Archives Mensuelles: janvier 2018

Liège, January 19, 2018

1. What is foresight, and in what way is it strategic? [1]

In the form in which we know it today in Europe, foresight represents an encounter and interaction between French and Latin developments, on the one hand, and those in the Anglosphere on the other. In English-speaking countries, the practice of foresight has evolved over time from a concern with military interests (such as improving defence systems) to industrial objectives (such as increasing competitiveness) and societal issues (such as ensuring the welfare of the population or ensuring social harmony). Since the 1960s, its chosen field has shifted from fundamental science to key technologies, then to the analysis of innovation systems, and finally to the study of the entire societal system. Having started out within a single discipline, namely the exact sciences, foresight has become pluridisciplinary, multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary, with an openness to the social sciences [2]. In doing so, it has moved considerably closer to the French approach, abandoning many of its earlier forecasting ambitions for a more strategic focus.

The French school of foresight (referred to as la prospective) originates in the thought of the philosopher and entrepreneur Gaston Berger. Deriving from a philosophy of collective action and engagement, it deals with value systems and constructs knowledge for political purposes [3], and has likewise become increasingly strategic in nature through contact with the worlds of international organisations, companies and regional territories [4]. Taking account of the long-term and la longue durée by postulating the plurality of possible futures, adopting the analysis of complex systems and deploying the theory and practice of modelling, foresight generates a strategic desire and willingness in order to influence and affect history. As I have helped to define it in various contexts – European (the Mutual Learning Platform of DG Research, DG Enterprise & Industry, and DG Regional & Urban Policy, supported by the Committee of the Regions) [5], French (the European Regional Foresight College) created under the auspices of the Interministerial Delegation of Land Planning and Regional Attractiveness (DATAR) in Paris) [6] or in Wallonia (the Wallonia Evaluation and Foresight Society) [7] – foresight is an independent, dialectical and rigorous process, conducted in a transdisciplinary way and taking in the longer sweep of history. It can shed light on questions of the present and the future, firstly by considering them in a holistic, systemic and complex framework, and secondly by setting them in a temporal context over and beyond historicity. Concerned above all with planning and action, its purpose is to provoke one or more transformations within the system that it apprehends by mobilising collective intelligence [8]. This definition is that of both la prospective and foresight; at any rate it was designed as such, as part of a serious effort to bring about convergence between these two tools undertaken by, in particular, the team of Unit K2 of DG Research and Innovation at the European Commission, led at the time by Paraskevas Caracostas.

The main distinguishing characteristic of the strategy behind the process of la prospective or foresight – some refer to la prospective stratégique or strategic foresight, which to my mind are pleonasms – is that it does not have a linear relationship with the diagnosis or the issues. Fundamentally, this tool reflects both the long-term issues it seeks to address and a vision of a desirable future that it has constructed with the actors concerned. Its circular process mobilises collective and collaborative intelligence at every step in order to bring about in reality a desired and jointly constructed action that operates over the long term and is intended to be efficient and operational. Foresight watch takes place at every step of this process. I define this as a continuous and largely iterative activity of active observation and systemic analysis of the environment, in the short, medium and long term, to anticipate developments and identify present and future issues with the ultimate purpose of forming collective visions and action strategies. It is based on creating and managing the knowledge needed as input into the process of foresight itself. This process extends from the choice of areas to work on (long-term issues) and of the necessary heuristic, via the analysis and capitalisation of information and its transformation into useful knowledge, to communication and evaluation [9].

2. Foresight and strategic intelligence

The Strategic Intelligence Research Group (GRIS) at HEC Liège, under the direction of Professor Claire Gruslin, sees strategic intelligence as ‘a mode of governance based on the acquisition and protection of strategic and relevant information and on the potential for influence, which is essential for all economic actors wishing to participate proactively in development and innovation by building a distinctive and lasting advantage in a highly competitive and turbulent environment’ [10].

For its part, the famous Martre Report of 1994, in its definition of economic intelligence, delineated a process fairly similar to that which I mentioned for foresight, likewise including monitoring, heuristics, the examination of issues, a shared vision and the strategy to achieve it, all set in a ‘continuous cycle’:

‘Economic intelligence can be defined as the set of coordinated actions by which information that is useful to economic actors is sought out, processed and distributed for exploitation. These various actions are carried out legally and benefit from the protection necessary to preserve the company’s assets, under optimal quality, time and cost conditions. Useful information is that needed by the different decision-making levels in the company or the community in order to develop and implement in a coherent manner the strategy and tactics necessary to achieve its objectives, with the goal of improving its position in its competitive context. These actions within the company are organised in a continuous cycle, generating a shared vision of the objectives to be achieved’ [11].

