [13]. Ses encouragements dans mon appréhension de la prospective sont constants. Le 27 avril 2000, il me dédicace son ouvrage Un homme de notre siècle [14], en m’adressant tous ses vœux pour la réussite de mes efforts de développement de la prospective wallonne. J’en déduis ainsi qu’une telle dynamique est vue positivement par un maître à penser de la prospective. Son influence sur ma réflexion méthodologique est considérable : il me fait appréhender sérieusement la systémique au travers de son ouvrage Les Systèmes du Destin [15], que j’acquière en 2003 et qui m’ouvrira les portes des systèmes complexes, avec Edgar Morin, Jean-Louis Le Moigne [16]  et, paradoxe, une redécouverte de Jean Ladrière [17], dont Michel Quévit, Gérard Fourez et Riccardo Petrella nous avait tant parlé. Lesourne, c’est aussi l’homme d’Interfuturs, cette opération Overlord de la prospective, qu’il réalisa pour l’OCDE, en complément du Rapport Meadows [18]. Jacques Lesourne, c’est aussi l’auteur de Ces avenirs qui n’ont pas eu lieu [19], qui m’inspirera l’idée de la méthode des bifurcations, un des atouts de terrain de l’Institut Destrée. Le message de Jacques Lesourne reste constamment présent dans ma mémoire. Lorsque j’ai eu l’occasion de l’accueillir à la Société wallonne de l’Évaluation et de la Prospective pour une conférence à Gembloux, nous avions non seulement longuement échangé, mais j’avais eu l’occasion de lui poser, à la fin de sa conférence, la question de savoir quelle devait être la plus grande qualité du prospectiviste. Il nous avait répondu comme le fait un chercheur : cette qualité doit être la modestie devant la fragilité des réponses que l’on peut apporter et face à l’ampleur des enjeux qui sont posés.

 

Les trois forces et qualités du chercheur de l’Institut Destrée

Hasquin, Schnapper, Lesourne. On me dira que ces choix sont bien francophones pour le chercheur d’une institution qui se veut européenne et internationale. C’est vrai que d’autres références et affinités auraient pu être évoquées, de Eleonora Barbieri Masini à Rome, Emilio Fontela à Madrid, Paraskevas Carakostas à Athènes, de Peter Bishop à Houston, à Ted Gordon ou Jerome Glenn ou Bill Halal à Washington, Verna Alle à San Francisco, Günter Clar à Stuttgart, Karlheinz Steinmüller à Berlin, etc.  Les trois cités en exergue sont ceux qui ont le plus marqué le chercheur dans ses pratiques comme dans ses contenus. Ils sont aussi, chacune et chacun porteur d’un axe parmi les préoccupations majeures de l’Institut Destrée : l’histoire, l’heuristique [20] et en particulier la critique des sources pour Hervé Hasquin, la citoyenneté, l’identité et la démocratie pour Dominique Schnapper, la prospective, l’analyse des systèmes complexes, la décision et l’auto-organisation pour Jacques Lesourne.  Les trois forces et qualités du chercheur de l’Institut Destrée.

Je pense être resté trop éloigné de ces qualités. Elles restent pour l’avenir, et pour les jeunes chercheuses et chercheurs des qualités à acquérir, des exigences à cultiver, des vigilances à activer entre les membres de l’équipe.

Ainsi, mes collègues ne s’en étonneront pas. Il nous faut sans cesse revenir à la tri-fonctionnalité de la pensée créatrice chère à Thierry Gaudin [21] pour organiser le processus de travail : une recherche des données pertinentes, l’évaluation de leur robustesse, leur traitement, leur critique rigoureuse ; ensuite leur mise en débat en confrontation entre collègues, experts, praticiens, enfin, un effort de conceptualisation qui constitue, par l’imagination bien balisée [22], la véritable plus-value du chercheur, celle qui ouvre les portes de l’innovation. Au cœur de ce système réside évidemment la vérification au sens que lui a donné Gilles-Gaston Granger : l’établissement de la solidité d’un énoncé provisoire concernant le réel, sans toutefois fixer de manière immuable l’essence connaissable des choses et des faits [23]. C’est le professeur Maurits Van Overbeke qui, dans une belle leçon de critique rappelait que, si l’avenir reste ouvert, – ce dont aucun prospectiviste ne doute -, pour l’historiographie aussi « le passé reste ouvert », tant il est vrai qu’elle répugne au prononcé de verdicts irrévocables [24].

Mais la chercheuse ou le chercheur à l’Institut Destrée n’est pas un chercheur de cantonnement ou de garnison. C’est un corsaire qui doit longtemps chercher ses sujets comme des proies et les conquérir de haute lutte : sur le plan budgétaire d’abord, sur le plan académique ensuite. Lorsqu’il tient son butin, il est rare qu’on ne tente de le lui arracher en lui contestant sa légitimité. Si, si, les exemples sont nombreux, tant en histoire qu’en prospective…

Aussi, le chercheur de l’Institut Destrée est-il un entrepreneur, celui qui prend tous les risques, qui les prend pour lui-même, ou avec son équipe.

 

Avons-nous été à la hauteur de nos chercheuses et de nos chercheurs ?

Dans une Wallonie que nous avons souvent décrite comme économiquement, socialement et surtout culturellement meurtrie, l’Institut Destrée a souvent cherché à construire une voie nouvelle. Pour les autres. Avec des succès relatifs d’ailleurs. Il l’a fait sur le plan local, parfois, territorial et régional souvent, en Wallonie, en France, en Europe. Son action a souvent été plus reconnue à l’international, notamment grâce à l’initiative Millennia2025, portée par Marie-Anne Delahaut, et qui a ouvert nos reconnaissances comme statut consultatif à l’UNESCO et au Conseil économique et social des Nations Unies.

Néanmoins, quand je vois le grand nombre de chercheuses et de chercheurs qui se sont investis si formidablement depuis 1986 : les Pascale Van Doren, les Marie-Anne Delahaut, les Paul Delforge, les Jean-François Potelle, les Michaël Van Cutsem, les Didier Paquot, les Sophie Jaminon, les Marie Dewez, les Coumba Sylla, et tant d’autres, je ne suis pas sûr que l’Institut Destrée, les administrateurs et moi-même, ayons toujours été à la hauteur de ce qu’ils ont donné et donnent encore à ce qui est plus que leur métier. Et quand je dis que je ne suis pas sûr, chacun peut comprendre qu’il s’agit d’un artifice et que je suis sûr que nous n’avons pas été à la hauteur.

Cet esprit timoré, défaitiste, confortable même, que Marc Bloch n’a que trop bien décrit dans L’étrange défaite [25], en parlant d’un autre pays et d’une autre époque, frappait et frappe encore la Wallonie. N’en doutons pas, il a aussi parfois atteint notre institution. Ainsi que je l’ai rappelé récemment, lorsqu’en octobre 1980, le ministre de la Région wallonne Jean-Maurice Dehousse propose de confier à l’Institut Destrée des études et des recherches, le Conseil d’administration ne veut pas répondre positivement, compte tenu de l’emprunt de 5.000.000 de FB alors nécessaire pour payer les chercheurs [26]…

Je ne peux non plus m’empêcher de me rappeler les conditions de mon propre engagement à l’Institut Destrée. Quand je dis engagement, je ne veux pas le dire dans le sens de recrutement. Voyant l’institution dans une impasse tant par rapport au nouveau centre de recherche historique, qui allait perdre la plupart de ses chercheuses et chercheurs, que de l’éducation permanente dont l’animatrice était en voie d’exfiltration, que du congrès La Wallonie au futur, programmé pour octobre 1988, officiellement annoncé, sans qu’une équipe puisse en assumer l’organisation, j’ai été amené à proposer de quitter l’enseignement pour assumer cette charge à partir du 1er juin 1988, sur base de mon salaire de professeur du Secondaire. Il faut reconnaître que cela s’est fait dans une forme d’indifférence, les administrateurs qui m’avaient encouragé étant absents lors de ma désignation, aucun contrat ne m’étant proposé – je n’en ai finalement jamais eu -, aucune assurance, aucune stabilité. Mes parents m’ont cru devenu fou, et encore, ils étaient largement dans l’ignorance de la situation. Tout le risque fut pour moi. Peut-on appeler cela l’esprit d’entreprendre dont on souligne tant le déficit ? Jacques Lanotte s’en souviendra à qui je m’étais confié à l’époque, lui-même étant alors très en retrait d’une institution en perdition.

Mon propos n’est pas celui d’un reproche adressé à quiconque. C’est un appel au Conseil d’administration que je viens rejoindre pour que nous prenions, ensemble, les initiatives nécessaires afin que la nouvelle directrice générale et l’équipe puissent, dans les mois et les années qui viennent trouver, un paysage de travail plus serein. Celui-là, j’en suis sûr, ne nuira pas à l’esprit combattif et pionnier de nos chercheuses et chercheurs.

 

Remerciements sincères

 

Philippe Destatte et Philippe Suinen, 28 juin 2022

Au moment où je quitte mes fonctions de directeur général, je veux bien sûr remercier cette équipe de choc, leur dire que je reste à leur écoute et même davantage. Dire aussi au Conseil d’administration, ainsi qu’aux présidents Jean-Pol Demacq, Jacques Brassinne, Philippe Suinen, mais aussi à Micheline Libon et à Bernadette Mérenne, que je les remercie pour la confiance qu’ils ont mise en moi. C’est la même confiance que je placerai en Pascale Van Doren et en son équipe rapprochée, avec Paul Delforge et Didier Paquot, bien sûr.

Jacques Lanotte et Marie-Anne Delahaut ont été mes coaches et confidents pendant toutes ces années. Marie-Anne l’a été à tout instant – parfois tard dans la nuit -, toujours disponible pour suggérer, relire, conseiller, impulser. J’ai souvent retrouvé en elle l’esprit de la Wallonne farouche et déterminée, rebelle aussi souvent, mais tellement profond, qui m’avait fasciné chez Aimée Lemaire lors de nos longues conversations de Nalinnes.

C’est à l’esprit d’indépendance, de résistance, de combattivité et d’intelligence subtile d’Aimée que je voulais confier mes derniers mots de ce jour. En espérant que cette grande Dame vous inspire pour le nouvel avenir que vous avez à construire.

Je vous remercie toutes et tous !

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] Léon-E HALKIN, Initiation à la critique historique, coll. Cahiers des Annales, 6, Paris, Armand Colin, 1973.

[2] Raymond ARON, La philosophie critique de l’histoire, Essais sur une théorie allemande de l’histoire, Paris, J. Vrin, 1964. – Dimensions de la conscience historique, Paris, Plon, 2e éd., 1964.

[3] Madeleine GRAWITZ, Méthodes des Sciences sociales, Paris, Dalloz, 2e éd., 1974. – Ibidem, 9e éd., 1993.

[4] Henri JANNE, Le système social, Essai de théorie générale, Bruxelles, Edition de l’Université libre de Bruxelles, 1972. – Voir aussi le travail pionnier : Henri JANNE dir., Europe 2000, General Prospective Studies, The Future is Tomorrow, 17 Prospective Studies, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1972.

[5] Paul DUVIGNEAUD, La synthèse écologique, Populations, communautés, écosystèmes, biosphère, noosphère, Paris, Doin, 2e éd., 1980.

[6] Paul DELFORGE, Dieudonné Boverie, Site Connaître la Wallonie, Institut Destrée, Mai, 2016. http://connaitrelawallonie.wallonie.be/fr/wallons-marquants/dictionnaire/boverie-dieudonne#.YrglvZBBzao

[7] P. DELFORGE, Charles-François Becquet, dans P. DELFORGE, Ph. DESTATTE, M. LIBON, Encyclopédie du Mouvement wallon, t. 1, p. 135-137, Charleroi, Institut Destrée, 2000.

[8] Philippe DESTATTE, L’Encyclopédie du Mouvement wallon (1983-2000), une obstination scientifique, budgétaire, citoyenne, dans P. DELFORGE, Ph. DESTATTE, M. LIBON, Encyclopédie du Mouvement wallon, t. 1, p. 7-9, Charleroi, Institut Destrée, 2000.

[9] Dominique SCHNAPPER, La communauté des citoyens, Sur l’idée moderne de nation, Paris, Gallimard 1994.- Voir aussi Nation et démocratie, Entretien avec Dominique Schnapper, dans La Nation, La pensée politique, p. 151-165, Paris, Hautes Etudes, Gallimard, Le Seuil, 1995.

[10] Ph. DESTATTE, L’identité wallonne, Essai sur l’affirmation de la Wallonie, XIXe-XXe siècle, p. 28, Charleroi, Institut Destrée, 1997. –  Ph. DESTATTE, Des nations à la nouvelle gouvernance territoriale, dans Marc GERMAIN et Jean-François POTELLE dir., La Wallonie à l’aube du XXIème siècle, Portrait d’un pays et de ses habitants, p. 487-500,Charleroi, Institut Destrée, 2004.

[11] D. SCHNAPPER, avec la collaboration de Christian Bachelier, Qu’est-ce que la citoyenneté ?, Paris, Gallimard, 2000.

[12] D. SCHNAPPER, L’esprit démocratique des lois, Paris, Gallimard, 2014.

[13] Marnix BEYEN et Ph. DESTATTE, Nouvelle Histoire de Belgique, 1970-2000, p. 23 , Bruxelles, Le Cri, 2009.

[14] Jacques LESOURNE, Un homme de notre siècle, De polytechnique à la prospective et au journal Le Monde, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2000.

[15] Jacques LESOURNE, Les systèmes du destin, Paris, Dalloz, 1976.

[16] Jean-Louis LE MOIGNE, La théorie du système général, Théorie de la modélisation, Paris, Presses universitaire de France, 1984.

[17] Jean LADRIERE, Les enjeux de la rationalité, Le défi de la science et de la technologie aux cultures, Paris, Aubier – Montaigne / Unesco, 1977. Et surtout Système (Epistémologie), dans Encyclopaedia Universalis, vol. 15, p. 686 sv, Paris, 1978.

[18] INTERFUTURS, Face aux futurs, Pour une maîtrise du vraisemblable et une gestion de l’imprévisible, Paris, OCDE, 1979.

[19] Jacques LESOURNE, Ces avenirs qui n’ont pas eu lieu, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2001.

[20] Ph. DESTATTE, Les opinions partiales altèrent la rectitude du jugement, Heuristique et critique des sources dans les sciences, Conférence présentée à la Salle académique de l’Université de Mons, dans le cadre du Réseau EUNICE, le 21 octobre 2021, Blog PhD2050, 1er novembre 2021. https://phd2050.org/2021/11/01/heuristique/

[21] Thierry GAUDIN, Discours de la méthode créatrice, Entretiens avec François L’Yvonnet, Gordes, Ose savoir – Le Relié, Avril 2003.

[22] Philippe DESTATTE, Questionnement de l’histoire et imaginaire politique, l’indispensable prospection, dans La Wallonie au futur, Vers un nouveau paradigme, p. 308-310, Charleroi, Institut Destrée, 1989. Cette communication, présentée au premier congrès La Wallonie au Futur a aussi été publiée dans Les Cahiers marxistes, février-mars 1988, n°157-158, p. 49-53.

[23] Gilles-Gaston GRANGER, La vérification, p. 299, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1992. – Dans ce domaine, ce sont évidemment les historiens qui excellent, voir la bible : Guy THUILLIER, La pratique de l’histoire, Introduction au métier d’historien, Paris, Economica, 2013, 865 p.

[24] Maurits VAN OVERBEKE, Berchtesgaden : un dîner avec le diable, p. 128, Louvain-la-Neuve, Academia-L’Harmattan, 2021.

[25] Marc BLOCH, L’étrange défaite, Témoignage écrit en 1940, Paris, Gallimard, 1990.

[26] ARCHIVES DE L’INSTITUT DESTREE, Conseils d’administration, Conseil d’administration du 26 octobre 1980 , p. 3.

« Les opinions partiales altèrent la rectitude du jugement », Heuristique et critique des sources dans les sciences

1 novembre 2021
éducation, Démocratie, Gouvernement
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Mons, 21 octobre 2021

Professeur d’histoire à la Sorbonne depuis 1812, haut fonctionnaire sous la Restauration, François Guizot (1787-1874) effraie le pouvoir par ses idées libérales et est suspendu d’enseignement de 1822 à 1824. C’est pendant cette période qu’il écrit les œuvres historiques majeures que sont l’Histoire de la révolution d’Angleterre, l’Histoire de la civilisation en Europe, l’Histoire de la civilisation en France, travaux qui, à l’époque, le font reconnaître comme l’un des meilleurs historiens de son temps [1]. Esprit scientifique, il est l’un des premiers – notamment après le chanoine liégeois Jean Chapeaville (1551-1617)  [2] – à pratiquer la note en bas de page, c’est-à-dire la référence aux sources, et à développer un apparat critique recourant aux documents de première main [3]. Élu député au début 1830, Guizot devient ministre de l’Intérieur dans le gouvernement issu de la Révolution de Juillet qui a fait de Louis-Philippe le roi des Français. Ministre de l’Instruction publique de 1832 à 1837, puis des Affaires étrangères, il joue un rôle politique de premier plan, allant jusqu’à assumer les fonctions de président du Conseil. Libéral conservateur, opposé au suffrage universel, il chute avec le roi lors de la Révolution de 1848 et revient à ses recherches historiques pour se consacrer à l’écriture jusqu’à la fin de sa vie [4].

 

1. Quelques questions concernant la relation entre un sujet et un objet

En 1820, alors que ses amis politiques sont écartés des affaires de l’État et qu’il enseigne à Paris, des auditeurs de ses cours ont compilé leurs notes en vue de publier ses leçons sur l’Histoire des origines du Gouvernement représentatif en Europe. Ayant retrouvé du temps, le Guizot retiré de la politique commence enfin le travail de révision nécessaire et publie lui-même ses leçons à Paris en 1851, puis très vite à Londres et en anglais, dès l’année suivante. Lors du discours d’ouverture de son cours, le 7 décembre 1820, le professeur aborde d’emblée la relativité des faits historiques. Ceux-ci, note Guizot, s’ils n’acquièrent ou ne perdent rien de leur contenu avec le temps qu’ils traversent, ne vont livrer leur sens que progressivement et les regards qui se porteront sur leur signification révéleront de nouvelles dimensions : l’homme apprend par-là, écrit-il, que, dans l’espace infini ouvert à sa connaissance, tout demeure constamment inépuisable et nouveau pour son intelligence toujours active et toujours bornée [5]. La difficulté dont le professeur fait part à ses étudiants réside au cœur même de l’objectif qu’il assigne à son cours : décrire l’histoire des institutions publiques en Europe à la lecture de ce moment particulier du nouvel ordre politique qui vient d’émerger en 1815. Il s’agit pour Guizot de rattacher ce que nous sommes à ce que nous avons été, et même – magnifique formule -, de renouer enfin la chaîne des temps [6].

François Guizot (1787-1874) – Portrait affiché par Laurent Theis

Le problème qu’observe Guizot, c’est que l’étude des institutions anciennes, en s’appuyant sur les idées et institutions modernes, pour les éclairer ou les juger, a été fort négligée. Et quand, cela a été fait, dénonce-t-il, ce fut avec un dessein si arrêté, que les fruits du travail étaient corrompus d’avance.