What is of particular interest in the search for parallels or convergences between economic intelligence and foresight is the idea, developed by Henri Martre, Philippe Clerc and Christian Harbulot, that the notion of economic intelligence goes beyond documentation, monitoring, data protection or even influence, to become part of ‘a true strategic and tactical intention’, supporting actions at different levels, from the company up to the global, international level[12].

3. Foresight in strategic intelligence

At the turn of the millennium, as part of the European ESTO (European Science and Technology Observatory) programme, the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) in Seville gathered a series of researchers to examine the idea of strategic intelligence as a methodological vehicle or umbrella for public policy-making. The idea was to recognise and take account of the diversity of methods made available to decision-makers in order to structure and mobilise them to ensure successful policy-making [13]. As Ken Ducatel, one of the coordinators of this discussion, put it, ‘The concept of strategic intelligence not only offers a powerful methodology for addressing (EU) issues, but has the flexibility to connect to other forms of interaction, adapt to new models of governance and open up to technological changes and social developments that are faster than we have ever known before’ [14].

At the time of the REGSTRAT project coordinated by the Stuttgart-based Steinbeis Europa Zentrum in 2006, the concept of Strategic Policy Intelligence (SPI) tools – i.e. intelligence tools applied to public policy – had become accepted, in particular among the representatives of the Mutual Learning Platform referred to earlier. As my fellow foresight specialist Günter Clar and I pointed out in the report on the subject of foresight, strategic intelligence as applied to public policy can be defined as a set of actions designed to identify, implement, disseminate and protect information in order to make it available to the right person, at the right time, with the goal of making the right decision. As had become clear during the work, SPI’s tools include foresight, evaluation of technological choices, evaluation, benchmarking, quality procedures applied to territories, and so on. These tools are used to provide decision-makers and stakeholders with clear, objective, politically unbiased, independent and, most importantly, anticipatory information [15].

This work also made it possible to define strategic intelligence as observed in this context. Its content is adapted to the context, with hard and soft sides and a distributed character, underpinned by scale effects, the facilitation of learning, a balance between specific and generic approaches and increased accessibility. Its process is based on demand, the need to mobilise creativity, making tacit knowledge explicit, the evaluation of technological potential, a facilitation of the process and an optimal link with decision-making [16].

From this viewpoint, foresight is clearly one of the tools of strategic intelligence for the use of policy-makers and stakeholders.

Anticipation, innovation and decision-making

The Directorate General for Research and Innovation of the European Commission has been involved for some years in forward-looking activities (FLAs) [17], just as the European Institute in Seville had been – as we saw – when it developed strategic policy intelligence (SPI) [18] tools for use in public policy-making[19]. FLAs include all systematic and participatory studies and processes designed to consider possible futures, proactively and strategically, and to explore and map out paths towards desirable goals [20]. This field obviously includes numerous different methods for anticipation of future developments, evaluation of technological choices, ex-ante evaluation, and so on.

In 2001, Ruud Smits, Professor of Technology and Innovation at the University of Utrecht, made three recommendations that he regarded as essential. First, he stressed, it was time to call a halt to the debate about definitions and to exploit the synergies between the different branches of strategic intelligence. Next, he noted the need to improve the quality of strategic intelligence and reinforce its existing sources. Finally, Smits called for the development of an interface between strategic intelligence sources and their users[21]. This programme has yet to be implemented, and our work at GRIS could be seen as reflecting this ambition.

This cognitive approach without a doubt brings us back to the distinction put forward by psychologist and Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman, who refers in his book Thinking fast and slow to two cerebral systems. He describes System 1 as automatic, direct, impulsive, everyday, fast, intuitive, and involving no real effort; we use it in 95% of circumstances. System 2, by contrast, is conscious, rational, deliberative, slow, analytical and logical; we only use it 5% of the time, especially to make decisions when we find ourselves in systems that we consider complex[22]. It is at such times that we have to make the effort to mobilise tools suited to the tasks we are tackling.

This question concerns all strategic intelligence tools, including foresight. Not just because the investments to be made in these fields of research are considerable, but because, often, many of us are unaware of the extent of that which we are unable to understand. All too commonly, we think that what we can see represents the full extent of what exists. We confine ourselves to the variables that we are able to detect, embrace and measure, and have a considerable capacity to refuse to recognise other variables. We know that this syndrome of WYSIATI (‘what you see is all there is’) is devastating: it prevents us from grasping reality in its entirety by making us think that we are in full command of the territory around us and the horizon. As Kahneman puts it, ‘You cannot help dealing with limited information you have as if it were all there is to know’ [23].