Les opinions partiales et conçues avant l’examen des faits ont ce résultat que non seulement elles altèrent la rectitude du jugement, mais encore, qu’elles entraînent, dans les recherches que l’on pourrait appeler matérielles, une légèreté déplorable. Dès qu’un esprit prévenu a recueilli quelques documents et quelques preuves à l’appui de son idée, il s’en contente et s’arrête. D’une part, il voit dans les faits ce qui n’y est point ; de l’autre, quand il croit que ce qu’il tient lui suffit, il ne cherche plus. Or, tel a été parmi nous l’empire des circonstances et des passions qu’elles ont agité l’érudition elle-même. Elle est devenue une arme de parti, un instrument d’attaque ou de défense ; et les faits, impassibles et immuables, ont été invoqués ou repoussés tour à tour, selon l’intérêt ou le sentiment en faveur duquel ils étaient sommés de comparaître, travestis ou mutilés [7].

On voit l’actualité de l’analyse faite par Guizot : la difficulté d’aborder des questions politiques relativement proches dans le temps, mais perçues comme lointaines par l’ampleur du changement des conditions institutionnelles, aussi brutales que celles qui peuvent s’opérer dans une révolution ou un changement profond de régime.

Ce qu’il met en évidence, c’est le péril qui guette l’enseignant, le chercheur, l’intellectuel – je n’ignore pas que je commets un anachronisme en utilisant ce mot en 1820 ou même en 1850. En particulier, Guizot pointe la difficulté de parler ou d’écrire de manière neutre, objective, sans passion, avec le recul qui est attendu de la fonction ou du métier de celui qui s’exprime, et de s’approcher de la vérité, voire de la dire. Les questions de l’analyse des sources, de la déontologie du scientifique, de la logique en tant que conditions de la vérité et de la relation entre un sujet et un objet dont il se saisit [8], de la critique historique sont au cœur de ce travail sur soi. On peut dès lors faire appel aux notions d’heuristique, ici, la recherche des sources sur lesquelles baser sa recherche et, au-delà, son enseignement, qui précède l’herméneutique, c’est-à-dire leur interprétation.

 

2. L’apocalypse cognitive

Dans la leçon qu’il présente à ses étudiants, Guizot met à la fois en évidence le risque de se satisfaire trop rapidement d’une maigre collecte de sources qui viendrait à l’appui d’une hypothèse énoncée préalablement sans vraiment la fonder. L’interprétation erronée des documents fait suite à l’indigence des données face aux ambitions et aux nécessités de la démonstration. La passion et l’engagement fondés sur la légèreté de l’argumentation menacent la qualité de la connaissance, tandis que l’érudition devient un instrument partisan. Combien de fois ne rencontrons-nous pas cette situation dans un monde où, pourtant, l’enseignement – notamment supérieur – se démocratise ?

Guizot, qui, comme ministre, a jadis ressuscité l’Académie des Sciences morales et politiques, verrait aujourd’hui un autre scientifique, membre de l’Académie des Technologies et de l’Académie nationale française de Médecine, lui tendre la main. À peine plus de deux siècles après les déclarations que nous avons mises en exergue, Gérald Bronner constate dans son ouvrage choc Apocalypse cognitive que les vingt premières années du XXIe siècle ont instauré une dérégulation massive du marché des idées. Nous constatons en effet avec le professeur de sociologie à l’Université de Paris que ce marché cognitif est à la fois marqué par la masse cyclopéenne et inédite dans l’histoire de l’humanité des informations disponibles et aussi par le fait que chacun peut y verser sa propre représentation du monde. De surcroît, pour Bronner, cette évolution a affaibli le rôle des gate keepers traditionnels que sont les académiques, les experts, les journalistes, etc., tous ceux qui étaient jadis considérés comme légitimes pour participer au débat public et y exerçaient une salutaire fonction de régulation [9].

C’est un certain pessimisme qui se dégage des analyses de Bronner quant à la capacité qui est la nôtre de faire face à cette situation. Au moins trois raisons y sont invoquées : d’abord, la fameuse « loi de Brandolini » ou principe d’asymétrie des idioties (Brandolini’s Law or Bullshit Asymmetry Principle). Le programmeur italien Alberto Brandolini constatait en 2013 que la quantité d’énergie nécessaire pour réfuter des idioties est supérieure à celle qu’il faut pour les produire [10]. Trouvera-t-on en effet, chacun d’entre nous, le temps, la force et le courage pour faire face au baratinage, aux analyses simplistes, voire aux infox ? Sur les réseaux sociaux, nombreux sont les universitaires qui renoncent.

Dans son beau livre sur Le courage de la nuance, l’essayiste Jean Birnbaum rappelait judicieusement la communication de Raymond Aron (1905-1983) devant la Société française de Philosophie en juin 1939. Face à la montée des périls, le grand intellectuel français appelait ses collègues à mesurer leur engagement : je pense, disait l’auteur de l’Introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire [11], que les professeurs que nous sommes sont susceptibles de jouer un petit rôle dans cet effort pour sauver les valeurs auxquelles nous sommes attachés. Au lieu de crier avec les partis, nous pourrions nous efforcer de définir, avec le maximum de bonne foi, les problèmes qui sont posés et les moyens de les résoudre [12].

Pour suivre, Bronner fait appel à une grande conscience du milieu du siècle de Guizot : Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859). Plus résolument démocratique que son contemporain, l’auteur de La Démocratie en Amérique (1835), y écrit qu’il n’y a, en général, que les conceptions simples qui s’emparent de l’esprit du peuple. Une idée fausse, mais claire et précise, aura toujours plus de puissance dans le monde qu’une idée vraie, mais complexe [13]. Certains d’entre vous ont peut-être encore en tête cette excellente caricature de Wiley Miller, publiée dans The Intellectualist, en 2015, où l’on voit une foule progressant vers un ravin sur un chemin fléché « Answers simple but wrong » tandis que quelques rares individus se dirigent au loin sur un chemin sinueux après avoir, livre en main, choisi la direction « Complex but right ». Au-delà du sens commun des mots, l’analyse des systèmes complexes, chère à William Ross Ashby (1903-1972), Norbert Wiener (1894-1964), Herbert Simon (1916-2001), Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901-1972), Jean Ladrière (1921-2007), Edgar Morin, Jean-Louis Le Moigne, Ilya Prigogine (1917-2003) et Isabelle Stengers, – pour ne citer que ceux-là – restent souvent en dehors du champ de connaissance de nos chaires universitaires et donc de nos étudiantes et étudiants.

Enfin, Bronner constate que la voracité de notre cerveau ne nous conduit pas mécaniquement vers les modèles de la science. Même lorsque nous avons un appétit de connaissance, ajoute-t-il, celui-ci peut facilement être détourné par la façon dont est éditorialisé le marché cognitif. Ainsi en est-il, par exemple, de la confusion entre corrélation et causalité, bien illustrée par le slogan nazi « 500.000 chômeurs : 400.000 Juifs » [14]. Ce mécanisme semble connaître des résurgences permanentes. Mais il en est d’autres, et dans tous les domaines. Ainsi, en 1978, le parti fasciste français Front national affichait : « Un million de chômeurs, c’est un million d’immigrés de trop ! La France et les Français d’abord ! » [15] Un autre exemple est l’affiche que Nigel Farage a dévoilée à Westminster à la mi-juin 2016, une semaine avant le référendum du BREXIT du 23 juin. L’animateur de radio britannique et leader du Parti pour l’Indépendance du Royaume-Uni – UK Independance Party (UKIP) a utilisé une image avec le slogan : Point de rupture : l’Union européenne nous a tous fait défaut et le sous-titre : nous devons nous libérer de l’UE et reprendre le contrôle de nos frontières. La photographie utilisée était celle de migrants traversant la frontière entre la Croatie et la Slovénie en 2015, avec la seule personne blanche visible sur la photographie masquée par une zone de texte. Nombreux sont ceux qui ont réagi en observant que prétendre que la migration vers le Royaume-Uni ne concerne que les personnes qui ne sont pas blanches revient à colporter le racisme. Cette polémique a poussé Boris Johnson à prendre ses distances avec cette campagne de Nigel Farage [16].

Le fait d’avoir trouvé des exemples particulièrement clivants, pour ne pas dire détestables, pourrait affaiblir l’idée que chacun de nous est susceptible de ne faire, en pure logique, que démontrer ce qui n’est que préjugé. Nous commençons souvent le processus de jugement par une tendance à parvenir à une certaine conclusion. Dans leur livre Noise: A Flaw of Human Judgment (Pourquoi nous faisons des erreurs de jugement et comment les éviter), le Prix Nobel d’Économie Daniel Kahneman, Olivier Sibony et Cass R. Sinstein donnent un excellent exemple illustrant une perspective de pensée qu’ils appellent biais de conclusion, ou préjugement : le collaborateur de George Lucas dans le développement du scénario du Retour du Jedi, le troisième film de Star Wars lui a proposé de tuer Luke et de laisser la princesse Leia prendre le relais. Lucas a rejeté l’idée, n’étant pas d’accord avec les différents arguments et répondant qu’on ne tue pas les gens comme cela, et enfin qu’il n’aimait pas cette idée et n’y croyait pas.

Star Wars, Le Retour du Jedi (1983)

Comme les auteurs de Noise l’ont observé, en affirmant « ne pas aimer » avant « ne pas croire », Lucas a laissé sa pensée rapide et intuitive du système 1 suggérer une conclusion [17]. Lorsque nous faisons ce processus, nous allons directement à la conclusion et contournons simplement le processus de collecte et d’intégration d’informations, ou nous mobilisons la pensée du système 2 – engageant une pensée délibérative – pour proposer des arguments qui soutiennent notre préjugé. Dans ce cas, ajoutent le prix Nobel d’économie et ses collègues, les preuves seront sélectives et déformées : en raison du biais de confirmation et du biais de désirabilité, nous aurons tendance à collecter et interpréter les informations de manière sélective pour justifier un jugement auquel nous croyons déjà [18]. Partout où l’on regarde, les préjugés sont évidents, concluent les trois professeurs. Lorsque les gens décident ce qu’ils croient en fonction de ce qu’ils ressentent, le psychologue Paul Slovic, professeur à l’Université de l’Oregon, nomme ce processus heuristique de l’affect [19].

 

3. L’heuristique comme une forme de résistance des esprits éclairés

Comme souvent, aux raisons de désespérer, nous pouvons opposer des raisons de nous réjouir et d’espérer. Celles-ci résident à mon sens dans la force que constitue l’heuristique, les techniques et la ou les méthodes scientifiques.

Par heuristique, on désigne généralement l’ensemble des produits intellectuels, des procédés et des démarches qui favorisent la découverte ou l’invention dans les sciences. Deux dimensions peuvent être distinguées. D’une part, une qualification méthodologique qui désigne les techniques de découvertes qui justifient et légitiment les connaissances et, d’autre part, ce que nous pouvons appeler une heuristique générale. Celle-ci constitue une partie de l’épistémologie, l’étude critique des sciences, [20] et a en charge de décrire et de réfléchir aux conditions générales du progrès de l’activité scientifique [21].

Nous sommes évidemment toutes et tous familiers avec les questions de méthode, ce chemin que l’on emprunte, que l’on entreprend, et qui a vocation à nous conduire et à nous permettre d’atteindre un but donné, de capitaliser un résultat. C’est ce parcours qui, comme scientifiques, comme intellectuels, nous fait vivre l’expérience, que nous appelons expérimentation lorsque nous la provoquons de manière systématique. La recherche scientifique se fonde sur une volonté de cheminer sur ce sentier en combinant de manière interactive l’observation aidée de l’expérimentation et l’analyse du système, permettant l’explication. L’adaptation des pensées aux faits constitue l’observation ; l’adaptation des pensées entre elles, la théorie [22].

En ce sens, la recherche contemporaine nous adresse deux messages. D’une part, celui de la rigueur, d’autre part celui de la relativité, et donc de la modestie. Elles sont à mon sens aussi nécessaires et importantes l’une que l’autre.

 

3.1. Le premier message : celui de la rigueur et de la critique

La rigueur consiste d’abord à savoir de quoi on parle, quel est le problème, ce que l’on cherche. C’est le premier but raisonnable de l’heuristique : formuler en termes généraux des raisons pour choisir des sujets dont l’examen pourra nous aider à parvenir à la solution [23].  On suit bien entendu les traces des mathématiciens, physiciens, logiciens, philosophes, etc. : Pappos d’Alexandrie (IVe s. PNC), René Descartes (1596-1650), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716), Bernhard Bolzano (1781-1848), Ernst Mach ((1838-1916), Jacques Hadamard (1865-1963), George Polya (1887-1985), Jean Hamburger (1909-1992), Morris Kline (1908-1992), etc. Et plus récemment Daniel Kahneman et Shane Frederick. Dans chacune de nos disciplines, nous avons pu en fréquenter l’un ou l’autre, sinon tous. Un mathématicien comme Polya, qui a enseigné à Zurich puis à Stanford, auteur de How to Solve it ? [24], défend l’idée que les sources des inventions sont plus importantes que les inventions elles-mêmes. Cela devrait constituer, affirme-t-il, la devise de toute étudiante ou de tout étudiant qui se prépare à une carrière scientifique. Les démonstrations non motivées, les lemmes qui arrivent on ne sait d’où, les lignes auxiliaires qui tombent du ciel sont abracadabrants et déprimants pour tous les élèves, bons ou médiocres [25]. Pour m’être fait démonter un jour à un examen oral sur le théorème de Bernoulli, je peux en témoigner personnellement…

Ainsi, il existe dans le monde certaines traditions de construction d’un discours critique et intellectuellement robuste, qui n’est d’ailleurs pas européo-centré et ne date pas, contrairement à ce qu’on nous enseigne trop souvent, de la Renaissance ou des Lumières. Enseignant à l’École nationale d’Ingénieurs de Tunis, je découvre chaque jour davantage ce que nous devons – et ce « nous » comprend des chercheurs comme Arnold J. Toynbee ou Joseph Schumpeter – à un savant arabe comme Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406). Dans son introduction à son œuvre majeure, Muqaddima, le Livre des Exemples, cet économiste, sociologue et historien du XIVe siècle conseillait de procéder à une confrontation entre les récits tels qu’ils lui ont été transmis et les règles et modèles ainsi constitués. En cas d’accord et de conformité, ces récits peuvent être déclarés authentiques, sinon, ils seront tenus pour suspects et écartés [26].

Cet effort heuristique concret a été initié par l’humaniste italien Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457) dont le rôle a été, selon François Dosse, décisif dans la notion de vérité, au point que l’historien et épistémologue de l’Université de Paris a parlé d’un véritable tournant [27]. Valla a remis en question l’authenticité de la Donation de Constantin écrite en 1440. Ce texte, reconnaissant à l’empereur romain Constantin le Grand (272-337) l’octroi d’un vaste territoire et d’un pouvoir spirituel et temporel sur le pape Sylvestre I (règne 314-335), a eu une grande influence sur la politique et les affaires religieuses dans l’Europe médiévale. Lorenzo Valla a clairement démontré que ce document était un faux en analysant la langue de la donation. Il montra que le latin utilisé dans le texte n’était pas celui du IVe siècle et affirma ainsi que le document ne pouvait pas dater de l’époque de Constantin [28].

La méthode critique va trouver ses gardiens du Temple en Charles-Victor Langlois (1863-1929) et Charles Seignobos (1854-1942), qui vont constituer le rempart contre ce qu’ils considéraient comme la pente naturelle de l’esprit humain : ne prendre aucune précaution, procéder confusément là où la plus grande attention est indispensable. Là où, écrivaient-ils, tout le monde admet en principe l’utilité de la Critique – avec une majuscule ! -, celle-ci ne passe guère dans la pratique.

C’est que la Critique est contraire à l’allure normale de l’Intelligence. La tendance spontanée de l’homme est d’ajouter foi aux affirmations et de les reproduire, sans même les distinguer nettement de ses propres observations. Dans la vie de tous les jours, n’acceptons-nous pas indifféremment, sans vérification d’aucune sorte des on-dit, des renseignements anonymes et sans garantie, toutes sortes de « documents » de médiocre ou de mauvais aloi ? (…) Tout homme sincère reconnaîtra qu’un violent effort est nécessaire pour secouer l’ignavia critica, cette formule si répandue de la lâcheté intellectuelle ; que cet effort doit être répété, et qu’il s’accompagne souvent d’une véritable souffrance [29].

Souffrance, le mot est lâché… Tout comme pour la beauté, il faut souffrir pour être chercheur. C’est une torture notamment inspirée des travaux de l’historien allemand Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886). Pour atteindre le paradis de la scientificité, elle soumet le document, mais aussi l’étudiant et le professeur à une série d’opérations analytiques composées de la critique interne ou critique d’érudition (restitution, provenance, classement des sources, critique des érudits), puis à la critique interne (interprétation, interne négative, de sincérité et d’exactitude, détermination des faits particuliers) et, enfin, les valorise dans des opérations synthétiques…

En 1961, dans l’ouvrage extraordinaire que constitue L’histoire et ses méthodes, publié sous la direction de Charles Samaran (1879-1982) de l’Institut de France, Robert Marichal (1904-1999) reprenait ce plan de Langlois et Seignobos, en considérant que la critique des textes n’a guère été remise en cause par les tenants de la « Nouvelle Histoire » qui, selon cet archiviste réputé, considèrent que les procédés traditionnels ont gardé leur efficacité. Marichal ajoutait d’ailleurs que les principes dont relève la critique ne diffèrent pas, dans ce qu’ils ont de général, de ceux de toute connaissance humaine, tels qu’on les trouve dans tout traité de logique ou de psychologie [30].

Cinquante ans plus tard, Gérard Noirel, un des spécialistes de l’épistémologie en histoire, rappelle dans l’édition en ligne de l’ouvrage de Langlois et Seignobos, que ceux-ci n’ont pas inventé les règles de la méthode historique, les principes de base étant connus depuis le XVIIe siècle et avaient été codifiés par les historiens allemands au début du XIXe siècle. Le grand mérite de ces deux professeurs à la Sorbonne est certainement, souligne Noiriel, d’avoir écrit qu’il fallait lire les historiens avec les mêmes précautions critiques que lorsqu’on analyse des documents [31].

Les sciences humaines ont été très influencées par le chemin scientiste qu’a emprunté l’histoire à la fin du XIXe siècle.  Comme cette discipline, elles ont ensuite pris quelque distance avec ce préjugé scientiste fondé sur la critique absolue des documents. Dans une introduction intitulée en 2008, L’approximative rigueur de l’anthropologie, Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan montrait en fait que le mot n’était qu’un paradoxe apparent ; il met en évidence la fatalité de l’approximation face à la vulnérabilité des biais cognitifs et des dérives idéologiques, mais il renonce à tout abandon à cette quête dans un livre d’ailleurs intitulé La Rigueur du qualitatif [32]. Le professeur à l’École des Hautes Études en Sciences sociales à Paris, mobilise d’ailleurs également son collègue américain Howard Becker, qui, dans Sociological Work: Method and Substance  (Chicago, Adline, 1970) et  Writing for Social Scientists (University of Chicago Press, 1986 & 2007), avait mis en évidence cette tension entre la cohérence de ce que l’on raconte et la conformité aux éléments découverts [33].

Le paradigme scientiste a fait place à d’autres paradigmes, qui ont d’ailleurs marqué l’ensemble des sciences humaines. C’est le cas de l’École des Annales, dont les cahiers, appuyés par le Centre de Recherches historiques de l’École pratique des Hautes Études à Paris, ont pu faire éclairer ces questions de critique historique par un brillant professeur liégeois comme Léon-E. Halkin (1906-1998).

Si elle restait une exigence méthodologique, la méthode critique stricte – au sens du culte idolâtre du document [34] –  a paru s’assouplir au tournant des années 1980. Comme l’avait déjà fait Charles Samaran en 1961, il s’agit désormais de mettre davantage en avant des principes généraux de la méthode [35], voire la déontologie de l’historien. Sur ce plan, et à la suite du directeur éditorial de l’Histoire et ses méthodes, Guy Thuillier (1932-2019) et Jean Tulard appellent à la rescousse le grand Cicéron : la première loi qui s’impose (à lui) est de ne rien oser dire qu’il sache faux, la seconde d’oser dire tout ce qu’il croit vrai [36].

Ainsi, poursuivent-ils, l’honnêteté d’esprit implique le sens critique [37]. Les autres préceptes des auteurs de La méthode en histoire sont ceux que je livre à mes étudiantes et étudiants en rappelant que ces conseils s’appliquent à toutes leurs tâches dans toutes les disciplines, comme dans la vie quotidienne :

  • On ne doit rien affirmer sans qu’il y ait un « document » que l’on ait vérifié personnellement.
  • On doit toujours indiquer le degré de « probabilité » – ou d’incertitude – du document. Il ne faut pas se fier aux apparences, et faire confiance aveuglément aux textes (…)
  • Il faut toujours marquer explicitement les hypothèses qui guident la recherche, et souligner les limites de l’enquête (…)
  • Il faut garder une certaine distance au sujet traité et ne pas confondre, par exemple, biographie et hagiographie (…)
  • On doit se méfier des généralisations hâtives (…)
  • Il faut savoir que rien n’est définitif (…)
  • Il faut savoir bien user de son temps, ne pas trop se presser (…),
  • Il est nécessaire de ne pas s’enfermer dans son cabinet (…). L’expérience de la vie est indispensable (…) [38]

 

 3.2. Le deuxième message est celui de la relativité, et donc de la modestie

C’est une formule forte qui clôture le remarquable travail de Françoise Waquet, directrice de recherche au CNRS : la science, écrit-elle, est humaine – forcément, banalement, profondément [39]. Son enquête, dans les laboratoires, les bibliothèques, les bureaux, parmi les maîtres et les disciples, les livres et les ordinateurs, montre comment s’articulent, autour de l’objectivité, les règles de métier et la – ou les – passions académiques.

Waquet prend en compte les analyses de Lorraine Daston, co-directrice de l’Institut Max Planck d’histoire des Sciences à Berlin. Ces  travaux ont montré une propension à  aspirer à un savoir qui ne porte aucune trace de celui qui sait, un savoir qui ne soit pas marqué par le préjugé ou l’acquis, par l’imagination ou le jugement, par le désir ou l’effort. Dans ce régime d’objectivité, la passion apparait comme l’ennemie intérieure du chercheur [40].

Henri Pirenne l’avait parfaitement exprimé en 1923 lorsqu’il affirmait du chercheur que pour arriver à l’objectivité, à l’impartialité sans lequel il n’est pas de science, il lui faut donc comprimer en lui-même et surmonter ses préjugés les plus chers, ses convictions les plus assises, ses sentiments les plus naturels et les plus respectables [41]. Émile Durkheim ne dit d’ailleurs pas autre chose pour la sociologie, ni d’ailleurs Marcel Mauss pour l’anthropologie, Vidal de la Blache pour la géographie ou même Émile Borel pour les mathématiques. On pourrait, avec Françoise Waquet multiplier les exemples qui débouchent, même dans les sciences dites « dures »  sur une forme d’ascétisme et d’objectivité passionnée [42].

Dans la seconde moitié du vingtième siècle, les fulgurants progrès de la science au sortir de la Guerre mondiale, les interrogations nées de la critique de la modernité n’ont pas laissé les sciences indemnes. Ancien élève de l’École polytechnique, le jésuite François Russo (1909-1998), notait en 1959 que la science tend à poser des problèmes qui se situent au-delà du domaine de la stricte méthode scientifique. Il citait les spéculations d’Albert Einstein (1879-1955), de Georges Lemaître (1894-1966) ou d’autres analyses sur l’univers comme totalité, sur les considérations sur la dégradation de l’énergie dans l’univers, l’évolution biologique, l’origine de la vie, de l’être humain, leur nature, etc., soulignant que les progrès de la science font rebondir ces questions sans les faire disparaître. Ainsi, posait-il aussi, et parallèlement, la question du sens [43].

Faut-il dire que les débats sur ces enjeux se sont développés, de Raymond Aron (1905-1983) à Paul Ricœur (1913-2005), de Karl Polanyi (1886-1964) à Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), de Karl Popper (1902-1994) à Richard Rorty (1931-2007) et Anthony Giddens, etc. ?

Sur la question de l’objectivité, c’est un des professeurs dont les cours m’ont personnellement le plus marqué, qui, face à la passion, montre le chemin de la lucidité. Dans L’histoire continue, Georges Duby (1919-1996) considère que c’est la stricte morale positiviste qui donne au métier du chercheur sa dignité. En effet, poursuit le médiéviste, l’histoire renonce à la quête illusoire de l’objectivité totale, c’est non par l’effet du flux d’irrationalité qui envahit notre culture, mais c’est surtout parce que la notion de vérité en histoire s’est modifiée. Ainsi, son objet s’est déplacé : elle s’intéresse désormais moins à des faits qu’à des relations…. [44]

 

Conclusion : sentiment, raison et expérience

Revenons à François Guizot, d’où nous sommes partis. Mais cette fois-ci pour conclure.

Dans ce moment Guizot, comme l’a appelé Pierre Rosanvallon, véritable âge d’or de la science politique [45], la leçon était claire : comment, dans la proximité et sous la pression des bouleversements majeurs que cette période connut – Révolution française, Révolution industrielle machiniste, y compris leurs transformations structurelles et systémiques dans les domaines technologiques, politiques, sociaux, culturels, etc., – comment appréhender les événements sous la souveraineté de la raison ?

Même si la plupart des êtres humains ont ressenti, chacun dans leur temps, l’avènement du monde [46], son accroissement, ses accélérations, ses émergences, ses instabilités, notre société semble davantage marquée qu’hier par le flot des informations en tous genres qui nous atteignent, nous interpellent, nous assaillent. Emportés nous-mêmes à grande vitesse sur ce qu’on qualifiait voici quelques décennies déjà, d’autoroutes de l’information, nous apprenons à piloter notre esprit à des vitesses jusqu’ici inconnues, boostés que nous sommes par nos outils numériques. C’est peu de dire en effet que ce sont désormais les microprocesseurs qui rythment nos travaux. Après être passés, lors du confinement, de Teams en Zoom, de Jitsi en Webex ou Google Meet – et en avoir souvent conservé l’habitude, nous savons toutes et tous, que le numérique bat désormais la cadence. Dans les flux de messages, de liens, de SMS qui nous sont adressés, nous nous éduquons tant bien que mal à identifier les pièges des pirates et autres nuisibles numériques. Au-delà de nos outils défensifs, c’est l’expérience qui souvent nous guide.

Nous avons peu de firewalls pour nous défendre contre les démons de l’apocalypse cognitive que nous décrit ou nous promet Gérald Bronner. Nous ne voulons pas de censure du « bien penser » ou de monde javellisé où l’on filtrerait nos connexions et où on passerait nos cerveaux au gel hydro-alcoolique. La meilleure régulation reste à mes yeux celle de notre propre intelligence, pour autant qu’elle reste fondée sur la raison et sur la rigueur du raisonnement.

Celle-ci passe assurément par l’heuristique et les méthodes de la recherche. Dans un discours qu’il prononçait en septembre 1964 à l’occasion de la rentrée solennelle de la Faculté polytechnique de Mons, le professeur et futur recteur Jacques Franeau (+2007) notait qu’il fallait éviter de confondre objectif et subjectif, que, puisque toute société a pour but essentiel de réaliser un cadre qui convienne le mieux à la vie et au bonheur des êtres humains, elle doit, pour y arriver, partir de données sûres et objectives, elle doit connaître avant de choisir son orientation et, ensuite, elle doit construire sur les bases solides que lui donne cette connaissance [47].

Ainsi, avons-nous mis, pour répondre aux inquiétudes, deux réponses en exergue : la rigueur et la critique, d’une part, la relativité et la modestie de l’autre.

Sans tomber dans l’idée de Voltaire selon lequel toute certitude qui n’est pas démonstration mathématique n’est qu’une extrême probabilité [48], l’éducation de ceux qui fréquentent l’enseignement supérieur doit fonder l’exigence tant de la robustesse que de la traçabilité raisonnable de toute information produite. Citer une source, ce n’est pas, quelle que soit la discipline, renvoyer à l’œuvre globale d’un savant, ni même à une de ses productions – numérique ou papier – sans préciser la localisation de l’information. Certains collègues ou étudiants vous renvoient à un livre de 600 pages, sans autre précision, ni d’édition ni de pagination. Vérification impossible. De même, pour reprendre un constat fait jadis tant par le mathématicien et économiste germano-américain Oskar Morgenstern (1902-1977) [49] que par le Français Gilles-Gaston Granger (1920-2016) [50], la question de la validité, de la fiabilité des données ne semble guère intéresser de nombreux chercheurs. Chez ces deux éminents spécialistes de l’épistémologie comparative, c’étaient les économistes qui étaient visés. Mais, n’en doutons pas, beaucoup d’autres chercheurs sont atteints… Je suis certain que ces témoignages résonnent en vous comme ils le font en moi. Former nos étudiants à la rigueur, à la précision et à la critique, c’est assurément contribuer à en faire, au-delà de chercheurs de qualités, des intellectuels conscients, à l’esprit courageux, c’est-à-dire apte à se saisir des contenus les plus difficiles ou les plus farfelus, s’en délivrer, et ne communiquer que sur l’exact et le certain.

La relativité et la modestie sont filles de la conscience de nos faiblesses face au monde et de la difficulté de se saisir du système dans sa totalité. Elles se nourrissent aussi de l’idée, légitime, que les explications des phénomènes ainsi que leur vérité, changent avec les progrès des sciences. On ne saurait nier, rappelle Granger, qu’une vérité newtonienne concernant la trajectoire d’un astre diffère de la vérité einsteinienne se rapportant au même objet [51]. Sans verser dans un scepticisme à l’égard de la connaissance scientifique, il s’agit plutôt de se regarder en face, nous êtres humains, et de prendre conscience de la richesse que constitue notre capacité à articuler sentiment, raison et expérience. À l’heure où les rêves de la cybernétique se transforment en réalités de l’IA générale, nous avons de plus en plus besoin de références humaines et scientifiques pour nous montrer le chemin.

Ainsi, et pour aller vers la fin de cet exposé, je solliciterai l’auteur de La Science expérimentale, Claude Bernard (1813-1878). Dans son discours de réception à l’Académie française, le 27 mai 1869, le grand médecin et physiologiste observait que, dans le développement progressif de l’humanité, la poésie, la philosophie et les sciences expriment les trois phases de notre intelligence, passant successivement par le sentiment, la raison et l’expérience [52].

Néanmoins, souligne Claude Bernard, ce serait une erreur de croire que si on suit les préceptes de la méthode expérimentale, le chercheur – et je dirais l’intellectuel – doive repousser toute conception a priori et faire taire son sentiment pour ne se fonder que sur les résultats de l’expérience. En effet, dit le physiologiste français, les lois qui règlent les manifestations de l’intelligence humaine ne lui permettent pas de procéder autrement qu’en passant toujours et successivement par le sentiment, la raison et l’expérience. Mais, convaincu de l’inutilité de l’esprit réduit à lui-même, il donne à l’expérience (expérimentation) une influence prépondérante et il cherche à se prémunir contre l’impatience de connaître qui nous pousse sans cesse dans l’erreur. C’est donc avec calme et sans précipitation que nous devons marcher à la recherche de la vérité, en s’appuyant sur la raison ou le raisonnement qui nous sert toujours de guide, mais, à chaque moment, nous devons le tempérer et le dompter par l’expérience, sachant que, à notre insu, le sentiment nous fait retourner à l’origine des choses [53].

Si, aujourd’hui, en 2021, les conceptions démocratiques européennes ont fondamentalement évolué depuis Guizot, notamment à la faveur des progrès de l’éducation et en particulier de l’enseignement supérieur, l’heuristique comme outil de découverte des faits reste une préoccupation sensible des chercheur-e-s de toutes les disciplines, mais aussi des citoyennes et citoyens dans un monde numérique. Comme celles réunies dans le réseau EUNICE, les universités européennes, par leur parcours, mais aussi et surtout par leur ambition, constituent sans aucun doute l’une des meilleures réponses à ces préoccupations réelles.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] Laurent THEIS, Guizot, La traversée d’un siècle, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2014. – Edition Kindle, Location 1104.

[2] René HOVEN, Jacques STIENNON, Pierre-Marie GASON, Jean Chapeaville (1551-1617) et ses amis. Contribution à l’historiographie liégeoise, Bruxelles, Académie royale de Belgique, 2004 – Paul DELFORGE, Jean Chapeaville (1551-1617), Connaître la Wallonie, Namur,  Décembre 2014. http://connaitrelawallonie.wallonie.be/fr/wallons-marquants/dictionnaire/chapeaville-jean#.YWrVvhpBzmE qui avait fasciné, à l’époque, le Professeur Jacques Stiennon.

[3] L. THEIS, op. cit., Location 1149-1150.

[4] Guillaume de BERTHIER DE SAUVIGNY,  François Guizot (1787-1874), dans Encyclopædia Universalis consulté le 13 octobre 2021.https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/francois-guizot/ – Pierre ROSANVALLON, Le moment Guizot, coll. Bibliothèque des Sciences humaines, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 1985. – André JARDIN et André-Jean TUDESQ, La France des Notables, L’évolution générale, 1815-1848,  Nouvelle Histoire de la France contemporaine, Paris, Seuil, 1988.

[5] François GUIZOT, Histoire des origines du gouvernement représentatif en Europe, p. 2, Paris, Didier, 1851. – (…) and man thus learns that in the infinititude of space opened to his knowledge, everything remains constaintly fresh and inexhaustible, in regard to his ever-active and ever-limited intelligence. GUIZOT, History of the Origin of the Representative Government in Europe, p. 2,

[6] Ibidem, p. 5 (EN, p. 3).

[7] Ibidem, p. 6.

[8] Voir sur ces questions le toujours très riche Jean PIAGET dir., Logique et connaissance scientifique, coll. Encyclopédie de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1967. En particulier, J. PIAGET, L’épistémologie et ses variéts, p. 3sv. – Hervé BARREAU, L’épistémologie, Paris, PuF, 2013.

[9] Gérald BRONNER, Apocalypse cognitive, Paris, PUF-Humensi, 2021.

[10] G. BRONNER, Apocalypse…, p. 220-221.

[11] Raymond ARON, La philosophie critique de l’histoire, Essai sur une théorie allemande de l’histoire (1938), Paris, Vrin, 3e éd., 1964.

[12] Raymond ARON, Communication devant la Société française de philosophie, 17 juin 1939, dans R. ARON, Croire en la démocratie, 1933-1944, Textes édités et présentés par Vincent Duclert, p. 102, Paris, Arthème-Fayard – Pluriel, 2017. – Jean BIRNBAUM, Le courage de la nuance, p. 73, Paris, Seuil, 2021.

[13] Alexis de TOCQUEVILLE, La Démocratie en Amérique, dans Œuvres, collection La Pléiade, t. 2, p. 185, Paris, Gallimard, 1992. – G. BRONNER, op. cit., p. 221.

[14] G. BRONNER, op. cit., p. 238 et 298

[15] Valérie IGOUNET, Derrière le Front, Histoires, analyses et décodage du Front national, 26 octobre 2015.

https://blog.francetvinfo.fr/derriere-le-front/2015/10/26/les-francais-dabord.html

[16] Heather STEWART & Rowen MASON, Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant poster reported to police, in The Guardian, June 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants

[17] D. KAHNEMAN, Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011. – Trad. Système 1/ Système 2, Les deux vitesses de la pensée, Paris, Flammarion, 2012. – See also: D. KAHNEMAN et al., dir., Judgment under Uncertainty,: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

[18] Daniel KAHNEMAN, Olivier SIBONY and Cass R. SUNSTEIN, Noise, A flaw in Human Judgment, p. 166-167, New York – Boston – London, Little Brown Spark, 2021. – Trad. Noise, Pourquoi nous faisons des erreurs de jugement et comment les éviter, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2021.

[19] Ibidem, p. 168. – Paul SLOVIC, Psychological Study of Human Judgment: Implications for Investment Decision Making, in Journal of Finance, 27, 1972, p. 779.

[20] Au sens le plus large du concept, tant latin qu’anglo-saxon. Voir Gilles Gaston GRANGER, Epistémologie, dans Encyclopædia Universalis, consulté le 10 octobre 2021. https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/epistemologie/

[21] Jean-Pierre CHRÉTIEN-GONI, Heuristique, dans Encyclopædia Universalis, consulté le 10 octobre 2021. https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/heuristique/

[22] Jean LARGEAULT, Méthode, dans Encyclopædia Universalis, consulté le 10 octobre 2021. https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/methode/

[23] George POLYA, L’Heuristique est-elle un sujet d’étude raisonnable ?, dans Travail et Méthodes, Numéro Hors Série La Méthode dans les Sciences modernes, Paris, Sciences et Industrie, 1958.

[24] G. POLYA, How to Solve it ?, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1945.

[25] G. POLYA, L’Heuristique est-elle un sujet d’étude raisonnable…, p. 284.

[26] Ibn KHALDUN, Le Livre des exemples, Autobiographie, Muqaddima, texte traduit et annoté par Abdesselam Cheddadi, collection Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, t. 1, p. 39, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 2202. – Abdesselam CHEDDADI, Ibn Khaldûn, L’homme et le théoricien de la civilisation, p. 194, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 2006.

[27] François DOSSE, L’histoire, p. 18-20, Paris, A. Colin, 2° éd., 2010. – Blandine BARRET-KRIEGEL, L’histoire à l’âge classique, vol. 2, p. 34, Paris, PUF, 1988.

[28] Ulick Peter BURKE, Lorenzo Valla, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, viewed on October 19, 2021 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lorenzo-Valla- Donation of Constantin, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, viewed on October 19, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Donation-of-Constantine

[29] Charles-Victor LANGLOIS et Charles SEIGNOBOS, Introduction aux études historiques, p. 48-49, Paris, Hachette & Cie, 1898. 4 éd., s.d. (1909).

[30] Robert MARICHAL, La critique des textes, dans Charles SAMARAN dir., L’histoire et ses méthodes, coll. Encyclopédie de la Pléiade,  p. 1248, Paris, NRF-gallimard, 1961.

[31] Gérard NOIREL, Préface de Charles-Victor LANGLOIS et Charles SEIGNOBOS, Introduction aux études historiques, Paris, ENS, 2014. https://books.openedition.org/enseditions/2042#ftn8

[32] Jean-Pierre OLIVIER de SARDAN, La rigueur du qualitatif, Les contraintes empiriques de l’interprétation socio-anthropologique, p. 7-10, Louvain-la-Neuve, Bruylant-Academia, 2008.

[33] Howard S. BECKER, Les ficelles du métier, Comment conduire sa recherche en Sciences sociales, p. 48, Paris, La Découverte, 2002. – J-P OLIVIER de SARDAN, op. cit., p. 8.

[34] F. DOSSE, L’histoire…, p. 29. On vise ici Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges (1830-1889). Voir François HARTOG, Le XIXe siècle et l’histoire, Le cas Fustel de Coulanges, p. 351-352, Paris, PUF, 1988.

[35] Ch. SAMARAN, L’histoire et ses méthodes…, p. XII-XIII.