This flaw – and there are others – should encourage us to join forces to cross methodological and epistemological boundaries and work to create more robust instruments that can be used to design more proactive and better-equipped public policies.

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

[1] A first version of this paper was presented at the Liège Business School on September 28, 2016.

[2] Paraskevas CARACOSTAS & Ugar MULDUR, Society, The Endless Frontier, A European Vision of Research and Innovation Policies for the 21st Century, Brussels, European Commission, 1997.

[3] ‘(…) By applying the principles of intentional analysis associated with phenomenology to the experience of time, Gaston Berger substitutes for the “myth of time” a temporal norm, an intersubjective construct for collective action. His philosophy of knowledge is thus constituted as a science of foresight practice whose purpose is normative: it is oriented towards work on values and the construction of a political project; it is a “philosophy in action”.‘ Chloë VIDAL, La prospective territoriale dans tous ses états, Rationalités, savoirs et pratiques de la prospective (1957-2014), p. 31, Lyon, Thèse ENS, 2015. Our translation.

[4] On la prospective territoriale, representing an encounter between the principles of foresight and those of regional development, see the reference to the DATAR international conference in March 1968. Chloë VIDAL, La prospective territoriale dans tous ses états, Rationalités, savoirs et pratiques de la prospective (1957-2014)…, p. 214-215.

[5] Günter CLAR & Philippe DESTATTE, Regional Foresight, Boosting Regional Potential, Mutual Learning Platform Regional Foresight Report, Luxembourg, European Commission, Committee of the Regions and Innovative Regions in Europe Network, 2006.

http://www.institut-destree.eu/Documents/Reseaux/Günter-CLAR_Philippe-DESTATTE_Boosting-Regional-Potential_MLP-Foresight-2006.pdf

[6] Ph. DESTATTE & Ph. DURANCE eds, Les mots-clefs de la prospective territoriale, p. 43, Paris, DIACT-DATAR, La Documentation française, 2009.

[7] Ph. DESTATTE, Evaluation, prospective et développement régional, p. 381, Charleroi, Institut Destrée, 2001.

[8] Ph. Destatte, What is foresight ?, Blog PhD2050, May 30, 2013.

https://phd2050.org/2013/05/30/what-is-foresight/

[9] René-Charles TISSEYRE, Knowledge Management, Théorie et pratique de la gestion des connaissances, Paris, Hermès-Lavoisier, 1999.

[10] Guy GOERMANNE, Note de réflexion, Tentatives de rapprochement entre la prospective et l’intelligence stratégique en Wallonie, p. 7, Brussels, August 2016, 64 p.

[11] Henri MARTRE, Philippe CLERC, Christian HARBULOT, Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises, p. 12-13, Paris, Commissariat général au Plan (Plan Commission) – La Documentation française, February 1994.

http://bdc.aege.fr/public/Intelligence_Economique_et_strategie_des_entreprises_1994.pdf

[12] ‘The notion of economic intelligence implies transcending the piecemeal actions designated by the terms documentation, monitoring (scientific and technological, competitive, financial, legal and regulatory etc.), protection of competitive capital, and influencing (strategy for influencing nation-states, role of foreign consultancies, information and misinformation operations, etc). It succeeds in transcending these things as a result of the strategic and tactical intention which is supposed to preside over the steering of piecemeal actions and over ensuring their success, and of the interaction between all levels of activity at which the economic intelligence function is exercised: from the grassroots (within companies), through intermediate levels (interprofessional, local), up to the national (concerted strategies between different decision-making centres), transnational (multinational groups) or international (strategies for influencing nation-states) levels.’ H. MARTRE, Ph. CLERC, Ch. HARBULOT, Intelligence économique et stratégie des entreprises…, p. 12-13. Our translation.

[13] Strategic intelligence can be defined as a set of actions designed to identify, implement, disseminate and protect information in order to make it available to the right person, at the right time, with the goal of making the right decision. (…) Strategic intelligence applied to public policy offers a variety of methodologies to meet the requirements of policy-makers. Derived from Daniel ROUACH, La veille technologique et l’intelligence économique, Paris, PUF, 1996, p. 7 & Intelligence économique et stratégie d’entreprises, Paris, Commissariat général au Plan (Plan Commission), 1994. – Alexander TÜBKE, Ken DUCATEL, James P. GAVIGAN, Pietro MONCADA-PATERNO-CASTELLO eds, Strategic Policy Intelligence: Current Trends, the State of the Play and perspectives, S&T Intelligence for Policy-Making Processes, p. V & VII, IPTS, Seville, Dec. 2001.

[14] Ibidem, p. IV.