[36] On ne peut toutefois que s’étonner que, aucun des quatre historiens n’indique la référence de cette citation…  Il s’agit en fait de CICERON, De orate, 2, 62-63. Nam qui nescit primam esse historiae legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat ? deinde ne quid ueri non audeat ? ne quae suspicio gratiae sit in scribendo ? ne quae simultatis ? Haec scilicet fundamenta nota sunt omnibus.  Qui ne sait que la première loi du genre est de ne rien oser dire de faux ? la seconde, d’oser dire tout ce qui est vrai ? D’éviter, en écrivant, jusqu’au moindre soupçon de faveur ou de haine ? Oui, voilà les fondements de l’histoire, et il n’est personne qui les ignore. Autre traduction : en effet, qui ignore que la première loi de l’histoire est de n’oser rien dire de faux ? Enfin, de n’oser rien dire qui ne soit vrai ? Qu’il n’y ait pas le moindre soupçon de complaisance en écrivant ? pas la moindre haine ? Tels sont bien entendu les fondements que tout le monde a connus. Merci à mon collègue historien Paul Delforge d’avoir retrouvé cette source.

[37] Ibidem, p. XIII. – Jean TULARD (1933) et Guy THUILLIER (1932-2019), La méthode en histoire, p. 91, Paris, PUF, 1986.

[38] J. TULARD (1933) et .G. THUILLIER, La méthode en histoire…, p. 92-94.

[39] François WAQUET, Une histoire émotionnelle du savoir, XVIIe-XXIe siècle, p. 325 , Paris, CNRS Editions, 2019.

[40] Lorraine DASTON, The moral Economy of Science, in Osiris, 10, 1995, p. 18-23. – F. WAQUET, op. cit., p. 393,

[41] Henri PIRENNE, De la méthode comparative en histoire, Discours prononcé à la séance d’ouverture du Ve Congrès international des Sciences historiques, 9 avril 1923, Bruxelles, Weissenbruch, 1923. – F. WAQUET, op. cit., p. 306.

[42] F. PAQUET, op. cit., p. 303. – Paul WHITE, Darwin’s emotions, The Scientific self and the sentiment of objectivity, in Isis, 100, 2009, p. 825.

[43] François RUSSO, Valeur et situation de la méthode scientifique, dans La méthode dans les sciences modernes…, p. 341. Voir aussi : F. RUSSO, Nature et méthode de l’histoire des sciences, Paris, Blanchard, 1984.

[44] Georges DUBY, L’histoire continue, p. 72-78, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1991.

[45] Pierre ROSANVALLON, Le moment Guizot, coll. Bibliothèque des sciences humaines, p. 75 et 87, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 1985.

[46] Michel LUSSAULT, L’avènement du monde, Essai sur l’habitation humaine de la Terre, Paris, Seuil, 2013.

[47] Jacques FRANEAU, D’où vient et où va la science ? Discours solennel de rentrée de la Faculté polytechnique de Mons, 26 septmbre 1964, p. 58.

[48] René POMMEAU, Préface, dans VOLTAIRE, Œuvres historiques,  p. 14, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 1957.

[49] Oskar MORGENSTERN, On the accuracy of Economic Observation, Princeton, 1950.

[50] Gilles-Gaston GRANGER, La vérification, p. 191, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1992.

[51] Ibidem, p. 10.

[52] Claude BERNARD, Discours de réception à l’Académie française, 27 mai 1869, dans Claude BERNARD, La Science expérimentale,  p. 405-406, Paris, Baillière & Fils, 3e éd., 1890.

[53] Ibidem, p. 439-440.

« Opinions which are partial have the effect of vitiating the rectitude of judgment », Heuristics and criticism of sources in science

26 octobre 2021
éducation, Democracy, Governance, History
Poster un commentaire

Mons, 21 October 2021 [1]

Abstract

In his History of the Origin of Representative Government in Europe, a series of lectures given two centuries ago, from the end of 1820 to 1822, but published thirty years later, François Guizot (1787-1874) criticised partial opinions conceived before examining the facts. Guizot, a professor at the Sorbonne and future Minister of Education under Louis-Philippe, believed that this attitude distorted the rectitude of judgments and introduced a deplorable frivolity into research. He thought that erudition would suffer as a result of inadequate investigation and cursory judgments. Although, in 2021, European democratic concepts have evolved fundamentally since Guizot’s time, particularly in favour of educational progress and especially higher education, heuristics as a tool for discovering facts remains a serious concern for researchers in all disciplines, and also for citizens in a digital world. European universities, through their process, and above all through their ambition, are arguably one of the best responses to these genuine concerns.

 

A Professor of history at the Sorbonne in Paris in 1812 and then a senior civil servant under the Restoration, François Guizot alarmed the authorities with his liberal ideas and was suspended from teaching from 1822 to 1824. It was during this period that he wrote his major historical works, entitled History of the English Revolution, General History of Civilisation in Europe, and Histoire de la civilisation en France, works which brought him recognition as one of the finest historians of his time [2]. With his scientific mindset, he was one of the first historians – notably after the Liège scholar of the 16th century, Jean Chapeaville (1551-1617) [3] – to use the footnote, in other words, a reference to sources, and to develop an apparatus criticus, using primary sources [4]. After being elected deputy at the beginning of 1830, Guizot became Minister of the Interior in the government that arose out of the July Revolution, which resulted in Louis-Philippe becoming king of the French. As Minister of Public Education from 1832 to 1837, then of Foreign Affairs, he played a key political role, even serving as President of the Council. Conservative by nature and opposed to universal suffrage, he fell from power, along with the king, during the Revolution of 1848 and devoted himself to writing until the end of his life [5].

1. Questions concerning the relationship between a subject and an object

In 1820, while his political friends were excluded from the business of government and he was teaching in Paris, his audiences compiled their notes with a view to publishing his lectures on The History of the Origins of the Representative Government in Europe. Guizot did not perform the necessary revision work until much later, as his lectures were not published until 1851, and then shortly thereafter in London, in English, the following year. During the opening discourse of his lecture of 7 December 1820, which is reproduced in the work, Guizot starts by addressing the relativity of historical facts, which, if they have not gained or lost any of their content over the time they have spanned, will reveal their meaning only gradually, and analysing their significance will reveal new dimensions: and man thus learns, he writes, that in the infinitude of space opened to his knowledge, everything remains constantly fresh and inexhaustible, in regard to his ever-active and ever-limited intelligence [6]. The problem which Professor Guizot imparts to his students lies at the very heart of the objective he has set for his lecture: to describe the history of the public institutions in Europe based on reading about the particular moment of the new political order that had emerged in 1815. For Guizot, this means we have to reconnect what we now are with what we formerly were, and even – and he expresses it so beautifully –, gather together the links in that chain of time.

The problem, observes Guizot, is that studying the old institutions using modern ideas and institutions to explain or judge them has been largely neglected. And when it has happened, he says, it has been approached with such a strong preoccupation of mind, or with such a determined purpose, that the fruits of our labour have been damaged at the outset.

 Opinions which are partial and adopted before facts have been fairly examined, not only have the effect of vitiating the rectitude of judgment, but they moreover introduce a deplorable frivolity into researches which we may call material. As soon as the prejudiced mind has collected a few documents and proofs in support of its cherished notion, it is contented, and concludes its inquiry. On the one hand, it beholds in facts that which is not really contained in them; on the other hand, when it believes that the amount of information it already possesses will suffice, it does not seek further knowledge. Now, such has been the force of circumstances and passions among us, that they have disturbed even erudition itself. It has become a party weapon, an instrument of attack or defence; and facts themselves, inflexible and immutable facts, have been by turns invited or repulsed, perverted or mutilated, according to the interest or sentiment in favour of which they were summoned to appear [7].

Guizot’s analysis is still valid: the problem of discussing political issues that are relatively close in time but perceived as distant due to the scale of the changes that have occurred in the institutional conditions, changes which can be drastic in the case of a revolution or a profound regime change.

He highlights the danger facing teachers, researchers and « intellectuals » – I am aware that it is anachronistic for me to use this word in 1820 or even in 1850 –, the difficulty they have in speaking or writing neutrally, objectively and dispassionately, with the distance that is expected of the role or profession of the person expressing their opinion and getting close to the truth or even telling the truth. The issues surrounding analysis of sources, the ethics of the scientist, and logic as conditions of the truth, along with questions concerning the relationship between a subject and the object they are addressing [8] and historical criticism are at the heart of this self-reflection.

 

2. A Cognitive Apocalypse

In his lecture to his students, Guizot highlights the risk of being contented too quickly with a sparse collection of sources which appear to support a previously stated assumption without truly substantiating it. When faced with the ambitions and requirements of proof, scant data produces incorrect interpretation of documents. Passion and commitment based on a flimsy argument threaten quality of knowledge, while erudition becomes a partisan instrument. How often do we encounter this situation in a world in which, however, education – and particularly higher education – is becoming increasingly democratised?

Guizot, who, as a minister, had previously resurrected the Académie des Sciences morales et politiques (Academy of Moral and Political Sciences), would today find support for his views from another scientist, a member of the Académie des Technologies (National Academy of Technologies of France) and the Académie nationale française de Médecine (French Academy of Medicine). Just over two centuries after the declarations we have highlighted, Gérald Bronner, professor of sociology at the University of Paris, observes in his remarkable work Apocalypse cognitive (Cognitive Apocalypse) that the first twenty years of the 21st century have introduced massive deregulation in the marketplace for ideas. We note, as does Bronner, that this cognitive market is characterised both by the vast amount of information available, which is unprecedented in the history of humanity, and also by the fact that everyone is able to contribute their own representation of the world. Furthermore, Bronner believes that this evolution has weakened the role of the traditional gatekeepers, namely the academics, experts, journalists, and so on, all those who were previously regarded as rightfully able to participate in public debate and perform a beneficial regulatory role [9].

Bronner’s analyses display a degree of pessimism concerning our ability to cope with this situation. At least three reasons are cited: firstly, the famous Brandolini’s Law or Bullshit Asymmetry Principle. The Italian programmer Alberto Brandolini observed, in 2013, that the amount of energy needed to refute nonsense is far greater than that required to produce it [10]. Will we all be able to find the time, strength and courage to deal with waffle, simplistic analyses and even fake news? Many academics on social media have stopped doing so.

In his fine work on Le courage de la nuance (The courage of nuance), the essayist Jean Birnbaum wisely recalls the presentation made by Raymond Aron (1905-1983) at the Société française de Philosophie in June 1939. Faced with the increasing dangers, the great French intellectual called on his colleagues to assess their commitment: I think, said the author of Introduction à la philosophie de l’histoire [11], that teachers like us are likely to play a minor role in this effort to save our deeply held values. Instead of shouting with the parties, we could strive to define, in the utmost good faith, the problems facing us and the way to solve them [12].

Next, Bronner calls on a great mind of the mid-19th century: Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859). More resolutely democratic than his contemporary Guizot, Tocqueville writes, in his book Democracy in America (1835), that in general, only simple conceptions take hold of the minds of the people. A false idea, but one clear and precise, will always have more power in the world than a true, but complex, idea [13]. Some of you may still recall the excellent cartoon by Wiley Miller, published in The Intellectualist, in 2015, which shows a crowd of people approaching a ravine on a path marked Answers, simple but wrong » while one or two are making their way along a winding path, book in hand, having chosen the direction « Complex but right ».

Wiley Miller, The Intellectualist, 2015

Beyond the common meaning of the words, complex systems analysis, so dear to William Ross Ashby (1903-1972), Norbert Wiener (1894-1964), Herbert Simon (1916-2001), Ludwig von Bertalanffy (1901-1972), Jean Ladrière (1921-2007), Edgar Morin, Jean-Louis Le Moigne, Ilya Prigogine (1917-2003) and Isabelle Stengers, to name but a few, often remains outside the field of knowledge of our university chairs and, therefore, of our students.

Lastly, Bronner notes that our voracious brains do not automatically lead us to scientific models. Even where we have an appetite for knowledge, he adds, this can easily be distracted by the way in which the cognitive market is editorialised. This is the case, for example, with the confusion between correlation and causality, which is clearly illustrated by the Nazi slogan, “500,000 unemployed: 400,000 Jews” [14]. This device seems to crop up repeatedly. But there are other examples, and in all fields. For example, in 1978, the French fascist party, the Front national, stated: « A million unemployed people are a million immigrants too many. France and the French first. »[15] Another example is the poster that Nigel Farage unveiled in Westminster in mid-June 2016, one week before the BREXIT referendum on 23 June. The British broadcaster and Leader of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) used a picture with the slogan Breaking point: the EU has failed us all, with the subheading: We must break free of the EU and take back control of our borders. The photograph used was of migrants crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border in 2015, with the only prominent white person in the photograph obscured by a box of text. Many people reacted by saying that to claim that migration to the UK is only about people who are not white is to peddle racism. That controversy prompted Boris Johnson to distance himself from Nigel Farage’s campaign [16].

The fact that we have found some particularly divisive, if not detestable, examples could weaken the idea that each of us, entirely logically, may simply demonstrate only what is prejudice. We often start the process of judgment with an inclination to reach a particular conclusion. In their book Noise: A Flaw of Human Judgment, Daniel Kahneman, Olivier Sibony and Cass R. Sinstein give a great example of a slant of thought they call conclusion bias, or prejudgment: when one of George Lucas’ collaborators in the development of the screenplay for Return of the Jedi, the third Star Wars film, suggested that he should kill off Luke and have Princess Leila take over, Lucas rejected the idea and disagreed with the different arguments, replying that « You don’t go around killing people » and, finally, that he didn’t like and didn’t believe that. As the authors observed, by « Not liking » before « Not believing », Lucas let his fast, intuitive System 1 thinking suggest a conclusion [17]. When we follow that process, we jump to the conclusion and simply bypass the process of gathering and integrating information, or we mobilise System 2 thinking – engaging a deliberative thought – to come up with arguments that support our prejudgment. In that case, adds Kahneman, a Nobel Prize winner for economics, and his colleagues, the evidence will be selective and distorted: because of confirmation bias and desirability bias, we will tend to collect and interpret evidence selectively to favour a judgment that, respectively, we already believe or wish to be true [18]. Prejudgments are evident wherever we look, conclude the three professors. When people determine what they think by consulting their feelings, the process involved is called the affect heuristic [19], a term coined by the psychologist Paul Slovic, Professor at the University of Oregon.

3. Heuristics as a form of resistance for enlightened minds

As is often the case, we can counter our reasons to despair with reasons to rejoice and hope. In my view, these lie in the power of heuristics, techniques and scientific method(s).

Heuristics is generally understood to mean all the intellectual products, processes and approaches that foster discovery and invention in science. There are two distinct aspects. Firstly, a methodological classification which denotes the discovery techniques that substantiate and legitimise knowledge and, secondly, what we can refer to as general heuristics. This forms part of epistemology, the critical study of science [20], and is responsible for describing and reflecting the general conditions for progress in scientific activity [21].

We are clearly all familiar with the questions of method, the path we follow or undertake, which is designed to lead us and to enable us to achieve a given goal and capitalise on a result. This is the path that provides us with our experience as scientists and intellectuals, which we call experimentation when we initiate it systematically. Scientific research is based on a desire to travel along this path, interactively combining assisted observation of experimentation and system analysis, thus enabling explanation. Adapting thoughts to facts is observation; adapting thoughts to each other is theory [22].

In that respect, contemporary research has two messages for us. Firstly, that of rigour and critique, and, secondly, that of relativity, and therefore humility. In my view, these are each as necessary and important as the other.

3.1. The first message: that of rigour and critique.

Rigour consists, firstly, in knowing what one is talking about, what the problem is, and what one is looking for. This is the first reasonable goal of heuristics: to express in general terms the reasons for choosing subjects which, when analysed, may help us achieve the solution [23]. We can, of course, follow in the footsteps of mathematicians, physicians, logicians, and philosophers, such as Pappus of Alexandria (4th century AD), René Descartes (1596-1650), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646-1716), Bernhard Bolzano (1781-1848), Ernst Mach ((1838-1916), Jacques Hadamard (1865-1963), George Polya (1887-1985), Jean Hamburger (1909-1992), Morris Kline (1908-1992), and, more recently, Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick. In each of our disciplines, we have visited one or more of them, if not all. A mathematician such as Polya, author of How to Solve it? [24], who taught in Zurich and then at Stanford, argues that the sources of inventions are more important than the inventions themselves. This should, he claims, be the motto of any student planning a career in science. Unsubstantiated demonstrations, lemmas that appear out of nowhere, and supplementary approaches that occur unexpectedly are puzzling and depressing for all students, both good and mediocre [25]. Having struggled through an oral exam on Bernouilli’s theory, I can personally testify.

There are, in the world, certain traditions for constructing a critical and intellectually robust discourse, one which is also not Eurocentric and does not, contrary to what we too often teach, date back to the Renaissance or the Enlightenment. As a Visiting Professor at the National Engineering School of Tunis, I am constantly discovering how much we owe – and the term “we” includes researchers such as Arnold J. Toynbee and Joseph Schumpeter – to the Arab scholar Ibn Khaldoun (1332-1406). In the introduction to his great work Muqaddima, this 14th century economist, sociologist and historian recommended making a comparison between the stories as handed down and the rules and models thus established. If they concur and are consistent, these stories can be declared authentic, if not, they will be considered suspect and discounted [26].

This tangible heuristic effort was pioneered by the Italian humanist Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457), whose role was, according to François Dosse, decisive in the notion of truth, to the extent that Dosse, a historian and epistemologist at the University of Paris, spoke of a real turning point [27]. Valla questioned the authenticity of the Donation of Constantine, written in 1440. This text, which acknowledged the fact that the Roman emperor Constantine the Great had bestowed vast territory and spiritual and temporal power on Pope Sylvester I (who reigned from 314 to 335), had great influence on political and religious affairs in medieval Europe. Lorenzo Valla clearly demonstrated that this document was a forgery by analysing the language of the donation. He showed that the Latin used in the text was not that of the 4th century and so argued that the document could not possibly have dated from the time of Constantine [28].

The critical method has found its guardians of the temple in Charles-V Langlois and Charles Seignobos, who established a bulwark against what they considered the natural inclination of the human spirit: not taking precautions and acting confusedly in situations where the utmost caution is essential. They wrote that while everyone, in principle, accepts the value of Criticism – with a capital C! – it hardly ever happens in practice.

The fact is that Criticism is contrary to the normal aspect of intelligence. The spontaneous human tendency is to add belief to assertions and to reproduce them, without even distinguishing them clearly from one’s own observations. In daily life, do we not accept indiscriminately, without any checks, hearsay, anonymous, unsafe information, and all types of documents of mediocre or dubious merit? (…) Any sincere person will recognise that significant effort is needed to shake off the ignavia critica, that common expression for intellectual cowardice; that this effort must be repeated, and that it is often accompanied by genuine suffering [29].

Suffering, the word is out … As with beauty, one needs to suffer to be a researcher. Research is a form of torture inspired, in part, by the works of the German historian Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886). To reach scientific paradise, the research process subjects the document, and the student and the teacher, to a series of analytical operations made up of internal criticism or scholarly criticism (restoration, provenance, classification of sources, criticism of scholars), then to internal criticism (interpretation, negative internal criticism, criticism of sincerity and accuracy, establishing the specific facts) and, lastly, optimises them in synthetic operations.

In 1961, in his extraordinary work entitled L’histoire et ses méthodes (History and its methods), published under the direction of Charles Samaran (1879-1982) from the Institut de France, Robert Marichal (1904-1999) picked up the notion put forward by Langlois and Seignobos, observing that documentary criticism had scarcely been challenged by the proponents of “New History”, which, according to this esteemed archivist, thought that the traditional processes were still effective. Marichal added that the principles that apply to criticism were no different, in general, to those that apply to all human knowledge, as can be found in any logic or psychology textbook [30].