[15] Günter CLAR & Ph. DESTATTE, Mutual Learning Platform Regional Foresight Report, p. 4, Luxembourg, IRE, EC-CoR, 2006.

[16] Ruud SMITS, The New Role of Strategic Intelligence, in A. TÜBKE, K. DUCATEL, J. P. GAVIGAN, P. MONCADA-PATERNO-CASTELLO eds, Strategic Policy Intelligence: Current Trends, p. 17.

[17] Domenico ROSSETTI di VALDALBERO & Parla SROUR-GANDON, European Forward Looking Activities, EU Research in Foresight and Forecast, Socio-Economic Sciences & Humanities, List of Activities, Brussels, European Commission, DGR, Directorate L, Science, Economy & Society, 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/forward-looking_en.html – European forward-looking activities, Building the future of « Innovation Union » and ERA, Brussels, European Commission, Directorate-General for Research and Innovation, 2011. ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ssh/docs/european-forward-looking-activities_en.pdf

[18] ‘Strategic Intelligence is all about feeding actors (including policy makers) with the tailor made information they need to play their role in innovation systems (content) and with bringing them together to interact (amongst others to create common ground).’ Ruud SMITS, Technology Assessment and Innovation Policy, Seville, 5 Dec. 2002. ppt.

[19] A. TÜBKE, K. DUCATEL, J. P. GAVIGAN, P. MONCADA-PATERNO-CASTELLO eds, Strategic Policy Intelligence: Current Trends, …

[20] Innovation Union Information and Intelligence System I3S – EC 09/06/2011.

[21] R. SMITS, The New Role of Strategic Intelligence…, p. 17. – see also R. SMITS & Stefan KUHLMANN, Strengthening interfaces in innovation systems: rationale, concepts and (new) instruments, Strata Consolidating Workshop, Brussels, 22-23 April 2002, RTD-K2, June 2002. – R. SMITS, Stefan KUHLMANN and Philip SHAPIRA eds, The Theory and Practice of Innovation Policy, An International Research Handbook, Cheltenham UK, Northampton MA USA, Edward Elgar, 2010.

[22] Daniel KAHNEMAN, Thinking fast and slow, p. 201, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.

[23] D. KAHNEMAN, Thinking fast and slow, p. 201.

Les lumières de l’Elysette

6 janvier 2018

Démocratie, Federalism(e), Gouvernement

3 Commentaires

Namur, le 6 janvier 2018

Depuis août 2017, une importante transformation s’est réalisée au premier étage du siège du gouvernement wallon à Namur et plus particulièrement dans les locaux qui servent de bureaux au nouveau ministre-président et à son équipe rapprochée. Une animation nouvelle est apparue qui a troublé l’image figée que donnait ce décor depuis près de dix ans. Les portes-fenêtres qui donnent sur le balcon se sont ouvertes, laissant entrevoir des va-et-vient qui succèdent ainsi à l’immobilité qui s’était installée sous les deux ministres-présidents précédents. Plus visible encore, avec l’automne puis l’hiver, pour ceux qui se déplacent sur le quai de Meuse que constitue l’avenue Baron Louis Huart, l’Elysette, de l’autre côté du fleuve, s’est illuminée et cette lumière, continue à veiller assez tard, tout comme le président du gouvernement de Wallonie qui y travaille.

Deux changements paraissent être intervenus. D’une part, le président de l’Exécutif exerce sa responsabilité à temps plein, et ce depuis Namur. D’autre part, le gouvernement marque son intention d’exercer ses prérogatives en pleine souveraineté.

Gouverner la Wallonie est une responsabilité qui doit s’exercer à temps plein

Le constat pourrait paraître banal. Il ne l’est pas. Absorbé par son grand intérêt pour son territoire de la Wallonie picarde puis, après 2011, par ses autres responsabilités de président du gouvernement de la Communauté Wallonie-Bruxelles, le ministre-président Rudy Demotte avait rompu avec cette volonté concrétisée depuis Jean-Maurice Dehousse et Bernard Anselme d’ancrer le pouvoir wallon à Namur. Absorbé par d’autres préoccupations locales – la situation dégradée de Charleroi appelait un bourgmestre très présent – ou par des tâches qui lui semblaient plus valorisantes, Paul Magnette n’aura, lui non plus, de 2014 à 2017, jamais vraiment donné l’impression d’occuper les lieux, autrement que ponctuellement, au rythme du Conseil des ministres ou de l’agenda parlementaire.

Or le redéploiement de la Wallonie nécessite de disposer d’un capitaine à plein temps, ce que symbolise aujourd’hui la permanence des lumières de l’Elysette.