Fifty years later, Gérard Noiriel, a specialist in epistemology in history, states in the online edition of the work by Langlois and Seignobos that they had not invented the rules of historical method, as the basic principles had been known since the 17th century and had been codified by German historians at the beginning of the 19th century. The major contribution of these two professors at the Sorbonne is arguably, states Noiriel, that they wrote that it was necessary to read the historians with the same critical precautions as when one analyses documents [31].

Human science has been greatly influenced by the scientific path taken by history at the end of the 19th century. But, like history, it has distanced itself from this strict criticism of documents. In an introduction, in 2008, entitled L’approximative rigueur de l’anthropologie (The approximate rigour of anthropology), Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, a professor at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences sociales (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences) in Paris, showed that the word was nothing more than an apparent paradox, highlighting the inevitability of approximation faced with the vulnerability of cognitive bias and ideological excesses, and then abandoning this quest completely in a book entitled La Rigueur du qualitatif The Rigour of the Qualitative) [32]. De Sardan also enlisted his American colleague Howard Becker, who, in Sociological Work: Method and Substance (Chicago, Adline, 1970) and Writing for Social Scientists (University of Chicago Press, 1986 & 2007), had highlighted this tension between consistency of what is being described and conformity with the elements discovered [33].

The scientific paradigm has given way to other paradigms, which have also characterised all human sciences. This is the case with the famous École des Annales (School of Annals), whose books, by a brilliant professor from Liège, Léon-E. Halkin (1906-1998), and supported by the Centre de Recherches historiques at the École pratique des Hautes Études in Paris, have helped to clarify these issues surrounding historical criticism.

Although it remained a methodological requirement, the strict critical method – in the sense of the idolatrous cult of the document [34]  – seemed to become more relaxed at the beginning of the 1980s. At the same time, as Charles Samaran had already done in 1961, it was now a question of highlighting the general principles of the method [35], or even the ethics, of the historian. In that regard and taking their cue from the editorial director of l’Histoire et ses méthodes, Guy Thuillier (1932-2019) and Jean Tulard call on the mighty Cicero for help: the first law he must obey is to have the courage not to say what he knows to be false, the second is to have the courage to say what he believes to be true. Thus, they continue, sincerity of mind implies critical sense [36]. The other precepts of Thuillier and Tulard are those I offer to my students, pointing out that this advice applies to all their tasks in all disciplines, as in daily life:

  • Do not assert anything unless there is a “document” that you have verified personally.
  • Always indicate the document’s degree of “probability” – or uncertainty. Do not rely on appearances or have blind faith in texts (…)
  • Always explicitly highlight the assumptions that guide the research, and point out the limits of the investigation (…)
  • Maintain a certain distance from the subject in question and do not confuse, for instance, biography and hagiography (…)
  • Be wary of hasty generalisations (…)
  • Be aware that nothing is definitive (…)
  • Know how to use your time well; do not rush your work (…),
  • Do not shut yourself away in your office (…). Life experience is essential (…) [37]

3.2. The second message is that of relativity, and therefore of humility.

 The remarkable work done by Françoise Waquet, research director at the CNRS, ends with some powerful words: science, she writes, is human – inevitably, mundanely, profoundly so [38]. Her research, in laboratories, libraries and offices, among teachers and students, books and computers, shows how business rules and academic passion(s) are structured around objectivity. Waquet considers the analyses performed Lorraine Daston, co-director of the Max Planck Institute Berlin for the History of Science. These works showed a propensity to strive for a knowledge that bears no trace of the person who has the knowledge, a knowledge which is not characterised by bias or acquired concepts, by imagination or judgment, by desire or effort. In this system of objectivity, passion appears to be the internal enemy of the researcher [39].

Henri Pirenne expressed it perfectly, in 1923, when he claimed that, in order to achieve objectivity or impartiality without which there is no science, [researchers] must constrict themselves and overcome their cherished prejudices, their most deeply seated convictions, and their most natural and respectable sentiments [40]. Moreover, Émile Durkheim expressed the same view for sociology, as did Marcel Mauss for anthropology, Vidal de la Blache for geography and even Émile Borel for mathematics. We could, as Françoise Waquet did, list numerous examples that, even in the so called “hard” sciences, lead to a form of asceticism and ardent objectivity [41].

In the second half of the twentieth century, the dramatic advances in science after the end of the Second World War and the questions arising from criticism of modernity have not left science unscathed. The Jesuit François Russo (1909-1998), a former student at the École polytechnique, noted, in 1959, that science tends to pose problems that lie beyond the domain of the strict scientific method. He cited the theories of Albert Einstein (1879-1955) and Georges Lemaître (1894-1966), other analyses regarding the universe in its entirety, and considerations concerning the depletion of energy in the universe, biological evolution, the origins of life and of humans, human nature, etc., underlining that scientific advances cause these questions to reappear rather than disappear. In this way, and at the same, he posed questions of meaning [42].

Should it be said that the debates on these issues have evolved, from Raymond Aron (1905-1983) to Paul Ricœur (1913-2005), from Karl Polanyi (1886-1964) to Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), from Karl Popper (1902-1994) to Richard Rorty (1931-2007) and Anthony Giddens, etc.?

On the question of objectivity, he was one of the professors whose classes had the greatest impact on me, who, when faced with passion, demonstrated the path of lucidity. In L’histoire continue (History is going on), the medievalist Georges Duby (1919-1996) considers that it is strict positivist ethics that gives the profession of researcher its dignity. If, he continues, history is abandoning the illusory quest for total objectivity, it is not on account of the stream of irrationality that is invading our culture, but it is above all because the notion of truth in history has changed. Its goal has moved: it is now interested less in facts and more in relationships… [43]

 

Conclusion: sentiment, reason and experience

Let us return to François Guizot, where we began, but this time in closing.

In that Guizot’s moment, as Pierre Rosanvallon called it, a veritable golden age of political science [44], the lesson was clear: how, at close quarters and under pressure from the major upheavals seen in that period – the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution, and the structural and systemic transformations they caused in the fields of technology, politics, society, culture, etc. –, how can we comprehend these events under the sovereignty of reason?

Even if most people have perceived, each in their own time, the advent of a new world [45], with its growth, acceleration, emerging trends and instabilities, our society appears to be characterised more so than yesterday by the flow of information of all kinds that reaches us, challenges us, and assails us. Carried along at great speed on what was already being called the information superhighway a few decades ago, we are learning to control our minds at hitherto unknown speeds, bolstered as we are by our digital tools. To put it mildly, it is now microprocessors that punctuate our work. During lockdown, having switched from Teams to Zoom, from Jitsi to Webex or Google Meet – and having often continued the habit, we all know that it is now the digital world that sets the pace. In the flow of messages, links and texts sent to us, we are learning how to identify the hackers and other digital pests. Beyond our defensive tools, it is experience that often guides us.

We have few firewalls to defend ourselves against the demons of the cognitive apocalypse described, or promised, by Gérald Bronner. We do not want any censorship of “good thinking” or a sterilised world in which we filter our connections and sanitise our brains. In my view, the best form of regulation remains our own intelligence.

This certainly involves heuristics and research methods. In a formal address he gave in September 1964 to mark start of the new term at the Faculté polytechnique de Mons, professor and future rector Jacques Franeau (+2007) noted that it was necessary to avoid confusing objective with subjective, and that, since the primary aim of any society was to create the best environment for human life and happiness, it was necessary, to achieve that goal, for it to start from certain and objective data, to have knowledge before choosing its direction, and then to build on the solid foundations afforded by that knowledge [46].

Thus, to address the concerns, we have highlighted two responses: firstly, rigour and criticism and, secondly, relativity and humility.

Without resorting to Voltaire’s idea that all certainty which is not mathematical demonstration is merely extreme probability [47], the teaching of those who frequent higher education must base stringency on both the robustness and the reasonable traceability of any information produced. Citing a source does not, whatever the discipline, mean referring to the overall work of a scholar, nor even to one of their creations – digital or paper – without specifying the location of the information. Some colleagues or students send you a 600-page book with no further clarification, editing or pagination. Verification is impossible. Similarly, to return to an observation made previously by both the German-American mathematician and economist Oskar Morgenstern (1902-1977) [48] and the Frenchman Gilles-Gaston Granger (1920-2016) [49], the issue of data validity and reliability does not seem to be of interest to many researchers. For these two distinguished experts in comparative epistemology, it was economists who were being targeted. But we can be sure than many other researchers are affected. I am certain that these testimonies resonate with you as they do with me. Training our students in rigour, precision and criticism will certainly help to make them not only good researchers, but also mindful and courageous intellectuals, in other words individuals capable of grasping the most difficult or far-fetched content, breaking free from it, and communicating only what is accurate and certain.

Relativity and humility stem from our awareness of our weaknesses when faced with the world and the difficulty we have in grasping the system as a whole. They are also nurtured by the legitimate notion that explanations of phenomena and their truth change with scientific advances. It cannot be denied, states Granger, that a Newtonian truth concerning the trajectory of a star differs from Einstein’s truth regarding the same object [50]. Rather than being sceptical about scientific knowledge, it is instead a question of looking at ourselves, as human beings, and acknowledging the richness of our capacity to articulate sentiment, reason and experience. At a time when cybernetic dreams are becoming a reality in artificial general intelligence, we have an ever-increasing number of human and scientific references to show us the way.

Thus, to conclude this talk, I will refer to the author of La Science expérimentale, Claude Bernard (1813-1878). In his acceptance speech at the Académie française, on 27 May 1869, the great doctor and philologist observed that, in the progressive development of humanity, poetry, philosophy and science express the three phases of our intelligence, moving successively through sentiment, reason and experience [51].

Nevertheless, states Bernard, it would be wrong to believe that if one follows the precepts of the experimental method, the researcher – and I would say the intellectual – must reject all a priori notions and silence their sentiment, so that their views are based solely on the results of the experiment. In reality, he adds, the laws that govern manifestations of human intelligence do not allow the researcher to proceed other than by always, and successively, moving through sentiment, reason and experience. But, convinced of the worthlessness of the spirit when reduced to itself, he gives experience (experimentation) a dominant influence and he tries to guard against the impatience of knowing, which leads us constantly to make mistakes. We must therefore go in search of the truth calmly and without haste, relying on reason, or reasoning, which always serves to guide us, but, at every step, we must temper it and tame it through experience, in the knowledge that, unbeknown to us, sentiment causes us return to the origin of things [52].

If, in 2021, European democratic conceptions have fundamentally evolved since Guizot, thanks to progress in education and in particular within higher education, heuristics as a tool for discovering facts remains a sensitive concern for researchers of all disciplines, but also citizens, in a digital world. European universities, such as those gathered in EUNICE, considering their background, but also above all by their ambition, undoubtedly constitute one of the best responses to real concerns.

 

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

[1] This text is the background paper of the conference that I presented on October 21, 2021 at the Academic Hall of the University of Mons, as part of EUNICE WEEKS mobilising, with the support of the European Commission, the network which brings together the universities of Brandenburg, Cantabria, Catania, Lille – Hauts de France, Poznań, Vaasa and Mons.

[2] Laurent THEIS, Guizot, La traversée d’un siècle, Paris, CNRS Editions, 2014. – Edition Kindle, Location 1104. – François Guizot, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Oct. 8, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Francois-Guizot

[3] René HOVEN, Jacques STIENNON, Pierre-Marie GASON, Jean Chapeaville (1551-1617) et ses amis. Contribution à l’historiographie liégeoise, Bruxelles, Académie royale de Belgique, 2004 – Paul DELFORGE, Jean Chapeaville (1551-1617), Connaître la Wallonie, Namur,  December 2014. http://connaitrelawallonie.wallonie.be/fr/wallons-marquants/dictionnaire/chapeaville-jean#.YWrVvhpBzmE which, at the time, had fascinated Professor Jacques Stiennon (ULIEGE).

[4] Ibidem, Location 1149-1150.

[5] Guillaume de BERTHIER DE SAUVIGNY, François Guizot (1787-1874), in Encyclopædia Universalis accessed on 13 October  2021.https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/francois-guizot/ – Pierre ROSANVALLON, Le moment Guizot, coll. Bibliothèque des Sciences humaines, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 1985. – André JARDIN and André-Jean TUDESQ, La France des Notables, L’évolution générale, 1815-1848, Nouvelle Histoire de la France contemporaine, Paris, Seuil, 1988.

[6] François GUIZOT, Histoire des origines du gouvernement représentatif en Europe, p. 2, Paris, Didier, 1851. – (…) and man thus learns that in the infinitude of space opened to his knowledge, everything remains constantly fresh and inexhaustible, in regard to his ever-active and ever-limited intelligence. GUIZOT, History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe, p. 2,

[7] François GUIZOT, History of the Origin of Representative Government in Europe, translated by Andrew E. Scobe, p. 4, London, Henry G. Bohn, 1852.

https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/61250/pg61250-images.html#Page_1

[8] Concerning these issues, see the always very valuable Jean PIAGET dir., Logique et connaissance scientifique, coll. Encyclopédie de la Pléiade, Paris, Gallimard, 1967. In particular, J. PIAGET, L’épistémologie et ses variétés, p. 3sv. – Hervé BARREAU, L’épistémologie, Paris, PuF, 2013.

[9] Gérald BRONNER, Apocalypse cognitive, Paris, PUF-Humensi, 2021.

[10] G. BRONNER, Apocalypse…, p. 220-221.

[11] Raymond ARON, La philosophie critique de l’histoire, Essai sur une théorie allemande de l’histoire (1938), Paris, Vrin, 3e ed., 1964.

[12] Raymond ARON, Communication devant la Société française de philosophie, 17 juin 1939, dans R. ARON, Croire en la démocratie, 1933-1944, Textes édités et présentés par Vincent Duclert, p. 102, Paris, Arthème-Fayard – Pluriel, 2017. – Jean BIRNBAUM, Le courage de la nuance, p. 73, Paris, Seuil, 2021.

[13] Alexis de TOCQUEVILLE, Democracy in America (1835), Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, p. 155, Chicago & London, The University of Chicago Press, 2002. – La Démocratie en Amérique, in Œuvres, collection La Pléade, t. 2, p. 185, Paris, Gallimard, 1992. – G. BRONNER, op. cit., p. 221.

[14] G. BRONNER, op. cit., p. 238 et 298

[15] Valérie IGOUNET, Derrière le Front, Histoires, analyses et décodage du Front national, 26 octobre 2015. https://blog.francetvinfo.fr/derriere-le-front/2015/10/26/les-francais-dabord.html

[16] Heather STEWART & Rowen MASON, Nigel Farage’s anti-migrant poster reported to police, in The Guardian, June 16, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/16/nigel-farage-defends-ukip-breaking-point-poster-queue-of-migrants

[17] D. KAHNEMAN, Thinking, Fast and Slow, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011. – Trad. Système 1/ Système 2, Les deux vitesses de la pensée, Paris, Flammarion, 2012. – See also: D. KAHNEMAN et al., dir., Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, 1982.

[18] Daniel KAHNEMAN, Olivier SIBONY and Cass R. SUNSTEIN, Noise, A flaw in Human Judgment, p. 166-167, New York – Boston – London, Little Brown Spark, 2021.

[19] Ibidem, p. 168. – Paul SLOVIC, Psychological Study of Human Judgment: Implications for Investment Decision Making, in Journal of Finance, 27, 1972, p. 779.

[20] In the broadest sense of the concept, both Latin and Anglo-Saxon. See Gilles Gaston GRANGER, Epistémologie, dans Encyclopædia Universalis, viewed on 10 October 2021. https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/epistemologie/

[21] Jean-Pierre CHRÉTIEN-GONI, Heuristique, dans Encyclopædia Universalis, viewed on 10 October 2021. https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/heuristique/ – Avrum STROLL, Epistemology, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, viewed on 16 October 2021, https://www.britannica.com/topic/epistemology

[22] Jean LARGEAULT, Méthode, Encyclopædia Universalis, viewed on 10 October 2021. https://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/methode/ – Scientific Method, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, October 15, 2021, viewed on 17 October. https://www.britannica.com/science/scientific-method

[23] George POLYA, L’Heuristique est-elle un sujet d’étude raisonnable?, in Travail et Méthodes, Numéro Hors Série La Méthode dans les Sciences modernes, Paris, Sciences et Industrie, 1958.

[24] G. POLYA, How to Solve it?, Princeton University Press, 1945.

[25] G. POLYA, L’Heuristique est-elle un sujet d’étude raisonnable…, p. 284.

[26] Ibn KHALDUN, Le Livre des exemples, Autobiographie, Muqaddima, text translated and annotated by Abdesselam Cheddadi, collection Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, t. 1, p. 39, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 2202. (Our translation in English) – Abdesselam CHEDDADI, Ibn Khaldûn, L’homme et le théoricien de la civilisation, p. 194, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 2006.

[27] François DOSSE, L’histoire, p. 18-20, Paris, A. Colin, 2° éd., 2010. – Blandine BARRET-KRIEGEL, L’histoire à l’âge classique, vol. 2, p. 34, Paris, PUF, 1988.

[28] Ulick Peter BURKE, Lorenzo Valla, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, viewed on October 19, 2021 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Lorenzo-Valla- Donation of Constantin, in Encyclopaedia Britannica, viewed on October 19, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Donation-of-Constantine

[29] Charles-Victor LANGLOIS and Charles SEIGNOBOS, Introduction aux études historiques, p. 48-49, Paris, Hachette & Cie, 1898. 4 ed., s.d. (1909).

[30] Robert MARICHAL, La critique des textes, in Charles SAMARAN dir., L’histoire et ses méthodes, coll. Encyclopédie de la Pléiade, p. 1248, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 1961.

[31] Gérard NOIREL, Preface by Charles-Victor LANGLOIS and Charles SEIGNOBOS, Introduction aux études historiques, Paris, ENS, 2014. https://books.openedition.org/enseditions/2042#ftn8

[32] Jean-Pierre OLIVIER de SARDAN, La rigueur du qualitatif, Les contraintes empiriques de l’interprétation socio-anthropologique, p. 7-10, Louvain-la-Neuve, Bruylant-Academia, 2008.

[33] Howard BECKER, Les ficelles du métier, Comment conduire sa recherche en Sciences sociales, p. 48, Paris, La Découverte, 2002. – J-P OLIVIER de SARDAN, op. cit., p. 8.

[34] F. DOSSE, L’histoire…, p. 29. Here, we are referring to Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges (1830-1889). See François HARTOG, Le XIXe siècle et l’histoire, Le cas Fustel de Coulanges, p. 351-352, Paris, PUF, 1988.

[35] Ch. SAMARAN, L’histoire et ses méthodes…, p. XII-XIII.

[36] Ibidem, p. XIII. – J. TULARD & G. THUILLIER, op. cit., p. 91.

[37] J. TULARD (1933) and .G. THUILLIER, La méthode en histoire…, p. 92-94.

[38] Françoise WAQUET, Une histoire émotionnelle du savoir, XVIIe-XXIe siècle, p. 325 , Paris, CNRS Editions, 2019.

[39] Lorraine DASTON, The moral Economy of Science, in Osiris, 10, 1995, p. 18-23. – F. WAQUET, op. cit., p. 393,

[40] Henri PIRENNE, De la méthode comparative en histoire, Discours prononcé à la séance d’ouverture du Ve Congrès international des Sciences historiques, 9 April 1923, Brussels, Weissenbruch, 1923. – F. WAQUET, op. cit., p. 306.

[41] F. PAQUET, op. cit., p. 303. – Paul WHITE, Darwin’s emotions, The Scientific self and the sentiment of objectivity, in Isis, 100, 2009, p. 825.

[42] François RUSSO, Valeur et situation de la méthode scientifique, in La méthode dans les sciences modernes…, p. 341. – See also: F. RUSSO, Nature et méthode de l’histoire des sciences, Paris, Blanchard, 1984.

[43] Georges DUBY, L’histoire continue, p. 72-78, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1991.

[44] Pierre ROSANVALLON, Le moment Guizot, coll. Bibliothèque des sciences humaines, p. 75 et 87, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 1985.

[45] Michel LUSSAULT, L’avènement du monde, Essai sur l’habitation humaine de la Terre, Paris, Seuil, 2013.

[46] Jacques FRANEAU, D’où vient et où va la science ? Formal address to mark the start of term at the Faculté polytechnique de Mons, 26 September 1964, p. 58.

[47] René POMMEAU, Préface, in VOLTAIRE, Œuvres historiques,  p. 14, Paris, NRF-Gallimard, 1957.

[48] Oskar MORGENSTERN, On the accuracy of Economic Observation, Princeton, 1950.

[49] Gilles-Gaston GRANGER, La vérification, p. 191, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1992.

[50] Ibidem, p. 10.

[51] Claude BERNARD, Discours de réception à l’Académie française, 27 May 1869, in Claude BERNARD, La Science expérimentale,  p. 405-406, Paris, Baillière & Fils, 3rd ed., 1890.

[52] Ibidem, p. 439.

Some “new” governance models in Europe and the United States

18 janvier 2019
Democracy
Poster un commentaire

Washington, 5 November 2018

We live in an age where populism, as both a totalitarian and a Manichean political attitude [1], is becoming more established on both sides of the Atlantic. An age, also, in which there is a proliferation of democratic innovations attempting to address the issues of the 21st century and the crises in representation and delegation. The question of public confidence in institutions is key, but it is based, first and foremost, on the way in which these issues should be resolved and, therefore, on the mechanisms that allow this to happen. In this respect, questioning governance in terms of its relationship with the law, as the World Bank and the World Academy of Art and Science are doing, makes sense, particularly in as turbulent a context as the one we live in today [2]. It seems that each piece of data, each reality, each fact and each change is doubted, challenged or even disputed. Individualism and the restricted thought communities in which some people seem to isolate themselves permanently prohibit any critical dialogue, permitting instead all forms of intellectual or cybernetic manipulation. Memory fades and the horizon becomes more limited, rendering any view fundamentally myopic. In an age of fake news [3], combined with superficial perspectives, all information, and also all knowledge, seems fragile and shifting. Yet, as a historian and Yale professor Timothy Snyder rightly pointed out, if there is no truth, there can be no trust, and nothing new appears in a human vacuum [4].

The democratic innovations are clearly here to fill this vacuum, by restoring meaning to collective action in which the involvement of each individual is recognised and by empowering citizens and politicians. The Destree Institute’s Wallonia Policy Lab – the Brussels Area Node for the Millennium Project – has been involved in these innovations in conjunction with the Parliament of Wallonia, based on an experiment which was launched in 1994 and which ended in 2017 and 2018, with citizens’ panels held within the parliamentary precinct itself, in dialogue with deputies and ministers. We are dealing here with the processes highlighted by Professor Archon Fung [5] which he calls “empowered deliberation” or “empowered participatory governance”, which enable officials and citizens to address complex and volatile governance issues to try and resolve them jointly [6].

In addressing some “new” governance models in Europe and the United States, we will firstly review the definition of the concept and the organisation of its models in three spheres. We will then move on to examine six mutations which have influenced and developed this model, before turning our attention to a 21st-century form of governance, as advocated by the Committee of Experts on Public Administration in the United Nations Economic and Social Council which, during its 2018 session, proposed a form of governance for Agenda 2030.

 

 1. The governance models

Behind the concept of governance, as we will use it here, lies an old idea reflecting the political science of social administration, and a more modern concept, stemming from the end of the 1980s, which represents an effort to reinvent a management model through dynamic organisation of the actors and stakeholders. This model has a history, which we will not elaborate on here, but which has its roots in the process of decolonisation and advancement of human rights and in the efforts, particularly by the United Nations and the related institutions, to shape new countries or even a new world [7].

 

1.1. Towards a definition of the concept of governance

In 1991, in a Report by the Council of the Club of Rome entitled The First Global Revolution, Alexander King (1909-2007) and Bertrand Schneider (born in 1929) use the term “governance” to denote the command mechanism of a social system (and its actions), which endeavours to provide security, prosperity, coherence, order and continuity to the system. This concept necessarily embraces the ideology of the system, which may (democratic) or may not (authoritarian) define means for the effective consideration of the public will and the accountability of those authorities. It also includes the structure of the government of the system, its policies and its procedures. Some might even say that governance is the means to provide a stable equilibrium between the various centres of power [8].

The British successor to Aurelio Peccei as President of the Club of Rome, and the French Secretary General of that organisation which was founded in 1968, note that the concept of governance, in the broadest sense, should not be reserved for national or international systems but should be used for regional, provincial and local governments and for other social systems such as education, defence, private enterprise and even the family microcosm [9]. Thus, governance includes the government and also any actor who uses the command mechanisms to articulate demand, formulate objectives, disseminate guidelines and monitor policies [10]. As the political scientist and futurist James Rosenau (1924-2011) indicates, in this fragmented world of ours, all these many and varied actors are of no less importance in the governance process than government policies. However, Rosenau, a professor at George Washington University, qualifies the idea of “command mechanism” found in the Club of Rome’s definition, preferring instead the concept of “control or steering mechanism”, which brings the concept closer to its etymological origin [11].

Steven Rosell, a Canadian researcher at the Institute for Research on Public Policy who was himself inspired by the works of the American diplomat and professor Harlan Cleveland (1918-2000) [12], offers a definition of governance that takes account of these aspects when he writes: the process of governance is the process whereby an organization or a society steers itself, adding that the dynamics of communication and control are central to that process. While the role of government is and remains central to the process of governance, in the information society more and more players, voluntary organisations, interest groups, the private sector, the media and so on – become involved in that process [13].

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has set itself the goal of advocating for change and connecting countries to knowledge, experience and resources that help people build a better life. In its second annual report, in 1991, the UNDP suggests that underdevelopment originates from a lack of political accountability rather than a lack of funding. Since 1992, the term “governance”, combined with the democratisation of State management, has appeared in the Global Report on Human Development [14]. The UNDP, which was a co-author, defined good governance as the exercise of political, economic and administrative authority in the management of a country’s affairs at all levels. Governance comprises the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations. Good governance has many attributes. It is participatory, transparent and accountable. It is effective in making the best use of resources and is equitable. And it promotes the rule of law [15].

We are aware of the World Bank’s role in disseminating the concept of “good governance” as a public management model – developing accounting control to tackle corruption, building legal frameworks to promote the establishment of international free enterprise, a mechanism for decentralising services, etc. [16] The Washington institution was also at the forefront in terms of defining institutional governance:

We define governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them [17]. We see the operational side of this definition for the World Bank, a definition which also includes a range of indicators that help to explain these various aspects of governance [18].

Other definitions have been developed over time, including those of the European Commission, the OECD and various countries. In its White Paper in 2001, the European Commission indicates that governance means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which they are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence [19].

As the political scientists have demonstrated, governance is a descriptive label used to highlight the changing nature of the political process over the past few decades. This concept alerts us to the ever-increasing diversity of areas and actors involved in the development of public policies. It takes into account all the actors and all the areas outside the executive framework of the policy development process [20]. The key element in both understanding and promoting governance is probably the notion of stakeholders of the particular policy or issue, which turns such parties into potential actors [21]. Whether they are engaged in action or in campaigning, it is through such involvement that actors find the legitimacy of participating in the governance of the defined territory. As for the public sector, such involvement may offer it a new opportunity to rethink its role and, consequently, a new vitality [22].

Lester Salamon, professor at John Hopkins University, has highlighted the new governance paradigm by demonstrating the transition between, on the one hand, traditional public administration based on programmes, agencies, hierarchy, public-private sector antagonism, command and control mechanisms and skills-based management, and, on the other, governance based on new tools, network logic, a constructive relationship between the public and private sectors, negotiation and persuasion and development of skills [23].

This comparison is consistent with others, particularly that between the Weberian Bureaucratic State and the Postmodern State, between government and governance, drawn up by Richards and Smith in 2002 and developed by Michael Hill [24].

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 1.2. The three spheres of governance

The UNDP model structures the State, the private sector and civil society as three spheres of governance based on a specific division of tasks.

– The role of the State and its three powers – legislative, judiciary and executive (public services and the military) – is to create a political and legal environment and climate conducive to human development by defending interests for the public good. It is the State’s responsibility to ensure law enforcement, maintain order and security, create a national identity and vision, define a public policy and programmes, generate revenues for public services and infrastructures, draw up and implement its budget and regulate and stimulate the market.

– The private sector which, from the smallest business to the largest, grows within the market, creates and provides goods and services, along with jobs and revenues for citizens. This commercial sector is not linked to a specific territory, yet it is an element of regional development.

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Three spheres of governance

– The private sector which, from the smallest business to the largest, grows within the market, creates and provides goods and services, along with jobs and revenues for citizens. This commercial sector is not linked to a specific territory, yet it is an element of regional development.

– Civil society, which comprises all citizens, who may be organised through non-governmental organisations, professional organisations, religious associations, women’s associations, cultural or community associations, etc., facilitates political and social interaction, particularly by mobilising groups of citizens to participate in economic, social and political activities and express a range of dynamic and varied opinions [25].

Although it makes the system easier to understand, this arrangement of the three spheres of governance does not diminish the complexity of the system. Thus, it reveals the following seven types of relationships which remain common:

– the relationship between governments and markets;

– the relationship between governments and citizens;

– the relationship between governments and the voluntary or private sectors;

– the relationship between (elected) politicians and (appointed) civil servants;

– the relationship between local government institutions and residents in towns and rural areas;

– the relationship between the legislative and the executive;

– the relationship between the Nation State and the international institutions ([26]).

In its analysis, the UNDP points out that none of the three spheres is solely responsible for good governance and cannot own it by itself. Good governance extends beyond the functions of each sphere and is a matter for their meetings and interactions. As G. Shabbir CHEEMA, Director of the Improved Management & Governance Division of the UNDP, writes, it is first and foremost a question of promoting interaction between these three spheres. The actors involved at the point where the State, the private sector and civil society meet are the keys to governance [27].

Thus, from the experience of international cooperation, globalisation and economic interdependence, it is possible to derive this approach to governance, which can be seen as a process of coordinating actors, social groups and institutions that produce compromises and political and social consensus on achieving specific goals – which are discussed and defined collectively – in fragmented and uncertain environments. This view of the concept clearly addresses the issue of the State’s role in the organisation of society. Although it radically alters the nature of the relationship between citizens and State, the governance model cannot replace the function of government. We are dealing here with a complementary approach, which involves the decision-makers and increases their expectation of collective action by relying on the other pillars of society.

We can see this in the convergence between the various definitions of the concept of governance and the issue of the position of civil society, while the capacity of civil society to enter into a global dialogue with the political sphere is central to the revitalisation of democracy and the rehabilitation of politics. The key element in both understanding and promoting governance is probably the notion of stakeholders of the particular policy or issue, which turns such parties into potential actors. It is through their action or campaigning that actors find the legitimacy of participating in the political and social arena. As for the public sector, and particularly the government, such involvement may offer it a new opportunity to rethink its role and, consequently, a new vitality [28]. Indeed, politics retains its rightful place in the new model. Its own, new political vision leads it into the heart of the system, as a facilitator and organiser of the debate and of the decisions being taken between actors. In this respect, it appears to be the mastermind, like the State [29].

2. Six mutations that influence governance

At a particular moment in history – in the early 1990s –, a search for a new equilibrium was launched between market, political and civil society actors. It may be that the third of these served to complement the first two, to try and correct the excessive pendulum swing caused by the neoliberal deregulation introduced by Reaganism and Thatcherism. Economic and civil society actors have also been able to join forces in developing countries to maintain cohesion mismanaged by discredited regimes, and have therefore been parties at the international level. The same geopolitical causes that put an end to the bipolarity of the world clearly had an effect on ideologies. Their erosion, and even their partial or total discrediting, no doubt contributed to the development or consolidation of the individualist vision that marks the supremacy of personal sovereignty over state sovereignty and reconnects with the philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment and the social contract. This individualism, in which the individual is not created for the State, but rather the State is created for the individual, is emerging as a significant trend in contemporary society.

In parallel, and faced with increased globalisation, the key players are operating increasingly at the international level and are, themselves, structuring the political and social arena [30]. The European Union is a good example of a public actor, as are multinational businesses and organisations such as Google, Uber, Greenpeace and the Millennium Project.

We wanted to highlight at least six mutations that influence governance, before examining how they influence our model: (1) The Knowledge Revolution (2) the transition to sustainable development, (3) the new social trifunctionality, (4) open government, (5) the conservative and populist zeitgeist, and (6) the increasing influence of businesses.

2.1. The Knowledge Revolution

There is no need to dwell on this mutation, except to point out that it is a single trajectory which originates in the Information Revolution of the 1970s, the communication highways, the cognitive revolution, the knowledge society, the digital revolution, the internet, the genome, robotics, artificial intelligence, etc.: all these transformations, these waves of technological and societal innovations, stem from the same dynamic. This structure of structural change leads us collectively towards something else whose magnitude we have barely perceived. One of the major results is clearly the higher levels of education among citizens and the significant increase in the number of intellectuals, defined as individuals who are engaged in critical thought, supported by research and reflection on society, and who offer solutions to address its normative problems. Unlike the far too negative perception people have of it, social media is a source of training and education for many. The internet, meanwhile, contains a considerable amount of information and knowledge which helps to train citizens. Social media is producing a multitude of new tools for building communities and promoting a more deliberative and more participatory democracy, even if its harmful effects cannot be denied. As early as 1974, in The Coming of Post-industrial Society, the sociologist Daniel Bell dedicated a chapter to this key issue question: who will lead? [31]

2.2. The transition to sustainable development

This transition, which also began at the end of the 1960s with increasing awareness of the limits imposed on growth, grew very (too) slowly through the various reports produced, above all, by the United Nations, scientists, NGOs of all kinds, political parties, States and, now, businesses. Nearly all accepted the notion that sustainable development is a systemic dynamic and a quest for harmony, as advocated in the Brundtland Report in 1987. The implementation of Agenda 2030 and the 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) adopted by heads of state and governments at the Special United Nations Summit of 25 September 2015, shares this systemic aspect and takes account of the critical need to save the planet and the urgency of climate change [32], highlighted further in the IPCC report of October 2018 [33].

2.3. The new social trifunctionality

It was the anthropologist and religious historian Georges Dumézil (1898-1986) who showed, through his work on ancient myths, how societies of Indo-European origin organise human activity based on a trifunctional approach. He consistently describes three functions in the societies studied. These are exercised as separate, hierarchical powers: a religion and sovereignty function, a military function and a production and reproduction function [34]. Thus, after the Aristotelian model [35], we note the feudal system model with its three orders, described by the historian Georges Duby (1919-1996), which is based on the work of Adalbéron, bishop of Laon (1027-1030) [36], and the French Ancien Régime model with its three states, conceived by René Rémond (1918-2007) [37] but previously described by the legal scholar Charles Loyseau (1566-1627) at the beginning of the 17th century. The governance model currently in force is a continuation of this trifunctionality, but it has the particular characteristic of seeking, as we have seen, a balance between stakeholders rather than a restrictive leadership of one party over the others.

As with all of Dumézil’s analysis, each of the models has been criticised. Take, for example, the well-known issues raised by Abbé Sieyes (1748-1836) [38] or by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) [39]. The model of governance by stakeholders has also been criticised and will be again. It has also been described as a new form of corporatism, which clearly evokes some highly charged images.

 

 2.4. Open government

Taking its inspiration from the works of the OGP (Open Government Partnership) and the OECD, open government can be conceived as a citizen-centred culture of governance that utilises innovative and sustainable tools, policies and practices to promote government transparency, responsiveness and accountability to foster stakeholders’ participation in support of democracy and inclusive growth [40]. This process is intended to lead to the co-construction of collective policies that involve all governance players (public sector, businesses, civil society, etc.) and pursue the general interest and the common good. Such initiatives have been taken by leaders said to be above politics, such as Tony Blair, Barack Obama and Emmanuel Macron, and are continuing, particularly in the action plans developed under the guidance of the OGP, such as the UK-NAP: 3rd OGP National Action Plan [41].

  

2.5. The conservative and populist zeitgeist

Whether you like him as a person or not, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, in his speech to the TUC (Trade Union Congress) in Brighton on 12 September 2006, perfectly captured the unease felt at that time by citizens and politicians, an unease which was still in its infancy but which would continue to grow until today. The quality of this analysis deserves a lengthy quotation.

« What has changed is the interplay between globalisation, immigration and terrorism. Suddenly we feel under threat: physically from this new terrorism that is coming onto our streets, culturally as new waves of migrants change our society, and economically because an open world economy is hastening the sharpness of competition. People feel they are working longer, but are less secure. They feel the rules are changing and they never voted to change them. They feel, in a word, powerless. This is producing a pessimism that is pervasive and fearful because there seems no way through, or at least a way under our control.

There is a debate going on which, confusingly for the politicians, often crosses traditional left/right lines and the debate is: open vs closed. Do we embrace the challenge of more open societies or build defences against it? In my judgement, we need an approach that is strong and not scared that addresses people’s anxieties but does not indulge them, and above all has the right values underpinning it. The challenge won’t be overcome by policy alone, but by a powerful case made on the basis of values, most especially those that combine liberty with justice, security with tolerance and respect for others. We have to escape the tyranny of the « or » and develop the inclusive nature of the « and ».

The answer to economic globalisation is open markets and strong welfare and public service systems, particularly those like education, which equip people for change. The answer to terrorism is measures on security and tackling its underlying causes.

The answer to concern over migration is to welcome its contribution and put a system of rules in place to control it [42].

 And Tony Blair goes on to condemn economic protectionism, isolation and nativism, the political current of opposing any new immigration:

Protectionism in the economy; isolation in world affairs; nativism within our society; all, in the end, mean weakness in the face of challenge. If we believe in ourselves we can be strong. We can overcome the challenge of global change; better, we can relish its possibilities [43].

The opposite of this open concept is clearly populism, which we mentioned at the outset. In June 2017, Anthony Zurcher, the BBC News correspondent in the United States, described this attitude and its consequences: challenging the legitimacy of elected representatives, distrusting the parliamentary system, criticising the media and a financial oligarchy that seems to run the world, along with challenging scientific evidence, particularly by maintaining a sense of confusion over certain issues: the case analysed was typical: Does Trump still think climate change is a hoax? [44]

 

 2.6. The growing influence of businesses

 The growing influence of businesses is a clearly visible reality. There is little doubt that the role of businesses is better recognised in society and that their impact on governance has increased at the global and the local level. In June 2014, alluding to integrated governance, a new governance model for sustainability, the United Nations Environment Programme observed that companies have been the engine behind the unprecedented economic growth of the past century. The big companies through their operations have managed to raise billions of people from poverty, provide employment and education opportunities and unlock the human potential for innovation and creativity [45].

If we analyse the UNDP’s ‘three spheres of governance’ model, we can already see that, in what we call the first generation (Governance Model 1.0. #1stGen), from the 1980s to the middle of the 2000s the influence of the Knowledge Revolution was already being strongly exercised over the private sector and over civil society. The transition towards sustainable development was recognised mainly within civil society, whereas the social trifunctionality model was disseminated in the public sector through the international institutions.