Cela nous réjouit fortement et le mettre au crédit du ministre-président Willy Borsus, dont on sait depuis longtemps qu’il est un travailleur assidu et déterminé, ne constitue pas une flagornerie de début de mandat. Il s’agit plutôt d’une réelle occasion de rappeler une vérité d’importance : gouverner la Wallonie est une responsabilité qui doit s’exercer à temps plein.

Ce pouvoir doit s’exercer pleinement là où il est ancré sur le plan politique.

Ancien secrétaire d’État à la Réforme des institutions à l’époque du Pacte d’Egmont, le ministre Jacques Hoyaux, qui présida l’Institut Destrée, a souvent souligné à quel point la localisation des institutions est importante, considérant qu’élues, élus et fonctionnaires ne réfléchissent pas de la même manière et ne comprennent pas les intérêts wallons de la même façon, s’ils sont au travail à Bruxelles ou en Wallonie [1]. De même, dans la République, souligne-t-on souvent que les députées et les députés sont des élus nationaux et non locaux, et qu’on ne gouverne pas la France depuis sa circonscription. Comment pourrait-il en être différemment en Wallonie, même dans un polycentrisme politique des grandes villes-capitales, dès lors que le Parlement, incarnation de la démocratie représentative et même souvent délibérative, est au confluent de la Meuse et de la Sambre ?

Certes, la question de la localisation des partis politiques reste problématique. Si nous savons l’importance qu’ils jouent dans le fonctionnement multiniveaux du fédéralisme belge, nous devons bien constater qu’un seul d’entre eux a son siège à Namur et que l’habitude de tenir des bureaux ou comités dans la capitale politique régionale semble – pour autant que nous puissions en juger de l’extérieur – relever de la rareté.

La cohérence entre le débat sociétal, l’espace médiatique, l’exercice des démocraties représentatives et délibératives, la décision politique, sa mise en œuvre par l’Administration et les opérateurs pertinents doit être assumée au grand jour, les dispositifs étant localisés, même dans une société de plus en plus numérique. Nous dirions que c’est surtout dans celle-là que, étant aux commandes, une personnalité politique élue ne peut être partout et donc nulle part. Dit autrement, la décision politique wallonne ne peut être un spectre qui se promène la lanterne à la main entre le boulevard de l’Empereur, l’avenue de la Toison d’Or, la rue des Deux Églises, et je ne sais quelle autre chapelle.

Je le répète : que le pouvoir exécutif wallon nous paraisse actuellement localisé clairement à l’Elysette, à quelques centaines de mètres du Parlement de Wallonie, nous réjouit. Mieux, une passerelle devrait bientôt encore rapprocher ces deux institutions majeures, les renforçant mutuellement au cœur de Namur Capitale.

Exercer ses prérogatives en pleine souveraineté

Le pouvoir régional doit également s’exercer pleinement sur le plan de l’initiative et de la responsabilité politique. Bien que depuis longtemps adepte de la co-construction des politiques collectives ou publiques, promoteur de la gouvernance démocratique par les acteurs et du Partenariat pour un Gouvernement ouvert, nous ne pouvons comprendre un discours comme celui qui valoriserait un soi-disant « modèle mosan ». Ce flou conceptuel s’est révélé comme un modèle vide dans lequel le gouvernement abandonne aux partenaires sociaux son pouvoir d’impulsion par rapport à la mise en œuvre de politiques régionales. Ce modèle a abouti à devoir constater une incapacité de décider et d’agir du politique dans une Wallonie qui nécessite toujours les réformes de structure appelée jadis de leurs vœux par les renardistes. Et je ne parle bien sûr pas d’anticapitalisme, mais de ce fédéralisme qui, comme le revendiquait le leader de la FGTB dès les années 1950, bannirait le chômage de la Wallonie [2].

On reste en effet abasourdi par le mea culpa d’un ancien ministre-président lorsqu’il confie que, lors de son arrivée à l’Elysette, il avait dans l’idée de tout changer – ce qui nous apparaissait alors bien nécessaire [3] – mais que sa consultation avec les partenaires sociaux l’en a dissuadé parce que les outils mis en place, notamment le Plan Marshall, fonctionnaient bien [4]. Que la concertation empêche le politique d’agir quand il faut agir constitue, de toute évidence, une dérive du système, en particulier quand la plupart des indicateurs sont au rouge et que les enjeux de long terme sont clairement identifiés. Même s’ils doivent être respectés, les interlocuteurs sociaux – patronat, indépendants et classes moyennes, syndicats de tout poil -, pas plus que les autres acteurs, n‘ont pas à gouverner à la place des élues et des élus ni à empêcher leurs initiatives. Sauf à verser à nouveau dans un conservatisme et un immobilisme qui marginalise plus fortement encore la Wallonie en Europe et dans le monde.