It seems that this pattern has evolved since the middle of the 2000s towards a second-generation governance model (Governance Model 2.0. #2nd Gen) in which sustainable development is widespread throughout all levels of the public sphere to the point of becoming the official norm. The effects of the Intelligence Revolution have continued to be felt everywhere, but they are especially extensive in the public sector, particularly through the open government movement, and particularly under the influence of Barack Obama, starting from his first term in 2009. But in a world in which knowledge is valued, a new sphere is emerging that of the world of research and universities (Academia). This represents an interface, being both autonomous and a meeting and activation point for the private, public and civil society spheres, particularly through its capacity to activate collective intelligence and its academic freedom. This new sphere is challenging the social trifunctionality model.

It could be argued that the adoption and implementation of the SDGs since 2015 represents a tangible acceleration of the transition towards sustainable development and the prospect of a new generation of governance (Governance Model 3.0. #NextGen).

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The growing influence of businesses may, in this key area of the SDGs which are the primary focus of their societal responsibility, provide valuable support, especially since awareness of sustainability in the business world has increased considerably and the resources available to public “authorities” are effectively eroded. Nevertheless, the conservative and populist zeitgeist which is disrupting the public sector and civil society may have some annoying effects, namely blocking or confusing the information and communication flows.

The impacts on the actors in governance of the six mutations in progress can be summarised in the following table.

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 3. Governance for Agenda 2030?

The United Nations Committee of Experts in Public Administration (CEPA), set up by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 2001, is composed of 24 members who meet every year at the UN headquarters in New York. The Committee supports the work of ECOSOC to promote the development of effective public administration and quality governance among Member States, particularly in the context of Agenda 2030, in support of the implementation and evaluation of progress in achieving the sustainable development goals. CEPA updates ECOSOC on the various aspects of governance and public administration of sustainable socio-economic development. Its particular focus is on topics relating to development of human capital, participatory governance, development of skills in countries experiencing crises or emerging from conflict, and on the various innovations in public administration and governance.

At its 17th session, which was held in New York in April 2018, the CEPA worked on the subject of preparing public institutions for the implementation of the SDGs (Readying public institutions for implementation of the SDGs). CEPA put forward recommendations on three issues it considered fundamental: firstly, preparing institutions and politicians with a view to ensuring the implementation of the sustainable development programme by 2030, then the implementation, at all levels, of efficient, responsible institutions that are open to anybody, and, finally, measures aimed at strengthening the institutions and giving them the necessary resources to transform societies and make them viable and resilient. Based on its earlier work, CEPA drew up a set of principles of effective governance to support the urgent and total achievement of all the sustainable development goals.

3.1. Effectiveness

3.1.1. Competence: to perform their functions effectively, institutions are to have sufficient expertise, resources and tools to deal adequately with the mandates under their authority (commonly used strategies such as: promotion of a professional public sector workforce, leadership development and training civil servant, financial management and control, investment in e-governement, etc.).

3.1.2. Sound policymaking: to achieve their intended results, public policies are to be coherent with one another and founded on true or well-established grounds, in full accordance with fact, reason and good sense (commonly used strategies such as: strategic planning and foresight, strengthening national statistical systems, risk management frameworks, data sharing, etc.).

3.1.3. Collaboration: to address problems of common interest, institutions at all levels of government and in all sectors should work together and jointly with non-State actors towards the same end, purpose and effect (commonly used strategies such as: centre of government coordination under the Head of State of Government, collaboration, coordination, integration and dialogue across levels of government and functional areas, raising awareness of the SDG, network-based governance, multi-stakeholder partnerships etc.).

3.2. Accountability

3.2.1. Integrity: to serve in the public interest, civil servants are to discharge their official duties honestly, fairly and in a manner consistent with soundness of moral principle (commonly used strategies such as: promotion of anti-corruption policies, practices and bodies, codes of conduct for public officials, elimination of bribery and trading in influence, conflict of interest policies, whistle-blower protection, provision of adequate remuneration and equitable pay scales for public servants, etc.).

3.2.2. Transparency: to ensure accountability and enable public scrutiny, institutions are to be open and candid in the execution of their functions and promote access to information, subject only to the specific and limited exceptions as are provided by law (commonly used strategies such as: proactive disclosure of information, budget transparency, open government data, registries of beneficial ownership, lobby registries, etc.).

3.2.3. Independent oversight: to retain trust in government, oversight agencies are to act according to strictly professional considerations and apart from and unaffected by others (commonly used strategies such as: promotion of the independence of regulatory agencies, arrangements for a review of administrative decisions by courts or other bodies, independent audit, respect for legality, etc.).

3.3. Inclusiveness

3.3.1. Leaving no one behind: to ensure that all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality, public policies are to take into account the needs and aspirations of all segments of society, including the poorest and most vulnerable and those subject to discrimination (commonly used strategies such as: promotion of equitable fiscal and monetary policy, promotion of social equity, data disaggregation, systematic follow-up and review, etc.).

3.3.2. Non discrimination: to respect, protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, access to public service is to be provided on general terms of equality, without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, disability or other status (commonly used strategies such as: promotion of public sector workforce diversity, prohibition of discrimination in public service delivery, multilingual service delivery, accessibility standards, cultural audit of institutions, universal birth registration, gender-responsive budgeting, etc.).

3.3.3. Participation: to have an effective State, all significant political groups should be actively involved in matters that directly affect them and have a chance to influence policy (commonly used strategies such as: free and fair elections, regulatory process of public consultation, multi-stakeholder forums, participatory budgeting, community-driven development, etc.).

3.3.4. Subsidiarity: to promote government that is responsive to the needs and aspirations of all people, central authorities should perform only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more intermediate or local level (commonly used strategies such as: fiscal federalism, strengthening urban governance, strengthening municipal finance and local finance systems, enhancement of local capacity for prevention, adaptation and mitigation of external shocks, multilevel governance, etc.).

3.3.5. Intergenerational equity: to promote prosperity and quality of life for all, institutions should construct administrative acts that balance the short-term needs of today’s generation with the longer-term needs of future generations (commonly used strategies such as: sustainable development impact assessment, long-term public debt management, long-term territorial planning and spatial development, ecosystem management, etc.) [46].

These principles of effective governance, drawn up by the UN CEPA to support the urgent and total achievement of all the sustainable development goals, is a genuine roadmap from which all actors in governance must be able to draw inspiration. Not only administrations and associations, as we have seen, but also citizens, businesses and researchers. Not only will the implementation of these principles contribute to increasing sustainable development and help it to achieve its goals by 2030, but they may also improve our world and our societies, here and now.

Conclusion: Rationality and Organization in Democracy

The governance models highlighted today are certainly not being advocated only for Europe and the United States. They are recommended for the entire world, but these models are enriched considerably by the work undertaken by the major international institutions, associations and foundations. Naturally, these include the Club of Rome, the UNDP, the World Bank, the ECOSOC CEPA and the Open Government Partnership. There are others, as well, such as the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the OECD.

The objective of these initiatives is, first and foremost, to improve democracy and governance. These cannot function without being organised through structured and often procedural dialogue between stakeholders. To achieve harmony, democracy also requires rationality and method [47] from citizens and politicians. Education and training are fundamentally what sustains them on a daily basis. This should never be forgotten.

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

 

See also : Philippe Destatte, What is Open Government?, November 7, 2017.

Direct access to PhD2050’s English Papers

 

[1] As Emiliano GROSSMAN and Nicolas SAUGER note in Pourquoi détestons-nous autant nos politiques?, p. 71-72, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 2017, populism is, if we accept the contemporary definitions of the term (including Cas MUDDE, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007.), first and foremost a partial ideology (in that it does not offer a full and comprehensive explanation of the world), built around two principles: total separation between the people and the elite (the people being good, the elite being corrupt), and subjection of politics to the general will. In other words, populism is based on a negation of pluralism (the people are a homogeneous whole) and a form of Manichaeism (the people are good, the elite are evil) Our translation. – See also Colin HAY, Why we hate politics, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2007.

[2] This text is an updated version of my speech at the “Round table on Governance & Law: Challenges & Opportunities” seminar held at the World Bank in Washington at the instigation of the World Academy of Art and Science and the World University Consortium, on 5 and 6 November 2018.

[3] Although the historian recalls that rumours are not specific to the information society or the knowledge society. See François-Bertrand HUYGHE, La désinformation, les armes du faux, Paris, A. Colin, 2016. – Fake News, la Grande Peur, 2018.

[4] Timothy SNYDER, The Road to Unfreedom, Russia, Europe, America, p. 279, New York, Tim Duggan, 2018.

[5] Archon Fung is Professor of Citizenship and Governance at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

[6] Archon FUNG, Democratizing the Policy Process, in Michael MORAN, Martin REIN & Robert E. GOODIN, The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, p. 682, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. – A. FUNG, Empowered Deliberation: Reinventing Urban Democracy, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2004.

[7] See inter alia Louis EMMERIJ, Richard JOLLY, Thomas G. WEISS, Ahead of the Curve?, UN Ideas and Global Challenges, New York – Geneva, UN-Indiana University Press, 2001. – id., En avance sur leur temps?, Les idées des Nations Unies face aux défis mondiaux, p. 229sv., Blonay, Van Diermen – ADECO – Geneva, United Nations, 2003. – Thomas G. WEISS, Governance, Good Governance, and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges, Third World Quarterly 21, n°5, October 2000, p. 795-814.

[8] Alexander KING & Bertrand SCHNEIDER, The First Global Revolution, p. 114, New York-Hyderabad, Pantheon Books – Orient Longman, 1991. – It should be noted that, in the French translation of this report, which was prepared by Jacques Fontaine and published in Paris in 1991, the term governance is translated by « structures de gouvernement [structures of government]”, thus indicating that its use is France is not yet widespread. A. KING & B. SCHNEIDER, Questions de survie, La Révolution mondiale a commencé, p. 163, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1991.

[9] A. KING & B. SCHNEIDER, The First Global Revolution : A Report of the Council of Rome…, p. 181-182.

[10] James N. ROSENAU & Ernst-Otto CZEMPIEL ed., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992. – J.N. ROSENAU, Along the Domestic Frontier, Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World, p. 145, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

[11] « Governance » is understood to come from the Greek kybenan or kybernetes (as in cybernetics), which means to steer or control. J.N. ROSENAU, Along..., p. 146.

[12] Harlan Cleveland, former United States Ambassador to NATO, president of the World Academy of Arts and Science, had himself used the term since the 1970s. – The organizations that get things done will no longer be hierarchical pyramids with most of the real control at the top. They will be systems—interlaced webs of tension in which control is loose, power diffused, and centers of decision plural. “Decision-making” will become an increasingly intricate process of multilateral brokerage both inside and outside the organization which thinks it has the responsibility for making, or at least announcing, the decision. Because organizations will be horizontal, the way they are governed is likely to be more collegial, consensual, and consultative. The bigger the problems to be tackled, the more real power is diffused and the larger the number of persons who can exercise it — if they work at it. Harlan CLEVELAND, The Future Executive: A Guide for Tomorrow’s Managers, p. 13, New York, Harper & Row, 1972.

[13] Steven A. ROSELL ea, Governing in an Information Society, p. 21, Montréal, Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1992.

[14] UNDP and governance, Experiences and Lessons Learned, UNDP, Management Development and Governance, Lessons-Learned, Series, n°1, p. 9. – Richard Jolly, Director General of Unicef, special advisor to the UNDP Administrator and the driving force behind the Human Development Report, and the conference entitled Good governance and democratisation: the role of the international organisations, Ottawa, United Nations Association in Canada (UNA-Canada), 16 and 17 October 1997. – Une nouvelle gouvernance mondiale au service de l’humanité et de l’équité, dans Rapports mondial sur le développement humain 1999, p. 97-123, New-York, UNDP – Paris-Brussels, De Boeck-Larcier, 1999.

[15] G. Shabbir CHEEMA, Politique et gouvernance du PNUD : cadre conceptuel et coopération au développement, http://www.unac.org/français/activites/gouvernance/partieun.html 17/02/02. Shabbir CHEEMA directeur de la Division du Renforcement de la Gestion et de la Gouvernance au PNUD. – Another definition given by the UNDP is that of Public Sector Management, which dates from 1995: governance or public management encompasses the direct and indirect management by the state of public affairs and regulatory control of private activities that impinge on human affairs. Governance can best be understood in terms of three major components: first, the form of political authority that exists in a country (parliamentary or presidential, civilian or military, and autocratic or democratic; second, the means through which authority is exercised in the management of economic and social resources; and third, the ability of governments to discharge government functions effectively , efficiently, and equitably through the design, formulation, and implementation of sound policies. dans Public Sector Management, Governance, and Sustainable Human Development, Discussion Paper 1, Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Policy and Programme Support, p. 19, New-York, United Nations Development Programme, 1995. – In 1997, a new study by the Management Development & Governance Division, prefaced by G. Shabbir Cheema, gave a very similar definition to the one presented in Ottawa: Governance can be seen as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. it comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences. In Governance for sustainable human development, A UNDP policy document, p. 3, New-York, United Nations Development Programme, 1997.

[16] See, for example: J. ISHAM, Daniel KAUFMANN & Lant PRITCHETT, Governance and Returns on Investment, Washington, The World Bank, 1995. – Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries, Washington, The World Bank, 1996. – Francis NG and Alexander YEATS, Good Governance and Trade Policy, Are They the Keys to Africa’s Global Integration and Growth? Washington, The World Bank, 10 November 1998. – Michael WOOLCOCK, Globalization, Governance and Civil Society, DECRG Policy Research on Globalization, Growth, and Poverty: Facts, Fears, and Agenda for Action, Background Paper, Washington, The World Bank, 10 August 2001.

[17] We define governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the capacity of the governement to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. Daniel KAUFMANN, Aart KRAAY & Pablo ZOIDO-LOBATON, Governance Matters, Washington, World Bank, 1999. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. 16/02/02. Daniel KAUFMANN, Aart KRAAY & Pablo ZOIDO-LOBATON, Gestion des Affaires publiques, De l’évaluation à l’action, dans Finances et Développement, June 2000, p. 1.

[18] Daniel KAUFMANN, Aart KRAAY & Pablo ZOIDO-LOBATON, Aggregating Governance Indicators, Washington, World Bank, 1999. http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance. 16/02/2002.

[19] Governance means rules, processes and behavior that affect the way in which they are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openess, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence. European Governance, A White Paper, July 25, 2001, p. 8.

[20] David RICHARDS & Martin SMITH, Governance and the Public Policy in the UK, p. 2, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002.

[21] La société civile et l’OCDE, in Synthèses, Paris, OCDE, December 2001, p. 1.

[22] Lester M. SALAMON, The Tools Approach and the New Governance: Conclusion and Implications, in Lester M. SALAMON, The Tools of Government, A Guide to the New Governance, p. 600-610 , New-York, Oxford University Press, 2002.

[23] L. M. SALAMON, The Tools of Government… p. 9, 2002.

[24] David RICHARDS & Martin J. SMITH, Governance and Public Policy in the UK, p. 36, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. – Michaël HILL, The Public Policy Process, p. 21, Harlow, Pearson Education Limited, 5th ed, 2009.

[25] G. Shabbir CHEEMA, Politique et gouvernance du PNUD: cadre conceptuel et coopération au développement…, p. 10. – Governance includes the state, but transcends it by taking in the private sector and civil society. All three are critical for sustaining human development. The state creates a conducive political and legal environment. The private sector generates jobs and income. And civil society facilitates political and social interaction – mobilising groups to participate in economic, social and political activities. Because each has weaknesses and strengths, a major objective of our support for good governance is to promote constructive interaction among all three. Governance for Sustainable Human Development, A UNDP Policy Document, United Nations Development Programme, January 1997.

[26] Sam AGERE, Promoting Good Governance, Principles, Practices and Perspectives, p. 1, London, Commonwealth Secretariat, Management and Training Services Division, 2000.

[27] G. Shabbir CHEEMA, Politique et gouvernance du PNUD: cadre conceptuel et coopération au développement…, p. 10.

[28] La société civile et l’OCDE, in Synthèses, Paris, OCDE, December 2001, p. 1.

[29] Philippe DELMAS, La maître des horloges, Modernité de l’action publique, Paris, Odile Jacobs, 1991.

[30] M. HILL, The Public Policy Process…, p. 20.

[31] Daniel BELL, The Coming of Post-industrial Society, p. 339, London, Heinemann, 1974.

[32] Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 21 October 2015. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E

[33] Summary for Policymakers of IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5ºC approved by governments, 8 October 2018. https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/

[34] Georges DUMEZIL, Jupiter, Mars, Quirinus, Paris, Gallimard, 1941.

[35] ARISTOTLE, Ethique à Nicomaque (349 ANC), p. 43sv, Paris, Vrin, 1997.

[36] Georges DUBY, The Three Orders, Feudal Society Imagined, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1980.

[37] René REMOND, L’Ancien Régime et la Révolution, p. 64sv., Paris, Seuil, 1974.

[38] Emmanuel Joseph SIEYES, Qu’est-ce que le Tiers état? (1789), Paris, Editions du Boucher, 2002.

[39] K. MARX & F. ENGELS, Manifesto of The Communist Party (1847).

[40] OECD, Open Governement, The Global context and the way forward, p. 19, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2016. – In November 2017, the OECD published this work in French, using the following definition: a culture of governance that is based on innovative, sustainable policies and practices inspired by principles of transparency, accountability and participation to promote democracy and inclusive growth. OECD, Gouvernement ouvert: Contexte mondial et perspectives, Editions OCDE, Paris. 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264280984-fr

[41] Policy paper, UK Open Government National Action Plan 2016-18, 12 May 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-open-government-national-action-plan-2016-18/uk-open-government-national-action-plan-2016-18

[42] Full Text of Tony Blair’s Speech to the TUC (Trade Union Congress), Brighton, Sept. 12, 2006. in The Guardian, 12 sept. 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/sep/12/tradeunions.speeches

[43] Ibidem.

[44] Anthony ZURCHER, Does Trump still think climate change is a hoax ? BBC News, June 2, 2017.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40128034

[45] Companies have been the engine behind the unprecedented economic growth of the past century. The big companies through their operations have managed to raise billions of people from poverty, provide employment and education opportunities and unlock the human potential for innovation and creativity. Integrated Governance, A New Model of Governance for Sustainability, p. 8, United Nations Environment Programme, June 2014.

[46] UN, Committee of Experts on Public Administration, Report on the Seveneenth Session (23-27 April 2018), p. 18-21, New York, Economic and Social Council, Official Records, 2018, Supplement N°24. E/2018/44-E/C.16/2018/8.

[47] We are thinking, in particular, of issues relating to mutual adjustment in developing policies. See Philippe ZITTOUN, La fabrique des politiques publiques, Une approche pragmatique de l’action publique, p. 201sv, Paris, Presses de Science Po, 2013.

The Jobs of Tomorrow… A Question of Intelligence?

3 octobre 2018
éducation, Foresight, Innovation, Nouveau Paradigme industriel
Poster un commentaire

Referring to a study in March 2017 by the Institute for the Future (Palo Alto, California), the Mosan Free University College (HELMo) [1] noted, at the start of the 2018-2019 academic year, that 85% of the jobs in 2030 have not yet been invented [2]. The HELMo team rightly pointed out that population ageing, climate and energy changes, mass migrations and, of course, digital technologies, robotisation and other scientific advances are all drivers of change that will revolutionise the entire world. Highlighting its vocational emphasis as a higher education institution, it wondered whether the jobs for which it was training people today would still exist tomorrow. At the same time, its Director-President Alexandre Lodez, along with the teaching staff representative, lawyer Vincent Thiry, and the student representative, pointed out that HELMo did not only want to train human operational resources in response to a particular demand from the labour market, but also wanted to train responsible citizens capable of progressing throughout their careers and lives. Everyone was asking a key question: What, therefore, are the key skills to be consolidated or developed?