Un renouveau tellement nécessaire

Or, le temps passe, et les législatures et les mandats de ceux qui n’ont pas su redéployer la Wallonie sont définitivement expirés. Les échecs d’hier ne constituent nullement la garantie des succès de demain. La Wallonie n’appartient à aucune organisation syndicale ni à aucun parti politique : ne doutons pas que, par de nouvelles configurations, demain sera construit différemment d’aujourd’hui.

Si les fenêtres se sont rouvertes, si les lumières se sont rallumées à l’Elysette, c’est le signe d’une nouvelle volonté de dialogue et de travail communs déjà ressentie, exprimée et entendue dans l’administration wallonne, les entreprises et les organisations. Nombreux sont ceux qui, ces derniers mois, ont souligné que quelque chose de positif se passe, que la Wallonie est en train d’enfin comprendre, mesurer et préparer un renouveau qui apparaît chaque jour plus nécessaire. Celui-ci pourrait, à court terme, prendre la forme d’un projet qui serait concrétisé à moyen terme. Mais, bien entendu, tous les scepticismes sont loin d’être surmontés tandis que certains, à la lecture des résultats du PTB dans les sondages, cultivent à nouveau le vieux rêve du front de gauche wallon et du socialisme dans un seul pays… croyant, par là, pouvoir échapper aux efforts de redéploiement de la Wallonie. Bien entendu, il existe en Wallonie une gauche et un socialisme qui n’ont jamais déserté les intérêts wallons, jamais pratiqué l’imposture ni l’inconstance. Des compagnons et successeurs de Freddy Terwagne et d’Alfred Califice, la Wallonie en aura toujours grand besoin.

Espérons que la mise en œuvre d’un projet concret, fondé sur la recherche, l’innovation et l’entrepreneuriat se réalise rapidement et qu’elle surmonte les difficultés d’un calendrier électoral compliqué autant que de manœuvres politiques qui ne devraient pourtant pas, du moins en théorie, pouvoir peser sur un redressement longuement attendu par les citoyennes et les citoyens. Nous ne rappellerons jamais assez que les échéances sont assez claires pour la Wallonie : en 2024 la loi de financement sortira en effet du mécanisme de transition qui maintenait à un niveau constant les transferts en termes nominaux pendant dix ans. Le financement complémentaire transitoire de compensation diminuera de manière linéaire de 10% par an, jusqu’à disparaître complètement en 2035. Se préparer à cette évolution nous impose d’ajuster nos indicateurs principaux sur la moyenne européenne, ce qui – n’en doutons pas – représente un effort considérable et implique une gestion volontariste et proactive.

La nécessité d‘une réelle gouvernance wallonne qui assume pleinement ses responsabilités face à la population, face aux acteurs sociaux et aux autres niveaux de pouvoir est plus grande que jamais. Cela signifie, comme l’indiquaient des membres du Collège régional de Prospective dans leur appel du 7 mars 2017 [5], l’obligation de concevoir une bifurcation majeure de la Wallonie par laquelle les entreprises produisent suffisamment de valeur ajoutée pour parvenir à une harmonie sociale, rendant confiance et assurant un minimum de bien-être pour toutes et tous.

Ce nouvel élan nécessite également, comme le nouveau ministre-président l’a rappelé à la plupart de ses interventions, qu’un mouvement se déclenche autour de ces idées pour qu’elles soient mises en œuvre collectivement. C’est un mouvement collectif qu’il s’agit d’initier. C’est l’ambition d’un pacte sociétal qui réunisse toutes les forces vives, tous les acteurs volontaristes et entreprenants, dans un effort commun, un engagement puissant qui fasse litière des vieilles rancœurs et place l’intérêt général ainsi que le bien commun au centre des préoccupations des Wallonnes et des Wallons.

Pour que les lumières, qui éclairent désormais l’Elysette, s’allument partout ailleurs en Wallonie.

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

The place of small towns in the Metropolitan Area of Wallonia

5 janvier 2018

Governance, Intelligence territoriale, Territorial Development

Poster un commentaire

Marche-en-Famenne, 6 December 2017 [1]

Contrary to the ideas of those who see cities as the centre of the world, I believe we must gradually abolish the distinction between urban and rural areas through the concept of metropolisation. I see this metropolisation as the ability to connect societies and people with the global economy through the willingness and capacity of players and, of course, the support of digital technologies that allow networking and therefore synergies, complementarities and co-constructions. In fact, with adequate connectivity, understood as accessibility within a network, either physical or virtual, we can trade and work from any location. We can even say that connectivity nullifies the two categories – urban and rural, city and non-city – which together have accounted for all space in the past; these two poles of a relationship that economist Camagni considered as the defining features of human society [2]. This shift obviously takes place in a new economy. The Cork 2.0 Declaration, entitled Activating Knowledge and Innovation pointed out that rural territories should participate in the knowledge-based economy with the aim of making full use of the advances made by research and development [3].