I will try to answer this question in three stages.

Firstly, by mentioning the global upheavals and their effects on jobs. Then, by drawing on a survey carried out by futurists and experts from around the world this summer, the results of which were summarised in early September 2018. And finally, by a short conclusion expressing utopia and realism.

1. Global upheavals

On the issue of technical and economic changes, we could proceed by mentioning the many contemporary studies dealing with this topic, including those by Jeremy Rifkin [3], Chris Anderson [4], Dorothée Kohler and Jean-Daniel Weisz [5], François Bourdoncle and Pierre Veltz and Thierry Weil [6]. We could also describe the New Industrial Paradigm [7]. Or, to reflect current events, we could even call on Thierry Geerts, head of Google Belgium, whose work, Digitalis [8] is very popular at present.

But it is to Raymond Collard that I will refer. Former professor at the University of Namur, Honorary Director-General of the Research, Statistics and Information Service at the Ministry of the Wallonia Region – the current Public Service of Wallonia – and scientific coordinator of the permanent Louvain Research and Development Group, Raymond Collard was born in 1928, but his death in Jemeppe-sur-Meuse on 8 July 2018 was met with indifference by Wallonia. It was only through an email from my colleague and friend André-Yves Portnoff on 13 September that I learned, from Paris, about his death.

On 15 March 1985, an article in the journal La Wallonie caught my attention. The title of this paper by Raymond Collard was provocative: Seeking Walloon pioneers! But the question was specific and could be asked again thirty-three years later: Are there, among the readers of this journal, men and women who can identify large or small businesses in Wallonia that truly live according to the principles of the “intelligence revolution”? The paper made reference to the presentation, in Paris, of the report drawn up by a team led by futurists: according to the report on the state of technology, we are witnessing the advent not of the information society, as is often said, particularly in Japan, but of the “creation society”, whose vital resource is intelligence and talent rather than capital. That is also why we talk of the intelligence revolution, a revolution which requires the harnessing of intelligence, something which cannot be done by force. The normal relationships between power and skills are altered at all levels.

The report itself, entitled La Révolution de l’intelligence [9], complemented my reading of the works of John Naisbitt [10] and Alvin Toffler [11]. It was described extensively by Raymond Collard. This relationship builder, as André-Yves Portnoff [12] called him, had travelled to Paris for the presentation of this document by Thierry Gaudin, civil engineer and head of the Centre de Prospective et d’Évaluation [Foresight and Assessment Centre] at the French ministry of Research, and Portnoff, then editor-in-chief of Sciences et Techniques, published by the French Society of Scientists and Engineers. The Minister for Research and Technology, Hubert Currien, and the Minister for Industrial Redeployment and Foreign Trade Edith Cresson were present at the event. Both were members of the government of Laurent Fabius while François Mitterrand was President of the Republic. It is not surprising that two ministers were present since the Centre de Prospective et d’Évaluation (CPE) was a service common to both ministries.

S-T_Revolution-Intelligence_1985

After finding this report, then photocopying it in the library, I literally devoured it – and then bought it on eBay. In 2018, it spells out a first clear message: the upheavals we are experiencing today are not new, even if they seem to be gathering momentum. Another message from Thierry Gaudin is that the cognitive revolution, reflected in the changes underway, has been ongoing since the start of the 1970s and will continue for several more decades.

I was not surprised then, as I am not surprised now. The conceptual context of the evolution of the technological system, leading to widespread change in all areas of society, is one I was familiar with. It had been taught to me at the University of Liège by Professor Pierre Lebrun, a historian and economist with a brilliant, incisive mind, whose astute words I would go and listen to, as one might listen to some freebooter down at the harbour. I taught this conceptual context to my students at Les Rivageois (Haute École Charlemagne) and at the High School Liège 2, and I teach it still at the University of Mons and even in Paris. Which is only fitting.

The analysis model for this context was conceptualised by Bertrand Gille, a technology historian and Professor at the École pratique des Hautes Études in Paris. In it, the director of the remarkable Histoire des Techniques in L’Encyclopédie de La Pléade, at Gallimard [13], clearly showed that it was the convergence of the rapid changes in the levels of training among the population and the spread of scientific and technical knowledge that was the driver of the technological progress that brought about the engineering Industrial Revolution. It will come as no surprise that Bertrand Gille was also a former teacher of Professor Robert Halleux, who was himself the founder of the Science and Technology Centre at the University of Liège. In this way, Bertrand Gille left his mark on several generations of researchers, historians and futurists, some devoting themselves to just one of the tasks, others to the other, and still others to both.

This model, which was reviewed by Jacques Ellul and Thierry Gaudin, imagines that the medieval technological system, highlighted by Fernand Braudel, Georges Duby and Emmanuel Leroy Ladurie, corresponds to an industrial technological system, which was the driving force and the product of an Industrial Revolution, described by Pierre Lebrun, Marinette Bruwier et al.[14], and, finally, a technological system under development, under construction, fostering the Intelligence Revolution and far from over. Land was key in the first revolution, capital in the second, and the third is based on the minds of men and women. Each time, it is materials, energy, the relationship with living beings and time that are involved.

In 1985, Raymond Collard explained what he had clearly understood from the report produced by Gaudin and Portnoff and the several hundred researchers they enlisted: the importance of the four major changes in the poles that are restructuring society:

– the huge choice of materials and their horizontal percolation, ranging from uses in the high-tech sectors to more common uses;

– the tension between nuclear power and saving energy resources, in a context of recycling;

– the relationship with living beings and the huge field of biotechnology, including genetics;

– the new structure of time punctuated in nanoseconds by microprocessors.

Raymond Collard explored all these points some time later in a remarkable speech to the first Wallonia toward the future Congress in Charleroi, in October 1987, entitled: Foresight 2007 … recovering from the crisis, changes in work production methods and employment, which is still available online on The Destree Institute website [15]. In this speech, Collard, who was Professor at the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences at the University of Namur, noted the following: it has been written that microelectronics is intellectualising industry. We are experiencing an industrial revolution that can be described as an “intelligence revolution”. The development of the possibilities created by the dramatic advances in microelectronics has opened up vast spheres to computer technology. Tomorrow, we will make greater use of artificial intelligence, which will be in evidence everywhere with the implementation of fifth-generation computers [16].

The 1985 report by the CPE remains a mine of information for anyone wanting to understand the changes underway, by looking both retrospectively – examining futures that did not happen – and prospectively – envisaging possible futures to construct a desirable future. There are some precepts to be drawn that are useful mainly for higher educational institutions and our businesses. The following give us cause to reflect:

“experience shows that the introduction of new technologies is harmonious only if the training comes before the machines” (p.15).

“it is no longer possible to develop quality without giving each person control over their own work” (p.15).

“giving a voice only to management means wasting 99% of the intellectual resources in the business” or the organisation. (…) Harnessing all the intelligence is becoming essential (p.42).

“a successful company is one that is best able to harness the imagination, intelligence and desire of its staff” (45).

“the new source of power is not money in the hands of a few, but information in the hands of many”. Quotation taken from the works of John Naisbitt (p.45).

But, above all, the text shows, in the words of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, that the essence of technology has nothing to do with technology [17]. Everything in technology was first dreamed up by man, and what has been successful has also been accepted by human society, states the report [18]. For this report on the state of technology is also a lesson in foresight. It reminds us, specifically through retrospect, that we are very poor at anticipating what does not already exist. Of course, as Gaston Berger stated on several occasions, the future does not exist as an object of knowledge. It exists solely as a land for conquest, desire and strategy. It is the place, along with the present, where we can innovate and create.

We often mistakenly believe that technologies will find their application very quickly or even immediately. Interviewed in February 1970 about 1980, the writer Arthur Koestler, author of Zero and Infinity, envisaged – as we do today – our houses inhabited by domestic robots that are programmed every morning. He imagined electric mini-cars in city centres closed to all other forms of traffic. He thought that telematic communications would, in 1980, allow us to talk constantly by video so as to avoid travelling. Interviewed at the same time, the great American futurist Herman Kahn, cofounder of the Hudson Institute, imagined that, in 1980, teaching would be assisted by computers which would play, for children, an educational role equivalent to the role filled by their parents and teachers[19].

The world continues to change, sustained, and also constrained, by the four poles. The transition challenges us and we are trying to give the impression that we are in control of it, even if we have no idea what we will find during its consolidation phase, sometime in the 22nd century.

Which jobs will survive these upheavals? Such foresight concerning jobs and qualifications is difficult. It involves identifying changes in employment and jobs while the labour market is changing, organisations are changing and the environment and the economic ecosystem are changing. But it also involves taking into account the possible life paths of the learners in this changing society [20], anticipating skills needs and measuring workforce turnover.

What we have also shown, by working with the area authorities, vocational education institutions and training bodies is that it is often at micro and territorial level that we are able to anticipate, since it seems that the project areas will be required, in ten to fifteen years at the latest, to be places for interaction and the implementation of (re)harmonised education, training and transformation policies for our society, with varying degrees of decentralisation, deconcentration, delegation, contractualisation and stakeholder autonomy. It is probably the latter context that will be the most creative and innovative, and one in which progress must be made. This requires cohesive, inspirational visions per area at the European, federal, regional and territorial level.

In leading the permanent Louvain Research and Development Group since the mid-1960s, particularly with the help of Philippe le Hodey and Michel Woitrin and the support of Professor Philippe de Woot, Raymond Collard had successfully set up and operated a genuine platform of the sort advocated by the European Commission today. Referring, as always, to Thierry Gaudin, he noted in 2000 that understanding innovation means grasping technology, not in terms of what is already there but in terms of revealing what is not yet there [21]. And although Raymond Collard recognised that this required a considerable R&D effort, he observed that this was not enough: as an act of creation which the market has to validate, innovation is the result of an interdisciplinary and interactive process, consisting of interactions within the business itself and between the business and its environment, particularly in terms of “winning” and managing knowledge and skills [22]. With, at the heart its approach, the idea, dear to François Perroux and highlighted by the work of the Louvain Research and Development Group in 2002, that a spirit is creative if it is both open and suited to combining what it receives and finding new combinatorial frameworks [23].

This thought is undoubtedly still powerful, and will remain so.

2. Foresight: from technological innovation to educational innovation

Like any historian, the futurist cannot work without raw material, without a source. For the latter, collective intelligence is the real fuel for his innovative capacity.

To that end, in 2000, The Destree Institute joined the Millennium Project. This global network for future studies and research was founded in 1996 in Washington by the American Council for the United Nations University, with the objective of improving the future prospects for humanity. It is a global participatory think tank, organised in more than sixty nodes, which are themselves heads of networks, involving universities, businesses and private and public research centres. Since 2002, The Destree Institute has represented the Brussels-Area Node which aims to be cross-border and connected with the European institutions [24].

The-Millennium-Project_logo250

In preparation for a wide-ranging study entitled Future Work/Technology 2050, the Millennium Project Planning Committee drafted some global scenarios to which they sought reactions from around 450 futurists and other researchers or stakeholders. A series of seminars was organised in twenty countries in order to identify the issues and determine appropriate strategies to address them. It was on this basis that a series of real-time consultations with experts (Real-Time Delphi) was organised on issues of education and learning, government and governance, businesses and work, culture and art and science and technology. From a series of 250 identified actions, 20 were selected by the panel of experts in the field of education and learning.

The complete list of the 20 actions is shown below. I have ordered them, for the first five at least, according to their level of relevance – effectiveness and feasibility –, as they were ranked by the international panel.

The first action on this list concerns the educational axes. This involves:

4. Increase focus on developing creativity, critical thinking, human relations, philosophy, entrepreneurship (individual and teams), art, self-employment, social harmony, ethics, and values, to know thyself to build and lead a meaningful working life with self-assessment of progress on one’s own goals and objectives (as Finland is implementing). 

The second will delight futurist teachers, since it involves:

20. Include futures as we include history in the curriculum. Teach alternative visions of the future, foresight, and the ability to assess potential futures. 

The third action is a measure of social cohesion:

6. Make Tele-education free everywhere; ubiquitous, lifelong learning systems.

The fourth, in my view, is probably the most important at the operational level:

2. Shift education/learning systems more toward mastering skills than mastering a profession. 

The fifth will totally transform the system:

3. In parallel to STEM (and/or STEAM – science, technology, engineering, arts, and mathematics) create a hybrid system of self-paced inquiry-based learning for self-actualization; retrain teachers as coaches using new AI tools with students.

The 15 other actions are listed in no particular order, some complementing initiatives on the ground, particularly in the Liège-Luxembourg academic Pole.

1. Make increasing individual intelligence a national objective of education (by whatever definition of intelligence a nation selects, increasing “it” would be a national objective). 

5. Continually update the way we teach and how we learn from on-going new insights in neuroscience. 

7. Unify universities and vocational training centres and increase cooperation between schools and outside public good projects.

8. Utilize robots and Artificial Intelligence in education. 

9. Focus on exponential technologies and team entrepreneurship.

10. Change curriculum at all levels to normalize self-employment. 

11. Train guidance counsellors to be more future-oriented in schools. 

12. Share the responsibility of parenting as an educational community. 

13. Promote “communities of practice” that continually seek improvement of learning systems. 

14. Integrate Simulation-Based Learning using multiplayer environments. 

15. Include learning the security concerns with respect to teaching (and learning) technology. 

16. Incorporate job market intelligence systems into education and employment systems. 

17. The government, employers across all industry sectors, and the labour unions should cooperate in creating adequate models of lifelong learning. 

18. Create systems of learning from birth to three years old; this is the key stage for developing creativity, personality. 

19. Create mass public awareness campaigns with celebrities about actions to address the issues in the great transitions coming up around the world [25].

We can appreciate that these actions do not all have the same relevance, status or potential impact. That is why the top five have been highlighted. However, the majority are based on a proactive logic of increasing our capacities for educating and emancipating men and women. The fact that these actions have been thought about on all continents, by disparate stakeholders, with a genuine convergence of thought, is certainly not insignificant.

3. Conclusion: in the long term, humans are the safest bet

As regards Wallonia, and Liège in particular, we are familiar with the need to create value collectively so that we are able to make ourselves autonomous and so that we can be certain of being able to face the challenges of the future. Without question, we must place social cohesion and energy and environmental risks at the top of this list of challenges. Innovative and creative capacities will be central to the skills that our young people and we ourselves must harness to address these challenges. These needs can be found at the core of the educational and learning choices up to 2050 identified by the Millennium Project experts.

The 1985 report on The Intelligence Revolution, as highlighted by Raymond Collard, is both distant from us in retroforesight terms and close to us in terms of the relevance of the long-term challenges it contains. In this respect, it fits powerfully and pertinently into our temporality. In the report, Thierry Gaudin and André-Yves Portnoff noted that setting creation in motion means sharing questions before answers and accepting uncertainty and drift. Dogmatism is no longer possible (…) as a result, utopia is evolving into realism. In the long term, humans are the safest bet [26].

Of course, betting on humans has to be the right decision. It is men and women who are hard at work, and who must remain so. This implies that they are capable of meeting the challenges, their own and also those of the society in which they operate. Technically. Mentally. Ethically.

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

[1] This text is a revised version of a speech made at the start of the HELMo 2018-2019 academic year, on 18 September 2018, on the subject of The jobs of tomorrow... A question of intelligence.

[2] The experts that attended the IFTF workshop in March 2017 estimated that around 85% of the jobs that today’s learners will be doing in 2030 haven’t been invented yet. This makes the famous prediction that 65% of grade school kids from 1999 will end up in jobs that haven’t yet been created seem conservative in comparison. The next era of Human/Machine Partnerships, Emerging Technologies, Impact on Society and Work in 2030, Palo Alto, Cal., Institute for the Future – DELL Technologies, 2017.

http://www.iftf.org/fileadmin/user_upload/downloads/th/SR1940_IFTFforDellTechnologies_Human-Machine_070717_readerhigh-res.pdf

[3] In particular, his best book: Jeremy RIFKIN, The End of Work, The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the PostMarket Era, New York, Tarcher, 1994.

[4] Chris ANDERSON, Makers, The New Industrial Revolution, New York, Crown Business, 2012.

[5] Dorothée KOHLER and Jean-Daniel WEISZ, Industrie 4.0, Les défis de la transformation numérique du modèle industriel allemand, p. 11, Paris, La Documentation française, 2016.

[6] François BOURDONCLE, La révolution Big Data, in Pierre VELTZ and Thierry WEIL, L’industrie, notre avenir, p. 64-69, Paris, Eyrolles-La Fabrique de l’Industrie, Colloque de Cerisy, 2015.

[7] Philippe DESTATTE, The New Industrial Paradigm, Keynote at The Industrial Materials Association (IMA-Europe) 20th Anniversary, IMAGINE event, Brussels, The Square, September 24th, 2014, Blog PhD2050, September 24, 2014.

https://phd2050.org/2014/09/26/nip/

[8] Thierry GEERTS, Digitalis, Comment réinventer le monde, Brussels, Racine, 2018.

[9] La Révolution de l’intelligence, Rapport sur l’état de la technique, Paris, Ministère de l’Industrie et de la Recherche, Sciences et Techniques Special Edition, October 1983.

[10] John NAISBITT, Megatrends, Ten New Directions Transforming our Lives, New York, Warner Book, 1982. – London and Sydney, Futura – Macdonald & Co, 1984.

[11] Alvin TOFFLER, The Third Wave, New York, William Morrow and Company, 1980.

[12] André-Yves PORTNOFF, Raymond Collard, un tisseur de liens, Note, Paris, 10 September 2018.

[13] Bertrand GILLE dir., Histoire des Techniques, Techniques et civilisations, Technique et sciences, Paris, Gallimard, 1978.

[14] Pierre LEBRUN, Marinette BRUWIER, Jan DHONDT and Georges HANSOTTE, Essai sur la Révolution industrielle en Belgique, 1770-1847, Brussels, Académie royale, 1981.

[15] Raymond COLLARD, Prospective 2007… sorties de la crise, transformations des modes de production, du travail et de l’emploi, dans La Wallonie au futur, Cahier n°2, p. 124, Charleroi, The Destree Institute, 1987.

http://www.wallonie-en-ligne.net/Wallonie-Futur-1_1987/WF1-CB05_Collard-R.htm

[16] R. COLLARD, Prospective 2007…, p. 124.

[17] This was his 1953 lecture. Martin HEIDEGGER, Essais et conférences, Paris, Gallimard, 1958. – Our translation.

[18] La Révolution de l’intelligence…, p. 182.

[19] La Révolution de l’intelligence…, p. 24.

[20] Didier VRANCKEN, L’histoire d’un double basculement, preface to D. VRANCKEN, Le crépuscule du social, Liège, Presses universitaires de Liège, 2014.

[21] Thierry GAUDIN, Les dieux intérieurs, Philosophie de l’innovation, Strasbourg, Koenigshoffen, Cohérence, 1985.

[22] Raymond COLLARD, Le Groupe permanent Recherche – développement de Louvain, p. 11, Brussels, Centre scientifique et Technique de la Construction (CSTC), 2000.

[23] Permanent Leuven Research and Development Group, 37th year, Peut-on industrialiser la créativité?, 2002. – François PERROUX, Industrie et création collective, t. 1, Saint–simonisme du XXe siècle et création collective, p. 166, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1964.

[24] http://www.millennium-project.org/

[25] Jerome GLENN, Results of the Education and Learning Real-Time Delphi that assessed 20 long-range actions to address future works-technology dynamics, Sept 2, 2018.

[26] La Révolution de l’intelligence…, p. 187.