As early as 1994, Bernadette Mérenne already highlighted, with François Ascher, the very close links between metropolisation and the new economic and social context, in an international framework. The professor from the University of Liège already showed how this process brought development, but also social and territorial disparities in that it concentrated the means of development in cities, and even in certain neighbourhoods, to the detriment of other cities or neighbourhoods: this type of metropolisation inevitably creates winners and losers. The geographer thus wrote, metropolisation generates a ternary structure in social groups, lifestyles and value systems: affluent sections in direct contact with the international economy, populations in difficulty often corresponding to those excluded from the new system and concentrated mainly in the metropolitan areas and an intermediate group, not included in the international metropolitan dynamics, but which has managed to find niches allowing them to integrate themselves (local production, leisure economy, etc.) [4]. In addition to these societal disparities, there are also environmental fractures. While historians have long cultivated, with sociologist Max Weber, [5] but also Roberto Camagni [6], the medieval principle of law and old German adage saying that city air makes you free (Stadtluft macht frei), we also know today, even more than in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that this same air kills. And this factor could become decisive in any propensity to locate activities and therefore as a factor of attractiveness. I have often used as a prime example here, ESPON’s map of emissions due to interurban road traffic for its scenarios up to 2030. This work shows that, by this time, Wallonia – and in particular the Famenne and the Ardenne Massif regions – could have major advantages they could exploit [7].

The Small Networked Town

If I take the example of Marche-en-Famenne, whose dynamism has been well described by the president and former minister Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb, the general manager of IDELUX Fabian Collard, as well as the mayor André Bouchat, we can see this small town in different configurations. Thus, we can look at Marche-en-Famenne as an urban centre with a small rural hinterland that provides it with resources and that is structured according to its needs: both its supply and service areas, and the area of influence of its public and private infrastructure, catchment areas, and areas of care, education, training, employment, etc. [8] We can also see Marche as a territory associated with others in an area with a population of nearly 60,000, created in 2007 and called « Pays de Famenne », a network of mayors of surrounding communities that transcend the provincial administrative boundaries of Namur and Luxembourg: Durbuy, Hotton, Marche-en-Famenne, Nassogne, Rochefort, Somme-Leuze. The Destree Institute and, in particular, my futurist colleague Michaël Van Cutsem took on the long-term task of working alongside the dynamic team led by Yves-Marie Peter. We can finally design Marche-en-Famenne as part and one of the nodes of a network of larger cities contributing to a vast network between, on the one hand, Luxembourg – linked to Metz, Nancy, Trier, Saarbrücken, Kaiserslautern, Arlon – and, on the other hand, Liège – linked to Hasselt, Maastricht, Aachen and Cologne. To the north, Namur, capital of Wallonia, opens the way to Louvain-la-Neuve-Ottignies-Wavre, and then Brussels. At these urban nodes, it would be necessary to add infrastructures to connect the space and thus make them factors of metropolisation: examples are the Euro Space Centre in Redu-Transinne with the new business park Galaxia, the Libramont Exhibition & Congress (LEC) at Libramont and its internationally renowned agricultural Fair, or the Bastogne War Museum, which has partnerships with Texas. The purpose of this group is, of course, to participate in the dynamics of the Greater Region of Saarland, Lorraine, Luxembourg, Wallonia and Rhineland-Palatinate. We should remember, of course, that Lorraine has just joined the Grand Est Region on 1 January 2016 by merging with the Alsace and Champagne-Ardenne regions. The metropolitan influence of this Greater Region is considerable: it is on the edge of four European capitals – Brussels, Frankfurt, Luxembourg and Strasbourg – and includes, as the forward-looking exercise Zukunftsbild Vision 2020 has shown, more than 40 universities and colleges, with potential for major education and R & D.

Here we can highlight the idea of innovation gardens, which I have presented elsewhere [9]. This operational model, of Finnish origin, makes it possible to design large integrated spaces that encourage a culture of collaboration rather than competition, by promoting innovation (technological, social – such as circuit courts (short circuits) in agriculture or teleworking and third places for services – and close ties between players and institutions. The examples of Espoo (Espoo Innovation Garden) or Wallonia Brabant are typical. This province constitutes with Braunschweig, in Lower Saxony, and Stuttgart, in Baden-Württemberg, the first European territory (EU28) in terms of Research & Development, mobilising 6% of its GDP. With Inner London and Helsinki, this territory is also the one where the number of higher education graduates is the highest in Europe, more than 41% among 25-64 year olds [10].

Crucial social innovation

In my opinion, building large, networked spaces like metropolitan development areas is crucial social innovation. This idea has not been able to establish itself in Wallonia, like in other regions or States where cities look too much in distorting mirrors and see themselves as smaller versions of Los Angeles or Shenzhen, confusing territorial marketing and a solid project, co-constructed and implemented on the ground. The logic chosen is very often the old one of hierarchical systems, urban frameworks where population and spatial sizes still seem to be the key indicators.

However, the real power of development would be to no longer consider Wallonia as we did in the past, as a large hinterland of external metropolitan areas: Lille, Brussels, the Meuse-Rhine Euroregion and Luxembourg, but as a vast metropolitan area in itself where nothing is really rural or (peri)urban any more, but where everything is largely interconnected both internally and externally. A space which, as Michèle Cascalès wrote, is of territorial excellence because it is supported by the realisation of a common project shared by the majority of actors in a territory so that the global and integrated approach will have to mobilise on a large scale and will require the emergence of a new equilibrium and the establishment of appropriate operating rules [11]. Wallonia has remarkable assets in terms of landscape and quality of life to claim the garden idea. It also has significant disadvantages in terms of innovation, research and development, the quality of education and training, employment and above all mobility and connectivity. But we are working hard on this … I trust.

Thus, the future of these metropolitan areas will lie in our ability to integrate these factors as well as all the players, including dynamic small towns like Marche-en-Famenne, into a common project. This can be done by creating metropolising [12], urban-rural partnerships [13] with the strong ambition of a dynamic policy of development, appeal and economic, social and territorial cohesion.

Philippe Destatte

@PhD2050

About the same topic:

Ph. DESTATTE, Quel(s) rôle(s) pour les territoires ruraux en Europe ?, Blog PhD2050, Couvin, le 31 mai 2017.

Ph. DESTATTE, Métropole et métropolisation : entre honneur archiépiscopal et rêve maïoral, Blog PhD2050, Liège, le 24 novembre 2016.

[1] This text is a copy of my speech given in English during a GFAR/South-North Mediterranean Dialogue Foundation workshop, which took place at InvestSud’s office in Marche-en-Famenne on 6 December 2017, under the chairmanship of Charles-Ferdinand Nothomb on the theme of Small towns in rural territories of the Mediterranean as catalysts of inclusive rural development and migration curbing

[2] Roberto CAMAGNI, Principes et modèles de l’économie urbaine, p. 8, Paris, Economica, 1992.

[3] Cork 2.0, A Better Life in Rural Areas, European Conference on Rural Development, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, Sept. 2016. http://enrd.ec.europa.eu/sites/enrd/files/cork-declaration_en.pdf

[4] Bernadette MERENNE-SCHOUMAKER, La métropolisation, une nouvelle donne ? in Acta Geographica Lovaniensia, vol. 34, 1994, p. 165-174.

[5] Max WEBER, The City, Paris, La Découverte, 2014.

[6] Roberto CAMAGNI, Principes et modèles de l’économie urbaine…, p. 3.

[7] ESPON Project 3.2., Spatial scenarios and orientations in relation with the ESPD and Cohesion Policy, Final Report, October 2006.

[8] Jacques LEVY and Michel LUSSAULT dir., Dictionnaire de la géographie et de l’espace des sociétés, p. 455, Paris, Berlin, 2003.

[9] Ph. DESTATTE, Des jardins d’innovation : un nouveau tissu industriel pour la Wallonie, Blog PhD2050, Namur, 11 November 2016, https://phd2050.org/2016/11/11/ntiw/

[10] My Region, my Europe, our future, Seventh report on Territorial, social and economic cohesion, p. 31 and 37, Brussels, European Commission, Regional and urban policy, September 2017.

[11] Michèle CASCALES, Excellence territoriale et dynamique des pays, dans Guy LOINGER et Jean-Claude NEMERY dir., Construire la dynamique des territoires…, Acteurs, institutions, citoyenneté active, p. 66, Paris-Montreal, L’Harmattan, 1997.

[12] Ph. DESTATTE, Quel(s) rôle(s) pour les territoires ruraux en Europe ?, Blog PhD2050, Couvin, 31 May 2017. https://phd2050.org/2017/06/01/ruraux/